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Foreword
This volume focuses on some of the unique parts of the Commission’s mandate 
concerning historical injustices related to land, socio-economic rights, economic crimes 
and grand corruption. This part of the mandate is unique not because there have been 
no previous investigations into these violations (though some of the violations have not 
been subject to much attention). Nor is this part of the mandate unique because there 
have been no previous commissions of inquiry with respect to them (though many of 
these violations have not been subject to previous commissions of inquiry). Rather, this 
part of the mandate is unique because the Commission is the first truth commission to 
have an express obligation to look at such a broad range of violations, including land, 
socio-economic rights, and grand corruption.  
Because truth commissions in the past have not focused on these violations – though 
some did address them in part in their reports – the Commission was forced to think 
creatively about how to capture the narratives and experiences of Kenyans with respect 
to these violations. Statement takers discovered, for example, that when asked to talk 
about human rights violations within our mandate, most statement givers focused on 
bodily integrity violations (such as killings, torture, massacres, etc.) and most focused on 
the most immediate and traumatic violations they had experienced, which invariably 
were such acts of violence. Yet even in those statements, one can discern elements of 
violations related to socio-economic rights. For example, a woman would testify about 
being raped and then indicate that she was still suffering from the physical and mental 
effects of the rape because she had little or no access to health care facilities.  
Faced with this challenge of eliciting individual experiences, perspectives, and narratives 
with respect to these violations, the Commission undertook a series of focus group 
discussions.  The discussions were led by an individual trained in socio-economic rights, 
and provided an opportunity for a more focused and detailed discussion of such rights 
and their violation in a specific community.  (For more on these discussions, see the 
chapter in Volume 1 on Methodology and Process.)
The first chapter in this Volume, on economic marginalization and violations of socio-
economic rights, addresses an issue that people in each region of the country raised 
with the Commission (economic marginalization), as well as violations that effect at a 
fundamental and profound level, the quality of life available to most Kenyans (socio-
economic rights).  There is no question that at a particular historical moment most Kenyans 
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have perceived their region, or their community, as being the subject of a deliberate 
government policy of economic marginalization. It is also clear that during different 
periods in Kenyan history, some regions of the country benefited more from economic 
development and assistance from the central government than other regions. Despite, or 
perhaps in part because of this, the Commission witnessed areas of under development 
in all regions of the country.  The former North Eastern Province is, for example, a province 
with virtually no tarmacked roads, making travel in the region at the best of times difficult 
and in the worst of times dangerous.  
This was made particularly evident to the Commission when our Acting Chairperson’s 
car hit a particularly bad patch of road and rolled into the adjoining ditch (miraculously 
the Vice Chairperson and those in the car suffered minor injuries).  Yet, the Commission 
experienced dirt roads and treacherous conditions in most of the other regions of the 
country.  While access to water is a particular challenge in the arid parts of the country, 
many residents in all regions of the country have little or no access to clean water.  The 
same, unfortunately, can be said for the other basic necessities of life: shelter; health care; 
food; education; employment; etc. While acknowledging that all parts of the country 
have suffered marginalization at one point in time, the Commission has identified four 
regions that have perennially suffered marginalization: North Eastern and Upper Eastern, 
Coast, Nyanza, and North Rift. 
The second chapter in this Volume focuses on the issue that many identified as the most 
important:  injustices related to land. There is no question that land is at the heart of 
many of the other violations experienced in most parts of the country, and our collective 
failure to “resolve the land question” has continued to fuel the commission of such other 
violations. The Commission does not claim here to provide ‘the’ solution to historical 
injustices related to land in Kenya.  The centrality of the land question to so much of the 
nation’s unity, health, and future appropriately led the drafters of the 2010 Constitution to 
include a permanent commission whose sole focus is on land, and the mandate of which 
includes addressing claims related to historical land injustices. Instead we have provided 
what we hope will be a succinct, yet thorough, description of the current perception of 
land injustices as reported to the Commission, including proposed solutions suggested 
by those most directly involved. 
Lastly, this volume ends with a discussion of economic crimes and grand corruption. 
While most understand land as at the root of many historical injustices, corruption, and 
particularly grand corruption, also has a profound and far reaching effect on the rights 
of Kenyans.  When it is brought to light and made the subject of criminal prosecutions 
or other legal proceedings, the public becomes aware of the extent of such corruption. 
Yet the effects of such corruption in even in the case of those scams made public is 
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harder to see.  Land injustices are often easy to see and experience, as many times they 
involve lack of access to a resource that is visible every day to those who have been 
displaced.  Corruption, on the other hand, involves the siphoning off of public resources 
for private gain. The result is less money for infrastructure, education, and health care. The 
relationship, however, between such corruption and such deprivations is often hard to 
see.  The Commission hopes that the content of this chapter will make it more apparent 
the profound cost the nation is paying through corruption.  Corruption is not just a crime 
that provides an undeserved benefit to a private individual (often an enormously large 
such benefit).  It is a crime that lessens the availability and access to the fundamental 
needs of human life:  food, education, health care, shelter, etc.  In other words, the crime 
of corruption is directly related to the violations of socio-economic rights and economic 
marginalization discussed in the previous chapter.
As with land, the Commission did not attempt to provide ‘the’ solution to the problem 
of corruption. Like land, there is a permanent commission which has as its sole mandate 
the combatting of corruption, including grand corruption. That commission has had its 
own challenges, including political interference by Members of Parliament. Therefore, the 
first step for the government to address the scourge of corruption effectively is to have 
genuine political will to tackle the problem. 
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CHAPTER
ONE
Economic Marginalisation and 
Violation of Socio-Economic 
Rights
Introduction 
1. At the opening of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC)’s 
Thematic Hearing on Economic Marginalisation on 13 February 2012 at the NHIF 
Auditorium, Nairobi, Commissioner Tecla Namachanja made the following remarks, 
which aptly summarise the Commission’s task in relation to the issues of economic 
marginalisation:
Ladies and gentlemen, as you may know, it is almost a year now since the Commission 
started going around the country, listening to individual Kenyans who have 
experienced the violations that this Commission is investigating. Members of the 
Commission have come face-to-face with issues of economic marginalisation. We 
have been to some areas in this country where the people feel that they are not part of 
Kenya. So, we have parts of this country where people consider themselves as coming 
from ‘Kenya Four’, ‘Kenya Three’ and ‘Kenya Two’, and we wonder what is ‘Kenya One?’ 
We have experienced it. They feel so because when you look at issues of infrastructure, 
it is pathetic.
We have come across children taking their lessons under a tree, yet they are expected 
to compete favourably with the rest of students from other parts of this country who 
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are endowed with all the facilities. We have toured places where you cannot get even 
a single tarmacked road in almost the entire county. We have met Kenyans who are 
not internally displaced persons (IDPs), yet they are landless. We have come across 
areas where the residents come from a region which is very productive, but even for 
the crops they produce, there are no factories. The factories are elsewhere.
For those of you who live around Nairobi, I once lived in Madaraka and I used to watch 
fellow Kenyans, especially from Kibera hit the road very early in the morning, very 
energetic, walking to Industrial Area. It would not be until eight in the evening that you 
would see them walking back, very tired. So, they work as hard as their fellow Kenyans. 
However, when you go to Kibera and Mathare, you wonder what conditions give birth 
to people living under such a situation.
We have been in counties where with the creation of counties, there are fears from minority 
groups of continued marginalisation, especially when it comes to sharing leadership 
positions.1
2. This Chapter of the Commission’s report deals with economic marginalisation 
and violations of socio-economic rights. It provides an analysis of the perceptions 
and reality of economic marginalisation. As required by the TJR Act, the Chapter 
documents perceptions of economic marginalization and backs the same with 
facts.
3. In particular, it documents narratives of economic marginalisation relating to four 
regions. The Commission is aware that since the adoption of the Constitution 
of Kenya, 2010, political and administrative units in the country have changed 
fundamentally, and in particular, provinces have ceased to be points of reference, 
both for administrative and analytical purposes. 
4. However, since provinces were the main political and administrative units during 
the Commission’s mandate period, and perceptions of economic marginalisation 
are aligned along these units, it was found necessary to use provinces as its point 
of reference.
5. The four provinces or parts thereof that have been identified in this chapter as 
having suffered economic marginalisation during the Commission’s mandate 
period are as follows: 
 North Eastern (including Upper Eastern) 
 Nyanza
1 TJRC/ Hansard/ Thematic Hearing on Economic Marginalisation and Minorities / Nairobi/ 13 February 2012/ p. 1
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 North Rift 
 Coast
 Western 
6. The choice of these regions was informed by popular narratives relating to 
marginalisation. The Commission then tested these perceptions to establish 
whether they could pass the ‘reality test’, that is, whether in fact these regions are 
economically marginalized. The reality test entailed weighing regional perceptions 
against the extent to which residents of these regions enjoy and access socio-
economic rights. 
7. Valid questions could be posed relating to why the other regions (Nairobi, Central, 
other parts of Rift Valley and Lower Eastern) are not profiled in this report, yet 
economic marginalisation (insofar as it manifests in poverty) is seen as a national 
phenomenon. It is acknowledged that the state of material lack of our people 
that manifests in poverty is indeed a national phenomenon as reflected in the 
Samburu women getting together for a TJRC session.
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information the Commission received. However, it understood its mandate relating 
to economic marginalisation in a much narrower sense, that is, marginalisation as 
understood from inter-regional perspectives. Nevertheless, it is acknowledged 
that even in regions that may not be regarded as economically marginalized, 
perceptions of marginalisation exist.
8. Firstly, some residents of regions that are not profiled here consider themselves 
to have been marginalised at one point or another in history. The Commission 
acknowledges and affirms these perceptions. In the case of Central Province, 
testimonies were received to the effect that the region’s fortunes dwindled under 
the then President Moi, with social infrastructure being degraded and the vast 
majority of elites excluded at the top, at least after the 1982 coup attempt. 
9. A similar narrative to that heard in Central was recounted by residents of Rift Valley 
region, who see themselves as the main ‘victims’ of marginalisation under the 
Kibaki administration, at least as far as appointments to key positions in the public 
service are concerned.
10. Secondly, in its travels around the country, the Commission witnessed poverty all 
over the land. Thus, a sense of marginalisation exists even in regions regarded as 
relatively more endowed in resources than others. In certain regions, there exist 
intra-regional narratives of marginalisation that are blamed on regional and local 
rather than national forces.  This is true of Nyanza, as it is for Central and other 
regions. For instance, in Central Province, residents of Nyandarua, where the 
assassinated leader JM Kariuki hailed from, considered themselves marginalised 
by others within the region.
11. The analysis on Nyanza Province demonstrates that residents of Kuria see their 
counterparts in the broader region as somewhat advantaged vis-a-vis themselves 
and that they (Luo and Kisii) are in some way part responsible for their situation. In 
Western Province, a region that appears to share Nyanza’s political and economic 
fortunes, narratives of marginalisation are not uniform. Evidence shows that certain 
parts of Western that have been close to power, in particular Bungoma and Vihiga 
appear to be the main beneficiaries of the limited social goods due to co-option, at 
least under the Moi regime. It is notable that within these sub-regions, narratives 
of marginalisation do exist.
12. In North Eastern and Upper Eastern, sub-regional claims of marginalisation 
invariably assume an ethnic or clan flavour. For instance, the Commission recorded 
testimony from members of the Ajuran clan who see themselves as victims of the 
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Degodia clan, and with complicity from the Provincial Administration and central 
government. Claims of economic and political marginalisation made by the Ajuran 
- in part due to loss of land to the Degodia - had indeed been the subject of claims 
submitted to the executive and proceedings in the courts for many years before 
the Commission was created.
13. While Lower Eastern is often not regarded as a marginalised at least not in 
popular narratives, this silence (to the extent that it is) obscures shocking levels 
of poverty and lack of social facilities in parts of this region. Cases of drought, 
famine and starvation in parts of Ukambani have become a staple of national 
news and shame. This state of affairs is in part due to policies of marginalisation 
by past regimes. Other than the harsh climatic conditions, the failure by 
successive regimes to take measures to arrest the perennial food insecurity 
situation and enhance access to basic goods such as potable drinking water 
must be acknowledged as a key factor.
14. The South Rift region, in particular the current Kajiado County, presents a curious 
case of economic marginalisation. While Kajiado is perhaps rightly ranked as the 
richest county (based largely on asset-based assessment), its residents have 
some of the lowest levels of access to social goods such as education, health, 
water and sanitation and physical infrastructure such as roads and can rightly 
claim marginalisation. In the Commission’s view, however, this phenomenon 
seems to present a case of mismanagement of resources or outright corruption. 
Resources that could improve the socio-economic condition of locals have either 
not been tapped, or have been diverted to other extraneous issues.
15. This brief summary of trends convinced the Commission that economic 
marginalisation was indeed a national and cross-cutting theme in so far as the 
poor and other disadvantaged groups such as women, ethnic minorities and 
indigenous groups are concerned. Issues related to marginalisation of these 
groups are dealt with elsewhere in this report. This chapter focuses only on 
the regional dimensions of the phenomenon. It is a synthesis of secondary and 
primary data that was available to the Commission. Primary data was drawn 
from statements submitted by or on behalf of victims in the prescribed form; 
testimonies made during hearings (individual and thematic); interviews with 
key actors, personalities and experts; memoranda submitted by individuals and 
groups; and reports of focus group discussions on economic marginalisation 
conducted in January and February 2012 in all the eight regions of the 
country. Secondary sources relied on include academic writings and reports by 
governmental and non-governmental actors or agencies.
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Legal and Conceptual Framework 
Statutory mandate 
16. As already noted, the subject matter mandate given to the Commission by 
Parliament was very broad. It entailed investigating, documenting and making 
recommendations in relation to human rights violations that fall not only in the 
category of civil and political rights, but also violations of what are cumulatively 
and popularly known as socio-economic rights. In relation to socio-economic rights, 
section 5(a) of the TJR Act requires the Commission to ‘establish an accurate, complete 
and historical record of violations and abuses of human and economic rights’. Section 
5(b) continues to provide that it should establish ‘as complete a picture as possible of 
the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights and economic 
rights committed between 12 December 1963 and the 28 February 2008’. Perhaps 
more importantly, section 5(f ) requires the Commission to:
Inquire into and establish the reality of otherwise of perceived economic marginalisation 
of communities and make recommendations on how to address the marginalisation. 
17. In essence, the TJR Act accorded the Commission a clear mandate to deal with 
issues relating to socio-economic rights. While other truth commissions have had 
the chance to look at socio-economic rights, none have been required to analyze 
them in as much depth as Kenya’s TJRC has. The small numbers of truth commissions 
that have looked at socio-economic rights have understandably been limited in 
their scope, given the other violations that they were required to examine.
18. Apart from the Liberian truth commission, none of the other commissions that 
examined socio-economic rights had any explicit mandate to do so. That they 
proceeded to do so is indicative of the reality that human rights violations - civil and 
political rights as well as socio-economic rights - cannot be compartmentalized in 
truth-seeking without compromising the truth itself. As one author has said, ‘not 
only does this compartmentalization oversimplify the relationship between those 
un-redressed legacies (of human rights violations) but it also does not reflect the 
reality of the societies that seek to address them’.2
19. Thus, whether as part of their mandate or because there was simply no way in 
which to compartmentalize human rights violations that took place over a 
significant period of their histories, truth commissions in East Timor, Morocco and 
2 Ruben Carranza ‘Plunder and Pain: Should Transitional Justice Engage with Corruption and Economic Crimes?’ (2008) 2 International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 310 pp. 314-315
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Peru ended up approaching socio-economic violations in ways that were organic 
to their context.
20. In East Timor, the Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation 
(CAVR - the Portuguese acronym), was not explicitly mandated to investigate 
socio-economic rights, but did a credible and comprehensive effort at examining 
violations of these rights not only during the Indonesian invasion and occupation 
of East Timor, but even during the immediate post-colonial period just prior to the 
invasion. The CAVR heard victims’ statements and conducted thematic hearings on 
socio-economic rights violations. 
21. It utilized field and academic research, government and public records, and used 
them to scientifically extrapolate the number of violations and victims that could 
be attributed to socio-economic rights violations.
22. Morocco’s Truth & Reconciliation Commission (IER) made findings regarding socio-
economic rights that were directly and specifically related to both the periods and 
targets of repression by the regime whose rule it was investigating. Consequently, 
the IER had a basis to recommend reparations that were specifically meant to 
respond to socio-economic rights violations committed against eleven (11) named 
regions in the country.
23. The work of Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (in Spanish: Comisión de la 
Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR)) is especially relevant to this Commission. While CVR did 
not have the mandate to investigate socio-economic rights, it arrived at conclusions 
that explicitly and strongly indicated that marginalisation was not only part of what 
took place in the conflict that it examined, but that the victims of physical integrity 
violations in that conflict were already and simultaneously victims of economic and 
social rights violations, and of marginalisation. The Peruvian truth commission said:
The TRC has been able to discern that the process of violence, combined with socio-
economic gaps, highlighted the seriousness of ethno-cultural inequalities that still 
prevail in the country. According to analysis of the testimonies received, 75 percent 
of the victims who died in the internal armed conflict spoke Quechua or other native 
languages as their mother tongue. This figure contrasts tellingly with the fact that, 
according to the 1993 census, on a national level only 16 percent of the Peruvian 
population shares that characteristic…The TRC has shown that, in relative terms, the 
dead and disappeared had educational levels far inferior to the national average. While 
the national census of 1993 indicates that only 40 percent of the national population 
had failed to attain secondary school education, the TRC has found that 68 percent of 
the victims were below this level… The TRC concludes that the violence fell unequally 
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on different geographical areas and on different social strata in the country. If the ratio 
of victims to population reported to the TRC with respect to Ayacucho were similar 
countrywide, the violence would have caused 1,200,000 deaths and disappearances. Of 
that amount, 340 000 would have occurred in the (capital) city of Lima.
24. Thus, by including a clear mandate to analyze socio-economic rights, the drafters 
of Kenya’s TJR Act adopted a modern holistic approach to human rights that did 
not distinguish between bodily integrity rights and socio-economic rights. It 
is an approach that more accurately reflects the reality of people’s lives, seen in 
the testimony of individuals and organizations that allows the Commission to 
more accurately describe the antecedents, circumstances, factors and context of 
violations and abuses.
25. Other than the statutory requirement to focus on socio-economic rights, there are 
several reasons of a historical, practical, and conceptual nature why the Commission 
considered focus on socio-economic rights and economic marginalisation as an 
important element of its mandate. From a historical and contextual perspective, 
violations experienced in Kenya were not limited to those in the category of civil and 
political rights. State action or inaction negatively impacted the economic lives of 
millions of Kenyans in a variety of ways described in different parts of this chapter. 
26. Evidence shows that while the majority of Kenyans may not have been detained 
without trial or subjected to torture and other physical integrity violations, 
government’s exclusionary economic policies and practices in the distribution of 
public jobs and services inflicted suffering on huge sections of society at different 
historical moments. As the Commission traveled the country collecting statements 
and conducting public hearings, the pervasiveness of socio-economic violations was 
evident and have been outlined in several parts of this chapter. It would have been 
odd to ignore this historical reality and the legacy of poverty that lives on today.
27. Indeed, as a function of history, the Commission noted that economic marginalisation 
in the Kenyan context was part of a set of violations or injustices often referred to as 
‘historical injustices’ in popular discourse. 
Conceptual approach 
28. The TJR Act mandated the Commission to investigate, document and make 
recommendations in respect of ‘gross violations of human rights’. The Act provided 
a partial list of what violations met the standard of ‘gross violations’. As discussed 
earlier in Chapter Two, Volume 1 of this report, the Commission defined gross 
violations of human rights to include violations of socio-economic rights. The 
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standard applied in determining whether a violation of a socio-economic rights 
is ‘gross’ depends largely on the structural nature of the violation and the impact 
of the violation (those violations that affect larger groups of people are more 
likely to be considered ‘gross’). However, in this chapter, the gross violations test 
is not applied. 
29. Although the TJR Act, 2008 mandated the Commission to investigate violations 
of socio-economic rights and to make various findings and recommendations in 
this regard, it is worth noting that socio-economic rights were not recognized as 
rights under Kenyan law until the adoption of the new Constitution on 27 August 
2010. Despite the absence of domestic recognition of socio-economic rights, 
Kenya had ratified relevant international instruments that recognized these rights. 
These treaties include the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) which Kenya ratified in 1972 and the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) ratified in 1992.
30. The absence of socio-economic rights in the old constitution, coupled with a 
dualist practice in terms of which international treaties had no direct application 
in Kenya, meant that socio-economic rights were not justiciable and courts were 
not a forum where any socio-economic rights related claims could be adjudicated. 
The consequence was that individuals and groups could not hold government to 
account for failure to meet its obligations undertaken at the international level.
31. Thus, in its determination of the state’s obligation relating to socio-economic 
rights, the approach adopted has been that been that taken by the United 
Nations Committee on Economic and Social Rights (the ESR Committee) in its 
determination of whether the state had. The ESR Committee has clarified the 
nature of a state’s obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
32. The Commission has thus taken into account the ESR Committee’s interpretation 
of these obligations, in particular through its General Comment No. 3 which 
established a ‘minimum core’ of obligations in relation to socio-economic rights: 
A minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum 
essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every state party. Thus, for 
example, a state party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of 
essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or 
of the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations 
under the covenant. If the covenant were to be read in such a way as not to establish 
such a minimum core obligation, it would be largely deprived of its raison d’être. By the 
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same token, it must be noted that any assessment as to whether a state has discharged 
its minimum core obligation must also take account of resource constraints applying 
within the country concerned. Article 2 (1) obligates each state party to take the 
necessary steps “to the maximum of its available resources”. In order for a state party 
to be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its minimum core obligations to a lack 
of available resources it must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all 
resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those 
minimum obligations.3
33. For a truth commission examining violations of economic and social rights, the 
fulfillment by a state of minimum core obligations under the ICESR is not only a 
normative but is also a practical standard. It provides basis for the truth commission 
in question to examine whether, in relation to Article 2(1) of the ICESR, the state 
has ‘take(n) steps … to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realization’ of socio-economic rights. 
34. Using the ESR Committee’s standard in General Comment No. 3 of how ‘progressive 
realization’ should be understood, the Commission has examined whether the 
state has taken those steps ‘within a reasonably short time after the covenant’s 
entry into force’ with respect to Kenya, and whether those steps were taken ‘in a 
deliberate, concrete (way) and targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting the 
obligations’ in the ICESR. 
35. Equally important and particularly relevant to the Commission’s mandate to 
investigate marginalisation is the obligation of the Kenyan state under Article 
2(2) of the ICESR to ‘guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present covenant 
will be exercised without discrimination of any kind’.  This non-discrimination 
obligation, it must be emphasised, is one that must be fulfilled immediately. 
In the words of the ESR Committee, ‘non-discrimination is an immediate and 
cross-cutting obligation in the covenant’.  Article 2(2) requires state parties to 
guarantee non-discrimination in the exercise of each of the economic, social and 
cultural rights enshrined in the covenant and can only be applied in conjunction 
with these rights. Discrimination constitutes ‘any distinction, exclusion, 
restriction or preference or other differential treatment directly or indirectly 
based on the prohibited grounds of discrimination and which has the intention 
or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on 
an equal footing, of covenant rights’. Discrimination also includes incitement to 
discriminate and harassment. The Commission considered whether economic 
marginalisation in Kenya over the period covered by its mandate is the outcome 
3 CESCR, General Comment No.3, paragraph 10
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of discrimination, and whether in itself - apart from the specific violations of ESR 
that comes with it - is a violation of the ICESR.
36. Moreover, the Commission notes that states have three levels of obligation 
in relation to human rights: the obligations to respect, to protect and to fulfill 
provided for under both international law and national law.
37. Firstly, the obligation to respect imposes a negative obligation requiring the state 
to refrain from any measure that may deprive individuals of the enjoyment of their 
rights or their ability to satisfy those rights by their efforts. This type of obligation 
is often associated with civil and political rights (e.g. refraining from committing 
torture) but it applies to socio-economic rights as well. With regard to the right 
to adequate housing, for example, states have a duty to refrain from forced or 
arbitrary eviction. Secondly the obligation to protect requires the state to prevent 
violations of human rights by third parties. 
38. The obligation to protect is normally taken to be a central function of states, which 
have to prevent irreparable harm from being inflicted upon members of society. 
This requires states: (a) to prevent violations of rights by individuals or other non-
state actors; (b) to avoid and eliminate incentives to violate rights by third parties; 
and (c) to provide access to legal remedies when violations have occurred, in order 
to prevent further deprivations.
39. The obligation to fulfill requires the state to actively take measures towards ‘the 
actual realization of rights’.4 With respect to SERs, this obligation could ‘consist 
in the direct provision of basic needs such as food or resources that can be used 
for food (direct food aid or social security)’.5 Some consider that state obligations 
relating to human rights include a fourth level: the obligation to promote. The 
obligation to promote (usually subsumed in the obligation to fulfill) entails actions 
such as ‘promoting tolerance, raising awareness, and ... building infrastructures.6
40. The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 recognize socio-economic rights.7 It also captures 
the aforementioned obligations by stating that the state shall take legislative, 
policy and other measures, including the setting of standards, to achieve the 
progressive realization of the rights guaranteed under Article 43 on economic and 
social rights.8 In addition, the government is required to use maximum resources 
4 The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the  Centre for Economic Rights V Nigeria Communication 155/96 (Hereinafter 
SERAC Case)
5 See SERAC, para 46
6 SERAC, para 46
7 Constitution of Kenya, 2010, sec 43
8 Constitution of Kenya, 2010, sec 21(3)
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available and in an effective and accountable way, to ensure the attainment of 
maximum levels of enjoyment of rights for all. Resources include funds, people, 
skills, good management and other assets.
Definitions
41. While the TJR Act mandated the Commission to inquire into and establish the 
reality or otherwise of economic marginalisation, the Act did not define the term 
‘economic marginalisation’. As such, the Commission had to adopt a working 
definition to guide its work by considering various academic writings on the 
subject in different contexts. 
Marginalisation is the social process of becoming or being made marginal (especially as a group 
within the larger society). ‘Marginality’ is seen in two dimensions: societal and spatial. While 
spatial marginality relates to geography – existence at the fringes, or at a distance from the 
centre – societal marginality ‘focuses on human dimensions such as demography, religion, 
culture, social structure (e.g. caste, hierarchy, class, ethnicity, and gender), economics and 
politics in connection with access to resources by individuals and groups.9
42. For some scholars, the concept of ‘marginality’ is generally used to analyze socio-
economic, political, and cultural spheres, where disadvantaged people struggle to 
gain access to resources and full participation in social life.10 Others define socio-
economic marginality as ‘a condition of socio-spatial structure and process in which 
components of society and space in a territorial unit are observed to lag behind an 
expected level of performance in economic, political and social well-being compared 
with the average condition in the territory as a whole’.11 As such, marginalisation is 
a process that denies opportunities and outcomes to ‘those living on the margins’, 
while enhancing the opportunities and outcomes for those who are ‘at the centre’. 
43. In the Kenyan context, those at the centre would be those in power, those 
connected to power through client-patron networks and those favoured by the 
state in terms of distribution of the benefits of economic development that should 
otherwise flow equitably to all citizens. While in the economic sphere individuals 
and groups could be pushed to the margins by the operation of market forces, 
which is perfectly legal, it is the insertion of the state and its agents in a variety of 
ways to tip the balance in favour of particular groups, or its failure to intervene to 
prevent the pulverization of the vulnerable, that is blameworthy. 
9 See G Gurung & M Kollmair Marginality: Concepts and their limitations (2005)
10 Gurung & Kollmair (n 9 above)
11 L Sommers et al ‘Towards typologies of socio-economic marginality: North/South comparisons’ in H Jussila et al (eds) Marginality in 
space: Past, present and future – theoretical and methodological aspects of cultural, social and economical parameters and critical 
regions (1999) pp. 7-24
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44. Against this background, the Commission adopted the following definitions of key 
terms used in this chapter: 
	 Marginalisation: a process that denies opportunities and outcomes to those 
‘living on the margin’, while enhancing the opportunities and outcomes for 
those who are ‘at the centre’. 
	 Economic marginalisation: a situation that is produced by the process 
through which groups are discriminated directly or indirectly, in the 
distribution of social goods and services. 
	 Discrimination: any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on 
any ground such as race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which 
has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment 
or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.12
45. On discrimination, the Commission looked at both direct and indirect discrimination 
- both those actions committed with the clear intent to discriminate and those 
actions that are not, regardless of their intent, having the effect of discriminating. 
In other words, the Commission adopted both an intent and effects test in 
establishing whether certain conduct (actions or omissions) were discriminatory.
46. Direct discrimination could be instituted by laws or policies in various sectors 
that keep certain groups at the margins. In Kenya, some of the laws that have 
been cited as overtly discriminatory relate to citizenship: as it applied to women 
by denying them the ability to donate citizenship to children borne of foreign 
husbands; and the prohibitive procedures that applied to certain ethnic minorities 
only (e.g. Somalis, Nubians and people from the former Northern Frontier District 
in general).
47. With respect to indirect discrimination, certain conduct, policy or law may 
lack a discriminatory intent, but its application has a discriminatory effect.13 
The removal of the Endorois community from their land to make room for a 
public park to generate foreign exchange for the country is a good example of 
an action that results in indirect discrimination. Regardless of the intent of the 
12 See article 2, CESCR; article 2 ICCPR and article 2 ICERD. See also, Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18 adopted 
under article 2, paras 6 and 7 of the ICCPR; article 1 of Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) which defines discrimination against women as ‘distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has 
the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, 
on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, 
civil or any other field’. See also CERD, General Recommendation 30
13 See Committee on Eliminations of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), General Recommendation 32, para 7
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state, it is clear that the effect of their removal with no or minimal compensation 
had the effect of impoverishing the community. Removed from their lands 
and the source of their livelihoods, members of the community live in extreme 
poverty.14 Perhaps as evidence of direct discrimination, the spread of economic 
development, distribution of social infrastructure and jobs in the public service 
to particular regions vis-à-vis others has over the years tended to coincide with 
occupancy of the presidency by a member of a community from such regions/
communities (and associated regions and communities). This role of the state in 
economic marginalisation is considered in greater detail further below.
48. In looking at economic marginalisation, the Commission also considered social 
and cultural marginalisation because of the complex relationship that exists 
between economic, social and political marginalisation. It agrees with the view 
that economically marginalized groups tend to be socially marginalized as well, 
so that they are disadvantaged with respect to both resources and power.15 In the 
Kenyan context for instance, because minorities have historically lacked effective 
political representation, they by extension, lacked the ability and avenues 
through which to articulate their concerns. In the broader political context, 
the reality of lack of democratic space in Kenya was that, even where there was 
political representation, power was wielded by others in an exclusionary setup. 
For this reason, possibilities for agitation for economic inclusion were largely 
absent.
49. In the Commission’s view, marginalisation combines discrimination and social 
exclusion and is often used interchangeably with ‘social exclusion’. Social exclusion 
is a process by which certain groups are systematically disadvantaged because 
they are discriminated against on some basis.16 This definition emphasises 
discrimination as a marker of social exclusion. While some largely associate social 
exclusion with poverty, other scholars consider that social exclusion is a broader 
concept than poverty, encompassing not only low material means, but the inability 
to participate effectively in economic, social, political and cultural life and in 
some characterizations alienation and distance from mainstream society.17 Social 
exclusion is in fact, ‘a combination of linked problems, such as discrimination, 
unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime and family 
breakdown’.18
14 On the Endorois see Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya, African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (communication 276 of 2003)
15 R Kanbur and L Squire The Evolution of Thinking About Poverty: Exploring the Interactions (1999) pp. 196-206
16 C Gaynor & S Watson, ‘Reducing Poverty By Tackling Social Exclusion’ DFID Evaluation Working Paper 22 (January 2007)
17 K Duffy Social Exclusion and Human Dignity: Background Report for the Proposed Initiative by the Council of Europe, CDPS (1995) 
p.1
18 Social Exclusion Unit (UK DPM Office) Breaking the Cycle: Taking Stock of Progress and Priorities for the Future (2004)
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50. In a nutshell, marginalisation has three dimensions: political, economic and 
social-cultural. In terms of political marginalisation, a group can be regarded as 
politically marginalized because it is disempowered in terms of participation in the 
democratic process and in decision-making. This could be because such a group is 
inadequately represented (despite its numbers) or lack representation altogether. 
Since political empowerment is one of the most important tools for accessing 
other social and economic privileges, such groups lose the ability to access every 
social, economic, and political benefit. People who are socially marginalized are 
deprived of social opportunities. According to Duffy, discriminatory social policies 
and practices have the effect that these individuals, groups or communities have 
relatively limited access to social resources such as education, health services, 
housing, income and work.19 Most marginalized communities are also associated 
with poverty. Poverty is now more frequently defined as a type of ‘social exclusion’.20
Conceptual and practical challenges 
51. While the Commission benefited from a variety of sources in completing this 
Chapter, documenting economic marginalisation presents numerous problems. 
The study of economic marginalisation and inequality is a complex exercise 
involving issues of causality, multiple dynamics and other technical aspects. A 
seminal report on inequality in Kenya identified several issues entwined in studying 
inequality, which is in part produced by marginalisation.21 Firstly, does one look 
at vertical (income) and horizontal (group, regional) inequalities simultaneously? 
Secondly, how are questions of causality and its directions (the role of institutional 
and non-institutional factors in creating opportunities and determining outcomes) 
resolved? Thirdly, how does one measure inequality (whether Gini-coefficient, an 
approach that is used in disciplines such as sociology, economics, and agriculture, 
is a good choice and whether focus on assets-based measurements is ideal)? 
Fourthly, what is the role of international trade in skewing incomes? These 
questions have no straightforward answers. 
52. The Commission, aware of the complex issues involved in analyzing the causes and 
effects of economic inequality and marginalisation, was guided by the TJR Act and 
chose to adopt a more targeted approach focusing on two aspects of economic 
marginalisation: 
	 The role of the state in respect to marginalisation, whether in increasing or 
decreasing inequality; and 
19 See Duffy (n 17 above)
20 D Narayan, R Chambers, MK. Shah and P Petesch, Crying Out for Change: Voices of the Poor (World Bank Publication), World 
Bank Publications, 01 November, 2000
21 SID Pulling apart: Facts and figures on inequality in Kenya (2004)
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	 Inequality between groups and regions (horizontal inequality) rather than 
vertical inequality (income differences within social groups, e.g. the poor and 
the rich). 
53. While the limited presence or absence of a particular group in the formal economy could 
be indicative of economic marginalisation, this chapter goes beyond participation 
in the economy - whether formal or informal - to assess a set of indicators derived 
from socio-economic rights such as health, housing, education, access to land, access 
to food and water, employment (especially state employment) as well as physical 
infrastructure (roads and social amenities).
54. Beyond conceptual problems posed by the notion of economic marginalisation, 
the Commission faced numerous other challenges at a practical level. The 
most challenging related to availability, reliability and quality of data, especially 
financial data relating to state expenditures on social programmes and infrastructure 
over the years in respect to the regions identified as economically marginalized. 
This gap in the data is reflected here.
Women keenly following proceedings during the TJRC’s public hearings in Rumuruti.
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55. Until recently, poverty and health studies or surveys done in Kenya excluded 
certain regions such as North Eastern. For instance, the 2003 Kenya Domestic 
and Household Survey (KDHS) was the first survey in the Demographic and Health 
Surveys (DHS) programme to cover the entire country, including North Eastern 
Province and other northern districts that had been excluded from the prior 
surveys (Turkana and Samburu in Rift Valley Province and Isiolo, Marsabit and 
Moyale in Eastern Province).22
56. In later studies, the reliability of data is questionable in part because the studies 
often do not include rural areas in the region because of the sparse population 
and difficulty in accessing them. To compensate for this shortcoming, the 
few studies conducted often oversample urban areas. The challenges of 
researching North Eastern have been aptly captured by one researcher who, in 
lamenting the difficulty of studying poverty notes that:
The quantitative poverty reports produced in Kenya have varied geographical and 
population coverage. The quantitative reports have emanated from sample surveys 
(rather than censuses), with some covering smallholder households, while others are 
national but normally omit the sparsely populated districts of North Eastern province 
and the North Rift.23
57. The Commission is of the view that the state’s lack of data and collection of data 
in respect to North Eastern and North Rift only perpetuated marginalisation of 
these regions. In other words, the failure to statistically track development in these 
regions pushed them even further to the margins. 
58. The Commission is not the first to lament the failure of successive Kenyan 
governments to collect sufficient data relating to access to socio-economic 
goods. The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights similarly lamented 
the absence of disaggregated statistical data in the initial report submitted 
by Kenya in 2007, making it difficult for that committee to evaluate Kenya’s 
compliance with the international obligations it undertook by ratifying the 
ICESCR Covenant.24  There is also paucity of academic literature on the subject of 
economic marginalisation.25
22 See Kenya Demographic and Health Surveys of 2008 (2009) 6
23 JT Mukui, ‘Poverty analysis in Kenya: Ten years on’ (2005). This is a Study conducted for the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), 
Society for International Development (SID), and Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA)
24 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights considered the initial report of Kenya on the implementation of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (E/C.12/KEN/1) at its 34th, 35th and 36th meetings, held on 6 and 
7 November 2008 (E/C.12/2006/SR.34-36), and adopted, at its 51st meeting held on 19 November 2008
25 Available studies include: reports done by SID Pulling Apart (2004) and Readings on Inequality in Kenya: Sectoral Dynamics and 
Perspectives (2006). See also KIPRA, ‘Inequality, poverty and the environment in Kenya’; Institute for Economic Affairs, Youth Fact 
book (2010)
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Context of Economic Marginalisation
59. According to one commentator, horizontal inequalities - the socio-economic 
and political differentiations based on socio-cultural identities such as ethnicity, 
religion or race - remain the single most important determinant of political 
contests in Kenya, fueling much of the sometimes violent contests during 
elections.26 In his essay, Muhula rightly argues that the socio-economic and 
political inequalities in Kenya are rooted in both historical as well as structural 
characteristics of the Kenyan state. Four major factors account for this: ethno-
regional political patronage; dominance of the Kenyan state; colonial legacy; and 
historical grievances and inter-ethnic rivalries. 
60. Indeed, economic marginalisation experienced by various regions, groups and 
communities in Kenya since independence has occurred in a historical, socio-
economic and political context marked by certain factors. These include: an 
overly centralised state both in terms of power and resources; ethnicisation of 
politics and public life in general; an all-powerful ‘imperial’ presidency marked 
by lack of accountability, lack of judicial independence, weak rule of law and 
personalization of power; bad governance and rampant corruption; a stunted 
economy in which the state was the main dispenser of largesse; and conflicts 
revolving around land with large swathes of the population unable to access this 
important resource. All these evolved against a backdrop of historical irredentist/
secessionist struggles marked by the ‘Shifta War’ and its aftermath in Northern 
Kenya as well as independence claims borne out of perceived marginalisation 
in the former Coast Province. While some of these factors were the root cause 
of marginalisation, they produced distortions that worsened the effects of 
economic marginalisation. Some of these are discussed in turn.
Colonial legacy
61. An important force that has shaped social, economic and political life in post-
independence Kenya is the colonial intervention between 1895 and 1963. 
Politically, it resulted in the implantation of a Westphalia-style state, with a 
constitution designed largely on the traditional liberal model which places 
emphasis on checking state power among the arms of government and comes 
fitted with strong property rights.27 As outlined next, economically, the capitalist 
model introduced by the white settler community would take root in succeeding 
26 R Muhula, ‘Horizontal Inequalities and Ethno-regional Politics in Kenya’ 1 (1) Kenya Studies Review (2007) 85. See also Stewart, 
F ‘Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities’, 28: 3 Oxford Development Studies (2000) 245-262
27 On the design of the post colonial state, see H. W. O. Okoth-Ogendo, ‘Law and Government’ in Kenya: An Official Handbook (1988) 
27-35.
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years with a newly-created African capitalist class playing a significant role. 
Overall, the colonial experience has had a far-reaching impact on our people. 
It is accurate to suggest that the seeds of inequality and marginalisation were 
planted by the colonial administration. 
62. The colonial project was accompanied by, or rather based, on massive dispossession 
of black African communities in Kenya. The Task Force on the Establishment of a 
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission created in 2003 noted with respect 
to the state that: 
[s]ince its creation by the British in 1895, the Kenyan state has largely been a predatory 
and illiberal instrumentality, an ogre defined by its proclivity for the commission of 
gross and massive human rights violations. Little need be said of the colonial state, 
which was specifically organized for the purposes of political repression to facilitate 
economic exploitation.28
63. The loss of lands and livestock by Africans in what was an agrarian society 
through predatory legislative machinery would produce widespread destitution. 
The failure of subsequent governments (in particular the Kenyatta government), 
to correct this injustice by restoring communities to their lands from which they 
had been forcibly evicted by the colonial government can be said to be largely 
to blame for inequities in land ownership and access in many parts of Kenya 
(especially in Central, Rift Valley, Western and Coast provinces).
64. While post-independence governments have had a role in skewing economic 
empowerment in favour of certain ethnic communities, certain communities – 
in particular sections of the Kikuyu community – got a head start by virtue of 
their proximity to centers of settler economy. In addition, as the focus of early 
missionary activity, they had early contact with formal education. Although 
many, as historical inhabitants of the fertile central belt lost their land to the 
white settlers, they would find themselves inserted into the capitalist settler 
economy as farm workers who would later benefit from that experience. 
Among this community would be created a new class of large-scale farmers 
and capitalist entrepreneurs, when in the 1950s the colonial administration 
found it expedient to undertake reforms that created a ‘buffer community’ of 
black landed bourgeoisie between white settlers and the agitating masses.29 It 
is largely from this group that the new capitalists in post-independence Kenya 
would emerge. 
28 Government of Kenya, Report of the Task Force on the Establishment of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (2003) 19
29 On land reforms relating to that period, see S Wanjala (ed) Essays on land law (2000)
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65. The policies of the Kenyatta regime would entrench the economic hegemony of 
the Kikuyu community based on this core group.30
66. There is another reason why apart from the distortions introduced by the colonial 
administration, economic marginalisation took root in post-independence Kenya: 
the preservation of the colonial state beyond the departure of the colonial 
authority through laws, culture and practices. On economic marginalisation, 
the structures that had promoted inequality and marginalisation in the colonial 
period remained in place. In this regard, the regional coordinator for Society for 
International Development, Ali Hersi, gave expert testimony at the Commission’s 
Thematic Hearing on Economic Marginalisation stating:
There was the structure of the colonial state itself and the mechanisms that it put 
in place to prefer certain groups over others. However, with the end of the colonial 
period, issues of inequality did not just go with colonialism. Unfortunately, the first 
government that came into power continued some of those policy choices in the post-
independence era that not only enhanced it but, in many instances, even deepened 
the inequality.31
67. If the post-colonial state internalized the practices of the colonial state, then 
marginalisation experienced in post-independence Kenya is not surprising. This 
is particularly telling because the colonial state has been described rightly as ‘a 
state of exclusion’ in the sense that ‘it divided the society between those who had 
rights of citizenship and those who did not – the urban and the rural respectively’.32 
The problematic economic policies pursued by the post-colonial government are 
discussed in detail below.
Ethnicity
68. The problem of ‘negative ethnicity’ also has colonial roots.33 Other than creating 
and co-opting some local elite through bribery, one method used by the 
colonial government to maintain control was the ‘divide and rule’ approach. One 
commentator has described this approach as ‘the conscious effort of an imperialist 
power to create and/or turn to its own advantage on the ethnic, linguistic, cultural, 
tribal, or religious differences within the subjugated colony’.34 The practices of the 
colonial administration planted the seed for ethnic divisions that was to be further 
instrumentalised by the new rulers in Kenya.
30 See K Kanyinga ‘Governance institutions and inequality in Kenya’ in SID (eds) Readings on Inequality in Kenya: Sectoral Dynamics 
and Perspectives (2006) 345, 347-348 discussing the role of the colonial state in creating capital among the Kikuyu
31 TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Economic Marginalization and Minorities/13 Feb 2013/p. 18
32 Kanyinga (n 30 above) 351 discussing Mamdani’s view of the post colonial state in Africa See Mamdani, M Citizen and the Subject: 
Contemporary African and the Legacy of colonialism (1996)
33 See Chapter One of Volume Three of this Report
34 See generally, Morrock, R ‘Heritage of strife: the Effects of Colonialist “divide and rule” strategy upon the colonised peoples’ 
Science & Society, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Summer, 1973) 129-151 at pp.133-137
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69. In Kenya, evidence tends to show that the distribution of public goods such as 
education facilities, health, water and physical infrastructure has followed patterns 
of access to political power, with Central and parts of Rift Valley that have produced 
the three presidents for the last 48 years enjoying the bulk of economic benefits. 
Favouritism practiced by those in power meant that members of their ethnic 
groups were favoured in the distribution of social infrastructure and employment 
in the public service, creating an exclusionary state. 
70. In the previous constitutional dispensation, which established a ‘winner-takes all’ 
system, the quest for the presidency became a zero-sum game. According to one 
commentator, outcomes shaped competition and a high price would be paid for 
losing because ‘losing almost meant economic ruin, fringe existence or oblivion.35 
Each ethnic community believed that capturing the presidency would guarantee 
almost exclusive access to national resources and public sector jobs, since the 
president controlled their distribution’.36 These practices resulted in inequalities 
and regional imbalances. Such inequalities are manifested in social, economic and 
political exclusion as well as disproportionate access to key services. They are also 
reflected in poverty patterns.37
Centralised state and personalisation of power
71. Both the structure and preeminence of the state in the political and economic 
sphere is central to understanding economic marginalisation in Kenya. Although 
the independence constitution provided for a decentralised federal government 
with checks and balances, its progressive demolition under President Jomo 
Kenyatta produced an overly powerful ‘imperial’ presidency. President Daniel arap 
Moi, who succeeded him, completed the process of centralizing power, eventually 
establishing a legal ban on multi-party politics in 1982. The ban on political parties 
that made Kenya a de jure one-party state was a big blow to development and 
democracy in Kenya. Power was personalized in the president following numerous 
constitutional amendments that strengthened the presidency to the detriment of 
other arms of government and civil liberties.
72. The struggle to hold onto power produced many casualties, with those outside 
power relegated to the fringes of social, political and economic life.38 Due to the 
centralization of power and limited economic opportunities, the state became 
35 M Akech Institutional reforms in the new Constitution of Kenya (2010) p. 12 
36 Akech (n 35 above).
37 Development Policy Management Forum (DPMF), Social Policy, development and governance in Kenya (2009). Report also 
Available at http://www.dpmf.org/dpmf/downloads/Evaluation%20&%20Profile%20of%20Education.pdf See a M B Mutuma Case for 
the Introduction Of Wealth Transfer Tax In Kenya World Bank Policy Paper
38 See GM Musila A Preliminary Assessment of the Kenyan Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Bill, 2008. Pretoria: Institute 
for Security Studies (2008) 40-41 and see generally M Aseka, Transformational Leadership in East Africa: Politics, Ideology and 
Community (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2005) for an exposition on the authoritarian and repressive tendencies of the Kenyatta 
and Moi regimes of government
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the main dispenser of largesse and those unconnected to it through client-patron 
networks were condemned to economic marginalisation. The ensuing struggle 
to control economic production and wealth gave rise to numerous human rights 
violations. It is thus not surprising that since the opening of democratic space in 
the early 1990s, economic issues became central to most victimization accounts 
in Kenya.39
Client-patron relations and corruption
73. Corruption has been cited as one of the three major problems that afflict African 
states, the other two being patronage and tribalism.40 In Kenya, the scourge of 
corruption has followed successive Kenyan governments since independence. 
Corruption has manifested in a variety of ways. The client-patron political 
relationships that formed the basis of the exercise of political power were built 
on and sustained by corruption.41 Mismanagement and misappropriation of state 
resources by political leaders led to the collapse of key state firms established to 
provide important services or to lead the fight against poverty. 
74. In addition, there have been major financial scandals that deprived the state of 
huge amounts of money, and as in the case of the Goldenberg scandal, dealt 
a major blow to the economy. The Goldenberg scandal, which involved the 
facilitation of the exportation of gold and diamonds from Kenya, is estimated 
to have cost the country 10 percent of its GDP under the Moi regime.42 More 
recently, the ‘Anglo-leasing’ scandal in 2005, which in many ways resembled 
Goldenberg and was apparently aimed at marshaling election funds for a 
faction within the NARC government, is said to have lost the country billions of 
shillings.43
Land and economic marginalisation
75. Many commentators and witnesses who spoke to the Commission assert, and 
it is widely acknowledged even in government circles, that one of the main 
problems that has bedeviled Kenya since independence revolve around land.44 
In discussing the colonial legacy, it was noted that the dispossession of Africans 
by the colonial government in favor of white settlers, coupled by the failure by 
39 See Peter O. Asingo, ‘The Political Economy of Transition in Kenya,’ in W Oyugi et al (eds) The Politics of Transition in Kenya: 
KANU to KADU (2003).
40 Bruce J Berman, ‘Ethnicity, patronage and the African state: the politics of uncivil nationalism’ African Affairs (1998), 97, 305-341 at 
306
41 See Part II of this report
42 On the Goldernberg scandal, see Government of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Goldenberg Affair (2005). See 
also, LA Cherotich, Corruption and Democracy in Kenya. (Unpublished MA Thesis, University of Oxford
43 Cherotich (n 42 above) 44.
44 See Kenya Land Policy
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the post-independence government to rectify the injustice, has been one of the 
main sources of economic marginalisation and a trigger of conflict. Dispossession 
of certain communities has left strong feelings of unfair treatment among these 
communities. 
76. As shown in this report’s chapter on land, the Kalenjin and Maasai communities 
feel that they were cheated out of their ancestral land through the resettlement 
programme instituted by the colonial government and later by the Kenyatta 
government. Similar sentiments continue to brew among inhabitants of the former 
Coast province who for a long time have been deprived of their rights. Policies by 
the colonial administration and independence government condemned them to 
near-permanent squatters.45 While accurate data is difficult to come by, the Kenya 
Land Alliance (KLA), a group that has worked on matters relating to land for many 
years and have done various studies has claimed that more than 65 percent of the 
arable land in Kenya is owned by less than 20 percent of Kenyans.46 It is asserted 
that these are largely politically-connected individuals. 
77. For those without access to political power, politically-driven exclusion from 
owning land has bred deep resentment, especially where the political patrons 
and administrators who control access to land are perceived to favour members of 
their own ethnic communities.47
78. With respect to public land, a weak legal regime led to massive ‘grabbing’ and 
misallocation by those legally entrusted with this important asset.48 The vesting in 
the president of powers to alienate public land and to grant title by section 3 of 
the Government Lands Act (Cap 280) became one of the main avenues of theft of 
public land. Under the Agriculture Act, provisions that enabled the Agriculture 
minister to take away land that lies idle and give to ‘others’ to farm provided an 
avenue for the grabbing of prime land owned by the Agricultural Development 
Corporation (ADC).
79. Various studies have shown that Kenya has a complex land regime, yet the 
administrative framework that oversees it is poorly coordinated and gives excessive 
power to administrators without establishing mechanisms to ensure that they 
not only perform their duties but also do not abuse their powers, thus breeding 
corruption in relevant agencies.49
45 K Kanyinga, The Land Question in Kenya Struggles, accumulation and Changing Politics, (1988) Phd Thesis
46 Kenya Land Alliance Draft report of a consultation on land tenure and conflict in Kenya (2008)
47 M Akech Institutional Reforms in the New Constitution of Kenya. Nairobi: International Centre for Transitional Justice (2010) p.24
48 On the illegal and irregular allocation of public land, see Government of Kenya, Report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry 
Into Illegal and Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2005)
49 Akech (n 47 above)
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Historical irredentist/secessionist struggles and state sovereignty
80. The Kenyan authorities have from a historical perspective discriminated against the 
Kenyan-Somalis and Somali refugees. This may be attributed to the long-standing 
conflicts between Kenya and Somalia, and the Kenyan authorities’ reaction to what 
they perceived as a ‘credible threat’ from the North-Eastern Province (formerly the 
Northern Frontier District - NFD). The conflict has its origins in the colonial era when 
the British extended their control to the semi-arid area, acquiring it from the Italians. 
81. New policies established by Britain escalated Somali resistance to British colonialism.50 
During the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference on Kenya’s independence 
(February to April 1962), the thorny issue of Somali self-determination was raised 
by members of the NFD and Somali delegations. The NFD delegation and the 
Somali government, the latter not officially a party to the conference, demanded 
that the NFD question be addressed before Kenyan independence. KANU and KADU 
categorically rejected the secessionist proposal, and some members of KANU issued 
a rejoinder that the Somalis in the NFD could immigrate to Somalia if they did not 
want to accept Kenyan administration. The British government had promised to 
resolve the matter, but later on through the Report on the Regional Boundaries 
Commission, deliberately recommended (not taking into account the fact that many 
of the people in the NFD wanted the region to rejoin with Somalia), that the region 
should be kept within Kenya by simply redrawing regional borders.
82. While massacres (subject of a separate chapter in this Report) constitute a different 
category of violations, its prevalence in the former NFD has some relevance for 
economic marginalisation for at least one reason. As is shown later, massacres in 
this region were often accompanied by wanton destruction of property, livelihood 
sources and houses.
83. The Commission found that there is a perception, at least among residents of the 
former NFD, that the claims of secession by a group of Somalis explains, at least 
in part, how the region and its residents have been treated by government over 
the years. Residents of this region complain of discriminatory laws, regulations, 
practices and procedures that apply to them only and not to other Kenyans. 
84. This is especially so in the area of citizenship and immigration laws. Their 
complaints centred on the fact that they have to produce more documents than 
other Kenyans. The screening exercise of Kenyan-Somalis and their issuance with 
50 O Otunnu Factors Affecting the Treatment of Kenyan-Somalis and Somali Refugees in Kenya: A Historical Overview. Refuge, 
Vol.12, No. 5 (November-December 1992)
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pink cards by the government in November 1989 is also cited as a clear case of 
discrimination. The Commission heard testimony from residents who are unable 
to obtain work because of their inability to obtain identity cards.
85. Information gathered from hearings, investigations and interviews with experts 
(including government officials) led to the conclusion that these claims are 
indeed credible. Residents of the former NFD have in the past been subjected to 
a discriminatory process in the application for national identity cards.
86. Jarso Forole’s testimony discloses a typical story. Speaking on behalf of the 
Inter-Ethnic Consultative Group representing largely all ethnic groups based in 
Marsabit County purposely formed to consult on the historical injustices faced 
by local residents for presentation before the Commission, Forole stated: 
[…] we are facing a dilemma in terms of citizenship. We are suffering. We feel as if we are 
third-class citizens of Kenya. It is as if we do not have equal rights with other Kenyans 
in terms of citizenship and instructions. We face constant scrutiny in terms of national 
registration. I remember that I could not join the university simply because I did not 
have an identity card. I got that identity card in a manner which I ought not to have 
followed. I had to bribe an official at the registration bureau to have my identity card 
issued at Kibera Location. I had applied for the identity card more than two years before 
that date. However, my application would be rejected because there was no conclusive 
proof that I was a Kenyan.51
87. With respect to the Coast province, it has been noted that land tenure issues 
in the 10-mile coastal strip of East Africa are intertwined with the early Swahili 
settlement in the region and the Indian Ocean trade. In Kenya, this area covers 
a strip of land of 1 900km stretching from Vanga in the south coast to the Lamu 
archipelago in the north. Since the conquest by Omani Arabs of the East Coast of 
Africa in 1660 A.D, the ownership of land in this area has changed hands severally 
between the Sultan of Zanzibar, the Imperial British East African Company 
(IBEACO), and later the British and Kenya governments in 1963.52 The British 
recognized the claims of the Sultan of Zanzibar on his 16km coastal strip. 
88. Only the Sultan’s ‘subjects’ (referring mainly to those with some ancestral links 
outside the protectorate) could register land in this area. As a result, up to 25 
percent of the indigenous Mijikenda were turned into landless squatters, unable 
to register the land they had lived on for generations. The Mijikenda are the 
nine ethnic group (Digo, Chonyi, Kambe, Duruma, Kauna, Ribe, Rabaj, Jibana 
51 TJRC/ Hansard/Public Hearing/Marsabit/4 May 2011/p. 11
52 G Wayumba. A Review of Special Land Tenure Issues in Kenya. Department of Surveying, University of Nairobi pp 7- 8
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and Giriama) residing along the coast from the border of Somalia in the north to 
Tanzania in the south.53
89. Although some of the land was adjudicated under the Land Titles Act and 
registered as private land, mostly by ‘outsiders’ and ‘absentee landlords’, the 
prevailing situation is that land occupied by the indigenous Kenyans is still 
held under communal customary tenure, as most of the land has not been 
adjudicated to determine the individual land rights. Further, although several 
settlement schemes have been established over the years by government, they 
have not always benefited the locals. The resulting squatter problem has been 
the source of a deep feeling of injustice. The land tenure issues remains one of 
the most sensitive issues as the local communities feel they were cheated by 
different initiatives. The inability of the locals to use the land on which they 
live for economic purposes has led to extreme levels of poverty. Thus, lack or 
limited government investment feeds an already rooted perception of economic 
marginalisation of the region.54
The Role of The State in Marginalisation
90. One of the specific actions required of the Commission in terms of section 5(a) of 
the TJR Act is to establish ‘an accurate, complete and historical record of violations 
and abuses of human rights and economic rights inflicted on persons by the state, 
public institutions and holders of public office, both serving and retired, between 
12 December 1963 and 28 February 2008’. As previously noted regarding state 
responsibility for human rights, the state can be said to be responsible, whether 
directly or indirectly, in the marginalisation of certain regions, communities and 
groups such as women and ethnic minorities.
91. Other than section 5(a) of the Act, there is conceptual basis and a necessity for the 
focus on the state when discussing responsibility for gross violations of human 
rights. Under international human rights law, the framework of responsibility is 
primarily state responsibility. This means that the obligation to implement human 
rights treaties and to ensure that the rights protected therein are realized belong to 
the state.
92. Under the framework of state responsibility, human rights obligations apply to 
all branches of government (executive, legislative and judicial) and at all levels 
(national and county). The broad role (with illustrative cases) of successive 
53 WRI and Landesa Rural Development Institute. “Kenya. Lesson 3: History of Land Conflicts” in Focus on Africa brief, March 2011 p. 3
54 Wayumba (n 52 above) pp. 7- 8
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governments (the state) in economic marginalisation during the mandate period 
is hereby outlined and sets the stage for the discussion relating to the economic 
marginalisation of particular regions in the next section.
The Kenyan State and economic marginalisation
93. In discussing the role of the colonial administration in creating economic 
marginalisation through a variety of mechanisms, it is noted that the legacy of the pre-
independence situation can be traced to the years before independence because of 
the near wholesale appropriation of the methods, ethos, culture and practices of that 
administration by the post-independence governments. According to the Task Force 
on the Establishment of a TJRC, ‘[i]n spite of the liberal [independence] constitution, 
the post-colonial state was autocratic at its inception because it inherited wholesale 
the laws, culture, and practices of the colonial state’.55
94. While it is true that the post-colonial government adopted an economic policy 
framework based on ‘African Socialism’, which came imbued with values of inclusion, 
human dignity, brotherhood and social justice and could have anchored equitable 
development, certain aspects of the policy, in particular its implementation, carried 
the seeds of inequality and economic marginalisation that would characterize the 
Kenyan state in succeeding years. Other than justifying prioritization of investment 
in certain regions to the exclusion of others, the implementation of the economic 
policy contained in Sessional Paper No 10 of 1965 took a decidedly capitalist slant, 
with a limited welfare component.
95. In addition, the restructuring of the state by the Kenyatta government soon after 
independence did not match, and in fact undermined the vision articulated in the 
economic policy based on African Socialism. The systematic dismantling of the 
independence constitution (abolishing of regional governments, the strengthening 
of the presidency while emasculating parliament and the judiciary) was inimical to 
the stated goals of African Socialism that underpinned economic policy. As at 1966 
when Kenya became a de facto one-party state, the oppressive and exclusionist 
practices of the state largely mirrored those of the colonial state.
96. Evidently, within the Kenyan context, horizontal manifestations of inequality 
(between groups and regions) point to the role of state institutions and policies in 
creating or nurturing inequalities. Both in the political and economic contexts, state 
institutions have played a key role in mediating access to economic opportunities 
and allocating resources.
55 Government of Kenya Report of the Task Force on the Establishment of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (2003) 19.
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97. As noted earlier, economic marginalisation, and by extension horizontal inequality, 
is considered by many as a ‘historical injustice’. According to some accounts, the 
reasons for the permeation of the language of ‘historical injustice’ into the discourse 
on horizontal inequities is not far to seek, but it poses particular challenges. In 
a country where for a long time economic and political power has been heavily 
centralised, where the state appropriated for itself the role of being the agency for 
development, and where politics is highly ethnicised, the hypothesis of unequal 
treatment can be misused.56
98. Therefore, the Commission notes that while its focus is to look at the role of the 
state, there are multiple factors that have produced inequality between regions 
and within regions. Clearly from testimonies made during the hearings, it is 
emphasised that inequalities do exist even within regions regarded as relatively 
advantaged over others. For anyone studying horizontal inequality, the challenge 
is to identify with clarity elements of that inequality that are attributable to the 
state. Nevertheless it is clear that economic marginalisation by the state can 
take place in various ways, through the diverse institutions, legislation, policies, 
administrative arrangements, and regulations and practices.
99. The practices of the colonial administration, mostly through its ‘divide and rule’ 
strategy planted the seeds of inter-ethnic rancour, but also set off a process that 
would produce economic marginalisation. One aspect that is worth discussing is 
how those policies determined the outlook and position of certain regions within 
the economy. 
100. When discussing the role of indigenous capital in the economy, one commentator, 
cites several writers and posits that the colonial state facilitated the accumulation 
of Kikuyu capital in ways that placed an elite group of the community in a position 
to dominate economically in later years. It is asserted that:
[p]rior to independence, state-led initiatives played significant roles in promoting the 
formation of the Kikuyu capital and therefore laying the basis of ethnic inequalities. 
Proximity to the capital city Nairobi and the White Highlands scheduled for the 
white settler economy provided the Kikuyu with opportunities for investment and 
accumulation of capital, which other groups could not have.57
101. The apparently advantaged position occupied by certain members of the 
community, did not change at independence, adds the commentator:
56 On this issue, see Society for International Development (SID), Introduction to Readings on Inequality in Kenya (2004).
57 Kanyinga (n 30 above) 347.
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[t]he post-colonial state framework nevertheless simply facilitated further accumulation of 
Kikuyu capital in both finance and agricultural sectors. Thus, Central Kenya, the heartland 
of the Kikuyu, evolved from the colonial period far more advanced than others.58
102. Although the impact of marginalisation of other large groups and the implications 
of capitalist development were not addressed in the initial analysis of the Kenyan 
political economy, both phenomena contributed to growing regional disparities 
and inequalities in development.59
Sessional Paper No. 10: African Socialism as the anchor of economic policy
103. The Commission takes the firm view that in post-independence Kenya, the 
seeds of economic marginalisation of certain regions were planted by the first 
formal economic blueprint, Sessional Paper No. 10 titled ‘African Socialism and 
its Application to Socialism’ published in 1965.  The purpose of the policy paper 
was to outline both the theory and practical application of African Socialism to 
economic planning. 
104. As Tom Mboya - evidently one of the main ideological architects of Sessional Paper 
No 10 written while he was Economic Planning and Development minister explained 
-, the adoption of the philosophy of ‘African Socialism’ was a necessary measure to 
anchor the newly- independent state, both in economic and political terms. 
105. Writing in 1963, two years before the Sessional Paper No. 10 was published, Mboya 
justifies resort to the philosophy of African Socialism as a choice driven by the 
need to respond to contextual demands in African society:
Africans are struggling to build new societies and a new Africa and we need a new 
political philosophy - a philosophy of our own - that will explain, validify and help to 
cement our experience.60
106. Having narrated the travails of newly independent African states and the need to 
transition from colonialism on a firm philosophical basis that was authentically 
African, Mboya offered his understanding of African Socialism, which would later 
reflect in Sessional Paper No 10. He noted that:
[w]hen I talk of ‘African Socialism’ I refer to those proven codes of conduct in the 
African societies which have, over the ages, conferred dignity on our people and 
afforded them security regardless of their station in life. I refer to universal charity 
which characterized our societies and I refer to the African’s thought processes and 
58 Kanyinga (n 30 above) See also Rothschild, D ‘Ethnic inequality in Kenya’ Journal of Modern African Studies 7:4 (1969) pp. 689-711
59 Kanyinga (n 30 above )  348
60 Tom Mboya, ‘African Socialism’ Transition No. 8 (March, 1963) pp.17-19
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cosmological ideas which regard man, not as a social means, but as an end and entity 
in the society.61
107. Sessional Paper No 10 identified several objectives that are of relevance to the 
issue of economic marginalisation. It noted that newly independent Kenya placed 
particular emphasis on the following objectives: political equality; social justice; 
human dignity including freedom of conscience; freedom from want, disease, 
and exploitation; equal opportunities; and high and growing per capita incomes, 
equitably distributed.62 The policy expressed that applying African Socialism to 
economic planning was the best framework of achieving the stated objectives.
108. The policy noted that African Socialism was based on two African traditions: 
political democracy and mutual social responsibility. Political democracy implied 
that each member of society is equal in his political rights and that no individual 
or group would be allowed to exert undue influence on the policies of the state. 
The state can never become the tool of special interests, catering to the desires of a 
minority at the expense of the majority. Accordingly, the policy contained a pledge 
to the effect that ‘the state … [would] represent all of the people and would do so 
impartially and without prejudice’.63 Mutual social responsibility was regarded as ‘an 
extension of the African family spirit to the nation as a whole … it implies a mutual 
responsibility by society and its members to do their very best for each other’. The 
state acknowledged that it bore an obligation ‘to ensure equal opportunities to all 
its citizens eliminate exploitation and discrimination and provide needed social 
services such as education, medical care and social security.’64
109. One of the main forces that drove the adoption of the policy was to respond to 
equity demands, mainly from the black African population and thus to address 
race related discrimination and exclusion within the economy. While Africans were 
restricted to native reserves, the white settlers occupied fertile swathes of land all 
over the country. Moreover, Africans performed most of the unskilled jobs, while 
Europeans held many of the management, professional, and higher technical posts 
in the public and private sectors. 
110. For their part, Asians thrived and dominated middle-level clerical, technical and 
commercial positions. The category of Asians refers essentially to Indians, most 
of who initially came to East Africa (more accurately brought in by the British 
at the end of the 1800s) to work on the Kenya-Uganda Railway. Later, they had 
61 As above. 
62 Sessional Paper No.10, para 4
63 Sessional Paper No. 10, para 8
64 Sessional Paper No. 10, para 11
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established themselves in business. In a segregated system, Asians were second-
class citizens (with Africans at the bottom). They had better opportunities across 
the board. Unlike Africans, their children had access to better education. Before 
independence, some could attend school with Europeans, which was the best 
education one could get.
111. It is against this background that Sessional Paper No. 10 was developed. 
President Kenyatta, when introducing the Sessional Paper, noted with regard 
to the adoption of African Socialism – a philosophy that had already been 
contained in the ruling party KANU’s manifesto – that ‘[o]ur [the government’s] 
entire approach has been dominated by the desire to ensure Africanisation of 
the economy and public service’.65
112. Writing in 1970, Rothschild described the state of affairs inherited by the 
independence government that provoked African claims for greater opportunity 
at independence:
Whereas the statistics on Europeans in the key occupational groups showed 42 percent 
in professional and managerial posts and 17 percent in technical and supervisory posts, 
those for the Asians were 23 percent and 4 percent respectively and for Africans were 
approximately one per cent in the two categories combined. As to the distribution of 
earnings, a similar lopsided pattern was evident; in 1962, the small Asian and European 
communities earned £46.8m in a total annual wage bill of £88.8m. In the private sector, 
29 percent of the regularly employed European males earned more than £1 800 per 
annum and another 29 percent earned between £1 200 and £1 799. Comparative 
statistics for the other communities showed 18 percent of Asian males earning £720 
and over, and one per cent of the African.66
113. The Africanisation programme therefore targeted a range of sectors: education 
(requiring 50-50 enrolment in schools previously the preserve of Europeans and 
Asians); agriculture (introducing state involvement in several areas including 
breeding; land transfers, a resettlement programme that entailed buying land 
from non-Africans and resettling Africans on a willing-seller-willing-buyer basis; 
providing access to finance; promoting creation of cooperatives and training) 
and; public service (affirmative action to increase numbers of Africans).67
114. While the policy articulated the right principles: social democracy entailing equal 
rights of participation and mutual social responsibility (which not only entailed 
65 Sessional Paper No. 10, p. 1.
66 Rothschild, D ‘Kenya’s Africanisation Programme: Priorities for Development and equity’ 44:3 The American Political Science Review 
(1970) 737-752 738 citing Kenya Population Census, 1962, Vol. III (Nairobi: Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 
1966) at 45-52 and Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstract, 1965 (Nairobi: Ministry of Economic Planning and Development)
67 Sessional Paper No 10, para 82
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social justice but also an obligation on the government to intervene in favour of 
the disadvantaged), there were serious flaws that laid the foundation for economic 
marginalisation in later years, building as well on a number of distortions that 
existed in society.
How Sessional Paper No. 10 fostered economic marginalisation 
115. It is the Commission’s considered view that the post-independence government 
largely got the broad ideological framework and the fundamentals of economic 
policy right. In particular, the policy correctly expressed the state’s obligation 
thus:
The state has an obligation to ensure equal opportunities to all its citizens, eliminate 
exploitation and discrimination, and provide needed social services such as education, 
medical care and social security.68
116. However, there are several elements that transformed the policy into a facilitator of 
economic marginalisation rather than a mitigator of inequality. Firstly, although it 
was recognized that land was previously owned communally with access regulated 
through membership in a particular group (clan, ethnic group), Sessional Paper No. 
10 asserted that a system of secure private title to land was necessary to anchor 
economic growth. Yet, the diversity of claims (that included communal title that 
governed property in most communities in the pre-colonial era) as well as the 
effects of dispossession during the colonial period does not appear to have been 
taken into account. Private individual title was the only recognized title through 
laws adopted soon after independence. This became one of the main reasons why 
the Sessional Paper No 10 was heavily criticized.
117. Expressing surprise (in respect to non-recognition of communal title to land), 
one of the most vehement critics of the policy decried the fact that ‘one of the 
best African traditions is not only being put aside … but even the principle is not 
being recognized and enhanced’.69  Those who testified during the Commission’s 
hearings or made written submissions on issues related to pastoralists and 
economic marginalisation blamed the land tenure system for many ills 
experienced by communities because of the non-recognition of communal land 
tenure. Describing the dispossession that pastoralist communities have suffered 
over the years, Michael Tiampati, who testified before the Commission on behalf 
of Pastoralist Development Network of Kenya noted:
68 Sessional Paper No 10, para 11
69 See for instance, Barak H Obama, ‘Another critique of Sessional Paper No. 10’ East Africa Journal, July 19 26-33 at 29 expressing 
surprise (in respect to non recognition of communal title) that ‘’one of the best African traditions is not only being put aside but even 
the principle is not being recognized and enhanced’
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There is also the aspect of land tenure. In these areas, essentially most pastoralists 
do not own land individually; they own them on communal basis. Management is 
through traditional institutions, but individualization of land ownership has come to 
undermine these principles and has also brought about problems.70
118. Acknowledging serious abuses that occurred under the land tenure system 
since independence, Chapter Five of the 2010 Constitution recognizes three 
categories of land holding, including communal land. The other two are public 
land and private land. This is partial justice for communities that have suffered 
dispossession and other injustices because of non-recognition of communal 
title since 1963. The Commission is of the view that appropriate measures must 
be taken under the Constitution to address and correct injustices that have 
occurred under the previous land regime that excluded communal form of land 
ownership.
119. The resettlement programme undertaken under Sessional Paper No. 10 was similarly 
problematic. The resettlement programme operated on a willing-seller-willing-buyer 
basis, a policy which subsequently condemned many to perpetual landlessness.71 
While it is difficult to access accurate data, it is often anecdotally suggested that 
there are hundreds of thousands, of squatters and landless people in the country, 
largely concentrated in the former Coast and Rift Valley provinces.72
120. It is the Commission’s view that in part because of the deep-rooted distortions 
introduced in society by the colonial dispensation and in particular the widespread 
destitution created by policies of dispossession and selective empowerment, newly-
independent Kenya would have needed a period of adjustment after independence 
to correct the ills of colonialism and address inequalities before introducing a 
capitalist market with limited state intervention in social programming. 
121. Unfortunately, the structures that had promoted inequality and marginalisation in 
the colonial period remained in place, as an expert witness noted:
There was the structure of the colonial state itself and the mechanisms that it put 
in place to prefer certain groups over others. However, with the end of the colonial 
period, issues of inequality did not just go with colonialism. Unfortunately, the first 
government that came into power continued some of those policy choices in the post-
independence era that not only enhanced it but, in many instances, even deepened 
the inequality.73
70 TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Economic Marginalization and Minorities/13 Feb 2013/p. 28
71 Sessional Paper No 10, paras 28-31
72 See Chapter on Land in this Volume of the Report. 
73 TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Economic Marginalization and Minorities/13 Feb 2013/p. 18
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122. In part because of the injustices visited on our people by the colonial administration, 
the post-independence government should have taken concrete measures not 
only to restore rights of the dispossessed, but also to institute measures that would 
have corrected existing imbalances in order to place different sections and regions 
in society on an equitable footing as the country embarked on constructing itself 
after the end of colonial administration. Investment policies should have aligned 
to at least these two objectives.
123. With respect to land for instance, rather than commercializing resettlement 
that skewed access in favour of those who had money or could access loans, 
resettlement should have been anchored on restoration of rights. This would entail 
assessing the claims of those forcibly removed from their land and restoring them 
to it while finding alternative settlement in cases where for a limited number of 
reasons - third-party interests, sustainability in the use of resources - restoration to 
specific land was impossible.
124. Those who presented their views on the question of historical land injustices to 
the Commission appeared aware that remedying such injustices would not entail 
restitution of land in all cases, especially where third-party interests are involved. 
Speaking on behalf of Pastoralist Development Network of Kenya, an organization 
that seeks to push for the integration of pastoralist issues in the national 
development agenda, Michael Tiampati reiterated the practical solutions to land 
injustices that have been made in the past by various aggrieved communities:
At the Bomas Conference on the new constitution, I heard pastoralists say that: You do 
not need to carry your skyscrapers in Nairobi and leave our land. You have the skyscrapers 
because they work for you, but what is there that is benefitting us? So you do not need to 
carry the skyscrapers from Nairobi and leave land in order to address historical injustices 
with regard to ancestral land. The question to address is what we want. If the takeover 
was by the settlers, yes, a case was raised during the Lancaster House Conference. They 
said that they wanted to buy back the land from the settlers who had developed on that 
land. That did not come to be. Those are some of the painful issues that will have to be 
addressed. They cannot be addressed in a hushed tone. They have to be addressed in 
an open and transparent manner so that everybody accepts whatever wrong that was 
done. We need to ask the question the Swahili way: Kosa limefanyika, tufanyeje? 74 (A 
mistake has been made, how do we correct it?)
125. Secondly, the implementation of the Africanisation programme – which was 
aimed at increasing African representation in various sectors including education, 
industry and public service – also left much to be desired. One commentator has 
74 TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Economic Marginalization and (n 73 above) p. 35
35
Volume  I IB    Chapter O N E 
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
noted that among the deliberate actions undertaken by political elites between 
1964 and 1970 that ‘undermined the liberal democratic constitution and the 
values it underpinned’ was the blatant ‘ethnic and nepotistic approach to the 
Africanisation of the public service’.75
126. As shown below in the regional assessments, the perception that over the years, the 
composition of the public service or at least the higher echelons has mirrored the 
regional extraction of the president is widely held. And while the Commission was 
unable to access complete data on the composition of the public service over the 
years, some tables and figures are included at the end of this section that point to 
this phenomenon.
127. In addition, while the philosophy that underpinned the economic policy (African 
Socialism) appeared to reject both Western capitalism and Eastern communism - 
pragmatically preferring to locate Kenya in the middle by adopting a non-aligned 
stance during the Cold War divide - in practice, the manner in which African 
Socialism was applied followed a decidedly capitalist path, with Kenya remaining 
non-aligned in political terms only. Elements of the policy that would have 
anchored a welfare state such as provision of social services like education, health 
and social security remained unimplemented. This was explained in the policy on 
grounds of lack of resources and skilled human resources. 
128. The Commission asserts that the elements of the policy of African Socialism that 
include social justice, equity and ‘brotherhood’ could have anchored a welfare 
state had this path been chosen consciously. As has been shown by the experience 
of many western liberal democracies, a welfare state is not incompatible with the 
tenets of a capitalist economic orientation.
129. Equally, with respect to affirmative action, the Africanisation programme that 
sought to address absence of Africans in the public service and various sectors of 
the economy soon after independence should have been implemented in a more 
inclusive manner, and with due regard to issues of diversity. 
130. From a historical perspective, it is partly the turn to the West and unbridled 
capitalism that was one of the main sources of the rift and subsequent fallout 
between President Kenyatta and Vice President Oginga Odinga in 1966. While 
the socialist Odinga urged that the government should look East for inspiration, 
President Kenyatta opted for capitalism and the West. While the conflict was 
partly ideological, Odinga had accused President Kenyatta of ‘betraying those 
75 C Odhiambo-Mbai ‘The rise and fall of the autocratic state in Kenya’ in W Oyugi (eds) The politics of transition in Kenya: From 
KANU to NARC (2003) 59.
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who struggled for a nationalist, inclusive cause’. The departure of Odinga from 
government, his banishment and the sidelining of his supporters would cement 
the liberal economic policies only three years after independence. 
131. Thirdly, and perhaps more importantly, the deliberate decision expressed in the 
policy to prioritize investment into ‘high potential regions’ to the exclusion of ‘low 
potential’ ones is key to economic marginalisation of the regions profiled here. The 
policy stated at paragraph 133 of Sessional Paper No. 10 reads as follows: 
One of our problems is to decide how much priority we should give in investing in 
less developed provinces. To make the economy as a whole grow as fast as possible, 
developmental money should be invested where it will yield the largest increase in net 
output. This approach will clearly favour the development of areas having abundant 
natural resources, good land and rainfall, transport and power facilities and people 
receptive to and active in development. 76
132. Many who made representations to the Commission identified this investment 
policy as the root of inequity and economic marginalisation of certain regions. 
According Ali Hersi, the policy paper left the colonial structures of inequality intact:
[T]his policy paper did not deconstruct the colonial logic that led to basis for inequality 
by advocating a discriminatory policy investment of government resources. 
133. Part of the problem was that what constituted ‘high potential’ areas was defined very 
narrowly. Paragraph 133 of Sessional Paper No. 10 stated that development would 
be directed to areas having abundant natural resources, good land and rainfall, 
transport and power facilities and people receptive to and active in development. 
These happened to be areas previously designated as ‘White Highlands’, largely 
in Central and parts of Rift Valley regions. The effect of the narrowly defined ‘high 
potential area’ has been that any area that cannot grow certain crops is considered 
wasteland more or less. Testimonies, including those from participants in FGDs 
countrywide were very critical of the state’s historical preference for cash crop 
farming to the detriment of livestock keeping that is the mainstay of the economy 
in arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) regions classified as ‘low potential’. 
134. The ASALs constitute about 80 per cent of the country’s land mass and it is home to 
about 10 million people. Noting that the policy excluded and led to the neglect of 
pastoralist areas and productive economic activity, Abdikadir Kaaru Gullet stated:
The Sessional Paper No. 10 of Kenya of 1965 clearly distributed the resources of Kenya to 
regions considered to be high potential areas. The benchmark for high potential areas is 
agricultural land producing coffee, tea or pyrethrum or cash crops. That is where Kenya 
76 Sessional Paper No 10, para133
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distributed its resources. Northern Kenya was not considered as one of the high potential 
areas in terms of livestock and livestock production. In other words, areas that do not 
produce coffee, tea or pyrethrum are considered to be low potential areas with no much 
benefit to the government. Therefore, there is no much need to invest in them in terms of 
education, water and other infrastructure.
135. It is important to note that some regions that would fall into the classification 
of ‘high potential’ areas because they meet at least some of the conditions set 
in Sessional Paper 10 have suffered marginalisation for other reasons. These are 
explored in section three of this chapter. In addition, it is worth noting that the 
view that certain regions, in particular the former ‘White Highlands’ benefitted in 
their entirety from the investment policy is inaccurate. Within these areas, there 
are pockets that benefitted more than others, with some not benefitting at all. An 
expert witness stated:
Over time, it was recognized that there were gaps in this [the policy of prioritizing 
investment in certain areas]. What was intended was that even in these areas that 
were being targeted, the resources did not necessarily go towards ensuring equitable 
development in that area itself. There were groups that benefited a lot more than others.77
136. Where there has been investment in marginalized regions over the years, planning 
has been driven by wrong priorities or by considerations that do not assist the 
intended beneficiaries, in part because decisions have been made in Nairobi. 
Speaking in relation to misplaced investment in certain pastoralist areas, another 
expert witness observed: 
This is what my colleague alluded to in terms of development initiatives for pastoralist 
areas being decided in Nairobi. I do not know whether you went to Laikipia to a place 
called ‘Mugogodo’, where there is a very big cereal store and yet those people do not grow 
any cereals because they are pastoralists. Essentially, you see the level of disorganization in 
terms of planning for certain communities. So, we feel that these are some of the aspects 
that have brought about economic marginalisation.78
137. What is clear is that African Socialism – albeit under a different name, Nyayoism or 
Nyayo philosophy - would remain relevant as an ideological framework continued 
to inform government economic planning and the government’s approach in 
general. Soon after taking over from Kenyatta in 1978, President Moi had declared 
that ‘nitafuata nyayo’ (I will follow the (Kenyatta’s) footsteps) meaning that he 
would ensure continuity of the principal ideals, policies and philosophy pursued 
by Kenyatta.
77 TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Economic Marginalization and Minorities/13 Feb 2013/p. 19
78 TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Economic Marginalization and Minorities/13 Feb 2013/p. 28
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138. The Nyayo philosophy would later be expressed in an acclaimed book by Moi.79 
Critics have argued that the manner in which the philosophy of Nyayoism was 
practiced led Moi to perfect most of the negative practices predominant in the 
closing years of the Kenyatta era, such as neo-patrimonialism and corruption. 80
139. In his communication to the Commission, former President Moi rejects the idea 
that any part of the country was marginalized under his rule. He writes that the 
central plank of his regime was inclusive development:
The biggest agenda of my government was to distribute resources equitably to all 
parts of the country. I cannot agree, even for a fleeting moment, to make reference to 
a so called ‘socio-economic marginalisation’ of any part Kenya, by my government.81
140. With respect to specific regions — Nyanza, Northern Kenya (former NFD) and 
North Rift— that have often dominated narratives on marginalisation in the past, 
Moi cites various projects and the various personalities (especially from Nyanza) 
who served in key positions in his administration as part evidence of inclusion. 
For North Eastern and North Rift, Moi denies marginalisation, while affirming that 
all was done to include Kenyans from those parts of the country. He attributes 
challenges faced by residents of those regions largely to natural causes: 
As the other areas namely Northern Kenya and Rift Valley Province, these areas faced a 
natural drawback of being dry and arid. The speed of development in areas where the 
climate and weather are not conducive cannot be compared to areas where land is arable 
and accessible by road. Despite these natural impediments, my government made a big 
effort to reach our people there, and today, despite all the challenges, the people of the 
dry areas feel as Kenyans, as the rest of the citizens. I created the Reclamation of Arid and 
Semi-arid Lands ministry and appointed Hon Justus Ndotto as its first minister. This was 
one of my attempts to speed up development in the arid areas.82
141. While some initiatives were launched to uplift these regions, especially the ASAL 
regions, it appears that measures taken were both inadequate and in some cases 
inappropriate. Creating structures does not always translate into results on the 
ground. The assertion by the former president that the residents from Northern 
Kenya feel like Kenyans today does not reflect the perceptions recorded by the 
Commission. While expressing optimism that the situation could change under 
the new Constitution, the majority of those who spoke from these regions (as is 
79 For more on Nyayo philosophy, see generally Daniel arap Arap Moi, Kenya African Nationalism: Nyayo Philosophy and Principles 
(1986).
80 Asingo, Peter O ‘The Political Economy of Transition in Kenya,’ in Walter O. Oyugi, Peter Wanyande and Odhiambo Mbai (eds) 
The Politics of Transition in Kenya: From KANU to NARC (2003) 22. See also Kyule, L The Politics of the Independence of Kenya 
(1999) 203 who notes that ‘the scope for criticism and free debate, already limited, was continually narrowed, civil society crippled 
and human rights infringed’.
81 Written Submission by Former President Daniel arap Moi to the TJRC (2012) p.20
82 Written Submission by Former President Daniel arap Moi to the TJRC (2012) p.23
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shown in testimonies in this chapter) categorically stated repeatedly that even 
today, their experiences have made them feel ‘less than Kenyan’, ‘as foreigners’ or 
‘unwanted outsiders in their own country’. 
142. Quite clearly, it appears that President Moi was and remains out of touch with the 
lived realities of Kenyans across the country.
Political power and economic empowerment
143. In part because of the nature of the state (power and resource concentration at the 
centre) and in part because of ethnicity, a clear link can be seen between economic 
fortunes of particular regions and control of political power. Hold onto power 
allowed ethnic elites to accumulate wealth, invariably within the group. In reference 
to the Kenyatta regime, it is noted that ‘power was increasingly concentrated in 
the Kikuyu elite who increasingly excluded elite from other ethnic groups from 
the centre.83 While the Commission is unable to confirm these statements, similar 
sentiments have been expressed at different times with respect to the Moi and 
Kibaki administrations. Concentration of political power in the hands of the Kikuyu 
elite also provided opportunities through which the group could accumulate capital. 
Politics and economy became intertwined. This is a phenomenon that has continued 
to underpin Kenyan politics.
144. The circumstances under which Daniel arap Moi assumed power in 1978 – amid 
jostling among the ruling elite to succeed President Kenyatta – and how his 24-year 
presidency evolved is explained thus: wielding political power meant economic 
prosperity for the ruling group, which can be aptly described in terms coined by 
Joseph Karimi and Phillip Ochieng as ‘The Family’, referring to rather close political 
confidants and business people tied closely to power as opposed to ‘family’, blood 
relatives.84 Throup and Hornsby observe:
Under Kenyatta, the Kikuyu had come to dominate business and commerce, the 
civil service, many of the professions and, of course, politics … with a comparatively 
elaborate communications and power infrastructure, Kikuyu land lay at the heart of 
the Kenyan economy in a way that the Kalenjin areas, the core of President Moi’s new 
coalition, did not.85 
145. Karimi, Ochieng and Asingo recount the intrigues surrounding attempts towards 
the end of Kenyatta’s life by members of ‘The Family’ to undermine the accession by 
83 Kanyinga, (n 60 above) 348; Bates, RH Beyond the miracle of the market: The political economy of agricultural development in 
Kenya (1989)
84 See Joseph Karimi and Philip Ochieng, The Kenyatta Succession (1980)
85 Throup, D & Hornsby, C Multiparty Politics in Kenya (1998) 26-27; Asingo, 23
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Moi, the constitutionally designated heir, to power.86 While rewarding those who 
had supported him among the Kikuyu elite (in particular Mwai Kibaki and Charles 
Njonjo (Kibaki became Vice-President, while Njonjo was retained as Attorney-
General, only to be ousted four years later for alleged links to the 1982 coup 
attempt and his rumoured clandestine attempts to seize power) as the limited 
data available to the Commission shows (see tables at the end of this section), Moi 
found it necessary to create room for the Kalenjin elite not only by expanding the 
patronage network beyond Central Kenya, but also by purging the public service.
146. As Moi embarked on this endeavour of including the Kalenjin, the casualties 
were inevitably Kikuyu. Moi’s response to increasingly critical and ‘uncooperative’ 
Kikuyu elite was ‘swift and economically damaging to the uncooperative Kikuyu 
elite, who began to lose out state-mediated economic opportunities to the Asians 
and a few Kalenjin front-runners’.87 Complaints leveled against President Kibaki 
at the end of his first term and which were expressed to the Commission suggest 
that a similar pattern was repeated, with the main casualties being Kalenjin.
147. Commentators attribute Moi’s recourse to authoritarian rule at the start of the 
1980s – only two or three years after assuming power – to his inability to ‘rule 
through consensus due to the recalcitrance of the Kikuyu elite’. The attempted 
coup in 1982 appeared to remind Moi of the insecurity of his rule and he would 
immediately move to destroy any opposition and to strengthen his hold on 
power. In succeeding years, the Moi regime is said to have attempted to deny 
Kikuyu businessmen opposed to its rule state-mediated economic opportunities 
and instead elected to work with Asian businessmen to undercut what was 
perceived as threat derived from the economic power of this elite.88 Leaders who 
worked closely with the administration are said to have flourished economically.
148. The intersection of politics and power in a context where the private sector remained 
insignificant over the years heightened political competition and increased 
opportunities for conflict over resources because the state had positioned itself as 
the main agency of development and ‘dispenser of largesse’. In the Commission’s 
view, this situation has had particular importance for economic marginalisation or 
inclusion; it meant that economic fortunes of individuals and groups depended on 
their acquisition, holding and wielding power or proximity to it. 
149. Political competition, as noted earlier, became a zero-sum game: win and be 
rewarded, lose and be marginalized, unless you could find some relevance in the 
ruling elite struggles to hold onto power. One commentator notes rightly that 
86 Peter O. Asingo (n 80 above) 20-22; Throup and Hornsby (n 85 above)
87 Asingo (n 80 above) p. 24
88 Asingo, (n 80 above) p.23; Kasfir, N., ed. Civil Society and Democracy in Africa: Critical Perspectives (1998)116
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‘the state became the institution critically necessary for changing the economic 
fortunes of individuals and their ethnic constituencies.89 This struggle in turn led 
to the growth of client-patron political relations on which the political structure 
was constructed. In some degree, this explains why, upon the easing of the 
authoritarian one-party structure, political contest in Kenya has been a violent 
affair from the 1990s.
150. Having identified the three factors that created and strengthened class divisions 
in Marx’s Europe (the concentration of economic power; absolute and unrestricted 
private ownership and; the close relationship between economic power and 
political influence) Sessional Paper No. 10 proposed that the application of African 
Socialism would eliminate these problems, asserting: 
[t]he concept of political equality in Africa rules out in principle the use of economic 
power as a political base. The vigorous implementation of traditional political democracy 
in the modern setting will eliminate, therefore, one of the critical factors promoting class 
divisions. The policy of African Socialism to control by various means how productive 
resources are used eliminates the second of the factors supporting a class system. Without 
its two supporting allies, the concentration of economic power cannot be the threat it 
once was.90
151. It can be argued that although Sessional Paper No. 10 rightly identified the danger 
of concentrating economic power in political hands and pledged to combat it, 
history bears out the fact that there has been complete failure in this regard. Kenya 
is ranked as one of the most unequal countries in Africa. While the Commission 
cannot confirm this, views were expressed that economic power is concentrated 
in particular elites who have held political power at one point or another and 
invariably, some of the richest Kenyans have either been part of the ruling elite, 
senior public servants or businessmen who at one time had a close association 
with power through various networks. This is not to suggest that association with 
power has been or is the sole origin of economic fortune.
152. As shown subsequently, history depicts that there have been clear links between 
politics and economic fortunes/development of ethnic communities and regions 
over time. One indicator that is a good marker of economic marginalisation or 
inclusion is physical infrastructure, in particular roads. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that by the time of Kenyatta’s death in 1978, of all regions, Central Kenya had the 
most well-developed social infrastructure, including roads. These would later 
suffer neglect and deteriorate under Moi, while Rift Valley gained the advantage in 
this regard.
89 Kanyinga (n 30 above) 348
90 Sessional Paper No 10, para 31
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153. Under Kibaki, Central Kenya arguably has the best road network in Kenya with the old 
ones having been replaced and new ones built. While there could be an economic 
rationale, and while it is true that some other regions have seen an improvement 
in part of their road infrastructure under Kibaki (with Northern Kenya getting its 
first tarmac/all-weather road since independence: the incomplete Isiolo-Moyale 
highway), the fact that the first ‘Super- highway (Nairobi-Thika) leads to Central 
Kenya perhaps confirms the links between politics and economic development 
that became a norm in post-independence Kenya. It has been suggested that it is a 
continuation of the flawed and biased policy (contained in Sessional Paper No. 10 
of 1965) that prioritized development of ‘high potential areas’ over ‘low potential 
areas’. 
Instrumentalising ethnicity and patron-client political relations
154.  In reviewing academic literature when attempting to diagnose the problem of the 
post-independence African societies, Berman cites three main issues: patronage, 
corruption and tribalism to which he refers to as ‘the evil triumvirate’.91 Of tribalism, 
he writes as follows:
[o]f the three, ‘tribalism’ appeared to be the underlying basis of the other two, the 
foundation of the power of the ‘Big Men’ and the catch-all explanation in academic 
analysis, as well as the mass media, of catastrophic political failure on the [African] 
continent.92
155. As is evident so far, the relationship between ethnicity and social, economic and 
political opportunities in Kenya has been clearly pronounced over the years.93 
Ethnicity has over the years been manipulated for political and economic gains. 
Because of weak democratic and accountability institutions, the attitude that the 
elite have towards state power (that is to be used towards personal enhancement, 
prestige and social status rather than in the service of some ideal or public good) 
has persisted.94 Political manipulation of ethnicity is almost a tradition in Kenyan 
politics.95 It has been a common practice for politicians and officials to use state 
power and institutions to promote their own interests or those of their ethnic 
groups.96 This is achieved through intimidation, violence and other forms of 
terror against real and imagined enemies.97 Nowhere is ethnicity more at play 
91 Introduced in an article by John Stackhouse titled ‘Are the Big Men Coming Back?’ published in Globe and Mail (Canada) 6 April 
1996
92 Berman, Bruce J ‘Ethnicity, patronage and the African state: the politics of uncivil nationalism’ African Affairs(1998) pp.305-341; 306
93 Ethnic Inequalities in Education in Kenya International Education Journal Vol 5, No 2, 2004 Centre for Development Studies
94 PA Nyong’o State and Society in Kenya (1989)
95 See Kenya Human Rights Commission, ‘Warlord Democracy,’ December 2002
96 PA Nyong’o Popular struggles for democracy in Africa (1987)
97 G Hyden African politics in comparative perspective (2005)
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than in the political arena. Ethnicity has become, not only a basis of political 
support, but also of political marginalisation.98
156. The political class has, since independence been accused of manipulating 
ethnicity in the capture, consolidation and hold onto power.99 Jomo Kenyatta 
built his power base among the Gikuyu, Embu and Meru (GEMA) communities, 
excluding the majority not only from the political, but also from the social and 
economic spheres of the state. Former president Moi, once in power, proceeded 
to consolidate it with the Kalenjin community, resulting in its ethnic domination 
and hegemony over state institutions. The collapse of the National Rainbow 
Coalition (NARC) that swept Kibaki into power only two years into his first term 
was largely due to the exclusion, or perceived exclusion, of non-GEMA players 
who had contributed to Kibaki’s victory in 2002. In the 2007 and 2013 General 
Election, both dominant sides appealed to ethnic bases.
Limiting spread of economic empowerment: Control and selective 
impoverishment
157. According to one author, the heavy reliance of private capital on political patronage 
and state-mediated commercial opportunities for economic advancement tended 
to curtail the scope for a large-scale private enterprise sector. Indeed most of the 
large capitalists who emerged were mainly Kikuyu elites with close links to the 
Kenyatta regime. Their interests had been secured by the formation of GEMA in 
1971. GEMA was created to secure the social and economic interests of Central 
Kenya communities. While Kenyatta was the patron of the organization, leading 
ministers served as officials (Julius Kiano, Mwai Kibaki, Jeremiah Nyagah, Jackson 
Angaine, Maina Wanjigi and Nguret) but were later replaced by businessmen 
notably Njenga Karume and Kihika Kimani to lower the political profile of the 
organisation following public uproar. GEMA is said to have become the main 
vehicle for organizing capital and acquisitions, including land purchases.
158. Commentators note that the state had an interest in maintaining a tight control 
over the size of the private sector. State control over the size, nature and mix 
of the emerging African capitalist class appears to have been hinged on the 
premise that an ‘expansive capitalist class would deprive the political leaders 
of the ability to mobilize economic opportunities and resources for political 
patronage purposes’.100
98 O Juma & M Munene ‘The Colonial Policies of Segregating the Kikuyu’ (2002) 2 International Journal of the School of Social 
Sciences 36
99 O Anthony & J Dan Back to the Future: The 2007 General Election (2007)
100 Kasfir (n 88 above) 112-113.
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A section of a trading center in Northern Kenya.
159. With hindsight, and in the context of client-patronage political relations described 
here and elsewhere, it can be concluded with certainty that the composition of the 
Cabinet appointed by presidents over the years since independence have been a 
good marker of inclusion across several sectors (political, social and economic). 
The tables below reflect the evolution under the administration of the first three 
presidents. 
160. For President Kenyatta, while his first Cabinet reflected a national outlook, there 
would be a dramatic shift only three years after independence, especially after the 
fallout between the President and the Vice-President Oginga Odinga, which would 
intensify in the 1970s as the elite around Kenyatta (largely from his Kiambu turf ) 
consolidated power and plotted Kenyatta’s succession. Five major events would 
punctuate and affect this evolution: the fallout, expulsion, and banishment of Odinga 
from politics (1966);101 an unreported heart attack suffered by Kenyatta (1966); the 
assassination of Tom Mboya (1969); the assassination of JM Kariuki in 1975 (a former 
confidant of Kenyatta from Nyeri who was apparently seen as a challenge to the 
Kiambu group) and; ‘Change the Constitution’ campaign (mounted allegedly to 
prevent the then Vice-President Moi from succeeding President Kenyatta). These 
events were to dictate changes in the Cabinet and government in general as the 
group around President Kenyatta took measures to consolidate power.
101 Odinga would never contest election again until 1992 when multiparty politics was re-introduced. Kenyatta, and subsequently Moi 
would — under the one party rule — deny him and his close allies the opportunity to contest any political seat
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Table 1:  First (Republican) Cabinet in Independent Kenya (1964)
MINISTRY NAME ETHNICITY
President Jomo Kenyatta Kikuyu
Vice-President Oginga Odinga Luo
Justice and Constitutional Affairs Tom Mboya Luo
Attorney-General Charles Njonjo Kikuyu
Finance and Economic Planning James Gichuru Kikuyu
Foreign Affairs (previously State in PM Office) Joseph Murumbi Goan-Maasai
Internal Security and Defence Njoroge Mungai Kikuyu
Education Mbiyu Koinange Kikuyu
Health and Housing Vacated by Njoroge Mungai Kikuyu
State, Pan African Affairs Joseph Otiende Luhya
Agriculture Bruce Mackenzie White Settler
Local Government Samuel Ayodo Luo
Commerce and Industry Julius Kiano Kikuyu
Works, Communications and Powerr Dawson Mwanyumba Taita
Labour and Social Services Eliud Mwendwa Kamba 
Natural Resources Laurence Sagini Kisii
Information, Broadcasting, Tourism Achieng Oneko Luo
Lands and Settlement Jackson Angaine Meru
Home Affairs Daniel Moi Kalenjin
Cooperatives and Marketing Paul Ngei Kamba
Source: State House website (dominion cabinet) with amendments 
by the Commission to reflect the republican cabinet.
161. It should be noted that as Prime Minister during the 6 months ‘dominion status’, 
Kenyatta had appointed a cabinet, largely a Kikuyu-Luo coalition (the two largest 
ethnic groups at independence and the dominant players in KANU). When Kenya 
became a republic on 12 December 1964, changes were made to the constitution 
and new ministries were created (Internal Security and Defence). The cabinet was 
reorganized slightly to consolidate power in Kenyatta’s Kikuyu confidants held 
core ministries in government. Kenyatta would accommodate only two from the 
opposition when KADU (the party of minority tribes dominated by Coastal groups, 
the Kalenjin and Luhya was dissolved). These two were Daniel arap Moi of KADU 
and Paul Ngei of the African Peoples Party (largely a Kamba-dominated party). 
Ronald Ngala (Coast), the leader of KADU who had been left out when the parties 
merged, would be brought into cabinet in 1966 to broaden the political base after 
the sidelining of Odinga and the Luo from government.
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162. Kenyatta would reorganize his cabinet in 1969 (after Mboya’s assassination) and 
again in 1975 (after JM Kariuki’s assassination). Out of a cabinet of 22, there would 
be 7 Kikuyu holding the core ministries of security, energy, finance and foreign 
affairs (he retained his key people from the last cabinet); 2 from their allied 
communities within GEMA (1 Meru and 1 Embu); 2 Luo; 2 from Coast; 2 Luhya; 2 
(Kalenjin); 2 Kisii; 2 Kamba and 1 European.  It is interesting to note that in Moi’s 
first Cabinet: there were 10 GEMA (8 Kikuyu; 1 Embu and 1 Meru); 3 Kalenjin; 3 Luo; 
3 Luhya; 2 Kamba; 2 Kisii; 2 Coast (1 Digo and 1 Taita); and 1 Maasai. In fact, Moi 
had decided to retain all ministers from the Kenyatta Cabinet who won elections. 
Bucking the trend that came to reflect in all post-independence cabinets (where all 
‘power’/’establishment/core ministries of Finance/Economy, Security, Energy and 
Trade/Commerce) have been held by members from the president’s ethnic group 
(or close confidants), only one ministry out of a cluster of 5 was held by a Kalenjin 
(Nicholas Biwott) in 1979. This was to change in later years. 
163. Moi’s last cabinet (January 1998) when he was serving his last term, secured after 
divisive and acrimonious elections, was the perhaps least inclusive (of all his 
governments since 1979). For the first time since independence, there was no single 
Kikuyu or Luo in the cabinet. In the ethnically charged 1997 presidential election, 
while GEMA communities voted solidly for Kibaki (1.9 million) catapulting him into 
second position behind President Moi (2.4 million), the Luo, Luhya and Kamba also 
voted along ethnic lines with Raila Odinga obtaining (660 000), Kijana Wamalwa (500 
000) and Charity Ngilu (400 000) respectively. The only member of the cabinet from 
the GEMA communities was Joseph Nyagah, son of Jeremiah Nyagah from Embu, 
who himself was a long-serving cabinet minister from 1963 to 1992.102
164. The outlook of the last cabinet would change several times over three years as Moi 
maneuvered to muster a winning formula in his succession plan. On 11 June 2000, 
the cabinet was reshuffled when KANU entered a coalition - the first since 1963 - 
with Raila Odinga’s National Development Party (NDP). Raila Odinga and 3 others 
from NDP would join the cabinet but resign in 2002 together with other long-
serving KANU ministers when Moi designated Uhuru Kenyatta as his successor. 
With an eye on the succession, Moi would make further changes to the cabinet in 
November 2001. Having earlier nominated Uhuru Kenyatta to Parliament (he had 
lost the contest in 1997), Moi would elevate him to cabinet, together with several 
other GEMA leaders.
102 It is notable that even with the banishment and exclusion of the Luo politically and economically during Kenyatta’s time, there would 
always be at least single Luo in his Cabinet. During Moi’s time, his contests with Kikuyu elite notwithstanding, Moi would include 
several Kikuyu in cabinet. Kibaki would serve as his VP for 11 years since 1978 when he was succeeded by Karanja, another Kikuyu. 
Karanja would be succeeded by Saitoti. Saitoti, who has rumoured Kikuyu roots would serve for 13 years before his dismissal in late 
2002 just a few months before elections.
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165. One of the main issues around which the coalition cobbled together by Raila 
Odinga mobilized votes in the 2007 presidential elections (and perhaps served to 
heighten chances for the violence experienced after the 2007 elections, was that 
although Kibaki had assumed power on a popular multi-ethnic platform, he had 
reverted to the practices of old by packing government and the public service with 
people from his ethnic origin region. 
166. In part because members of the Kalenjin community had thrived at high levels 
of government under President Moi, they became the main casualty under the 
new administration as Kibaki created room for a new group. Other than historic 
land injustices (largely blamed on Kenyatta and Moi by those who testified), it 
is possible that the disenchantment with Kibaki over perceived marginalisation 
of certain elites would translate into the bitter conflict that transformed the Rift 
Valley into the worst theatre of the post-election violence (PEV) in 2007/2008.
167. The composition of cabinets and other key government positions (shown 
in the tables above and below) appears to reflect the client-patron political 
relations described elsewhere.  But it also, as noted, serves as a relatively good 
measurement of political and economic inclusion. The practices of exclusion 
by successive post-independence governments across sectors would result in 
inequalities and regional imbalances described in part in the following section. 
168. The effects of inequalities attributable to the government are visible today 
in various regions. While poverty is a national problem, overall, economic 
marginalisation is marked by disproportionate burdens of poverty for certain 
regions.
169. According to a report by the Ministry of Medical Services,103 poverty rates in 
2006 were ranked as follows: North Eastern 73.9 percent, Coast (69.7), Western 
(52.2), Nyanza (47.6, Eastern (50.9), Rift Valley (49), Central (30.4) _and Nairobi 
21.3 percent. This reflects, for some regions that have suffered marginalisation 
throughout the independence period, the cumulative effects of economic 
neglect. Specifically, the effects of economic marginalisation include lack of 
social infrastructure and limited or no access to key services such as health 
facilities, schools, food and water, shelter and social welfare.
103 Ministry of Health, Facts and Figures on Health and Health Related Indicators (2008)
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Table 2:  Ethnic composition of the government, 1969
Ethnic group Ministers* Permanent  
secretaries
Assistant  
ministers 
Population, 
1969 census
Kikuyu 7(30%) 8 (38%) 8 (21%) 20%
Luo 3 3 2 14%
Luhya 2 2 8 13%
Kalenjin 2 2 4 11%
Kamba 2 2 2 11%
Gusii 2 2 2 6%
Mijikenda 1 1 2 5%
Taita and Taveta 1 1 0 1%
Meru and Tharaka      1 0 2 5%
Embu and Mbeere      1 0 1 1%
European 1 0 0 0%
Somali 0 0 2 2%
Masaai 0 0 2 1%
Asian 0 0 1 1%
Other 0 0 2 9%
Total 23 21 38 100
*Ministers include the President and the Attorney-General
Source: Hornsby C, Kenya: A History Since Independence (2012) p. 221
Table 3: Last Kenyatta Cabinet (1978)
MINISTRY NAME ETHNICITY
President Jomo Kenyatta Kikuyu
VP and Home Affairs Daniel Moi Kalenjin 
Attorney-General Charles Njonjo Kikuyu
Finance Mwai Kibaki Kikuyu 
State, Provincial Admin. Mbiyu Koinange Kikuyu 
Defence James Gichuru Kikuyu
Foreign Affairs Njoroge Mungai Kikuyu
Local Government Julius Kiano Kikuyu
Agriculture Bruce MacKenzie White
Lands and Settlement Jackson Angaine Meru
Information Jeremiah Nyagah Embu
Health Omolo Okero Luo
Natural Resources William Odongo Omamo Luo
Power and Communication Ronald Ngala Coast
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Tourism J Shako Coast
Social Services and Cooperatives Masinde Muliro Luhya
Commerce and Industry James Osogo Luhya
Education Taaita Toweett Kalenjin
Works James Nyamweya Kisii
Economic Planning Zachary Onyonka Kisii
Source: Constructed by TJRC largely from Hillary Ng’weno’s A Political History of Kenya and DP Aluhwalia’ Post-
colonialism and the politics of Kenya (1996)
Table 4: First Moi Cabinet after the 1979 General Elections
MINISTRY NAME ETHNICITY
President Daniel Moi Kalenjin
Vice-President Mwai Kibaki Kikuyu
Agriculture James Osogo Luhya
Attorney General Charles Njonjo Kikuyu
Basic Education Moses Mudavadi Luhya
Commerce John Okwanyo Luo
Cooperative Development Mathews Ogutu Luo
Economic Planning Zachariah Onyonka Kisii
Energy Munyua Waiyaki Kikuyu 
Foreign Affairs Robert Ouko Luo
Health Arthur Magugu Kikuyu 
Higher Education Joseph Kamotho Kikuyu 
Home Affairs Stanley Oloitiptip Maasai
Industry Eliud Mwamunga Taita
Information and Broadcasting Daniel Mutinda Kamba 
Labour Elijah Mwangale Luhya
Livestock Jeremiah Nyagah Embu
Local government Charles Rubia Kikuyu
Environment and Natural Resources Andrew Omanga Kisii
Social Services and Housing Robert Matano Digo
State, Office of the President James Gichuru Kikuyu
State, Office of the President Nicholas Biwott Kalenjin
State, Office of the President Godfrey Kariuki Kikuyu
Tourism Gilbert M’Mbijiwe Meru
Transport and Communication Henry Kosgey Kalenjin
Water and Development Jonathan Ng’eno Kalenjin
Works Paul Ngei Kamba
Source: Weekly Review, Nairobi 30 November 1979 as cited in DP Aluhwalia (1996)
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Ethnicity of Cabinet Appointments 1963-April 2008
Table 5: Ethnicity of Cabinet Appointments 1963-April 2008
Source:  Hornsby C, Kenya: A History Since Independence (2012) p 221 and 699 (integrated)
Table 5:  Military Heads from 1964-2011
ROLE NAME DATES ETHNICITY
Chief of General Staff Major-Gen. R.B Penfold
Brigadier Joseph Ndolo
Gen Jackson Mulinge
Gen Mahamoud Mohamed
Gen Daudi Tonje 
General Joseph Kibwana
Gen Jeremiah Kianga
Gen Julius Karangi
1966-1969
1969-1971
1978-1986 (retired)
1986-1996
1996-2000
2000-2005
2005-2011
2011 onwards
British
Kamba
Kamba
Somali
Kalenjin -Tugen
Mijikenda
Kamba
Kikuyu
Commander of Kenya Army Maj-Gen Ian Freelend
Brigadier A.J Hardy
Brigadier Joseph Ndolo
Maj-Gen Jackson Mulinge
Lt-Gen John Sawe
Lt-Gen James Lengees
Lt-Gen Daudi Tonje
Lt-Gen Augustine arap Cheruiyot
Lt-Gen Abdullahi Aden
1963-1964
1964-1966
1966-1969
1969-1980
1981-1986
1986-1993
1993-1994
1994-1998
1998-2000
British
British
Kamba
Kamba
Kalenjin-Keiyo
Samburu
Kalenjin -Tugen
Kalenjin - Nandi
Somali
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ROLE NAME DATES ETHNICITY
Lt-Gen Lazarus Sumbeiywo
Lt-Gen Jeremiah Kianga
Lt-Gen Augustino Njoroge
Lt-Gen Jack Tuwei
Lt-Gen Njuki Mwaniki
Lt-Gen John Kasaon
2000-2003
2003-2005
2005-2008
2008-2010
2010-2011
2011 onwards
Kalenjin - Keiyo
Kamba
Kikuyu
Kalenjin
Kikuyu
Kalenjin
Deputy Commander of the 
Army
Col Joseph Ndolo
Lt Col Jackson Mulinge
Col Peter Kakenyi
Brigadier Lucas Matu
Majr-Gen James Lengees
Maj-Gen Daudi Tonje
Maj-Gen Jeremiah Kianga
Maj-Gen Augustino Njoroge
Maj-Gen Jones Mutwii
Maj-Gen Njuki Mwaniki
Maj-Gen Maurice Oyugi
To 1966
1966-1969
1969-n/a
1972-1974
1983-1986 
1986-1992
2000-2003
2003-2005
2005-2008
2008-2010
2010 onwards
Kamba
Kamba
Kamba
Kikuyu
Samburu 
Kalenjin -Tugen
Kamba
Kikuyu 
Kamba
Kikuyu
Luo
Commander of Kenya Air 
Forces
Group Capt Ian Stockwell
Group Capt Fred Rockwell
Group Capt John Edwards
Colonel Dedan Gichuru
Lt-Gen Mahamoud Mohamed 
Maj-Gen Dedan Gichuru
Maj-Gen DK Wachira
Maj-Gen Nick Leshan
Maj-Gen Simon Mutai
Maj-Gen Julius Karangi
Maj-Gen Harold Tangai 
Maj-Gen Joff Otieno
1964-1967
1967-1971
1971-1973
1973-1980
1982-1986
1986-1989
1989-1994
1994-2000
2000-2003
2003-2005
2005 onwards
2011
British
British
British
Kikuyu
Somali 
Kikuyu
Kikuyu
Maasai 
Kamba
Kikuyu
Taita
Luo
Commander of Kenya Navy Commander EMC Walker
Commander Pearce 
Commander Hall
Colonel Jimmy Kimaro
Maj-Gen Simon Mbilu
Maj-Gen Joseph Kibwana
Maj-Gen Aboud Rauf Raouf
Maj-Gen Pasteur Awitta
Maj-Gen Samson Mwathethe
Maj-Gen Ngewa Mukala
1964-1967
1967-1969
1969-1972
1972-1978
1978-1988
1988-1998
1998-2001
2001-2003
2004-2011
2011 onwards
British
British
British
Taveta
Kamba
Mijikenda
Bajuni
Luo
Mijikenda
Luhya
Chief of Staff at MoD Colonel Lucas Matu
Brigadier Peter Kakenyi
1969-1972
1972-1974
Kikuyu
Kamba
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Table 6:  Police and internal security heads, 1969-2008
ROLE NAME DATES ETHNICITY
Commissioner of Police Bernard Hinga
Ben Gethi
Bernard Njiinu
Philip Kilonzo
Shadrack Kiruki
Duncan Wachira
Philemon Abong’o
Edwin Nyaseda
Mohammed Hussein 
1965-1979
1978-1982 (sacked)
1982-1988
1988-1993
1993-1996
1996-1999
1999-2003
2003-2004
2004-2009
Kikuyu
Kikuyu
Kikuyu
Kamba
Meru
Kikuyu
Luo
Luo
Somali
Head of Special Branch James Kanyotu 1965-1991 Kikuyu
Deputy-director of Intelligence Stephen Muriithi 1965-1982 Kikuyu
Head of the GSU Ben Gethi
Peter Mbuthia
Erastus M’Mbijjiwe
Jackson arap Kosgei
Charles Kimurgor
Samson Cheramboss
David Kimaiyo
Lawrence Mwadime
Mathew Iteere
1967-1978
1978-1982
1982-1987
1987-1993
1993-1999
1999-2002
2002-2003
2003-2005
2005-2009
Kikuyu
Kikuyu
Meru
Kalenjin-Nandi
Kalenjin
Kalenjin
Kalenjin
Taita
Meru
Head of the CID Peter Okola
Ignatius Nderi
Noah arap Too
Francis arap Sang
Daniel Ndung’u
Joseph Kamau
Simon Karanja Gatiba
1965-1973
1973-1984
1984-1999
1999-2003
2003-2004
2004-2006
2006-2010
Luo
Kikuyu
Kalenjin-Kipsigis
Kalenjin
Kikuyu
Kikuyu
Kikuyu
Head of the Presidential Escort Unit Bernard Njiinu
Elijah Sumbeiywo
Stanley Manyinya
Charles Kimurgor
Samson Cheramboss
David Kimaiyo
Nixon Boit
Mathew Iteere
Benson Githinji
1964-1980
n/a
n/a
n/a-1993
n/a -1999
1999-n/a
n/a-2003
2003-2005
2005-2010
Kikuyu
Kalenjin-Keiyo
Kalenjin-Nandi
Kalenjin-n/a
Kalenjin
Kalenjin
Kalenjin
Meru
Kikuyu 
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ROLE NAME DATES ETHNICITY
Permanent secretary for internal 
security
James Mathenge
Hezekiah Oyugi
Wilfred Kimalat
Zakayo Cheruiyot
Dave Mwangi
Cyrus Gituai
1983-1986
1986-1991
1991-1998
1998-2003
2003-2006
2006-2008
Kikuyu
Luo
Kalenjin
Kalenjin
Kikuyu
Embu
Head of Military Intelligence Lazarus Sumbeiywo
Wilson Boinett
1986-1988
1988-1990
Kalenjin-Keiyo
Kalenjin-Keiyo
Special Branch/NSIS Head William Kivuvani
Wilson Boinett
Michael Gichangi
1991-1995
1995-2006
2006 onwards
Kamba
Kalenjin 
Kikuyu
Table 7:  Kenyatta’s key Provincial Commissioners
NAME POSITION BACKGROUND
Paul Boit PC Central, Western and 
Nairobi 1964-1980
Kalenjin-Nandi, son of chief
Isaiah Cheluget PC Nyanza Province 
1969-1980
Kalenjin-Kipsigis
Charles Koinange PC Central and Eastern 
1967-1980
Kikuyu from Kiambu, son of Senior Chief Mbiyu 
Koinange’s brother and Kenyatta’s brother-in-law
Eliud Mahihu PC Eastern and Coast 
1964-1980
Kikuyu from Nyeri, colonial administrator and ex-Home 
Guard
Isaiah Mathenge PC Coast, Rift Valley and 
Eastern 1965-1982
Kikuyu from Nyeri, ex-Home Guard and detention camp 
warder
John Mburu PC Coast, North Eastern, 
Nairobi and Western 
1964-1979
Kikuyu from Murang’a
Simeon Nyachae PC Rift Valley and Central 
1965-1979
Gusii, son of Senior Chief Nyandusi
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Table 8:  Senior Kikuyu parastatal Heads in the 1970s
NAME ROLE BACKGROUND
Ephantus Gakuo Director-general of East African Railways (later Kenya 
Railways), 1967-1970s
Murang’a
Bethwell Gecaga Chairman, Industrial Development Bank, 1976-1979 Murang’a
Julius Gecau Managing director, East Africa (later Kenya) Power and 
Lightning Company, 1970-1984
Kiambu
James Karani Gitau General Manager, Kenya National Trading Corporation, 
1969-1979
Kiambu
Stanley Githunguri Executive chairman, National Bank of Kenya, 
1976-1979
Kiambu
Charles Karanja General manager, Kenya Tea Development Authority, 
1970-1981 
Kiambu
John Matere Keriri General manager then managing director, 
Development Finance Company of Kenya, 1972-1982
Kirinyaga
Peter Kinyanjui Chairman of East African Harbours Corporation (later 
Kenya Ports Authority), 1970-1980
Kiambu
John Michuki Executive chairman, Kenya Commercial Bank, 
1970-1979
Murang’a
Philip Ndegwa Chairman, Agricultural Finance Corporation to 1974 Kirinyaga
Matu Wamae Executive director, Industrial and Commercial 
Development Corporation, 1969-1979
Nyeri
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Profile and Status Report of Economically 
Marginalized Regions and Communities 
North Eastern and Upper Eastern
There is one half of Kenya about which the other half knows nothing 
and seems even to care less.
Leslie Farson, describing the Northern Frontier District (NFD).
Before we started the session, the National Anthem was sung. I want 
to tell you that we have never been part of the National Anthem. 
The National Anthem talks of justice, fellowship, awareness, good 
life, abundance, among other things. These things have never been 
experienced in this region. In totality, I can say that we have never been 
part of this country.104
Testimony of a Somali Elder in Garissa
One thing that surprised me was how a soldier, a government officer, the 
president of this republic, who equally took the oath of allegiance that 
he would protect the interests of his people, would persecute his own 
people for 40 years and show no regard for their human rights.105
Testimony of a witness in Wajir 
Background 
170. This part of the report relates to economic marginalisation of what was previously 
known as the Northern Frontier Districts (NFD). The NFD consisted of Upper 
Eastern Province (Marsabit, Moyale and Isiolo) and the former North Eastern 
Province that consisted of four districts namely Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Ijara. 
These three have now been consolidated into three counties: Garissa, Mandera 
and Wajir, with Ijara having been subsumed into Garissa County. North Eastern 
has primarily been inhabited by ethnic Somalis, Garre/Garri and the Sakuye/
Boran while in Upper Eastern there are the Boran, Rendille, Gabra, Burji, Somalis, 
Garri/Garre, Turkana and Samburu.
104 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Garissa/ 14 April 2011/ p.3
105 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Wajir/ 18 April 2011/ p.5
56
Volume IIB    Chapter O N E  
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
The law and economic marginalisation
171. The marginalisation of the North Eastern region is marked by four key 
developments: the carving off of the NFD; the enactment and application of 
separate laws to the region; the Shifta War (1963 to 1967) waged by separatist 
ethnic Somali forces and; the application of discriminatory development 
policies by post-independence governments. The marginalisation of the 
communities in the former NFD, who are largely pastoralists, goes back to the 
colonial era.106 
172. During both the colonial and post-independence administrations, the government 
enacted several laws targeting only the North Eastern region. First, largely driven 
by security concerns, the Outlying District Ordinance of 1902 declared the Northern 
Frontier District (NFD), made up of Wajir, Mandera, Ijara, Garissa, Isiolo, Moyale and 
Marsabit districts, a closed area.
173. This meant that movement in and out or the region was only possible when using 
a pass. This had the effect of cutting off the area from the rest of the country 
not just physically, but also in terms of policy implementation. Coupled with a 
government policy of neglect, these laws and others enacted later created what 
can be regarded as a ‘Kenya of two halves, not just in terms of security but also in 
terms of development.
174. Residents attributed the closure of the NFD to the rest of the country and the 
imposition of a separate legal regime by the colonial administration to security, 
economic and religious concerns. Ali Dubat Amey, an elder who testified before 
the Commission, summarises these sentiments as follows:
This NFD was ruled differently by the white man. We had two different sets of laws. 
Nobody could go out of NFD to other parts of Kenya. This resulted in us being 
segregated, isolated and being kept away from other Kenyans. It was done for two 
reasons: One, the white man wanted to protect the Asian businessman. They knew 
Somalis were very aggressive businessmen, so they were protecting the Asians and 
the white men who were helping them colonize this country. The other thing they 
were protecting is that they knew the Somali were Islamic evangelists. We could easily 
convert Kenyans, who were mostly traditionalists. So, they created a buffer zone.107
106 For readings on NFD, see Taya Weiss, Guns in the borderlands: Reducing the demand for small arms ISS Monograph No 95; 
Onguje, P. Wild Barrel, Incompatible Regimes: The case of violence in Isiolo Central Division. Nairobi: PeaceNet, 2002; Ahmed 
Issack Hassan, Legal Impediments to the Development in Northern Kenya. A paper presented at the Consultative Meeting for 
Members of Parliament in Naivasha, Kenya 22-23 August, 2008.
107 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Garissa/ 14 April 2011/ p. 3
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The development divide: A country of two halves
Source: KHRC Foreigners at home: The Dilemma of Citizenship in Northern Kenya, p. 20
175. The Special Districts (Administration) Ordinance of 1934, together with the Stock 
Theft and Produce Ordinance of 1933, gave the colonial administrators ‘extensive 
powers of arrest, restraint, detention and seizure of properties of what was 
described as hostile tribes’.  This provision also introduced the possibility of using 
excessive force on residents. These powers were often abused when government 
operations were carried out. 
176. The preamble of the Stock Theft and Produce Ordinance provided that the 
purpose of the law was ‘to provide for the recovery of fines imposed on Africans 
(including Somalis) for the theft of stock or produce by levy on the property 
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of the offender or his family, sub-tribe or tribe’. This provision appears to have 
legalised collective punishment of ethnic communities and constitutive clans 
for the offences allegedly committed by their members, once the Provincial 
Commissioner declared such a tribe hostile. 
177. At independence, the government enhanced, rather than diminished the 
discriminatory and oppressive laws applying to Northern Kenya. Collective 
punishment previously applied by the colonial administration remained 
a common feature of the post-independence governments’ dealings and 
operations in Northern Kenya. Some of the serious episodes of gross human 
rights violations such as the ‘Wagalla Massacre’ described elsewhere in this 
report fit this collective punishment mould. 
178. One resident of the region, Abdikadir Kaaru Gullet summarises their sentiments 
in this regard:
The legislation which led to this life of marginalisation and gross violation of human 
rights under the seal of the law is explained here. In other words, the independent 
government of Kenya subjected its citizens to retrogressive colonial legislation that 
was inherited by our independent government of Kenya just to punish the citizens 
of Northern Kenya. The colonial legislation eventually became the Kenyan law.
179. Indeed, many of the laws remained in force after the departure of the colonial 
master. For example, the Restricted Districts Ordinance of 1902 became Cap.103 of 
the Laws of Kenya. This Act, as its predecessor, declared Northern Kenya a closed 
district, meaning that that movement in and out of the district was prohibited and 
was only possible with a special permit. Under section 127 of the independence 
constitution, the president was granted powers similar to those previously 
exercised by the governor-general of ruling the northern region by decree. This 
was in addition to the 1934 law whose continued application was recommended 
by the Committee on the Bill of Rights at the Lancaster House constitutional 
talks.108 Three subsequent amendments to the independence constitution 
strengthened the legal regime applicable to the region. 
180. First, the third amendment to the constitution reduced the parliamentary 
majority required to approve a declaration of a state of emergency from 
a two-thirds majority to a simple majority.109 It also extended the period 
after which a parliamentary resolution must be sought from 7 to 21 days. 
Declaration of the state of emergency was made valid for three months 
instead of two. 
108 KHRC, Foreigners at home: The dilemma of citizenship in Northern Kenya p. 21
109 Third Amendment, Act No.14 of 1965. 
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181. Second, the fourth amendment extended the president’s power to rule the 
NEP by decree to districts outside the NFD. These districts, described as 
‘outlying districts’, are Marsabit, Isiolo, Tana River and Lamu.110 These ‘outlying 
districts’ would later be included in the Indemnity Act of 1970 that was aimed 
at providing immunity to security officials and government officials from 
criminal and civil liability related to the ‘Shifta War’. 
182. Third, the sixth amendment effectively enlarged the government’s emergency 
powers by removing parliamentary oversight over emergency legislation.111 
The amendment allowed the president ‘at any time by order in the Kenya 
Gazette to bring into operation generally or in any part of Kenya, part III of 
the Preservation of Public Security Act or any part thereof.’112 With the granting 
of absolute, unchecked powers in relation to emergencies and public order in 
general, the president had discretion to apply any significant amount of force, 
where deemed necessary and invoke the provisions of various laws in enforcing 
security in the region.
183. In addition to constitutional amendments, the Preservation of Public Security 
Act (1960) was amended to define the full scope and operation of the new 
powers granted to the president. A distinction was made between ‘public 
security measures’ and ‘special public security measures’. The president could 
institute ‘public security measures’ without approval of Parliament. In order 
to cover public officials and members of the security forces who could be 
responsible for abuses during the ‘Shifta War’, the government passed the 
Indemnity Act in 1970.  The objective of the Indemnity Act was stated in 
the preamble as ‘to restrict the taking of legal proceedings in respect of 
certain acts and matters’. The Commission found that there is a perception in 
northern Kenya and the Coast that the Indemnity Act is part of the machinery 
of oppression and marginalisation because in their view it precludes any form 
of inquiry or justice, including by this Commission. The opposition and boycotts 
of the Commission by some residents of these regions was due in part to the 
perception that it could not legally inquire into gross violations of human rights 
perpetrated in these regions. 
184. It is notable however that the Commission took the view early on that the 
Indemnity Act neither prevented it from investigating gross violations during 
the ‘Shifta War’ nor from making appropriate recommendations relating to 
reparations.113
110 Fourth Amendment, Act No. 16 of 1966
111 Sixth Amendment Act No.18 of 1966
112 See KHRC (n 108 above) 24
113 See Legal Opinion Relating to the Application of the Indemnity Act (1970) [Annexed to Report]
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Security and economic marginalisation
185. In view of the security challenges posed to the region and the country at large, 
it is perhaps not surprising that both the colonial and post-independence 
administrations have regarded the North Eastern region through a security lens. 
The Commission finds that policy and approaches to issues in Northern Kenya 
(and parts of Coast region) have been securitized. 
186. Before independence, the colonial administration regarded the region as 
inhospitable and occupied by people it regarded as hostile. Having voted to 
secede from Kenya in a referendum held shortly before independence in 1963, the 
inhabitants of the NFD took up arms when the results were ignored by the colonial 
administration. Residents of the region recounted with bitterness how their right 
to self-determination was ignored. 
187. The incoming government considered the NFD as firmly part of the newly-
independent Kenya. With the support of Somalia that harboured aspirations of 
a ‘Greater Somalia’ that would encompass not only Northern Kenya but also the 
Ethiopian Ogaden region and Djibouti, Somalis in the NFD led by the Northern 
Province Peoples’s Progressive Party (NPPPP) would wage a three-year 
secessionist war that ended around 1968.114 
188. A mixture of secessionist insurgency, inter-ethnic and clan warfare based on the 
struggle for resources, and banditry has characterized the region ever since. In 
addition, the civil war in Somalia has contributed greatly to insecurity in Northern 
Kenya over the years. These developments have often prompted the government 
to respond with armed force in ways that occasion serious violations and disrupt 
the economic lives of those involved. 
189. In our view, there is a clear link between the government’s policy that has 
regarded every issue in the North from a security perspective and the economic 
marginalisation suffered by the region. Many residents attribute the marginalisation 
the region suffered in subsequent years to the fact that they had expressed an 
affirmative voice in favour of secession from Kenya that was brutally muzzled. 
According to a witness from Garissa: 
First and foremost, there was the emergency during the 1967 period. The declaration 
of that emergency led to serious crimes against humanity. The people of this province 
were subjected to unfair treatment. For instance, pastoralists were not allowed to graze 
114 See KHRC (n108 above) 21 citing B Baker Escape from domination in Africa: Political disengagement & Its consequences (2003) 
p. 7
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within a three-kilometre square area. That led to the loss of 90 percent of the basic 
livelihood - livestock of the pastoralists of NFD. Otherwise, had that not been there, 
today the people of NFD would be the richest in Kenya.115 
190. In some cases, the state has been guilty of doing too little in responding to 
insecurity generated by inter-ethnic or inter-clan conflicts over scarce resources 
and cultural practices such as cattle rustling that deprive citizens of resources 
vital for their survival and economic welfare. The generalized sense of insecurity 
in the region or parts of the region has had a far-reaching impact in limiting 
advancement in education and investment in the region. 
191. The state has also been directly responsible for economic marginalisation as a 
result of deprivations visited on residents because of policies aimed at enhancing 
security. In particular the numerous security operations conducted in this region 
has often resulted in loss and confiscation of property, especially cattle, by state 
security agents. 
192. The securitization of every aspect of life in the region meant that discriminatory 
policies were applied with the effect of seriously undermining the economic 
welfare of the inhabitants. In addition, the failure by the government to take 
measures to remedy the situation - especially after 1997 after many laws were 
repealed and recognition emerged that the legal regime applied had produced 
gross violations of human rights - compounds the responsibility of the state for the 
economic marginalisation of the region.
193. While much of the oppressive legislation has since been repealed, the consequences 
of discrimination still lingers. The enforced isolation since the pre-independence 
period through all post-independence regimes, and the discriminatory development 
policies retarded the development of the region, resulting in social and economic 
under-development. Economic marginalisation manifests in high levels of poverty, 
insecurity, high illiteracy rates and poor education facilities, under-developed human 
resources, inadequate and poor infrastructure, and high morbidity and mortality 
rates. 
194. The perception is that even though democratic space may have opened up 
in Kenya, nothing much has changed in the former NFD and that there have 
been no significant improvements in the socio-economic circumstances of the 
inhabitants.
115 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Garissa/ 12 April 2011/ p.13
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195. Insecurity and lack of stability has also remained a major challenge to development. 
Conflicts arise mainly as a result of scarce resources, violent armed ethnic conflicts, 
external incursions from unstable neighbouring countries and inter-clan rivalries. 
Government security operations that target the region have also been a source of 
insecurity.  A combination of famine (in part attributable to periodic droughts) and 
poor social services have made life in Northern Kenya generally difficult for the 
inhabitants of the vast, remote region with a largely harsh environment. 
Recognition, citizenship rights and belonging
196. One of the main complaints expressed by the residents of North Eastern Kenya 
and the entire former NFD relates to recognition of their citizenship rights. 
Discrimination is a major complaint. The residents rightly wonder why they have 
to be subjected to procedures (when applying for formal documents like birth 
certificates, particularly national identity cards and passports) from which similarly 
placed applicants (in other border areas) are exempt. 
197. The discriminatory procedures to which the residents were, and are still subject 
were described to the Commission. Previously, applicants for birth certificates, 
national identity cards and passports from the former NFD were subject to 
procedures applicable to aliens. Omar Shurie described this experience:
In that same period, the issue of citizenship was a major cancer in the throat. Jambo la 
kusikitisha sana, kwa mfano, (the most saddening thing) when we were applying for 
citizenship papers, - the identity card, passport and birth certificates, we were subjected 
to fill a third form called ‘PP7’. That is the name of the form. The rest of Kenyans were only 
to fill the other two forms. In this particular form, the ‘PP7’, above it was written: ‘To be 
filled by aliens and those claiming to be indigenous Kenyans’. So, where do we fall? The 
people of NFD fell under the latter part.116
198. Following a much-publicised petition to the then Attorney-General Amos Wako 
by a group called the ‘NFD Youth Movement’, the requirement for residents of 
North Eastern to fill the third form, the PP7, was abolished. However, residents 
from that part of the country would continue to be subjected to discriminatory 
procedures they described as ‘triple-vetting’ when they apply for national 
identity cards and passports. In respect of the ‘triple vetting procedure’, Omar 
Shurie testified that: 
[…] we are vetted three times: the one that disturbs me a lot is after we are vetted 
here in Garissa from the sub-location to the location and the district administration 
that is not the end of our process. Documents are sent to Nairobi and the Director of 
116 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Garissa/ 12 April 2011/ p.13
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Intelligence must endorse them under the pretext that we cannot differentiate Kenyan 
Somali from Somalia Somali. That statement is untrue. Any Kenyan can differentiate a 
Somali from Somalia from a Kenyan Somali only by their accent. It is not a matter of that 
they can disturb anybody. Ironically, there are other communities living along Kenyan 
border points who are not subjected to this type of treatment.117
199. There is a sense in which the difficulties encountered by residents of this 
region in having their citizenship recognised, acquiring identity documents 
and passports goes to the core of the economic marginalisation that they have 
experienced. Without citizenship, the people could not claim their rights. They 
became vulnerable to abuse. The Commission heard many heart-wrenching 
stories about lives that have been destroyed for lack of national identity cards 
and by extension passports. Pupils who passed their Form Four exams in very 
difficult conditions were unable to advance to university because they could not 
secure identity cards. Some Kenyans could not travel abroad to take advantage of 
scholarships because they could not obtain identity cards and passports. Other 
Kenyans cannot access the employment market because they lack the most basic 
identity document: the national ID Card.
200. While government has had legitimate concerns related to security arising from aliens 
acquiring Kenyan nationality, the measures undertaken were disproportionate and 
in many cases inappropriate. These measures created a sense of impunity among 
117 TJRC/ Hansard/Public Hearing/Garissa/12 April 2011/p. 14
Somali men standing at the start of a TJRC hearing.
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immigration officers and the security forces. The Commission heard of a Provincial 
Commissioner who allegedly nullified 3 000 identity cards in Garissa, apparently 
because aliens had infiltrated the system. The applicants remain in limbo, their 
lives on hold. 
201. Many stories falling in one or other of the categories capture the plight of the 
majority of the region’s residents and merit attention. Beka Hidhfi’s testimony, 
narrated by Hassan Omar Shurie, has particular resonance in a region that has 
felt victimised and marginalized in part because of the religion professed by the 
majority - Islam. This story highlights a number of issues, one of which is that denial 
of formal identity documents has resulted in violation of a multiplicity of rights, 
including the right to practice religion freely:
Madam Acting Chair, my evidence is that - the people know and will bear me witness 
- when hundreds of applicants are waiting for identity cards to come, they normally 
go to the office to confirm whether they have arrived. It is in that same office which, 
without fear, will tell them that the identity cards were cancelled by the PC. I have a 
case in point of an old mother who is very religious by the name Beka Hidhfi. I assisted 
this lady to the office to apply for an identity card because she wanted to visit Mecca. 
She had been told that she could not travel without a passport. To do that, she had 
to first get an identity card. The Muslim religion does not force someone to take a 
document. Initially, she thought the identity card was not necessary. So, she had 
never applied for one, although she is a Kenyan and also her father was a Kenyan. We 
prepared an affidavit and attached photocopies of her mother’s colonial passport. The 
father used to travel to Tanzania and Mecca. Unfortunately, they were in that block of 
2009. Today, she cannot trace the photocopies. It is now a problem because she might 
never make it to Mecca. Maybe she could use a camel to Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt and 
then to Mecca. It is just clear and everybody in Garissa knows that the identity card 
applicants for 2009 were cancelled. You can get that information in the registration 
office. The reason they give is that there were many aliens among the applicants. Is 
that the applicants’ mistake? If aliens slip into the system by bribing, how is a student 
who completed Garissa high school affected? I have a brother who completed high 
school and got a B+ but could not get an identity card in 2009. In 2010 there was 
lack of materials at the head office in Nairobi. Up to now, he is tarmacking and he is 
frustrated.118
202. The measures taken to curb abuse in the process of registration have also 
fostered corruption, which enhances abuse of the rights of legitimate applicants. 
The Commission heard narratives of people having to buy forms in order to 
apply for official documents and having to pay a bribe in the process, with no 
118 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing /Garissa/ 12 April 2011/ pp.18-19
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guarantees. It was alleged that government officials collect a minimum of Sh1 
500 to issue birth certificates, which is required when applying for a national 
ID card. For this reason, aliens can obtain documents with ease. Yet it is the 
possibility of infiltration of the system that has been used by the government 
to justify stringent application procedures. It is indeed unfair for circumstances 
to be created where the system is compromised, then genuine Kenyans suffer 
because of this.
203. Because of the manner in which they have been treated over the years, the sense 
of alienation created among residents of former NFD is palatable. In view of our 
findings, we do not find this surprising. Even in the wake of the adoption of the 
new Constitution, the perception remains that this part of the country (North 
Eastern Kenya) has been forgotten. The words of elder Dubat Ali Amey from 
Garissa encapsulate the views expressed by many of the region’s residents: 
Before we started the session, the National Anthem was sung. I want to tell you that 
we have never been part of the National Anthem. The National Anthem talks of justice, 
fellowship, awareness, good life, abundance, among other things. These things have 
never been experienced in this region. In totality, I can say that we have never been part 
of this country… we have never been considered as part of the diversity of this country. 
We have never been considered part of this country as a community, our culture, lifestyle 
and partly our religion.119
204. The idea that the former NFD is not part of Kenya is fully ingrained in popular 
narrative. Many recounted how, when travelling to Nairobi one would tell you 
that they were travelling to Kenya. The statement by Jarso Forole, who presented 
a memorandum on behalf of an inter-ethnic group from Marsabit County aptly 
demonstrates this sentiment of alienation:
As we travel to Kenya, we face the strict burden of proof that we are, indeed, 
Kenyans. If the four of us were to travel in the same vehicle, the presumption 
would be that the rest are all Kenyans, but I am a foreigner. So, at the numerous 
roadblocks which are lined up all the way from here to Isiolo where Kenya starts, 
I have to produce my identity card, in default of which I would face severe 
consequences. This scenario does not stop in Isiolo. In our own country, I feel 
the indignity of being stopped at a public office and being subjected to security 
and other checks simply because from my looks, I am a dangerous person or a 
terrorist. This is the kind of pain we have been living in since Kenya attained its 
independence.120
119 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing /Garissa/ 14 April 2011/ p.3
120 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/Marsabit/ 4 May 2011/ p.11
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Geographical and climatic factors and economic marginalisation
205. Northern Kenya has some of the harshest climatic conditions in Kenya. The area, 
which has Sahelian features, is mostly arid or semi-arid land (ASAL). The three 
counties of North Eastern are described as arid and fall in the category of 85 to 100 
percent arid, which is the extreme form of aridness. The region receives minimal 
levels of rainfall annually, which is also erratic. Most of the land is not suitable for 
agriculture, with only? percent of Garissa’s County being described as arable. Most of 
the arable land is found along the Tana River. Weir is characterised by long dry spells 
and short rainy seasons, and is mainly classified as Zone VII (entirely arid), except for 
Bute and Gurar divisions which are categorized as Zone IV.121 Only 30 percent of Wajir 
is arable, however, it is largely rangeland suitable mostly for nomadic pastoralism 
due to low rainfall and scarcity of irrigation water.122 Mandera is also very dry and 
mostly rangeland viable for nomadic pastoralism. A small strip along the seasonal 
Daua River (the only river in the district) has some potential for crop production 
through small-scale irrigation. About ( ) percent of the land is cultivable. Given the 
low altitude of the region, temperatures are high, ranging from 20o C and 38o C, with 
an average temperature of 30o C.
206. The Northern Kenya region receives only low levels of rainfall per year, less than 
300mm. For decades, the region has experienced frequent droughts. Records show 
that the region has in recent memory experienced droughts in the years 1927, 
1933, 1938, 1949, 1952, 1969, 1979, 1984, 1991, 1993, 1999, 2007, 2008 and 2009.123 
Droughts exacerbate the fragility of the existence of pastoralists and their livestock, 
which is the main source of income in these areas. Impact of cyclic droughts includes: 
	 deaths and economic ruin for pastoralists; 
	 poverty (reliance on livestock); and 
	 ecurrent droughts hinder the implementation of proposed activities and 
programmes since much of the resources are diverted to emergency and 
drought recovery programmes. 
 
 These cyclic shocks have retarded development in the area as gains of a particular 
season are wiped out by drought and famine124 and dependence on food aid. 
Even within the middle-income group, there is a high dependence on food aid, 
as is evident in analysis of food consumption, further on in this report. But the 
lower wealth groups remain the most vulnerable to chronic food insecurity and its 
121 As above
122 Republic of Kenya Wajir District Development Plan for the Period 2002-2008
123 Save the Children, ‘Nutritional Anthropometric and Retrospective Mortality Survey Sebule, Habaswein, Diff, Kulaaley and Banane 
divisions Wajir South District’, (2010) p. 7
124 Wajir South District Development Plan 2008-2012 
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effects. This increased dependency has had a negative effect on agro-pastoralism, 
with some farmers declining to engage in crop production since they are assured 
of relief in case of any deficit.125
207. It was explained earlier that state responsibility relating to economic marginalisation 
arises either where there is overt discrimination in the distribution of social goods or 
when the state fails to take measures in favour of groups who are disproportionately 
disadvantaged in terms of access to services vis-à-vis other groups and regions. 
With respect to the food security situation in Northern Kenya, recurrent famines 
and depletion of livestock through effects of drought show that successive 
governments have consistently failed to take measures to enhance food production 
and to address vulnerability of populations to broader effects of drought. Although 
reliable predictions of climatic conditions and in particular rainfall patterns have 
been provided, government’s response has consistently been reactive rather than 
preventive. Such responses have often been themselves ineffective in responding to 
resultant famine. 
208. The districts generally are sparsely populated. The population density for example 
in Mandera falls below 35 persons per square kilometre except the Central division, 
which has 436 persons per square kilometre. In Wajir, settlement patterns indicate 
that Central division has the largest population density of 21 persons per square 
km. According to the 2009 Census Report, North Eastern Kenya has a total of 2.3 
million people, although questions have been raised in relation to this figure, which 
is 65 percent higher than the projected number of 1.3m.126 The low population 
density in the region poses serious challenges for planning and service delivery.
209. The population in arid districts is relatively young. According to the National 
Bureau of Statistics, the mean age in North Eastern was 20.2 years in 2008, the 
lowest in the country compared to a slightly higher national average of 22.5 years. 
Ten of the districts with lowest mean age come from ASALs, with six of them from 
the northern districts.132 Along with this, the population in NEP is most fertile, with 
a total fertility rate of 7.2 percent (against a national average of 5.0 percent). 
210. The impact of the drought on the sensitive pastoralist livelihood has been extensive. 
Pasture continues to decline, herds are forced to walk at least 40km between water 
points and remaining pasture areas. Pastoralist households derive 40 percent of 
their nutrition from livestock meat and milk and declining herds are jeopardizing 
this critical food source.
125 Save the Children (n 123 above) p. 7
126 Government of Kenya, 2009 Population and Housing Census, Volume II, at 19
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Socio-economic indicators of economic marginalisation of North Eastern 
Employment
211. Over 70 percent of the population practice nomadic pastoralism and drought has 
impacted negatively on them. Several pastoral families have fallen back to sedentary 
life and moved to peri-urban areas, increasing the population of peri-urban poor. This 
results in high unemployment rates. Employment is mainly provided by the public 
sector, which absorbs less than 2 percent of the labour force. Most of the labour 
is unskilled, due to high illiteracy rates. There is a need to start income generating 
activities and small-scale industries targeting unskilled labourers.
212. The majority (nearly 70 percent) of the population in North Eastern Kenya is below 
25 years of age. This has significant impact on resources as more services and 
employment opportunities are needed to cater for this group. The population 
growth is also rapid, probably due to socio-cultural practices, which are common to 
the pastoralist society. Polygyny probably explains the prevailing high population 
growth rate. The dependency ratio is high, thereby retarding development activities. 
213. The ability of the province to house, feed, educate, provide health and security 
for its people is constrained, as most of the infrastructure facilities were planned 
for a smaller number of people. Institutional development has been slow 
and inconsistent. North Eastern Province is not well endowed with industrial, 
manufacturing and informal sectoral activities. These sectors facilitate employment 
opportunities and their absence aggravates unemployment.
Land
214. North Eastern Province has no medium or high potential land. All the land in the 
province is classified as low potential.127  The lack of Lands Registries in the region is 
one of the major impediments to the economic progress of the people of the region. 
Under the Registered Land Act, Chapter 300, Laws of Kenya, there are established Land 
Registries in every district to empower the District Lands Registrar to issue title deeds 
for properties in that district. Once land has been allocated, surveyed and a letter of 
allotment issued, every allottee is required to meet the conditions on the letter of 
allotment to be able to get a title deed. Title to land or property is the legal proof of 
ownership. This enables the owner to offer such title as security to access financial 
loans, guarantee payment of goods and services and give surety for bail or bond in 
Court.128
215. The entire Northern Kenya does not have a single Lands Registry where a title can 
be processed, or sales, transfers and charges can be registered. In the first place, 
127 See Society for International Development (SID) Pulling Apart: Facts and Figures on Inequality in Kenya (2004) 16
128 Ahmed Issack Hassan, Legal Impediments to the Development in Northern Kenya. A paper presented at the Consultative Meeting for 
Members of Parliament in Naivasha, Kenya 22-23 August, 2008 p. 17
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most of the properties in the urban centres in the region have not been properly 
surveyed and very few people have titles to their land. Even then, the few with titles 
to their properties have to travel all the way to Nairobi to transact any business on 
their land. This is because the Registry Index Map (RIM) for Northern Kenya, which 
captures the properties that have been surveyed and registered, is held in Nairobi. 
It is therefore imperative that the system of land registration be effected in the 
region and land registries established in every district headquarters. As noted by 
Hassan, if a person can sell and transfer his lands with a title in Kajiado without 
coming to Nairobi, there is no reason why another person from Moyale, Ijara or 
Mandera is forced to come to Nairobi to do such mundane things as pay land rates 
or apply for official search.129
Infrastructure
216. Access to infrastructure is a major determinant of overall well-being. This is because 
infrastructure helps to diversify production, expand trade and lower the cost of 
production. Infrastructure includes public utilities such as power, telecommunications, 
piped water supply, sanitation and sewerage systems. There are wide disparities in the 
density (length of roads per square km) across the provinces. According the 2004 SID 
report, Nairobi had the highest density of roads in the country at 3.2 compared to 0.1 in 
North Eastern. There is no tarmac road beyond Garissa town. The first tarmac road since 
independence is the Isiolo-Moyale road, currently under construction. Despite the 
spread of mobile phones, wide disparities have been evident in access to telephony, 
129 Hassan (n 128 above).
Pupils at a school in Turbi.
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with available data indicating North Eastern as the province with the least telephone 
connection per population followed by Western and Eastern provinces.130
Poverty
217. Poverty is a serious problem in the whole of the North Eastern Kenya region and is 
caused by poor natural resource development, a high population growth rate and 
limited employment opportunities outside the livestock sector. Other causes of 
poverty include cyclic droughts, lack of a fully developed livestock market, diseases 
(livestock and human), illiteracy, lack of proper planning, reduced government 
spending in projects that require subsidies, unemployment, land tenure problems, 
over-reliance on a pastoral economy and lack of innovativeness. 
218. These problems are exacerbated by insecurity. In a report published in 2002, the 
Kenya Institute for Public Policy and Research Analysis (KIPPRA), which processed 
data from 1994, noted that there were great regional variations in poverty rates, 
with North Eastern Province having the highest of its rural population (73.06 
percent) living below the poverty line, compared with 35.32 percent for Central 
Province.131 In the same study, Homa Bay (Nyanza), with 87.20 percent of its 
population living below the poverty line, had the highest poverty level, followed 
by Mandera District in North Eastern. 
219. In Wajir, poverty is severe and more than 65 percent of the population lives 
below the absolute poverty line. 132 Poverty in Wajir is mainly distributed among 
pastoralists, small-scale farmers who constantly face crop failure, peri-urban 
poor (who sell firewood and charcoal), and extended families, among others.133 
The pastoralists are under constant threat of poverty during drought. Severe 
drought leads to livestock deaths, which are the pastoralists’ main livelihood. 
These communities keep on moving in search of pasture and water and do not 
settle to carry out other activities. Furthermore, this constant movement over 
the vast and harsh terrain has consequences in terms of education for their 
children, thus cyclic poverty seems to persist endlessly. The population is poor 
also due to insecurity as a result of frequent attacks from cattle rustlers. Poor 
livestock markets contribute to low incomes as middle men take advantage of 
the situation and offer low prices.134
130 SID (n 127 above) 18
131 Paul Kimalu et al., ‘A Situational Analysis of Poverty in Kenya’, KIPPRA Working paper Series, Paper no. 6 (2002) p. 32
132 National Coordinating Agency for Population and Development (NCAPD), Wajir district Strategic plan  for the implementation of the 
national population policy for sustainable development 2005-2010 (2005) p. 9
133 National Coordinating Agency for Population and Development (n 136 above) p. 9
134 National Coordinating Agency for Population and Development (n 137 above) p.10
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220. The situation is no better in Mandera. Apart from Mandera town which is fairly served 
with infrastructure including electricity, piped water and telephones, all the other 
centres lack these facilities. Lack of economic facilities except petty trade in livestock 
products and handicrafts, which provide a livelihood for some households residing 
in these centres, further drives them deeper into poverty. Due to constant drought, 
lack of market for livestock and unemployment, most people, especially the poor, 
are dependent entirely on relief food of maize rations and water. Based on the Early 
Warning Systems (EWS) and community-based food aid targeting and distribution, 
about 76 percent accounting for 170 336 persons in 2002 in Garissa are poor. 
Other poverty-stricken groups are female-headed households, orphans, widows, 
street children, beggars, the physically challenged and the handicapped. The same 
patterns of poverty are replicated in Garissa, where the situation is worsened by the 
presence of a larger population as a result of the refugee camps. This inadvertently 
places more pressure on already over-stretched social amenities and infrastructure. 
Levels of poverty among women and children are very high since they are the least 
capable of fending for themselves. Cases of abuse, neglect and diseases are also very 
high. Education and health are hampered, further compounding poverty levels. 
221. While Kenya is generally poor, this poverty is not evenly distributed countrywide 
and varies by ecological zones with the arid areas bearing the brunt of its negative 
impacts. Part of the reason for this scenario is the lack of diversification of economic 
activities in arid areas as opposed to high potential districts. In arid areas, there 
is over-dependence on the livestock economy, which is challenged by several 
factors, including natural weather and incessant ethnic conflict. 
222. These indicators generally show the relative poverty in arid districts compared 
to high-potential districts like Uasin Gishu, Kakamega, Machakos, Kericho and 
Nyandarua. Comparing Wajir to Nyandarua, the absolute poverty level of the 
former is 57 percent while that of the latter is 27 percent. The life expectancy is 
almost the same, with Wajir having 52 and Nyandarua 54, but the average family 
size in Wajir is much bigger than that of Nyandarua, as it stands as six family 
members in contrast with 4.6 in Nyandarua.135
223. Although there is variation in high potential districts, their absolute poverty 
rates tend to be much lower compared to those in arid districts. Dependency 
ratios also vary, with high-potential districts having lower levels of dependency 
135 Republic of Kenya, Kenya National Development Plan 2002-2008. Nairobi: Ministry of Planning and National Development, 2002. 
Table 1: Poverty-related indices for selected arid districts and Table 2: Poverty related indicators for selected high potential districts 
in Kenya.
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compared to arid districts. This can be explained by the fact that there are less 
economically active people than there are dependents and this is linked to the fact 
that unemployment levels are higher and that there are fewer economically viable 
outlets. The main economic activity is pastoralism, which is adversely affected 
by the harsh prevailing droughts and the need to constant migration. Absolute 
poverty levels in high-potential districts are lower than those registered in arid 
districts, with the implication that the latter are poor.136
224. The life expectancy in arid districts is lower than that of high-potential districts, 
mainly as a result of the harsh geographical conditions, malnutrition, poor health 
and insecurity. It is also an indicator of the lack of basic social services such as 
health amenities and hospitals. Populations in arid districts have slightly larger 
family sizes compared to high potential districts.  This situation adds to the pressure 
exerted on social amenities, as most of the population also tend to be dependents 
rather than being economically active. 
Food security
225. Low rainfall aggravates the drought conditions, which in turn have severe effects 
on the people in North Eastern Kenya. Sometimes households rely on three to eight 
litres of water per person per day.  Water pans and dams have dried up in most of the 
centres.  Malnutrition rates are very high. Clashes - related to decreased resources 
- often take place and livestock migrations are high because of declining pasture 
areas. As a result of drought, there is constant deterioration of food security, which 
in effect reduces the purchasing power in food and non-food commodity prices. 
Insecurity in the region has continued to pose problems for organizations such as 
the UN’s World Food Programme (WFP) that run food assistance programmes. 
Institutional framework and capacity
226. Economic and social development hinge on institutional capacity and a fragile 
institutional framework compounds the problems of such development. Such 
institutional support comes from schools, hospitals and clinics, viable economic 
activities (banking, commerce, and manufacturing plants), all of which are in short 
supply in North Eastern Kenya.  The presence of such institutions opens up avenues 
for employment and economic development. 
227. In North Eastern, the institutional framework is inadequate. There are very few 
schools and hospitals, leaving the inhabitants in a desperate situation. Economic 
activities are limited and there is little industrialization and manufacturing activities 
136 Ministry of Planning and National Development (n 139 above)
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in the region. The poor institutional framework is further compounded by the poor 
road network, with most rural roads being inaccessible, especially during the rainy 
season. Some improvements on the road network, especially the feeder roads, were 
done through the Fuel Levy Fund, but there is still substantial work required to 
facilitate accessibility.
228. The continuous drought affects long-term plans to develop water structures. Most 
funds were diverted to emergency water trucking and other activities to save lives. 
Access to infrastructure and social services in the arid areas is far below the national 
average. In 2006 for example, there were 69 public secondary schools in Kitui District 
but only 28 public secondary schools in the whole of North Eastern. In addition, 
in 2001, there were 86 secondary schools in Uasin Gishu District, but only 16 such 
schools in both Turkana and Wajir districts. Closing such a gap and achieving higher 
levels of service provision of quality education remains an enormous challenge.
Education
229. Both internal and external factors influence the uptake of education in North Eastern 
Kenya. Internally, cultural practices and stereotypes have continued to hamper 
education uptake. Parental attitudes towards education, cultural practices and 
beliefs are partly to blame for the low levels of literacy among nomadic pastoralist 
communities of Kenya. School dropout rates are high for both boys and girls and 
at all levels of the educational stages.  The foregoing is generally worse for the girl 
child, given the conspicuous subordinate status of women among nomadic pastoral 
ethnic groups. Statistics show that about 93 percent of North Eastern women have 
no education at all, compared with only about 3 percent in Central Province.137 
Furthermore comparatively, of the 92 percent women in Nairobi who are literate, 
only 6.4 percent are literate in North Eastern. For men, corresponding figures for 
Nairobi and North Eastern Province are 94.2 percent and 29.5 percent respectively. 
230. In addition to their multiple domestic responsibilities, certain cultural practices 
such as female genital mutilation and infibulations among some of the ethnic 
groups, early marriage and the parental preference for boys’ education, greatly 
curtail girl child education.138 Indeed, girl children often lose out to boys when 
parents have to prioritize who to educate. 
231. Girl children often find themselves trapped: teenage pregnancy, early marriage, 
motherhood or transactional sex with the possibility of contracting sexually 
137 See Society for International Development (SID) (n XX above) VIII. Kenya Demographic and Health Survey (2003), Table 3: Gender 
Disparities in literacy and Educational Acquisition.
138 DN Sifuna, ‘Increasing access and participation of pastoralist communities in primary education in Kenya’ International Review of 
Education 2005, p.51; p.499-516
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transmitted infections (STIs) including HIV/AIDS. Education is perceived as not 
important for girls and therefore they are withdrawn from school so that they can 
contribute their labour at home. 
232. External factors such as the pastoralist lifestyle that entails frequent migrations 
has influenced access, participation and achievement in education. Other factors 
are linked to institutional development and capacity. Schools are in short supply 
and this has contributed to lowered access of children to both primary and 
secondary school education. The cost of schooling is also prohibitive and due 
to the high levels of poverty in the region, many parents cannot afford the extra 
costs that schools demand. Because of frequent mobility, educational trajectories 
are not strictly followed and dropout rates tend to be very high. There are also 
very few youth polytechnics and skill training centres to absorb some of these 
children. There is need to establish more day secondary schools that are cost-
effective. These factors mean that school enrolment rates for North Eastern are 
far below those of other provinces and the national average.
233. Gross enrolment rates for primary school and secondary school stand at 17.8 
percent and 4.5 percent respectively in North Eastern, way below the national 
average of 87.6 percent and 22.2 percent. North Eastern has the highest school 
drop-out rate, which stands at 12.6 percent compared to Nyanza which has the 
lowest drop-out rate in the country standing at 6.8 percent and the national 
average drop-out rate of 8.1 percent. The inadequacy at the school level can 
be best captured by the non-proportional pupil-teacher ratio in North Eastern, 
indicating a shortage of teachers and skills.139
234. Data from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) in 2008 on enrolment 
rates (for boys and girls) indicates that only 32.3 percent in North Eastern have ever 
enrolled in school against the national average of 76.8 percent. In Central Kenya for 
example, 92 percent of the population has attended school. Worse still, only three 
percent (and only 0.5 percent of women) in NEP have attended secondary schools, 
against a national average of 8.7 percent. Notably low is the population that has 
attended any post-secondary institutions, at only 0.6 % (KNBS, 2008).
235. When it comes to nomadic districts in Kenya including Isiolo, Tana River, Wajir, 
Moyale and Turkana, the Kenya National Statistics Plan 2002-2008 figures 
highlight the differences in literacy rates, primary school enrolment and dropout 
rates, secondary school enrolment and dropout rates in the above regions. From 
the data, it is indicative that Wajir has the lowest primary and secondary school 
139 See Ministry of education, Statistics Division, Table 3.8: Access to education 2002 and Table 4: National Gross Enrolment, Pupil-
teacher Ratio and Drop-Out Rates
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joint enrolment rates (boys and girls), standing at 14.5 percent and 4.6 percent 
respectively, while Moyale has the highest enrolment rates standing at 63.2 
percent and 8.5 percent respectively. Out of the 4.6 percent of students who enrol 
in secondary schools in Wajir, over 50 percent of them drop out before completion 
of the approved four-year secondary school course.140 Wajir also has very low 
literary rates, which impacts the ability to access the job market.  For example, the 
modest educational achievement registered among pastoral-nomadic children 
cannot allow them to compete with those from other communities on an equal 
footing when it comes to securing jobs and other self-actualizing opportunities. 
They may therefore be left with the option of engaging in banditry, cattle theft, 
drug abuse and trafficking, or casual and unskilled manual work. 141
236. Some of the undertakings they engage in are not only poorly paid, but also 
erratic. Compounding this situation is the incessant ethnic conflicts and cattle 
raids that complicate livelihoods and access to social services such as education. 
Indeed, the proliferation of small arms - fuelled by the long armed conflict in 
Somalia - and the apparent commercialization of livestock theft, have heightened 
insecurity in the region. These conditions have far-reaching implications on 
children’s socialization, development and education. In addition, it has the effect 
of entrenching and institutionalizing inter-generational poverty transfer.
237. In Kenya’s high-potential areas, the story is markedly different, which is telling of the 
sorry state of the country’s social service provisioning and welfare system. As such, 
the corresponding figures on literacy among sedentary communities, especially in the 
high-potential areas, are substantially different from those registered in arid districts. 
Data from arid areas compare unfavourably with that from high-potential districts. 
238. It can perhaps be hypothesized that in the absence of sustainable economic 
opportunities, education remains the best option for nomadic pastoralists. The 
present education uptake, even with the application of mobile schools in the province 
is less than satisfactory. There are numerous technical and operational problems 
that confront the region in terms of accessing, participating and achieving desired 
educational outcomes. Because of poor performance in transition exams (the Kenya 
Certificate for Primary Education - KCPE and Kenya Certificate for Secondary Education 
- KCSE), mobility within the education system remains very low. In particular, poor 
performance in KCSE - in part marked by the region’s lowest representation in the top 
100 students ranking in national exams (together with the Coast region - means that 
very few transition to university and tertiary level education. 
140 Kenya, Republic of Kenya, Kenya National Development Plan 2002-2008. Nairobi: Ministry of planning and National Development, 
2002. Table 5: Literacy Indicators in Selected Nomad-Inhabited Districts of Kenya
141 Ezekiel Mwenzwa and Eric Masese, From Dim to Full Light: Spotlighting the Education Concerns of Nomadic Children in Kenya
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239. While the quota system applied in admissions into certain fields such as medicine 
has ensured a level of representation in those professions, more appropriate 
interventions are required. These interventions should target primary and secondary 
levels to increase transition rates and performance.
240. The failure of the education system is largely due to the aggregate nature of its 
administration and authorities need to customize education for the circumstances 
of a particular region, keeping in mind pastoralism, drought, food insecurity, crisis 
and conflicts experienced in North Eastern and the implication of these factors on 
education access and retention.
Health, water and sanitation 
241. Multiple factors of poor infrastructure, low population density and limited 
institutional capacity cement low service delivery on water and sanitation in North 
Eastern Kenya. A large percentage (95 percent) of children in NEP are born at home, 
against a national average of 69.5 percent. Only 11.8 percent of infants in this 
province have an immunization card, against a national average of 63.7 percent. 
Nearly a third of all infants are underweight.142 
242. According to a 2004 report, there are great inequalities as to the doctor-patient 
ratio in Central Kenya, which is about 1:20 700, compared to North Eastern (around 
1:120,000.)143 In terms of disposal of human waste, the 2009 Census shows that 
out of a population of 248 000 in North Eastern sampled, only 220 have access 
to a main sewer, 212 of these use a septic tank, 62,678 use a pit latrine, while the 
majority (184 425) relieve themselves in the bush, equating to 74 percent.144 
243. More than 50 percent of the population either draws water from unprotected wells 
(25.4%) or from rivers (25.6%). Only 5.7 percent of the households in the arid districts 
have access to piped water, and most of these are concentrated in the urban areas.145 
Low nutrition and poor access to medical and related services poses life threatening 
challenges to the population. Women’s health needs special attention and maternal 
health care centres need to be increased to reduce morbidity and mortality. There is 
need for maternity amenities and child care services in the district hospital in order 
to improve maternal and child health care services. 
142 Kenya National Bureau of Statistics. Well being in Kenya a Socio-economic profile. Nairobi: 2008
143 SID (n 127 above). 
144 Kenya Population and Housing Census Report, volume II: Population and Household distribution of socio-economic characteristics 
(2009) p.359
145 Kenya National Bureau of Statistics. Kenya Integrated Household Budget survey. Nairobi: 2007. See also 2009 Census Report 
(above) p. 339
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Economic marginalisation and access to social-economic goods in North 
Eastern
Testimony by Jarso Forole
What evidence do we have for being marginalized? I am sure that for those who have 
travelled by road, after crossing Merile River, you must have had a feeling of what we 
have been feeling since 1963. We have our road to this area. Unfortunately, this is a 
road classified as A2 and runs all the way from Cairo right through Addis Ababa all the 
way to Cape Town. Until recently, there is one section of that road which had no single 
piece of tarmac. This is the section before you get to Moyale, about 500 kilometers. We 
are told that there was a time when funds were kept aside to reconstruct that road but 
due to the influence of some individuals in the government, the funds were diverted 
to other areas. It is recently that the government decided to do something. We are yet 
to see the job being completed. 
We have very few public health facilities. The existing ones are not fully equipped 
and, at the same time, they are under-staffed. We also have very limited maternal 
and child health services. Sadly, we do not have any facilities in a county that spans 
over 15 percent of the total land mass of Kenya. For instance, if you take the southern 
part of Laisamis constituency, you will see that there is no single health facility that 
has been established by the government. We have very few that were established by 
missionaries. If this is not marginalisation, then what is it? 
Illiteracy levels are very high. For instance, close to five decades after independence, 
there are statistics which show that Moyale has only 10 secondary schools. Those 
schools serve an area which takes up 15 percent of the country’s land mass. There is 
no school that gives proper education to secondary school-going children. Moyale 
started in 1920 when it was established by the colonialists. However, compared 
to other areas which were established recently, you will see that we are highly 
marginalized. Take an example of Makueni. We only have 10 secondary schools but 
Makueni, established in the late 1990s, has more than 230 public secondary schools. 
I do not want to go further into that.
Access to safe water is a luxury for us. Most of the facilities we have were established 
during the colonial period to serve the population that existed during that time. For 
instance, in Marsabit, we have the Bakuli water supply which was established to meet 
the demands of just about 2 000 people. Today, we have gone beyond the 60 000 
mark. So, while other Kenyans turn around and turn on a tap to have clean water, 
in Marsabit, people have to travel more than 80 kilometers to look for water. If you 
were to travel 80 kilometers a day to look for water, would you have time to do things 
to gain economically? We have been complaining about chronic poverty. However, 
in my considered opinion, one of the factors that have greatly contributed to the 
continued poverty is the water crisis. If a 20-litre jerrican goes for almost a dollar 
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(Sh70) and we are talking about a poor person who lives below a dollar a day, what 
picture are we trying to portray? I have vast experience working in the humanitarian 
assistance field and going by the CF Standards, even in a humanitarian situation, a 
person needs at least 15 litres of water a day. Just think how much money does a 
household need to meet the daily requirement? So, as much as we are facing water 
problems, we are cheating ourselves when we say that we are fighting poverty in 
Marsabit.
More worrying is the situation of our children. The World Health Organization (WHO) has 
established a threshold to determine the nutritional standards among children below 
five years of age. One of these standards is the so-called acute global malnutrition rate, 
which the WHO worries about when it permanently remained at 15 percent, always. At 
times, it goes as high as 30 percent. You can paint the picture of what the local child 
goes through.
In a nutshell, I would like to make reference to the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). Every year, Kenya conducts a review of its progress. If we were to conduct 
that review in Marsabit, we would not know for sure if we are on the right track 
towards achieving those eight goals. This is a largely livestock-based economy. 
Our expectation is to have services just like our colleagues who are farmers. While 
our Kenyan government has established special funds and subsidies for farmers in 
Kenya, we are yet to have any action taken in our favour.  We have the Coffee Board 
of Kenya, the Pyrethrum Board of Kenya and a sisal board and a sugar board. I am 
yet to hear of a board that addresses the needs of pastoralists. 
The only industry that is there to serve our interests is based in Nairobi; the Kenya 
Meat Commission (KMC). Food security is also a major problem here and we have 
evidence of it. If you look through the window or as you were coming from Isiolo, 
you must have seen some huge silos, less than a kilometre from where we are.
The silos were established in the 1990s to receive local produce from this 
area. During that period, Marsabit was second after Kitale in terms of cereals 
production. The need for additional silos was felt because there was a lot of 
produce. Similar structures were erected along the way. At that time, we were 
self-sufficient in terms of food production. However, today, there is no grain from 
the local area that can be traced in those silos. Instead of having local produce, 
today, it is housing humanitarian aid. That has led us to claim that the state 
provides us with food. At this moment, if you go off the road, you will encounter 
very serious humanitarian situations of emaciated lactating mothers, chronically 
malnourished children and people queuing at food distribution centers on a daily 
basis.146
146 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Marsabit/ 4 May 2011/ p.13
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Nyanza Province
The question that has repeatedly been asked is: Who is responsible for the sorry 
state of the Luo people in Kenya? The answer to this question reveals a litany of 
systematic official policy to oppress, subjugate and dehumanize the Luo people, 
which would have largely been profiled as follows: economic emasculation, mental 
and psychological warfare, utilization and murder of Luo leaders and political 
marginalisation.147 
I cannot agree, even for a fleeting moment, to make reference to a so-called ‘socio-
economic marginalisation’ of any part of Kenya, by my government.148
244. One of the main narratives in the context of Kenyan politics, development, and 
gross violations of human rights, is that Nyanza Province has suffered socio-
economic marginalisation under successive post-independence governments. 
Like North Eastern Province and the NFD in general, Nyanza could be placed in the 
category of ‘politically dissident’ regions.
245. Speaking during the Commission’s hearings in Kisumu, Phoebe Asiyo, a former MP 
for Karachuonyo, provided a moving testimony that summarised the prevailing 
perceptions about the economic and political marginalisation of Nyanza, especially 
what is popularly known as ‘Luo Nyanza’:
The role of the Luo community in the struggle for independence of Kenya cannot 
be over-emphasised. At independence, the whole of Kenya saw the Luo as the most 
educated community, with probably the highest number of university graduates, 
faculty heads and professionals in almost every other field. The Luo community 
produced who was who in all sectors of the economy, political, economic and 
intellectual fabric in the Kenyan society. Fifty years down the road, the Luo community 
is bedevilled with every other conceivable societal ill, languishing at the bottom of the 
ladder of progress.149
246. The disintegration of the Kikuyu-Luo coalition that formed the core of KANU at 
independence and the eventual fallout between Kenya’s first President Jomo 
Kenyatta and first Vice-President Oginga Odinga in 1966 over differing visions 
for the country as described earlier forms an important context within which to 
contemplate the marginalisation of Nyanza. It was noted that the fallout between 
Kenyatta and Odinga in 1966, the assassination of prominent Luo politician Tom 
Mboya in 1969 and the banning of Odinga‘s opposition party, the Kenya People’s 
Union (KPU), and Odinga’s eventual detention earlier in 1969, consigned Nyanza 
147 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Kisumu/ 14July 2011/ p. 20
148 Written Submission by Former President Daniel Arap Moi to the TJRC (2012) p.20
149 TJRC/Hansard/ Public Hearing / Kisumu/ 14July 2011/ p. 20.
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Province to enduring conflict with the Kenyatta regime.150  The same would 
continue during the Moi regime. 
247. In her testimony, Asiyo pinpoints 1969 as the year when the marginalisation of 
Nyanza started:” It was soon after the assassination of Tom Mboya in 1969 and the 
detention of Jaramogi Odinga that the real marginalisation of the Luo started”.151 
Although Moi had in 1980 as president attempted to ‘rehabilitate’ Odinga and 
his KPU colleagues politically by restoring their KANU membership and offering 
state jobs to some, this attempt was aborted when it became evident that 
Odinga’s ideological inclinations and his attitude towards KANU rule - which 
he perceived as corrupt and exclusionary - had not changed in his 14 years of 
political banishment. It is reported that Moi changed his mind when Odinga 
publicly criticised Kenyatta for his alleged exclusionary policies while explaining 
why they had fallen out. 
248. While there have been prominent personalities from Nyanza who served in 
successive regimes, the region has been associated with opposition politics since 
independence, save for a few years in the 1960s. As explained earlier, the structure 
of the Kenyan state and the nature of politics has been such that the economic 
fortunes of communities were largely linked - although not exclusively - to their 
standing with the regime of the day. Because of the centralised nature of the 
state, patronage, corruption and the politics of exclusion and negative ethnicity 
had taken root in Kenyan politics. In this context, the political banishment of 
leading political figures coincided with, and meant economic isolation of the 
entire region. However, the co-option of leaders from regions that had been 
marginalised presented a semblance of inclusion at the centre. Both Kenyatta 
and Moi made sure that Nyanza was represented in their governments over the 
years, especially in cabinet. Former President Moi rejects the idea that Nyanza 
was marginalised under his rule and cites names of prominent Luo leaders who 
served in his government. President Moi writes:
The biggest agenda of my government was to distribute resources equitably to all 
parts of the country. I cannot agree, even for a fleeting moment, to make reference 
to ‘socio-economic marginalisation’ of any part Kenya, by my government. I had a 
cabinet for many years which had a proportionately large number of ministers from 
the said Nyanza region. [In fact], one of the jokes in Nyanza in the late 1980s was that 
every MP was either a minster or assistant minister except James Mbori, MP for Kasipul 
Kabondo.
150 Odhiambo-Atieno, E.S. 2002. Hegemonic Enterprises and Instrumentalities of Survival: Ethnicity and Democracy in Kenya, African 
Studies, 61 (2) pp. 223-249
151 Written Submission by Former President Daniel arap Moi to the TJRC (2012) p.20
81
Volume  I IB    Chapter O N E 
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
250. With respect to the Armed Forces over which successive regimes have often 
sought to have tight control, President Moi compares his administration and that 
of his predecessor, Kenyatta. He states that ‘by 1978, the joke of the town was that 
no Luo could rise beyond the rank of a major in our armed forces’. He lists the 
following to demonstrate that during his tenure, members of the Luo community 
were appointed to high positions in the military: 
	 Lt-Gen Daniel Opande
	 Maj-General Pasteur Awita
	 Maj-Gen Maurice Oyugi
	 Maj-Gen Sam Suero
	 Maj-Gen Barrack Onyango
	 Brigadier Fred Sidondo
251. The President also cites the names of other senior personalities that he appointed 
as follows:
Ministers [and Assistant Ministers]:
1. William Odongo Omamo
2. Robert Ouko
3. Wilson Ndolo Ayah
4. Peter Oloo Aringo
5. John Okwanyo
6. Dalmas Otieno
7. Stephen Ondiek
8. Raila Amolo Odinga
9. Adhu Awiti
10. Peter Nyakiamo
Permanent Secretaries
11. Joab Omino
12. Hezekiah Oyugi
13. Leo Odero
14. Valentine Opere
15. Peter Wambura
16. William Ochieng
17. Richard Muga
Envoys
18. Michael Okeyo
19. Noah Okulo
20. Maurice Omwony
21. Pamela Mboya
22. Frost Josiah
23. Green Josiah
24. Bob Jalang’o
25. Daniel Mboya
26. Ochieng Adala
27. Prof Thomas Ogada
249. To emphasise his point, President Moi lists the following who served at different 
points in his 24 year rule:
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	 Police Commissioner:  Philemon Abong’o
	 Heads of Parastatals
Prof Bethwell Ogot
Prof Simeon Ominde
Prof David Wasawo
Prof Otieno Malo
Prof Ojany
Phillip Okundi
	 Vice-Chancellors
Prof Douglas Odhiambo
Prof Shellemiah Keya
Prof Fredrick Onyango
	 Directors of Medical Services
Dr Joseph Oliech
Dr James Nyikal
	 Chief Architect: Joel Nyaseme
	 Chief Engineer Roads: Engineer Otonglo 
252. The Commission takes the view that while the listing of Luo personalities who 
served in the Moi regime is evidence of a level of inclusion of people from Nyanza, 
the co-option of elites did not necessarily translate into economic inclusion in a 
broad sense. As shown below, other indicators assessed by the Commission, such 
as social amenities and infrastructure, seem to reflect a different reality. 
253. It appears to the Commission that the inclusion of certain elites also had a political 
goal under both post-independence administrations: it served to politically 
isolate Odinga who had taken a hard-line stance against both the Kenyatta and 
Moi governments since the 1966 fallout and his eventual banishment in 1969.
254. In 2003, just as Nyanza leaders appeared to find a new footing at the centre 
of power following the formation of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) a 
year earlier, commentators note that similar disagreements within the Kibaki 
regime (between Kibaki and Raila Odinga) would likewise lead to the blacklisting 
of Nyanza both in terms of access to capital development and also in terms 
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of appointments to public positions.152 Indeed, following the fallout between 
Kibaki and Odinga, Kibaki would sack Odinga and his allies from government in 
2003. After the hotly contested and divisive constitutional referendum of 2005, 
Odinga would later form the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and contest 
the 2007 elections against Kibaki, largely on a platform that held out Kibaki as a 
practitioner of the old politics of exclusion. 
255. Odinga and the Nyanza elite would be catapulted to the centre of power following 
the negotiated National Dialogue and Reconciliation Process in 2008 that produced 
a government of national unity after the post -election violence (PEV) of 2007-2008. 
Odinga’s proximity to power (in his capacity as Prime Minister and co-principal) 
certainly tempered narratives and perceptions of exclusion, especially as appointments 
into public service from Nyanza increased.
256. It is fair to state, as asserted by many who spoke to the Commission, that, 
Nyanza has been in the political and economic cold for all but 10 years since 
independence in 1963. The systematic isolation of Nyanza since 1966 by 
successive governments as narrated by those who made testimonies has led to 
the heightening of poverty in the region in general and various social and 
economic problems that have gone unaddressed. Some of these issues are 
discussed below. 
152 R Muhula ‘Horizontal Inequalities and Ethno-regional Politics in Kenya’ Kenya Studies Review (2009) 85-105 pp 99-100
Miss Phoebe Asiyo (centre) testifying in Kisumu on economic marginilisation of the Nyanza Region. 
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Socio-economic indicators of economic Marginalisation in Nyanza 
Poverty 
257. An assessment of poverty is germane to the discussion of economic marginalisation 
because poverty is regarded as the inability to access basic human needs by 
segments of the population. This inability could be attributed to a set of factors 
but does, in our historical context, reflect a legacy of economic marginalisation, 
although not exclusively. Poverty assessment reports classify poverty in terms of 
food poverty, hardcore poverty, and absolute poverty.153 
258. At 63.1 percent, Nyanza Province is said to have the highest incidence of absolute 
poverty in the country.154 The national average is 52 percent. Kisumu District, one 
of the poorest districts, has an absolute poverty rate of 65.44 percent.155 Kisumu 
experiences a food poverty level of 54.9 percent, which indicates that food insecurity 
is another major problem.156 According to a World Bank Report published in 2008, 
incomes of rural households in Nyanza are the lowest of all the provinces, but have 
risen over time, while the ‘Gini-coefficient’ increased until 2004 and then moderated. 
The report also notes that livestock ownership is lowest in Nyanza and that average 
land size fell rapidly, to become lowest across all regions by 2007.157 Asiyo’s testimony 
summarises the outlook of Nyanza across various relevant indicators:
Luo Nyanza, as Joseph Kaguthi, former Provincial Commissioner called it, is today one 
of Kenya’s most under-developed, with all the development indicators grim. Poverty 
is rife in Luoland. The disease burden is very high; the mortality rate is higher than it 
is in most provinces and life expectancy is low. All health indicators are at their worst 
compared to the national indicators.158
259. Many other witnesses testified that this grim picture is not restricted to Luo Nyanza 
but appears to be common to other parts of Nyanza region as well, especially to 
Kuria. According to a report by the National Coordinating Agency for Population and 
Development (NCAPD), 49 percent of the district population in Kuria lives in absolute 
poverty, whereas a large percentage experience food poverty. The District Poverty 
Assessment Report for the year 2000 identified the main factors that engender 
poverty in the district as rapid population growth, economic and environmental 
factors, HIV/AIDS and socio-cultural practices and attitudes such as polygamy 
153 See National Bureau of Statistics, Second Report on Poverty in Kenya: Welfare indicators atlas (2000)
154 KS Njonjo and Institute of Economic Affairs, Youth Fact Book: Infinite Possibility of Definite Disaster? (2010)
155 See S Dosker, What Makes the Difference? Socio-economic and demographic determinants of orphan primary school enrolment in 
Kisumu District, Kenya. (Unpublished MA thesis, University of Amsterdam & Great Lakes University of Kenya, 2006) p13. See also 
Central Bureau of Statistics, Department of Kisumu District. Demographical data (2001)
156 KS Njonjo and Institute of Economic Affairs, Youth Fact Book: Infinite Possibility of Definite Disaster? (2010)
157 See World Bank, Kenya Poverty and Inequality Assessment (2008) p. 60
158 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Kisumu/ 14July 2011/ p. 20
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and wife inheritance. Inadequate and unreliable rainfall patterns have immensely 
affected agricultural activities in some parts of the district.159
District Level Estimates of Poverty, 2005/6
Source: World Bank Report, Kenya poverty and inequality assessment, 2008
159 National Coordinating Agency for Population and Development (NCAPD), Kuria District Strategic Plan (2005-2010) p. 6
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Health
260. The Kenya Demographic and Health Survey (KDHS)160 of 2008 shows that the rates 
by province of under-five mortality rate display considerable disparities. According 
to this report, Nyanza Province has the highest levels of both under-5 years and 
infant mortality rates (import Table 8.2, pp 116). Almost one in seven children 
in Nyanza dies before attaining his or her fifth birthday (149 deaths per 1 000), 
compared with one in 20 children in Central Province (51 deaths per 1 000), which 
has the lowest rate. Thus, the risk of dying before age five is almost three times 
higher in Nyanza than in Central. Infant mortality is also highest in Nyanza (95 
deaths per 1000) and lowest in Eastern (39 deaths per 1 000). 
261. A comparison between the 2003 and 2008 reports shows that there have been 
considerable declines in child mortality rates in Nyanza over the five years, with 
under-5 mortality declined from 206 to 149 deaths per 1,000 births since 2003. 
262. The KDHS report of 2003 shows that except for neonatal mortality, all childhood 
mortality indicators are highest in Nyanza and lowest in Central.161 Under-5 
mortality is highest in Nyanza (206 deaths per 1 000 live births), followed by North 
Eastern (163 per 1000), and lowest in Central (54 per 1000) and Rift Valley (77 per 
1 000) provinces. This implies that a child born in Nyanza is four times more likely 
than a child born in Central to die before celebrating his or her fifth birthday. The 
same pattern is also observed in infant mortality rates, with the highest rate in 
Nyanza (133 deaths per 1 000 live births) and the lowest in Central (44 deaths per 
1000 live births). The figures shown for infant mortality and under-5 mortality in 
2003 and 2008 are consistent with the trend in previous surveys done in 1989, 
1993 and 1998. 
263. With regard to health facilities, Kuria, one of the poorest and most marginalised 
of all districts has 1 hospital and 8 health centres spread across the district. The 
doctor to patient ratio is 1:56 913 and households are located an average of 5 
kilometres from the nearest health facility. Daniel Chacha Muherei, who testified 
on behalf of the local MP Wilfred Machage, captured the poor state of health 
facilities in Kuria as follows:
We have very few health facilities, but wherever there is a health facility, the municipal 
council helps to open the small routes to access those health facilities. So, we have 
160 The Demographic and Health Survey (KDHS) is a programme conducted after every five years by KNBS primarily to provide 
demographic, health and other socio-economic indicators to assist stakeholders in planning, monitoring and evaluation of 
population and health policies and programmes. The 2003 KDHS was the fourth to be conducted in Kenya, the others having been 
conducted in 1989, 1993 and 1998
161 See Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, Kenya Demographic and Health Survey 2003 (2004) pp.114-115
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roads which are maintained by the council. However, we do not know if it that council 
will continue after 2012. We have a sub-district hospital here. There is a road coming 
here, direct to that place, but this hospital has never seen an ambulance since we got 
a district here. Therefore, our people are suffering. So, I say it is an injustice. Our people 
are dying here; if we do not have money and there is a government facility here. A 
mother comes to deliver and dies, when you are just looking at her. Sometimes, she 
loses a child. It is a pity.162
264. The most prevalent diseases in Kuria are malaria, upper respiratory tract infections 
(URTI) and diarrhoea. HIV/AIDS prevalence is high among the productive age 
group (15 to 49). It is estimated to be in the range of 13 percent and is one of the 
highest in Nyanza Province.163
265. The disparities across the provinces in under-5 child mortality rates are remarkably 
unequal. According to the KDHS (2003), Nyanza’s under-5 child mortality rate was 
206, which is much higher than the national average of 115 and is 152 units above 
Central’s rate which was the lowest. Nyanza’s low child survival rate is consistent 
with its being a malaria-endemic area, with a modest bed net coverage of 32 
percent, which includes a small 17 percent of the under-5s sleeping under a net.164 
According to the 2009 KDHS, Nyanza still has the highest levels of both under-5 
and infant mortality rates.165
266. Data accessed by the Commission from 2004 shows that there are also wide 
regional disparities in life expectancy. While life expectancy in Central is 
64.2 years, it is in 44.8 years in Nyanza.166 The death rate among the people in 
Nyanza is high in part because of lack of adequate medical services, particularly 
along Lake Victoria, where the outbreak of water-borne diseases is common. 
While the government cannot be blamed for these diseases in the context of 
economic marginalisation, these diseases compound the effects of economic 
marginalisation because of the burden they place on meagre incomes and limited 
medical facilities. In the case of HIV/AIDS - in respect of which Nyanza has led 
consistently in terms of prevalence - the group most affected is the productive 15 
to 35 years band. While feeding on the high rates of poverty, HIV/AIDS heightens 
the level of poverty among the affected communities thus compounding the 
effects of economic marginalisation.
162 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Kuria/ 25 July  2011/ p.16-17
163 KNCAPD (n 159 above) 7
164 Society for International Development, Readings on Inequality in Kenya: Sectoral Dynamics and Perspectives (2006) p.111
165 Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, Kenya Demographic and Health Survey 2008-09 (2010) p 106. 
166 See SID (n 127 above) 15, 16 & 26
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Education
267. According to the NCAPD report, the total enrolment in primary schools in Kuria 
stood at 90.4 percent for boys and 84 percent for girls in 164 primary schools. 
The population in primary schools was 37,356 constituting 36 percent of the 
total population in 1999. It was expected to increase to 53,063 in 2008. In the 17 
secondary schools, enrolment in 2001 was 2,896, which is only 18.5 percent of 
the total population of secondary school-going (15 to 19) youth. The secondary 
school population stood at 15,151 in 1999 (14.7 percent of the total population), 
implying that during changeover from primary to secondary schools, the drop-
out rates are very high. The major challenge that has resulted is low enrolment in 
schools, a non-schooling gap which is wide and increasing, and the low retention 
in schools due as the high drop-out rate increases poverty levels.167
268. Concerning public education, Kisumu District reflects national trends; a primary 
school enrolment of 69.7 percent and a low secondary school enrolment of 19 
percent.168 Data from 2006 indicates 322 primary schools, (72 in Maseno, 66 in 
Kombewa, 40 in Kadibo and 144 in Winam).169 The teacher/pupil ratio is 1:40. 
Due to the introduction of free primary education in 2003, classes became 
overcrowded, causing increased pressure on teachers. There are slightly more 
boys than girls enrolled within primary education: (51% boys, 49% girls). The 
average attendance rates by sex is similar: 8 years for boys, whereas girls only 
complete 7 years.170 
269. In the early years of independence, the government’s education policy was 
driving manpower needs in the economy, with the desire to demonstrate to the 
public that independence was not a sham but brought real benefits.171 Colonial 
policies produced the result that few Africans had more than four years of 
schooling and as a result there was a huge skills gap that had to be plugged. 
For the first decade following independence, the government focused largely 
on expanding secondary and tertiary education. Through the Africanisation 
programme pronounced in 1965 through Sessional Paper No. 10, mandatory 
quotas (50-50) for inclusion of Africans were imposed on schools previously 
reserved for whites and Asians. 
167 See Kuria District Strategic Plan (n 159 above). 
168 Little Fact Book. (2002). Social Economic & Political Profiles of Kenya’s Districts. Institute of Economic Affairs
169 S Dosker. (2006). What Makes the Difference? Socio-economic and demographic determinants of orphan primary school enrolment 
in Kisumu District, Kenya. (unpublished) MA thesis University of Amsterdam & Great Lakes University of Kenya
170 See S Dosker. (2006). What Makes the Difference? Socio-economic and demographic determinants of orphan primary school 
enrolment in Kisumu District, Kenya. (unpublished) MA thesis University of Amsterdam & Great Lakes University of Kenya p.14-15 
& Central Bureau of Statistics (2002). Department of Kisumu District. Demographical data
171 See Moses Oketch and Caine Rolleston, Policies on free primary school education in Easter Africa: A review of the literature 
Institute of Education, University of London , Monograph No 10 (2007) 10-11
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270. Rolleston and Okech record that by 1978 when Moi took over from Kenyatta, the 
best secondary schools had been concentrated in Central Province, the home 
of Kenyatta and Nyanza.172 The concentration also reflected where Christian 
missionaries had made their bases. Central in particular had benefited from early 
access to education because of penetration of the earliest Christian missionaries.
271. While the Kenyatta government placed emphasis on secondary and tertiary 
education to implement its Africanisation policy, it had identified “ignorance” 
and illiteracy as two of the problems that it needed to tackle through education, 
essentially by expanding primary education. Consequently access to primary 
education became linked to the notion of development. 
272. The First National Development Plan 1964-1969 highlighted the need to 
expand education noting that “education and national development are so 
closely related that it is almost impossible to speak of one without the other”. 
Sessional Paper No. 10 included education as an instrumental part of Kenya’s 
development strategy with emphasis placed on the economic value rather 
than social value of education. Education was to be “regarded as the principal 
means of relieving the shortage of skilled manpower and equalizing economic 
opportunities among all citizens”. Although there was rhetorical commitment 
to universal free primary education in the earliest government development 
plans, primary education was regarded as a long-term objective of the 
education programme, which at the time focused on furnishing manpower 
needs of the economy. 
273. On assuming power, Moi was to shift the education policy fully towards free 
primary education. Under Moi, the development language had shifted from that 
of emphasising secondary education to that of recognising primary education 
as the foundation of economic and national development.173 The government 
would provide universal primary education (UPE) for seven years, free of charge 
to all children of primary-school age; abolish building and other school funds in 
primary schools and provide free milk to primary school children throughout the 
country (Republic of Kenya, 1979:155). The feeding programme was mainly to 
attract pupils from semi-arid areas to attend school. With the economic downturn 
in the early 1990s, elements of UPE disappeared, with fees reintroduced (as 
building levies) and the milk programme ended. UPE would later be reintroduced 
by the NARC government after the 2002 elections.
172 Moses Oketch and Caine Rolleston (n 171 above) p.12
173 Government of Kenya, Fourth National Development Plan, (1979-1983) p.155
90
Volume IIB    Chapter O N E  
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
274. It is fair to note that the expansion in primary education instituted by Moi and 
investment in education generally is one of the main positive legacies of his 
24-year rule. Kenya’s achievement in the development of basic education was 
a showcase among sub-Saharan African countries at the World Conference on 
Education for All in 1990.  However, the effect of the Moi policy of leaning towards 
primary education is that secondary education was undermined. The government 
announced that due to the high cost of secondary education, parents would be 
asked to contribute more and that the bursary scheme at secondary education 
would also be reviewed. The policy was to allow only for a modest expansion in 
secondary education in order to correct the imbalance between districts and 
between boys and girls.174 
275. This policy had the result that investment would shift from Nyanza and Central 
provinces. For many years, these two provinces, especially Nyanza were at the 
top in terms of performance both in primary and secondary level despite the 
political and economic isolation of the region. However, education would suffer 
neglect, in later years especially in Nyanza, with accusations levelled against the 
Moi government that it had set out to undermine education standards in that 
province through a variety of means, including the systematic transfer of the 
best teachers.
276. In Kuria, where education standards have remained very low, perceptions of 
marginalisation, which appear to be borne out of experience, persist. Testimonies 
attributed lack of schools and equipment in the area to “sabotage” and deliberate 
policies pursued since independence that benefited certain parts of the country 
to the exclusion of others. Residents of Kuria feel that other parts of Nyanza 
benefited as the neglect of their region continued. Daniel Chacha, again speaking 
on behalf of his local MP, stated: 
Let us now talk about education injustice and sabotage. While education is the key 
to success, Kuria was intentionally shoved off-target by our neighbours through 
deliberate designs schemed to obliterate our intellectual skills. Government schools 
were concentrated in other parts of Nyanza Province. For instance, in a memorandum 
dated 3 November, 1963 presented to the late President Kenyatta, the Kuria delegation 
complained of among other anomalies, educational marginalisation. For instance, 
the single administrative division in the neighbouring Nyanza Division, the then 
Central Division in South Nyanza District had nine government-aided schools, while 
Kehancha Division had only one partially-aided school, Taranganya secondary school. 
Our schools are extremely poor in performance as they are poorly equipped. All this is 
a result of marginalisation due to that Sessional Paper No.10.175
174 (n 176 above p.12)
175 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Kuria/ 25 July 2011/ p.5
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277. The Ministry of Education recognises that poor infrastructure is one of the major 
barriers to improving access to primary and secondary school education in Kenya. 
Furthermore, experience shows that physical facilities are an important factor in 
both school attendance and achievement.176 Often, the best performing schools 
in national examinations are also the best-equipped in terms of infrastructure. In 
2005, the Kenya government came up with the Kenya Education Sector Support 
Programme (KESSP) whose vision was to provide quality education and training 
to all for development. The main goal of KESSP was to improve education by 
ensuring that there was adequate and proper education infrastructure.177 KESSP 
was created in response to the major backlog of infrastructure provision and 
the shortage of permanent classrooms, particularly in poor districts. It was also 
recognised that the existing infrastructure was generally in poor condition 
due to lack of investment capital, poor construction standards and inadequate 
maintenance.178 
Water and Sanitation
278. According to the KDHS 2003, there are marked provincial differentials in the source 
of drinking water and by extension access to piped water. More than three-quarters 
of the households in Nairobi have piped water in their dwelling, compound, or 
plot compared with only 2 to 4 percent of households in Western, Nyanza, and 
North Eastern provinces.179 According to the same survey, only about 1 percent 
of households in Nyanza had water piped to their houses, compared to about 33 
percent in Nairobi and about 12 percent in Central.180 
279. In recent times, water supply to both villages and municipalities in Nyanza has 
been affected by the water hyacinth through blockage, which lowers the quantity 
of water pumped. Water hyacinth infestations have been reported to lower the 
water quality in Kenya and Uganda (in terms of colour, pH, turbidity (suspended 
solids) and hence increase the treatment costs. 
280. Increased costs are associated with keeping the water intake points free of water 
hyacinth. The villages bordering the Lake Victoria have no access to the lake for 
their water needs at times when the beach is heavily infested with the obnoxious 
weed. Even if they do access the water, it is dirty and often smelly because of the 
rotting mats of the weed. 
176 Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (2005) Kenya Education Sector Support Programme 2005-2010. Nairobi: Ministry 
of Education Science and Technology Pg. ix
177 Minister of Education, Science and Technology (n 176 above).
178 Ministry of Education, Science and Education (n 180 above) 1.
179 KHDS (2003) 24
180 See SID (n 108 above) p.18
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281. Pollution is another major problem. The quality of water in Lake Victoria is threatened 
by the increased inflow of nutrients into the lake from surrounding areas, leading to an 
increase in levels of phosphorous, nitrogen and silt. Also the fivefold increase in algal 
growth since 1960, and the shift in its composition towards the dominant blue green 
algae, reduced the oxygen levels in the lake waters, increased the risks of sickness 
for human and animals drawing water from the lake, clogged water intake filters 
and increased chemical treatment costs for urban centres.181 There has also been an 
increase in pollution of the lake waters as a result of disposal of domestic and industrial 
waste, discharge of raw/untreated sewage and discharge of agro-chemicals among 
others into the lake. Some of these pollutants contain heavy metals and persistent 
organic chemicals, which are very harmful to both human beings and animals.182
282. Flooding poses a serious problem for sanitation in Nyanza. The overflow of 
refuse from the simple pit latrines mostly in use in Nyanza has been the source of 
numerous outbreaks of water-borne disease. According to the Kenya Integrated 
Budget Survey, about 56 percent of urban households in Kenya use pit latrines 
compared to 79 percent of rural households.183 
283. According to the Annual Health Sector Statistics Report of 2008, only 76.3 percent 
of households in Nyanza had toilet facilities compared to 98.7 percent in Nairobi 
and 99.6 percent in Central. Poor sanitation is dangerous as evidenced by the health 
statistics from hospitals in Nyanza, which show that cases of cholera and other 
water-borne diseases like diarrhoea, typhoid and parasitic infections frequently 
occur, especially during the rainy season, when pit latrines get flooded, polluting 
the drinking water resources like wells and rivers.184
Housing
284. According to the KDHS of 2003 and 2008, house ownership in Nyanza is as 
high as 84.6 percent of the population owning a home and 83.9 percent also 
owning the land on which the home stands.185 This is markedly high compared 
to Nairobi, where only 10.4 percent of the population own homes and 8.3 
percent also own the land on which the home stands. Although this feature has 
been praised as positive, given that the percentage of house owners in Nyanza 
is even higher than the national average of 70.5 percent and those owning the 
181 National Environmental Management Authority, Provincial Environment Action Plan: Nyanza Province 2007-2011. Nairobi: NEMA, 
2007 p. 39
182 National Environmental Management Authority (n 181 above) p. 40-43
183 The Water Sector Sanitation Concept- WSSC (Ministry of Water and Irrigation/MWI, Kenya, August 2009)
184 Case Study of Sustainable Sanitation Projects: UDDTs Implemented via CBOs and Water Services Trust Fund, Nyanza, Western 
and other Provinces, Kenya. Nairobi: EU, SIDA, GTZ & BMZ. Available at- http://www.susana.org 
185 KHDS (2003) pp. 24-26
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land on which their home stands being at an average of 64.3 percent,186 these 
figures are misleading because the value of the property is very low. 
285. The national survey does not appear to distinguish types of houses: whether, 
permanent (stone built), semi-permanent (plastered mud walls with iron roof ) 
or mud walls and grass-thatched. Although iron sheet roofs are increasingly 
common, the predominant houses in rural Kenya (outside Nairobi) have mud 
walls and floors and grass-thatched. Since the value of land in Kenya is not 
regulated, there are huge price differentials between land in urban areas (cities 
and towns) and rural (agricultural land). A metre square of land in Nairobi and 
neighbouring provinces of Central and parts of Rift valley is definitely of higher 
value than in rural Nyanza. Price differences exist even within Nairobi. While 
one can obtain one acre of productive land in many parts of rural Kenya for an 
average Sh200,000, a similar piece of land on the outskirts of Nairobi would fetch 
several million shillings. Although land holders may have a secure title, the low 
value of the land undermines its potential use to secure loans for development 
projects.
286. Access to electricity has a wide urban-rural gap, despite the country having had in 
place a rural electrification programme for many years. As of 2004 only 5 percent 
of the households in Nyanza had access to electricity. In Nairobi, 71 percent of 
the households have electricity. This distinctly shows an unfair distribution of 
electricity supply among regions and amounts to marginalisation.187
Economy and Unemployment
287. Unemployment has been a persistent national problem for many years. 
According to Njonjo, unemployment increased from 6.7 percent in 1978 to 25.1 
percent in 1998/1999 before easing to 12.7 percent in 2005/2006. Data shows a 
general trend of increasing unemployment rates over the years. As many people 
lost their jobs through the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) of the early 
1990s, the informal sector became increasingly important, accounting for most 
of the growth recorded: the informal sector is the highest employer followed by 
agriculture and manufacturing. The table below reveals considerable variation in 
unemployment among the different age-groups, with the youth category (15 to 
34) recording relatively higher rates of unemployment.188 
186 See KHDS (2003); SID (n 108 above) 17
187 See Society for International Development (SID) Pulling Apart: Facts and Figures on Inequality in Kenya. Nairobi: SID (n 108 
above) p.19
188 Youth Fact Book, p.128
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Table 9: Youth Unemployment in Kenya between 1978 and 2005/2006
Age Cohort 1978 1986 1998/99 2005/06
15 – 19 26.6 36.2 47 25
20 – 24 18.5 29.2 47.3 24.2
25 – 29 4.8 8.6 25.1 15.7
30 – 34 2 2.7 14.3 7.5
Av 12.97 19.2 33.4 18.1
35 – 39 1.8 2.1 12 7.6
40 – 44 0.7 0.7 11.2 6.4
45 – 49 1.1 2 14.7 5.7
50 – 54 1.4 0.9 18.9 4.7
55 – 59 1.5 4.1 40.6 4
60 – 64 3.2 45.2 2.5
Average 6.7 9.7 25.1 12.7
Source: GOK, Various Statistical Abstracts 
288. Unemployment increased from 6.7 percent in 1978 to 25.1 percent in 1998/1999 
before easing to 12.7 percent in 2005/2006. The table also reveals considerable 
variations in unemployment among different age cohorts, with the youth category 
(15 to 34) recording relatively higher rates of unemployment. According to Omolo 
(unpublished), youth overall unemployment has persistently been at least double the 
national unemployment rate.
289. Unemployment was found to be high in many areas of Nyanza, especially among 
a majority of young school leavers. Idleness among unemployed youth leads 
to crime and other vices. There are inadequate training institutions, denying 
youth the skills required for gainful employment, which coupled with a high 
rate of school drop-outs, becomes the root cause of unemployment.189
290. Over the years, especially during the Moi regime, the manufacturing base, 
industries and cash generating farming activities in Nyanza were allowed to 
collapse. These included the fishing industry, rice farming, cotton and the sugar 
industry, which had previously thrived. Most of these sectors were mismanaged 
by state corporations under which they operated. The centralisation of key 
players in Nairobi did not serve local economies. For example, while Nyanza 
189 Geoffrey Njeru, Mapping the Root Causes of Conflict: An Agenda for Sustainable Conflict Mitigation and Peace Building in Kenya. 
Nairobi: KEC-CJPC and Diakonia- Sweden (2009) p.29
95
Volume  I IB    Chapter O N E 
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
has relied on fishing and Lake Victoria was the mainstay of production, many of 
those who testified lamented the fact that the only fish factory in the country 
was located in Thika, more than 400km away. 
291. Moi cites several projects undertaken by his government in the Nyanza region to 
counter claims of marginalisation, asserting:
[o]ther development projects at the time included the creation of the Lake Basin 
Development Authority (LBDA), with its headquarters in Kisumu. The government 
sourced and installed ultra-modern rice mills of the time at Kibos and Ahero, which 
are still operational to date. An inland container depot was built in Kisumu and a 
Central Bank division was also opened.190
292. Despite Moi’s assertions, claims of marginalisation dominated the hearings. 
The collapse of manufacturing linked to the agricultural sector in the Nyanza 
region was the subject of the majority of testimonies related to economic 
marginalisation. Charles Omondo Oyaya, a one-time cotton farmer and local 
leader stated:
This region is known for a lot of potential. It has some of the best natural resources one 
would need in any given country. We are just sitting at the gulf of Lake Victoria, which 
is rich in fisheries resources. You might want to know that unlike all other resources 
that we have that are productive, until only five years ago, we did not have a fisheries 
policy. We did not have a marketing instrument or structure. The whole of the Lake 
Victoria circuit had no motorable road, no electricity. So, it means that their resource 
could not be used. This region was known for producing the best quality of cotton. 
I say this with confidence because I was involved in this sector. I was shocked at the 
quality of the produce of cotton in this Region. We know that the cotton sector died 
through systematic policy inaction and lack of State support.191
293. Witness Oyaya expressed similar views about the sugar cane industry, arguably 
the most expansive and potentially lucrative sector for both Nyanza and Western:
We know that this is the area that produces sugarcane. All the factories are on their 
knees through receivership. On the contrary, the region has been presented to be 
unproductive, full of lazy people who cannot produce anything. The Kenya Revenue 
Authority records show that actually, Nyanza is number 3 in revenue generation after 
Nairobi, Coast and then you go to Western. In our minds, these are the poorest areas, but 
it does show that they produce but nothing comes back.192
190 Written Submission by Former President Daniel arap Moi to the TJRC (2012) p.23
191 TJRC/ Hansard/Public Hearing/ Kisumu/14 July 2011/ p.22
192 TJRC/ Hansard/Public Hearing/Kisumu/14 July 2011/p. 22
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294. Dr Israel Kodiaga, on behalf of a group of elders decried economic marginalisation, 
alluded to the collapsed textile industry and the under-performing fishing industry:
On the economic front, you will realize then that a lot of industries in Luo Nyanza 
and specifically Kisumu have been allowed to go under as one of the many ways 
of dispossessing the people. Cases in point include, but are not limited to, Kicomi, 
Kisumu Breweries, the fish processing plants […] That there are no roads linking 
the lake region and the fish sources and beaches is a further manifestation of the 
same [marginalisation]. The sugar industry or the sugar factories here are under 
receivership, with heavy debts, but the successive governments have always bailed 
out coffee farmers, tea farmers and dairy farmers in other regions to the neglect of 
cotton and sugar.193
295. While the Commission is aware of the diplomatic dimensions of another dispute, 
it is of the view that the manner in which the government handled the Migingo 
Island dispute appears to reflect attitudes towards the economic situation in the 
region. Those who stated that the dispute is more than just a struggle over a 
patch of land in the lake could be right. The waters around the island are said to 
be some of the richest in terms of fish, which Kenyan fishermen are prevented 
from accessing. 
296. It has been noted that the government has taken action to revive most of the 
sectors that had collapsed in the region, in particular the cotton and rice industries. 
Meanwhile, the sugar industry, perhaps the single largest industry in the Nyanza 
and Western regions, continues to experience serious problems that hold back the 
region’s economy. These problems include corruption, importation of cheap sugar 
and mismanagement.
Infrastructure: Roads
297. A World Bank report rightly links the state of infrastructure and economic welfare 
of households. It suggests that improved infrastructure access is associated with 
movements out of poverty. By way of example, it explains that one reason why 
infrastructure variables are important is that households that are closer to, among 
other things, a motorable road, fertiliser and piped water, grow more crops (in 
absolute number) and are more likely to diversify economic activities in which 
they are engaged and therefore move out of poverty.194  In rural agricultural 
settings, availability of motorable roads increases access to markets and 
agricultural services (for example, extension services). In its province by province 
193 TJRC/ Hansard/Public Hearing / Kisumu/ 19 July 2011/ p.15
194 World Bank World Bank, Kenya Poverty and Inequality Assessment (2008)  viii
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analysis, a World Bank report notes that Nyanza starts off worst on motorable 
roads in 1997, but ends up better than Coast and Rift Valley in 2007 and that 
Central is the best throughout.195
298. Of the roughly 14 500 km of roads in the Lake Victoria basin, only about 1 
200km are paved (8%). These carry more than 80 percent of passengers and 
freight traffic. However, serious under-investment and lack of commitment 
to maintenance have left the road network in a poor state of repair. This 
poor condition contributes to a high rate of road accidents and deaths as 
well as to extensive economic losses in maintenance and repair of vehicles. 
Road safety is further reduced by the operation of matatus, which comprise 
close to 78 percent of the public transport system.196  Moi has rejected claims 
that Nyanza can be regarded as economically marginalised, in part because 
of the poor state of roads, provides as evidence several roads his government 
constructed or improved: Kisumu-Bondo; Awasi-Chemilil; Kibos-Chemilil, Miwani 
(sugar belt road); Migori-Isebania; Luanda-K’Otieno-Sori and Homa Bay-Katito-
Kisumu. While this network had the desired effect of opening up certain areas 
in the region, most are in a poor state of repair. In addition submissions were 
received from residents who claim not to have benefited at all, or who were, in 
their view, ‘accidental beneficiaries’ of projects that did not target their needs.
299. Decrying the poor state or roads in Kuria, one witness stated poignantly:
There has not been any tarmacked road in Kuria since the world was created, apart 
from a small stretch that links Migori to Tanzania through Kuria. This was a road 
constructed in the early 1970s and does not very much serve Kuria, apart from being 
a highway passing through Kuria. It is against such a backdrop that while we embrace 
nationhood, ethnic unity and patriotism, we similarly envisage with gusto unity in 
diversity, unity of purpose and equitable community development that is enshrined 
in devolved systems worldwide.197
300. The assumptions made in this study are borne out by testimonies by residents 
linking the difficulties they experience in accessing services such as health and 
economic stagnation to poor road infrastructure. Lack of motorable roads has 
also hampered access to markets for agricultural produce. Some speakers linked 
lack of investment and the subsequent poor state of infrastructure to politics, 
lack of accountability and corruption. When responding to the question whether 
195 World Bank (n 194 above) p.56
196 National Environment Management Authority (2007); Provincial Environment Action Plan Nyanza Province 2007-2011. Nairobi: 
NEMA p.75
197 TJRC/ Hansard/Public Hearing/Kuria/ 25 July  2011/ p.6
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she was aware that any monies were ever allocated for infrastructure, Phoebe 
Asiyo responded:
During my time in Parliament, you could not trace where monies were sent to by the 
Treasury. Yes, you passed the Bills, but the ministries did whatever they wanted with 
those monies. I will give you an incidence or two that took place in my constituency. 
Money was allocated for rural electrification in Kendu Bay. All the equipment were 
delivered together with the poles and everything. Because I did not quite agree with 
everything the establishment said and I was critical of some of the policies of the 
government, some very big vehicles came and took away all the poles and equipment 
that would have given the people of Kendu Bay electricity in 1980. It is only this year 
that Kendu Bay is getting electricity, yet that allocation was made in 1980. You can 
count how many years it has taken for electrification to get to Kendu Bay.198
301. On the role of politics in economic inclusion, Asiyo’s testimony is instructive:
There was a road from Oyugis to Kendu Bay, which was allocated funds for tarmacking. 
The funds were raised by Tom Mboya when he went to the USA. In 1971, that road 
was supposed to be tarmacked. The money for that road was used to tarmac a road 
in Thika and yet, the road would open up South Nyanza to Tanzania. Up to this 
minute, the road remains un-tarmacked. These are some of the issues we raise when 
we talk about marginalisation of Nyanza Province. Of course, there are much bigger 
issues; for example, the irrigation of Kuja/Miriu. It was intended to provide light and 
irrigation for Nyakach, all the way to Kobala in Rachuonyo. Today, that face of it is out 
and nobody is talking about irrigation, yet it was key for food security in that very 
dry area. So, I am just mentioning the few instances in my constituency where the 
government has withdrawn money and even equipment and taken them to other 
areas. There are much bigger development programmes that were taken away from 
Luo Nyanza to other areas on the pretext of siasa mbaya, maisha mbaya.199 (wrong 
politics, bad life)
302. As noted previously sections, the Commission is convinced that economic 
fortunes of some regions have turned on whether they supported or antagonised 
the regime of the day. While we cannot confirm the veracity of the assertion 
that money intended for a road in Nyanza was diverted to Thika in 1971, Asiyo’s 
testimony seems to bear out the perceived link between politics and economic 
inclusion. It is sad that that the adage, siasa mbaya, maisha mbaya (wrong 
politics, bad life) captures a past reality and experience of Kenya’s people. It 
is hoped that the new constitutional dispensation, with all its stipulations on 
inclusion and social justice, will banish this way of managing national affairs. 
198 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Kisumu/ 14 July  2011/ p.40
199 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Kisumu/ 14 July  2011/ p. 40
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Coast Province
303. The idea that the former Coast Province has been marginalized economically by 
successive governments since independence is a central feature of the historical 
narrative in the context of Kenyan politics, development and gross human 
rights violations. Like the former North Eastern Province, the NFD in general and 
Nyanza, the Coast region could be placed in the category of ‘politically dissident’ 
regions that have suffered marginalisation under successive regimes. However, 
marginalisation experienced in the region, especially when understood from the 
point of view of dispossession, is due also to the confluence of interests arising 
from the region’s strategic value as a principal gateway to the country and the 
East and Central African region and its valued seafront land resources.
304. The Coast consists of 13 districts and 21 constituencies, with a population of 3.3 
million people, according to the 2010 national census. The main ethnic groups 
are the Mijikenda comprising of nine culturally and linguistically inter-related 
sub-groups, among them the Rabai, Chonyi, Giriama, Mjibana, Kauma, Kambe, 
Digo and Duruma. Most of them profess the Christian faith, save for the Digo 
who are mainly Muslims. The non-Mijikenda groups are the Taita-Taveta, Orma, 
Pokomo, Munyoyaya, Malokote, Bajuni, Swahili and people of Arab descent. The 
last three mainly inhabit the coastal towns. In total there are 15 coastal ethnic 
groups and a growing Caucasian community.
305. However, over the years, there has been a significant migration of Kenyan 
citizens from upcountry regions drawn to the Coast in search of better economic 
prospects. The region has therefore become a mosaic of various identities. 
This has had a profound bearing on the socio-economic and political relations 
within the region. Perceptions of marginalisation of the region yielded a sense 
of ‘otherness’ with some ethnic groups being classified as ‘insiders’ or indigenous 
communities, while other communities are routinely referred to as wabara or 
upcountry people.
306. The latter group includes the Kamba, Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya and other groups. Over 
the years, the indigenous communities residing in the Coast have consistently 
complained of exclusion from the hinterland and exploitation of their resources 
without reward. This partly explains political dynamics. The persistent claims 
and allegations of exploitation and exclusion are blamed on the so called non-
indigenous communities commonly referred to as ‘watoka bara’ or wabara (those 
from the hinterland).
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307. The Commission visited various parts of the region and received numerous 
written and oral submissions from residents. Travelling across the region, 
we experienced what Coast communities have for years decried what they 
perceive as marginalisation and under-development of the region. We came 
to the conclusion that as is the case for other marginalized regions, successive 
governments have since independence failed to take tangible action to deal 
with these deep-rooted feelings among the inhabitants of the Coast. One of 
the critical issues, described by some as ‘a ticking time bomb’, is the seemingly 
intractable land question.200 More recently, other factors including the perceived 
mistreatment of residents at the hands of police in the context of Kenya’s 
efforts in the American-led  ‘war on terror’, poor education levels and lack of 
infrastructure have all served to fuel feelings that successive governments do 
not care about the region. We hereby outline findings on marginalisation at the 
Coast. 
Particulars of economic marginalisation
308. To observers, the Coast region embodies a series of paradoxes, which appear 
to summarise the narrative of economic marginalisation of the region. About 
a decade ago, Ali Mazrui, a leading Kenyan scholar characterized Kenya’s Coast 
Province by a number of dichotomies (or “paradoxes”).201 He noted that while 
the Coast has been historically the most “cosmopolitan” of all regions that 
constitute Kenya today, a region which has attracted immigrants from highly 
diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds over several centuries, and which has 
played a central role as a hub of commerce and infrastructure, the region was 
relegated to a secondary position in terms of political and economic power 
in colonial and post-colonial times. Although Mazrui positively described the 
Coast as heterogeneous and being the ‘least tribal’ of the regions of Kenya, 
he observed that it is “among the least ‘national’ in power, influence and 
orientation”. 
309. Mazrui states that despite having provided Kiswahili as a lingua franca, the Coast 
was and continues to be relatively under-developed in modern education, 
infrastructure and other factors. He also notes that although the Coast has not 
been under-represented in the political system in a formal sense because it has 
had a fair number of constituencies measured by population figures, there is a 
persistent perception of being politically marginalized, with people of Coastal 
200 Government of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) 220.
201 AA Mazrui The Kenya Coast: Between Globalization and Marginalization (2000)
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origin holding relatively few executive positions in the central administration, 
civil service and parastatals.202 It is our view that while the participation or 
inclusion of residents of one or other part of the country in the public service 
is not necessarily important for its own sake - and that service delivery is what 
is crucial - we have shown earlier in section one of this chapter that Kenyan 
history demonstrates that economic fortunes of regions or parts of regions have 
historically been tied to proximity to power. Claims of exclusion (whether proved 
or not) should be taken seriously.
310. The Commission heard that for the coastal region, the overall outlook of 
marginalisation does not appear to have changed over decades since independence. 
Residents expressed their disappointment that the change promised by the 
National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) coalition of 2002 that they overwhelmingly 
supported did not materialize with the disintegration of the coalition soon after 
President Kibaki’s election. 
202 G George ‘Changing Political Faces on Kenya’s Coast’ (2008)  Journal of Eastern African Studies 1992-2007
Abeid Abdalla Kavanga, a representative of the Mombasa Republican Council, testifying before the TJRC.
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Testimony on Economic Marginalization
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Hola/12 January 2011/p. 23
People of Tana River, Munyoyaya, Moilana, the Pokomo and the Orma have been denied these 
rights. Our hospital is like rotten house that has been abandoned. It is in a pathetic state, but that 
is where we are admitted. We do not get proper medication. You get a prescription and you are 
told to go and buy medicine from other private hospitals. When you are discharged, you get a 
bill that you cannot afford to pay. That is one right that we have been denied. I have complained. 
I have gone up to the President, and asked for this to be looked into, but it has not been done.
The third issue is about education. I wonder why our schools do not excel in national 
examinations.  Even if they do not do well, there is no institution of higher learning in our 
area.  These are some of problems we face in Tana River. 
Our roads are terrible.  The Garissa-Mombasa road is impassable. I do not know whether your 
officers came here by road or air. If they came by road, I am sure they saw how bad this road 
is.  This has been our concern for many years. Since the time of Mzee Kenyatta, this road has 
remained in the same state up to today. I do not know whether we are waiting for the trumpet 
to be blown so that this road can be tarmacked up to Garsen.
The other issue which I have followed with the authorities is the recruitment of youth into the 
army, police, prisons and AP service. During the recruitment exercise, money changes hands. If 
you cannot part with KSh60,000, your son cannot be employed. We formed a committee of 40 
elders from this district and went to Nairobi to complain about these malpractices, but nothing 
has happened so far. We have not succeeded.
With regard to agriculture, we do not have market for our produce. For example, our mangoes 
rot in the shamba because we cannot sell them. We have struggled to do mango farming on 
a large scale, but with little success. We are also exploited by middlemen from Nairobi. They 
buy them as they wish. Since we have no other market, we sell to them at a throw-away price. 
We have tried to get this market in Nairobi, but all in vain. We have never succeeded. We have 
gone through members of Parliament. We have tried to go through the civil servants, but it has 
not worked out. These are injustices that they have visited upon us in Pokomo land. Businesses 
are dying. This does not just affect the Orma or the Pokomo or the Munyoyaya, but all the 
communities that live in this district. It is the same situation. I am speaking the truth that is 
known among all these communities.
I appeal to this Commission to visit the hospital and see the condition in which it is. It is the same 
government that is in Kenya, but if you look at our schools, starting from Mororo all the way up 
to Kipini they are in pathetic condition. You cannot believe that this is where your children live. 
Will they benefit in any way? Will they get any treatment? For three days, they do not get any 
water yet, that is a boarding secondary school where children are supposed to be learning. If 
you look at the desks, they would rather sit on the cement. The situation is very bad. We are all 
Kenyans and we should be treated equally. We have pleaded for these issues to be addressed, 
but we have not succeeded. Today, you have come here to listen to us and we are not talking 
politics. I am talking about the problems that Tana River is facing and what the elders have tried 
to solve without any success.203
203 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Hola/ 12 January 2011/ p. 2-3
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The land issue
311. Land and associated concerns, which is the subject of a more detailed chapter 
in this report, is one of the region’s most intractable problems, and the centre of 
most marginalisation accounts. Many observers note that the land question is a 
potential trigger of conflict, owing to its peculiar historical and legal origins and 
the impact dispossession has had on the economic fortunes of locals.204 
312. The persistent failure by successive governments to address the issue has not 
helped, but fueled theories of conspiracy of wabara or non-coastal leaders and 
communities. The single most conflictive issue in Coast region is land or rather, the 
loss or lack of access to it, faced by many communities and individuals. In virtually 
all accounts, problems of land access for the local population play a very important, 
if not the dominant role205. The substantive chapter on land deals with this issue on 
detail. A short summary of the historical origins of the problem will suffice here. 
313. The period leading up to the affirmation of protectorate status over East Africa on 
August 15 1895 is important, since it is  during this era that native communities 
(mainly the Mijikenda) were driven out of their ancestral land by Arab invaders 
who were seeking to establish permanent settlements as a way of consolidating 
trade with Asia and the Middle East or looking for slaves.
314. In 1886 when the British and German governments established the 10-mile 
coastal strip or Mwambao and ceded control over it to the sultanate of Zanzibar, the 
assumption was that the sultan’s subjects within the strip would retain rights to 
land vested in the Imperial British East Africa (IBEA Co) and later the British imperial 
government within the strip was restricted to waste and unoccupied land. The 
indigenous communities within the Mwambao were treated as if they did not exist. 
From 1896 up to the period 1908, the British authorities, in their quest to establish 
the full extent of land accorded to `private’ ownership, passed an ordinance for the 
adjudication of claims within the strip.206
315. The land titles ordinance provided at section 17 (1) that all land that would 
not have been claimed within 6 months would be considered as Crown Land. 
Certificates of title issued by the recorder of titles were to be conclusive evidence 
of ownership and could be held up against all persons (including government) 
that the person to whom the certificate is granted is the owner of the land and 
all that was on it.
204 See for instance, M Mwandawiro Land, elections, and conflicts in Kenya’s Coast Province, 
205 M Mwandawiro “Investigation Report on Violence at Kenya’s Coast Province for the NGO Council”  (2009) p.17
206 Land Titles Ordinance(1908)
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316. This ordinance was applied to Malindi, Lamu, and Tana River District. By 1975, this 
ordinance had been applied to the whole of the 10-mile coastal strip. In the process 
of adjudication, only the claims lodged before 1922 were accepted by the recorder 
of titles in a process that dragged on until 1975. Many of these were reportedly 
fraudulent, undocumented and unverified. 
317. As a result, 95 percent of all land within Mwambao was recorded in the name of 
Arab immigrants, the remaining 5 percent being declared Crown Land for lack of 
claims. In what is now Lamu District, claims were lodged only in respect of the 
island. The entire mainland was declared crown land, later government land.
318. During the period leading up to the independence of the Kenyan republic, the 
colonial government in 1926 took measures that ensured that ‘native resources’ 
in this part of the country were delineated `outside’ Mwambao except some 
(13) pockets of land in what is now Kwale District. The indigenous people were 
dispossessed. The independence constitution confirmed and satisfied all land 
rights (regardless of how the land was acquired) before 1 June 1963, thus giving 
legitimacy to a fraudulent and clearly unjust process of expropriation.
319. The Land Titles Act radically altered the concept of land ownership under African 
customary tenure governing the indigenous coastal communities and created 
biases in the land adjudication against the indigenous communities.207 The abuse 
of the Land Titles Act has had a great negative impact on coastal land, leading to 
the area having the largest single concentration of landless indigenous people. 
320. Specifically, this is manifested in the form of “squatters” on government land, 
absentee landlords, tenants-at-will, idle land, mass evictions and lack of access to 
the sea. The slow land adjudication process and delay in finalization of settlement 
programmes have denied the locals secure access to land.208
321. It is maintained that the process of adjudication was riddled with fraud and lacked 
transparency. It did not benefit the locals who had lost their ancestral lands to 
Arabs and the colonial government and subsequently the post-independence 
government. Speaking in relation to Lamu, Hussein Sudi El-Maawy stated:
From the onset of independence, Lamu residents were unaware of the extent of the 
government land; they were precluded from obtaining land; land was provided as 
gifts to individuals who were deemed loyal to that administration, or on the basis of 
ethnicity, thus advocating nepotism within government ranks. These allocations were 
done illegally as the individuals concerned failed to follow the proper procedures as 
207 Cap. 282 Laws of Kenya
208 National Land Policy, articles 184-186. Ministry of Lands, 2007 p.39
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mandated by the Land Acquisition Act. An example is publicizing the distribution of 
land. The people who were involved in this irregular allocation were the surveyors, the 
physical planning officers, the Lamu County Council Chairman, Members of Parliament, 
chiefs, the District Commissioner and the Commissioner of Lands.209
322. Successive post-independence governments maintained the status quo, leaving 
land grievances, particularly the squatter problem unresolved. While local claims 
remained unaddressed, huge tracts of land were leased out to investors (99-year 
leases). One commentator suggests that while much of the Arab-Swahili control 
over coastal land has been eroded in the decades since independence, it was not 
the local communities that profited from this process. 
323. Instead, much land went to large-scale agro-industrial ventures (such as sisal 
estates), the tourist sector or private developers along the ocean shore. Kenyans 
will remember that until the directive was overturned by a court of law in 2012, 
only the President of the Republic of Kenya had the power to allocate beach plots 
and land facing the sea. It is not surprising that most of this land would be allocated 
and is now controlled by well-connected “up-country” Kenyans or foreigners, many 
of them “absentee landlords”. 
324. The report further suggested that a clear indicator that the successive governments 
continue to marginalize the coast area is that the government has not come up with 
a solution to the problem of absentee landlords and that of squatters in Mombasa, 
despite many promises that action would be taken. On assuming power in 2003, 
the NARC government, through a ministerial order from the Ministry for Lands and 
Settlement, directed the termination of payments of ground rent to the landlords until 
the government found a permanent solution to the squatter problem in the ten-mile 
coastal strip. It is reported that the order would change nothing on the ground.
325. The widespread nature of the land problem in Coast was a persistent issue in 
our hearings. It was revisited by the majority of those who interacted with the 
Commission. Speaking in Wundanyi, Frida Mghanga Mwadime recounted: 
Concerning land, this is a critical issue, not only in Taita Taveta County. I think you heard 
of it as you travelled around Coast Province. In Taita Taveta, land is a very crucial issue 
because 63 percent of our land is comprised of a national park, Tsavo East and Tsavo West. 
Thirty three percent of it comprises personal land and ranches. We have sisal estates in Voi 
and in Taveta and those who own this land are senior [well-connected] people. I will not 
mention their names because they are known. In Voi, we also have such land-owners. The 
209 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p.4
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Taita and Taveta are only left with 6 per cent, on which we have constructed our schools, 
dispensaries and it is also used for farming…210
326. The theme of dispossession of ancestral lands by the colonial government and 
post-colonial governments is quite prominent. Tales of dispossession dominated 
submissions from residents. In Taita Taveta, the Commission heard about loss of 
land to national parks, sisal farms and ranches owned by the rich and powerful. It 
was reported that 63 per cent of land in the region is covered by the Tsavo East and 
Tsavo West national parks, while 33 per cent is personal land and ranches owned 
largely by ‘outsiders’. This was ancestral land that had been taken over by the colonial 
government and held under sisal plantations. When the white farmers departed, 
ownership was transferred to rich and powerful people from ‘upcountry’ rather than 
to locals who had been forcibly removed. The testimony by Christopher Nyange 
raises some of these key issues:
The third issue is with regard to land that was taken by people for sisal plantations. This 
area was given as a gift to the people who had helped the British government. Why 
should they have given gifts in Taita when the war was not concerning the Taita? The 
question seemed to be hard for the colonialists to answer. In 1964 when they left, they 
said that the affected areas should be compensated. Money was given but it has never 
reached the Taita or Taveta people. Instead, land was transferred from them to the same 
people. It went to the Kenya government or administration led by Kenyatta, who took 
the compensation money and land as well. The injustice was started by the colonialists. 
All this land should have been given back to the owners.211
327. With respect to one 7 000 acre farm in Taita Taveta forcibly taken in 1932 and 
passed down from a Mr Grogan, to a Mr Patel, then to one Basil Criticos, Kio Kisala, 
who spoke on behalf of the more than 12 000 residents of Titobo and Timoribo 
locations, narrated their travails, with this plea: 
Our expectations are that since the Greek man [Basil Criticos] on that land has no 
grandfather, we ask who passed on that land to him? Our expectation is that the land 
should be reverted back to the citizens. We should occupy it as local residents. The farm 
was taken away in 1932. He should give up the land for us and let it be sub-divided 
among us. I would also like to say that our elders be compensated for guarding his farm 
against invasion by monkeys, forced labour and arbitrary arrests. This was against their 
human rights.
In Taita Taveta, this has left the majority of the population landless and destitute, with 
only six per cent to go around. Very few residents have very small plots that they can call 
their own, yet many do not have titles, which has rendered their hold as tenuous as that 
210 TJRC/Hansard/ Public Hearing/ Wundanyi/24January 2012/ pp.6 - 7
211 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/Wundanyi/24 January 2012/p.26
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of those who squat on big farms. Historical dispossession abounds in other parts of the 
region. As a result of this state of affairs, the squatter problem is serious in the region.212 
328. Expressing views similar to those of Dorothy Munene below, several speakers 
questioned the authenticity of titles of private developers from outside the region, 
while imploring the government to de-gazette the park as well as repossess and 
redistribute privately-held land to locals:
We ask that the land that is owned by the private developers be looked into; how did 
they acquire it? Where did they buy it? If you look at history you will see that when 
Grogan left, none of the presently rich people bought that land. So how did they acquire 
it? This land is supposed to be returned to us. Most of us have one acre and six to ten 
children. Where will these children live? The places are so congested and you would 
think it is Mathare slum. So we are asking the government to look into such land so that 
the land is returned to its rightful owners.213
329. The Commission also heard accounts of residents who lost their land during 
security operations or were forced to move for security reasons, never to recover 
it again. These accounts relate both to the ‘Shifta War’ and subsequent security 
operations in the region. Some residents expressed the view that in certain parts 
of the region such as Lamu, security was used as an excuse to dispossess them 
of their land. According to multiple accounts, many were not restored to their 
land, (which was taken over by the government and subsequently grabbed by 
powerful people) or to recover compensation for the same. 
330. In respect of lack of compensation, one speaker notes as follows:
[…] little consideration has been given to the Lamu community members who were 
forced out of their farm lands in 12 villages, including those in Shakani, Shendeni, 
Vundeni by the security forces during the ‘Shifta War’ in the 1960s. These locals, who 
were, in essence, the first IDPs in independent Kenya, were forced to move into slums 
in Lamu or to migrate to other areas of Kenya and Tanzania and, to date, no form of 
redress has been made.214
331. Submissions from Coast residents invariably link their state of economic marginalisation 
marked by poverty, illiteracy and lack of access to basic services to these varied acts of 
land-related dispossession. The Commission heard of many accounts of police brutality 
and other kinds of mistreatment by the provincial administration, extra-judicial killings, 
arrest and imprisonment of those who agitate for restitution as well as the destruction 
of property and evictions of those who live off these lands with contested titles.
212 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Wundanyi/ 25 January 2012/ p. 21
213 TJRC/ Hansard/ Women Hearing / Wundanyi/ 24 January 2012/ p.7
214 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p. 4
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332. The control of land by absentee landlords has left many local communities 
despondent. Indeed, the landlessness of the native communities of the Coast 
region is mainly responsible for the high levels of poverty. In some areas, local 
communities find it difficult to continue fishing operations as hotels and other 
plot owners have blocked access to roads and beaches.215 In respect of land and 
poverty, the views expressed by Hussein Sudi El-Maawy a retired senior lecturer 
and now a community elder in Lamu are relevant for other parts of the region:
It has been found that the land insecurity and inequitable access to natural resources 
led to vulnerability and is one of the biggest causes of poverty. It, therefore, comes as 
no surprise that Lamu County remains one of the poorest in Kenya. Decades of inherited 
poverty have led to the disenfranchisement of the people; they have been denied access 
right over their land since colonialism; later, they were forced out of their homes during 
the ‘Shifta War’ of the 1960s. Lamu has reached a boiling point after the government 
failed to address the historical injustices as well as curtail ongoing fraudulent land 
procurement in the area.216
333. Residents are of the view that although the new Constitution and the National 
Land Policy have finally acknowledged indigenous ownership of land, and the 
importance of addressing historical injustices in the coastal region, the delayed 
reforms and political blockage towards development of power to manage their 
land and natural resources persist.
Education 
334. Experts suggest that the problem of marginalisation in the education sector at 
the coast has historical roots in the colonial and pre-colonial era. It is notable that 
until shortly before independence in 1963, the provision of education in Kenya 
was segregated along racial lines, with separate systems for European, Asian and 
African pupils. From a national perspective, the Coast region is among the most 
‘under-developed’ areas of Kenya in the provision of education. 
335. This section highlights some of the factors that contribute to the low quality education 
at the Coast together with the more institutional and financial aspects of educational 
policy. The slow uptake of western education upon introduction has had a bearing 
on standards and coverage. At the Coast, western education took long to take 
root. Some reasons have been proposed by experts why this is the case.217 Western 
education, which before World War I was introduced through mission schools, made 
215 M Mwandawiro ‘Usipoziba ufa utajenga ukuta; Land, elections, and conflicts in Kenya’s Coast Province.’ (2009)
216 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p. 3
217 See for instance, Robert Makonde, Challenges of western education in the Coast Province of Kenya, 1890-1963, Unpublished Phd 
Thesis, Columbia University (1980)
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little headway among Muslims, who feared that their children would be proselytized. 
Special consideration was given to the Arab communities in the protectorate, but their 
former slaves and servants, predominantly black Africans, were largely ignored. 
336. State educational policy calling for government-missionary ‘cooperation’ in matters 
concerning African education did little to improve opportunities among Africans in 
the province. Makonde points out that the evidence from this region is especially 
strong in showing how Indians and to a lesser extent Arabs were provided with 
better schools and skills training in preparation for middle-level positions in the 
colonial administration and society. 218
337. In contrast, only a small percentage of African children were encouraged to pursue 
‘industrial’ training. The attempt to ‘reform’ education through measures such as 
those proposed in the Beecher Report served between 1950 and 1963 to mollify 
discontent and prepare for decolonization. The Beecher Committee was appointed 
in 1949 and mandated to investigate, evaluate and report upon the structure and 
functioning of the African educational system.
338. Makonde argues that the implementation of the Beecher Committee report 
allowed the rich districts to benefit far more than the poor ones at the Coast. Within 
the protectorate, almost nothing was done to provide even primary educational 
services to Africans. Further, research suggests that the inequalities inherent in the 
coastal region before colonial rule have not only been sustained but have also 
been exacerbated both by the racially divided and stratified school system and 
by the policies for funding through the Local Native Councils. These policies laid a 
strong foundation for the persistent problem of marginalisation in education.219
339. Today, the Coast remains one of the lowest-literacy regions in the country. According 
to government statistics, both Kwale and Kilifi districts had the highest primary 
school enrolment rate between 2002 and 2004 in the Coast. In the same period, 
Lamu and Taita Taveta districts’ enrolment rates continued to lag behind the other 
districts, although there was a slight improvement in the latter. The low enrolment 
rate is attributed mainly to poor facilities and infrastructure, lack of trained teachers, 
and early marriage of girls, particularly in the rural areas. 
340. Overall, literacy levels are low in the Coast, but are higher in urban than in rural 
areas. According to the Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics, Economic Survey of 
2005, a significant disparity in literacy is found between men and women, with 
218 See for instance, Robert Makonde, Challenges of western education in the Coast Province of Kenya, 1890-1963, Unpublished PhD 
Thesis, Columbia University (1980)
219 Makonde (n 218 as above)
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that of women being much lower. Kilifi, Tana River and Kwale districts have the 
highest disparities between men and women.220
341. In terms of numbers of schools and learning centers, the Kenya Central Bureau 
of Statistics’ Economic Survey of 2005 revealed that inadequacy and distribution 
are a problem. In Kisauni constituency, for example, with a population of over 
300 000, the constituency had only sixteen primary schools and four government 
secondary schools. This contributes to the prevalence of illiteracy in the area, and 
it could be contrasted with Wundanyi constituency (Taita), which has less than 100 
000 people, but only 56 primary schools and 15 government secondary schools.221
342. Lack of facilities and trained teachers in adequate numbers and their impact 
continues to be a persistent complaint. Speaking in relation to Lamu, Mohammed 
Abdikadir portrays a picture that is replicated across the region:
The other issue is poor performance in national examinations. We have a shortage of 
teachers in Lamu. We do not have sufficient equipment. You find that we have schools, 
but no laboratories. The schools do not have sports equipment and libraries. This has 
made it impossible for them to compete effectively against other counties. Out of 47 
counties, we are ranked in the 44th position. This is very sad because we know that our 
children would like to study like others, so that when it comes to employment, they can 
also compete with the rest of the country.222
343. It appears that the government’s policy of free primary education has been 
undermined by lack of teachers and other facilities. Bakari Ali Mohamed concurs:
Everybody is talking about the shortage of teachers in schools. Parents have to employ 
some teachers. Children do not perform well because the school committees are not 
able to employ teachers.223
344. Widespread complaints were recorded that although national universities have 
started their campuses at the Coast, the region does not have a fully-fledged 
university based in Mombasa, the second largest city in Kenya. In addition, until 
the elevation of three coastal schools (Kenyatta High, Mwatate, Mama Ngina Bura 
Girls’ School and Ribe Boys’ High School) to national school status in May 2011, 
there was no single national high school at the Coast. The three were among 
27 other schools granted this status around the country. The grievance appears 
justified given that national schools represent the mark of excellence as they are 
220 Government of Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics, Economic Survey (2005)
221 Kenya State of the Coast Report (2008) : United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the National Environment Management 
Authority
222 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p. 37
223 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/Lamu/9 January 2012/p.51
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often better resourced; admit top performers and generally top national exams 
and the number of those who subsequently get university admission.
345. Lack of education and poor education standards have a direct bearing on economic 
prospects. Residents lamented unemployment among their ranks. Unable to access 
work, many young people resort to joining the security forces. Speaking on behalf 
of the Munyoyaya community from northern Tana River region, Hirsi Sheikh Dulow 
lamented the poor education standards, unemployment and marginalisation of 
that community. In our view, this is the fate of most communities in the Tana River 
region: 
[…] You will be surprised to hear that in Kenya, this community does not have a single 
officer in the government, not even a District Officer. You cannot find a lieutenant in the 
military, the Kenya Police or the Administration Police. Their highest rank would be that 
of sergeant. In terms of education, we do not have officers. The few who are there are 
clerks. This is because of victimization. There is no development in our area and in terms 
of education, we have been so much marginalised that we cannot compete effectively 
with other communities in Kenya and that means that when it comes to employment, 
we encounter problems. It is only recently that we had a few people who have studied 
to degree level, but before that the level of education was so low. So, when we talk of 
being marginalised and receiving no justice in Kenya, we know what we are saying… this 
community has suffered great injustice since independence. Even long after attaining 
independence, they have been victimized. They have not received sufficient education 
and they are left behind on all fronts of development and we think this commission 
should address that … Those who get D grades are unable to go to secondary schools. 
Even if they are not admitted by the Joint Admissions Board (JAB), they are unable to pay 
for the parallel degree courses and because of that, they rush to join the security forces.224
346. The Commission also recorded a persistent complaint that most learning institutions 
such as primary schools, especially in rural coastal areas, experience a severe shortage 
of well-trained teaching staff. It was reported some of these primary schools largely 
depend on untrained teaching staff. For instance a report compiled by Ujamaa, an 
NGO, revealed that 45 percent of teachers in primary schools around Mtaa and Taru 
locations of Kinango District are untrained. These teachers are tasked with the duty 
of teaching examination candidates. While the real impact of this shortage cannot 
be ascertained, it is noted that lack of adequate trained teachers must have a bearing 
on the quality of education and literacy levels in affected areas.
347. Testimonies cited the location of Utalii College in Nairobi as further evidence of 
marginalisation of the region. Utalii is the premier government training college 
in matters of hospitality and tourism. The Coast is largely known as the hub of 
tourism, with tourists-related sectors as its economic mainstay. While we may not 
224 TJRC/ Hansard/ Thematic Hearing / Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p. 12
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be in a position to verify these claims, Coast residents submitted that other than 
the location of the college, numerous other factors - including poor transition rates 
at primary and secondary level - conspired to ensure that they had insignificant 
representation in this important institution. A branch of Utalii was opened at the 
Coast in 2010 and although this is an important development, it is not easy to 
immediately gauge its impact. 
Health
348. The health care system in Kenya comprises of several providers and levels of 
health care provision, mostly the government’s ministries of Medical Services 
and Public Health and Sanitation and private health care providers such as non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs). 
The public health system consists of national referral hospitals, provincial general 
hospitals, district hospitals, health centers and dispensaries. Private health care 
systems are mostly run by NGOs, faith-based organizations (FBOs) and CBOs. 
Health facilities including dispensaries, health centres, district hospitals, provincial 
hospitals, teaching and referral hospitals, private maternity and nursing homes, 
private clinics and voluntary counseling and testing facilities (VCTs) are run by 
government, NGOs, CBOs or FBOs.225
349. Despite the centrality of the Coast region to the Kenyan economy, it records 
the lowest health infrastructural development as seen in the low number of 
healthcare facilities (402 facilities by the end of 2007). A key factor in explaining 
this trend has been attributed to exclusionary practices of the governing elites. 
Other factors include the low levels of adult education and adherence to the 
local ways of defining and maintaining health, some of which are not beneficial. 
High costs hinder the use of modern health services in most parts of the coast 
province. A survey in Kwale District conducted by the Health Management 
Information Systems (HMIS) indicated that high costs hamper the use of modern 
health services for 10 to 30 percent of the population.226 As a result, many people 
have turned to traditional healers. 
350. The survey in Kwale showed that 40 percent of the mothers take their child 
to a traditional healer when they fall sick. Reliance on traditional medicinal 
practitioners is higher if the mother has no formal education or is a Muslim, and if 
the condition of the child is chronic. Reports and anecdotal evidence suggest that 
the Coast region has largely been ignored when it comes to the provision of social 
225 Social policy, development and governance in Kenya; A Profile on Healthcare Provision in Kenya. Research Report by: Keriga, L 
(DPMF Researcher) Professor Bujra, A (Director of Project) Development Policy Management Forum (DPMF)
226 The health facilities provided only include health facilities which have been registered and provided codes by the Ministry of Health.
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amenities.227 The table below shows that the number of government hospitals 
increased considerably by six facilities and government-manned dispensaries by 
24. Urban bias creates inequality in accessing health facilities, with most of them 
located in the better-developed commercial centres such as Mombasa. At the 
district level, Kilifi records two hospitals, while Kwale has no hospital, but has five 
private health clinics. The influx of commercial sex workers too has implications on 
the disease burden, mainly HIV/AIDS, with Mombasa, Malindi and Lamu districts 
the most affected. Insecurity in the districts of Kwale and Likoni also influences the 
distribution of health facilities.
Table 1.1
Year 2003 — 2004 2005 2006 2006 — 2007
No of Health Facilities No of Health Facilities No of Health Facilities
Hospitals
GOK 9 9 15
NGO/Missions 2 2 4
Private 10 10 7
CDF 0
Dispensaries
GOK 152 152 176
NGO/Mission 55 55 57
Private 9 9 38
CDF 63
Health Centres
GOK 32 32 38
NGO/Mission 2 2 2
Private 1 1 2
CDF - - 0
Total 272 272 402
In addition, the table below shows the dire situation that some of the coastal people in 
rural areas face in pursuit of medical care. In Kilifi, the doctor-to-patient ratio was 1 doctor 
to 100 000 patients. This statistic, as one may readily deduce, is a big contributing factor 
to the low quality medical care provided to such rural people.
227 See Abdalla Bujra and Leah Keriga ‘Social policy, development and governance in Kenya; A Profile on Healthcare Provision in 
Kenya’ Development Policy Management Forum (DPMF) 
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Table 1.2
Health Indicator Mombasa Malindi Lamu Kwale Kilifi Taita 
Taveta
Tana River
Doctor: Patient ratio (GOK) 1:3000 1:19502 1:36343 1:82690 1:100000 1:41000 1:95500
No. of health facilities 211 83 5 57 73 44 57
No. of hospitals 9 3 1  2 3 2
No. of nursing homes and h/centers 19 2 - 5 5 7 5
No. of dispensaries 183 24 - 21 22 36
Average distance to Health centre 0.5km 1.5km 5km 30km 5km 10km 50km
Source: Research Report by Leah Keriga and Prof Abdalla Bujra
Infrastructure and social amenities
351. Despite the government having undertaken a number of policy measures to 
develop infrastructure and services for human settlement since the 1970s, a report 
by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the National Environment 
Management Authority (NEMA)228 suggests that very little progress has been 
made in their implementation. Among the policy measures developed to address 
infrastructure and service provision include the ‘Growth Centre Policy’, ‘Rural Trade 
and Production Centre Strategy’, ‘District Focus for Rural Development’ and ‘Slum 
Upgrading’. Even in areas where infrastructure has been built applying these 
policies, the expected results have not been realized. The Growth Centre Policy, for 
instance, has failed to redirect human settlement away from Nairobi and Mombasa 
cities. A result of the ineffective implementation of these policies has been the 
continued poor state of infrastructure in many areas, including coastal rural areas 
(NEMA, 2004).229 
Roads
352. The UN and NEMA-prepared State of the Coast Report230 provided data showing 
that most of the roads in Mombasa District converge on the city due to its 
importance as an industrial and commercial centre. It is relatively well-served 
by both classified and unclassified roads, although the network is not equally 
228 Kenya State of the Coast Report Published in 2008 by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the National 
Environment Management Authority (NEMA)
229 Kenya State of the Coast Report Published in 2008 by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the National 
Environment Management Authority (NEMA)
230 Government of Kenya, 2008. “Kenya State of the Coast Report: Towards the integrated management of Kenya’s coastal and 
marine resources.” UNEP and NEMA, Nairobi p.90 
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distributed, with many of the roads concentrated on the Mombasa/West 
Mainland axis. This has left the North/South mainland areas with few vehicular 
roads, which has been a contributing factor in the relative under-development of 
these parts. 
353. Kwale District has probably the densest road network on the Coast outside 
Mombasa. Kwale has the longest motorable road network of 1129.6 km, followed 
by Mombasa, which has 109.6 km. The bulk of the road network in Kilifi is mainly 
unclassified and seasonal. The same situation is found in Lamu, Tana River and 
Taita Taveta districts. Inadequate repair and maintenance, and uncoordinated 
and unplanned development on road reserves have worsened the situation of 
roads in the region. The Coast is also served by a railway line from Mombasa to 
Nairobi, branching at Voi to serve Taita Taveta township. The railway is used to 
ferry passengers and cargo from the port of Mombasa. 
354. However, Kwale is divided into two unequal parts by the Lunga Lunga-Kihangu-
Silaloni road, with one-third lying to the western side served by unclassified 
roads. The remaining two-thirds lying on the eastern side are well-served by 
classified roads as it is densely populated and economically more significant. 
355. The road network in Kilifi is composed mainly of unclassified roads, nearly all of 
which are impassable during the wet season. Tana River, Lamu and Taita Taveta 
districts have few tarmac roads, the majority of which are usable only in the dry 
season. It has been estimated that nearly 75 percent of all goods imported and 
exported through the port of Mombasa are conveyed by road, underlining the 
critical importance of this means of transport.
Water and Sanitation 
356. Government statistics231 suggest that nearly 50 percent of households at the 
Coast are connected to a reticulated water supply, whereas the national figure 
is only just over 40 percent. The number of connected households is highest on 
Mombasa Island, with nearly 20,000, followed by Mombasa mainland, where 
nearly 13,000 are connected and fewer household numbers for the other centers 
making a total of over 45,000 households connected to a reticulated water supply 
in the Coast. 
357. The water demand is estimated at 190,000m3/day during the low season and 210 
000m3/day during the high tourist season. Despite a number of major sources 
being fully operational, there is a shortage of water due to the high demands 
231 Ministry of Planning and National Development Kwale and Kilifi District Development Plans for 2002-2008
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arising from the growth in population and industry. Consequently, private and 
communal boreholes are quite common supplementary sources of water. Over 
65 percent of the coast population is served by pit latrines. Over 25 percent have 
no provision for domestic waste water whatsoever. These data contrast somewhat 
with national averages where 6 percent have a flush toilet and only 16 percent 
have no provision for sewage disposal whatsoever.
358. The main sources of fresh water in rural areas at the Coast are ground water, surface 
water and roof catchments, according to the UN/NEMA report. Mombasa Island 
and district has the highest number of households with access to piped water 
supply, while Lamu has the lowest. Water demand in the coastal region has been 
growing rapidly over the years. The demand estimated for 1995  was about 200 000 
m3 /day and was projected to rise to 280 000m3 /day by 2010 and 380 000 m3/day 
by 2020 (World Bank, 1996). 
359. The water supply system has been overtaken by demand, which has increased 
rapidly in concert with the growth of the tourism industry and irrigation schemes. 
The main uses of water are domestic (which accounts for 35 percent of the total 
water demand), livestock, irrigation and industry. To address water shortage, 
complementary water sources such as communal boreholes, roof catchments, dams 
and wells are common. There is need, however, for the quantity of groundwater to 
be assessed, and this information to be used for its management.
360. Increasing pollution from domestic sewage and solid waste is the most severe 
pollution challenge in the Kenya Coast, particularly at hotspots located in and 
around main urban centers like Mombasa. Over 65 percent of the Coast has 
no sewage system and is served by septic tanks, soak pits and pit latrines. In 
Mombasa, wastewater management is not adequate and only 10 percent of 
the population is connected to the sewage system. Individual houses have pit 
latrines while most institutions dispose their wastewater in soak pits, which 
contributes to groundwater pollution. Areas served by sewage systems, however, 
also contribute to environmental degradation because treatment works are not 
operational and the sewage is disposed directly into the sea, threatening public 
health and marine life. The situation is compounded by the fact that Kenya does 
not yet have any effluent standards for discharge into the sea, and most water 
projects have been implemented without due consideration of sanitation and 
other complementary infrastructure. The main causes of the poor urban water 
systems in coastal regions include poor planning, mismanagement and lack of 
technical expertise.232
232 World Bank, Meeting the Challenges of Mega Cities in the Developing World: A Working Paper. (1996)
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Housing
361. Most communities at the Coast build houses using mangrove poles, coral rubble, 
palm thatch and clay. Due to high poverty levels and poor development of 
infrastructure, most rural houses are not connected to modern amenities such as 
piped water, electricity and a sewer system.233 In most urban centres, the demand 
for housing has outstripped supply, leading to the spread of slum and squatter 
settlements without clean water supply or sewerage. While rapid urbanization 
and poverty are the main causes of this scenario, the situation is aggravated by 
inappropriate and ineffective regulatory frameworks, limited access to affordable 
finance, high construction costs and inaccessibility to affordable, serviced land. 
As the demand for low-cost housing increases, especially in the urban centres, 
new ways of providing housing need to be sought. The insecurity of titles due to 
unresolved historical land ownership issues has had an impact on the ability of 
residents to develop permanent structures or use the land they occupy to obtain 
loans to invest in economic development.
Gender and marginalisation
362. Gender equity at the Coast hinges heavily on the religious, cultural and economic 
dynamics of the different communities that inhabit the region. Deep-rooted 
religious, traditional and cultural values militate against gender equity with regard 
to opportunities for equitable sharing of household and societal responsibilities, 
inheritance and employment.234 
363. For instance, 48.6 percent and 42 percent of men work in the formal and informal 
sectors respectively. The corresponding figures for women are 34.8 and 55.1 
percent, indicating that men have greater access to livelihood opportunities than 
women. It is however important to note that these aspects indicate marginalisation 
of women by their communities rather than by the state. While this is not directly 
attributable to the state, cultural and religious practices compound the effect of 
marginalisation of women.
Intra-regional disparities
364. It is evident that some areas of the Coast are better endowed than others, due to 
the status of the region (whether a city or not), economic power and/or political 
influence. As the capital city of Coast, Mombasa tends to have an advantage 
over other regions economically, mainly in terms of infrastructure. In healthcare, 
233 Government of Kenya Coast Province Profile (2002) Central Bureau of Statistics, (Unpublished data)
234 J Hoorweg, D Foeken & RA Obudho, Kenya Coast Handbook: Culture, resources and development in East African Littoral (2000)
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Mombasa has about 211 health facilities compared to five found in Lamu District. 
The average distance a person can walk to a health centre in Mombasa is 0.5km 
compared to 50km walked by a patient in Tana River.
365. Most rural areas at the Coast are served by a dilapidated and narrow road 
network, in contrast with urban centers such as Mombasa, Kilifi and Kwale, which 
are well served by both classified and non-classified roads. The better roads are 
generally concentrated around important industrial and commercial centres, 
which also host the air traffic infrastructure. Mombasa has the main airport in 
the Coast region, Moi International Airport, serving international and domestic 
air traffic. Malindi, Lamu and Ukunda have smaller airports, while other towns 
have airstrips. 
366. In terms of CDF allocation, Taita Taveta is allocated more resources compared 
to Mombasa. One argument for this is that Taita Taveta ranks lower on the 
poverty index and has suffered greater marginalisation than urban Mombasa, 
therefore the need for more allocation of resources for development purposes. 
However despite the fact that it receives more money, the county remains one 
of the poorest in the country. Taita Taveta is one of the richest districts in the 
country in terms of land and land-based resources, an integral component of the 
Tsavo economic system, which accommodates more than half of the country’s 
population of elephants. 
367. However, most of its population is entirely dependent on rain-fed agriculture, 
whose production has declined by a factor of two over the last couple of years as 
a result of land degradation, unprecedented droughts and destruction of crops 
by wildlife. Notably, most of the district has some intractable land issues, with 
the huge portion of land owned by non-residents and a large part is the Tsavo 
national park. Some estimates indicate that only 25 percent of the land is held by 
locals.  
368. It can be argued that while CDF has empowered local communities to initiate 
development programmes, the management of these funds must be improved. 
Apart from increasing the amount disbursed to previously marginalized regions, 
cancelling the legacy of marginalisation will require a comprehensive programme 
that includes land reforms, supporting farmers to improve agricultural production 
and a state for locals in the extractive industries.
119
Volume  I IB    Chapter O N E 
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
Western Province
369. In terms of size, Western Province is the second smallest province in Kenya. It 
borders Uganda to the west, Rift Valley to the east and Nyanza Province to the 
south. Under the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, it comprises four counties - Bungoma, 
Busia, Kakamega and Vihiga. The predominant inhabitants of the Western region 
are the Luhya, whose large populations live in the rural areas and agriculture is the 
main economic activity.
370. While all indicators and perceptions among the people have Western region as 
a marginalized region, this characterization has not featured as prominently in 
formal accounts as is the case for Nyanza, Northern Kenya and the Coast regions. 
This depiction is perhaps attributable to a combination of factors, including the 
fact that due to its rich fertile soils that favour agriculture and relative security, 
Western has been perceived to be economically stable, in spite of the high levels 
of poverty.235 
371. Western has often been ignored in classification of marginalized regions in Kenya, 
yet its historical evolution and political fortunes are closely tied with that of 
Nyanza province, which is acknowledged in formal accounts as a marginalized 
region. Both provinces had been administered as one unit during the colonial 
period. In addition to the historical ties, leading figures from both regions shared 
ideological orientation and have jointly been at odds with both the Kenyatta and 
Moi governments. A thriving agricultural sector, both subsistence and cash crop-
based meant that the region had the ability to produce food, and the influence of 
churches in the education sector appear to have cushioned the region from the 
effects of economic marginalisation experienced in Nyanza. It is notable however 
that there has been a diversity in political orientation within the region in the sense 
that while the region remained marginalized, sections of its leadership were co-
opted into government.
372. Backed up with a history that lacks political favour with successive governments 
and the high level of poverty, it is evident that Western Kenya is marginalized. 
Recent trends reveal that the region has been forgotten in the development 
agenda. It would therefore be worthwhile to specifically examine key indicators 
of marginalisation in the region generally and specific parts suffering from gross 
cases of marginalisation. 
235 See PF, Hebinck & M Omosa Chronic Poverty in Rural Western Kenya: Its Identification and Implications for Agricultural 
Development (2003) 
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Socio-economic indicators of economic marginalisation 
Education
373. Education and literacy is one of the indicators for measuring human development. 
According to the Kenya National Adult Literacy Survey report conducted in 2006 
by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics in collaboration with UNESSO,236 regional 
disparities confirm the trend that economically-privileged areas have a higher rate 
of academic achievement compared to poverty-stricken areas. Western Province 
had a 54 percent desired level of mastery and a 57.9 percent minimum level of 
mastery - below the estimated 61.5 percent national literacy level.
374. There are fewer government schools in Western compared to the Rift Valley and 
Central region. Most are mission schools run by religious institutions or private 
schools. The limited input by government in education has adversely affected the 
overall situation of access to education in the region. Only the middle-class and 
upper-class can afford private schools, shutting out the poor. 
375. The quality of education is determined by the quality of teachers and the 
distribution of educational facilities. While this assertion cannot be confirmed, the 
popular perception in the past was that Western was short-changed in terms of the 
quality of teachers posted in the region. In the early 1970s, there were allegations 
that teachers at some schools in did not have the required qualifications, leading 
to low pass marks.237 Records from 1986 show that the number of trained teachers 
in secondary schools in Central, Rift Valley, Eastern and Nyanza was higher than 
that of Western and North Eastern.238 In the late 1990s, Nairobi and Central had the 
highest percentage of qualified teachers, compared to North Eastern and Western. 
376. The rate of pre-primary attendance in Western is encouraging. According to the 2009 
census, Western is ranked third in the country. The population attending primary 
stands at 1 276 295. Western is ranked third with places like Rift Valley, Eastern and 
Nyanza having a higher number of students attending primary school. However, 
the Commission has been unable, from the available sources, to establish what this 
absolute number represents in terms of the percentage of children eligible to attend. 
The transition from pre-primary to primary education in Western is commendable. 
When it comes to secondary school and tertiary education, the province ranks 6th, 
with less than 200 000 and 12 000 respectively attending such schools. 
236 The Kenya National Adult Literacy Survey was conducted in 2006 by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics in collaboration with 
UNESSO. The report presents the findings on the status of literacy in Kenya. The specific objectives include identifying issues that 
relate to adult literacy, obtain comprehensive data on adult literacy and the magnitude of literacy. This report gives the regional 
disparities in the level of literacy in Kenya with places like Nairobi and Central having above75% minimum level of mastery
237 Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard) March 21- May 12, 1972 
238 Educational Statistics Unit, Ministry of Education
121
Volume  I IB    Chapter O N E 
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
377. The transition rate has been inconsistent between 2003 and 2008 following the 
introduction of free primary education by the Kibaki administration. At 2003 
it was 43.8 percent, below the national rate of 52 percent. It increased in 2004 
and 2004 2005 then dropped in 2006. The highest transition was in 2008 where 
the rate rose to 45.7 percent but this was still below the national average of 52 
percent239 In terms of the drop-out rate, Western is ranked second. The national 
dropout rate is 5.4 percent, while that of Western is 8.0 percent.240 Causes of 
drop-outs include poverty, substance abuse and poor performance. 
378. One of the main complaints from residents in relation to education is the lack 
of tertiary institutions to absorb those who graduate from secondary schools as 
Frederick Wandera Oseno from Busia stated: 
Our main problem is that we do not have tertiary institutions and that is why, at the 
moment, if we want to employ 20 nurses, for example, you can get seven. There are 
many students with a mean grade of C+ and above, but because of lack of money, they 
are just at home. When they stay at home, they become idlers. It is high time we got 
a tertiary college around that can accommodate them. The teachers and lecturers to 
those institutions should ensure that the students who have got C+ and above get 
sponsorship and training. Whenever we look for nurses, they are not there because of 
lack of finances to take them to colleges.241
Agriculture and economy: The case of the cotton, rice and fishing industries 
379. During the 1960s and 1970s, agriculture was generally good in the region. The 
situation however changed in the 1980s and 1990s with the deterioration of 
the economy. This period was marked with poor market prices and relapse of 
basic infrastructure.242 Certain parts of Western, especially Busia District, with 
its poorer soils that could sustain only certain crops (cotton and rice), suffered 
more than others as state corporations dealing with them were systematically 
destroyed and bankrupted during the Moi era.  The popular perception is that 
the cash crop industry in Western and Nyanza (especially rice, sugar and cotton) 
was systematically destroyed by the government in order to impoverish the 
region associated with opposition to successive governments. 
380. Cotton farming was introduced in Kenya in the 1900s, by the late 1960s it had been 
introduced to many parts of the country. Cotton has great potential in Western as 
the soil is quite fertile for cotton growing. At one stage, Busia in Western produced 
about 60 000 bales of cotton per year.243 Cotton growing provided employment 
239 Public Expenditure Review: policy for Prosperity Ministry of State for Planning, National Development and Vision 2030
240 G Odipo & O Abagi Efficiency of Primary Education In Kenya: Situational Analysis And Implications For Educational Reform (1997)
241 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Busia/ 1 July 2011/ p. 25-26
242 R. Ochieng (ed) Historical studies and social change in western Kenya: essays in memory of Professor Gideon S. Were (2002) 
243 Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard) 20 June 2006
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opportunities to many people, however there has been a decline in cotton 
production not only in Western, but also in the country generally. In 1991 when the 
Cotton Lint and Seed Board was privatized, the industry suffered major challenges 
which led to the closure of major ginneries. The ginneries previously owned by the 
Cotton Board were later sold to private entrepreneurs. In 1992, the government 
made efforts to revive cotton growing in Western and Nyanza with two ginneries 
built at Asembo Bay and Malakisi. Despite these efforts, the mismanagement and 
controversial privatization of the Cotton Board during the Moi regime adversely 
affected the industry.
381. Residents lamented the neglect the cotton industry suffered, partly attributing it to 
government policies and the location of related factories away from the region of 
production. Witness Frederick Wandera Oseno, told the public hearings in Busia that:
Samia and Busia are well-known for cotton farming and it has helped us in education. 
Interestingly, cotton farming is done in Busia County and the industry is (sic) in Eldoret. 
The second industry is being taken to Kisumu. That has deteriorated cotton farming, 
with low prices and no markets for the cotton. When farmers saw all those violations, 
some could not continue with cotton farming. I cannot blame the past government. If 
there was somebody to ensure that there is ready market and good prices of cotton, we 
would not be having many deaths and poverty in Samia and Busia counties.244
382. The government initiated several rice irrigation schemes in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The largest one is the Mwea irrigation scheme in Kirinyaga, Central Kenya. There 
is also the Ahero scheme in Kisumu County and the Bunyala irrigation scheme in 
Busia, which was launched in 1968. Mismanagement and lack of investment by the 
National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB) brought the industry to its knees in the 
late 1980s and 1990s. Scheme operations eventually stalled in 1999 due to depletion 
of the revolving funds following the 1998 Mwea crisis. Ahero also collapsed, leaving 
Mwea as the only major functional rice irrigation scheme in Kenya.
383. As in Nyanza, fishing is an important economic activity in the Western region, 
where it is practiced on a commercial and subsistence scale in Budalang’i and 
Funyula constituencies in Busia District which border Lake Victoria. Despite its 
importance, the industry has suffered decades of neglect: fishermen receive little 
or no state support to buy equipment, cooling facilities lack, marketing is scanty 
and there are no local factories to process fish. Speaking in Busia, witness Zainabu 
Muyoti  complained:
We have fish, but we do not have cold storage facilities. We are requesting this 
Commission to make suggestions that we are provided with cold storage facilities. If we 
had cold storage facilities, we would bargain on the prices. But when third parties come 
244 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Busia/ 1 July 2011/ pp. 25-26
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into play, they dictate and we are afraid that our fish will go bad and nobody will buy 
them. So, we normally sell them at a throwaway price.245
384. There are complaints that government response to the hyacinth weed menace 
that has adversely affected fishing activities has been less than adequate. 
Recently, the minister in charge of Fisheries acknowledged that the government 
has done very little to revive the fishing industry in Western Kenya. It is reported 
that today, pond-based fishing in other parts of the country could have overtaken 
Nyanza and Western in overall yields following government investment in fishing 
ponds. 
Land
385. While land title issues in most of Western are settled, conflict remains in parts 
previously vacated by white settlers and where government initiated settlement 
schemes, especially in Mt Elgon and Bungoma. The land issue as it relates to 
conflicts in Mt Elgon and Bungoma is the subject of a separate chapter in this 
report. While large-scale land-related conflicts such as those witnessed in the 
Rift Valley and Coast regions are not common in Western, land fragmentation is 
however a problem due to population pressure. This situation is a result of the 
small land sizes which averages is 1.1 hectares per household compared to land 
size averages in the Rift Valley that stands at 2.6 hectares per household.246 
Security and economic marginalisation
386. Western is home to the agriculturally-rich Mt Elgon District, which has been at the 
centre of long-standing disputes over land. What initially started as land disputes 
soon spread to criminal acts. A militia group called the Sabaot Land Defense Forces 
(SLDF), whose activities are described in detail elsewhere in this Report, had been 
blamed for committing most of these criminal acts. The motive of the group is 
reportedly to seek redress for alleged injustice during land distribution in the 
Chebyuk settlement scheme. Mt Elgon has suffered from high rates of insecurity 
and people have lived in fear due to the continued violence. 
367. As a result of the insecurity in Mt Elgon region, people lack basic medical services, 
clothing, and sufficient food.247 Other socio-economic effects of the violence in 
Mt Elgon include poor agricultural production as well as threats to food security. 
Mass displacement and creation of new groups of destitute IDPs has resulted, 
with competition over basic goods and services such as water, food and shelter. 
245 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Busia/ 5 July 2011/ p. 44
246 The emergence of land markets in Africa: assessing the impacts on poverty, equity, and efficiency Stein Terje Holden, Keijiro 
Otsuka, Frank Place .Washington DC : Resource for the Future (2009)
247 http://www.msf.org/source/countries/africa/kenya/2008/MSF_MtElgon_May2008.pdf Mount Elgon. Does Anybody Care (2008)
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According to humanitarian organizations such as the Kenya Red Cross Society, 
lack of adequate water has caused health problems. Coupled with inadequate 
sanitation supplies, the situation gets worse. Due to the violence and insecurity, 
the provision of medical care by the government has starkly declined. Schools 
have also been affected by the rise in insecurity. Many children have been 
forced to stay out of school, while others have transferred to other schools in 
safer areas.
388. Due to the escalating violence, the Kenya Army was deployed in 2008 to calm the 
situation in response to the atrocities allegedly committed by the SLDF. However, 
the army, which was supposed to protect people in this region, was accused of 
committing various human rights abuses on the people of Mt Elgon, leading to 
fear by the local people of both the militia and the army.
389. Other than insecurity in Mt Elgon, other parts of the Western have over the years 
experienced insecurity linked either to post-election violence or ordinary criminal 
activities. In the 1980s and 1990s, economic activity was disrupted in many parts 
of Western, especially in Kakamega, due to the activities of a militia group/gang 
called ‘Msumbiji’.  Before 2007, Western experienced cycles of political violence 
and land clashes in 1992 and 1997. According to the Commission of Inquiry into 
the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) of 2007 chaired by Justice Philip Waki, the 
violence experienced in Western is not well-understood or fully-acknowledged. 
This violence posed great security challenges in Western, with great loss of life. 
According to the CIPEV report, areas that were most affected were Busia, Vihiga, 
Kakamega, Lugari, Mumias and Mt Elgon districts. Violence took the form of 
killings, mostly by security forces, looting and destruction of property. Overall, the 
violence as in previous cycles has had a serious socio-economic impact because of 
the depressed local economy. 
Health, water, sanitation and housing
390. According to the National Health Survey, Western has low numbers of health 
facilities.248 Many hospitals are mission hospitals, clearly indicating the absence 
of or a limited role of government in the sector. A Medical Services ministry 
survey reveals that there are eight district hospitals, 13 sub-district hospitals, one 
rural training health center, three rural demonstration training health centers, 56 
health centers, 158 dispensaries and one provincial general hospital in Western. 
Child and under-5 mortality is very high, with 121 children under-5 dying per 
1 000 births and closely follows Nyanza, where 149 out of 1 000 children die.249 
248 Social Policy, Development and Governance in Kenya 
249 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey (2008-09)
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In 2003, Western ranked third in child mortality.250 A witness noted the lack of 
adequate health facilities in one part of Kakamega, which reflects a region-wide 
trend:
We really do not have very many health centres. The few that exist do not have enough doctors 
and nurses. There is only one doctor with a few assistants at the nearby hospital and they 
do not work on Sundays. It is also difficult to run this hospital because it lacks water. Blood 
transfusion is not done at Shibuye health centre. This service is only available at Kakamega 
General Hospital. If it is at night, like yesterday there was a woman who was bleeding and she 
was told to pay money to be transported from Shibuye health centre to Kakamega General 
Hospital. This lady continued bleeding until she lost the child. The lady is still alive. They had 
gone looking for money, but when they came back she had lost her baby through miscarriage. 
She was supposed to be transferred to Kakamega General Hospital for proper medical attention. 
So, it becomes very difficult. We die because of petty things which the government would have 
helped us to manage.251
391. The 2009 census records that Western, Nyanza and North Eastern provinces have 
the lowest supply of piped water. Only 7 percent of the households in Western 
can access piped water, despite of the presence of numerous permanent rivers 
and other water sources that can be tapped and processed. The access rate is 
below the national average, which stands at ()percent. In terms of water quality, 
the number of people who access water is much lower. At the county level, there 
are several disparities. Lugari District for example, suffers from diminished access 
to safe drinking water and sanitation at only 16.4 percent, which is way below the 
national rank which stands at 53 percent.252
392. Over the years, the availability of safe water for drinking has been below the Kenyan 
average percentage. Sanitation both in homes and in urban centers remains poor in 
Western. The 2009 census notes that ‘poor sanitary conditions impacts on prevailing 
health standards and development’. The percentage of the main mode of human 
waste disposal in Western is alarming - only 0.9 percent of the households have 
access to a main sewer, 0.7 percent to a septic tank and 0.1 percent to a cesspool. 
Western however ranks highest in the percentage of households with a pit latrine, 
with 95.5 of the households having pit latrines. While this is a good thing, serious 
health problems are posed by pit latrines in areas like Busia that experience periodic 
flooding during the long rainy season.
393. According to the Demographic and Health Survey, the percentage of home 
ownership in Western is above the national one, with 89.6 percent of the people 
250 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey (n 265above)
251 TJRC/ Hansard/ Women’s Hearing / Kakamega/ 28 June 2011/ p. 22
252 Little Fact Book : Social Economic & Political Profiles of Kenya’s Districts (2002)
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owning houses and 7.8 percent paying rent.253 However, as in the case of Nyanza, 
these are mostly non-permanent houses made of mud walls and floors with grass 
thatches or iron sheet roofing.
Roads
394. According to NEMA, infrastructure in Western is fairly well developed and evenly 
distributed.254 From our travels as a commission, this statement contradicts the 
reality on the ground. It also does not align with perceptions of the residents who 
feel that the poor state of roads is a clear indicator of the marginalisation that the 
region has suffered. Overall, the road network can be said to be bad in this region. 
In fact, it is the most cited indicator to demonstrate that the Western region is 
marginalized. 
395. There are some tarmac roads, all-weather roads and a railway line (the main Kenya 
Uganda Railway) that has been out of commission for more than a decade. The rainy 
season has however spoilt the state of roads, which are in a bad state of disrepair. 
In addition, huge trucks used for transportation to neighbouring countries are a 
major cause of deterioration of the condition of roads. The Parliamentary Committee 
on Transport and Housing blames the Roads ministry for the poor state of roads in 
Western and Nyanza, despite the government allocating funds for rehabilitation in 
the whole country.
396. On the road infrastructure, Mary Emadau from Teso region made remarks which 
apply to the whole of Busia and neigbouring counties:
Teso has never had a tarmacked road except the Trans-Africa road. We have been told 
from time to time that the road that joins us with Busia and Mt Elgon is supposed to be 
tarmacked but even today, I used it and it is a murram road.255
397. The lack of all-weather roads is a countywide problem. Witness Zainabu Muyoti 
weighed in during the public hearings in Busia:
We are requesting that as a country we want a road to come from Amurai passing 
through every constituency going through Amukura, Nambale, Butula, Funyula to go to 
Port Victoria. If women and men do business, we will interact with all these communities. 
Busia people do business in Amagoro. Let us work together and do business together 
to bring peace among us.256
398. The same situation exists in other counties which have minimal coverage of tarmac 
roads. In Kakamega, a case was made by one of the witnesses, a Ms Machoto and 
253 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey, 2003
254 NEMA Provincial Environmental Action Plan (2007-2011) Western Province
255 TJRC/ Hansard/ Women’s Hearing / Busia 5 July 2011/ p. 7
256 TJRC/ Hansard/ Women’s Hearing / Busia/ 5 July 2011/ p. 44
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others on the impact of lack of infrastructure on health and development:
On issue of infrastructure, our roads are very bad.  The Sigalagala to Butere road, for 
example, is impassable. I live in Isulu. This road is not passable. Sometimes expectant 
women deliver their babies on the roadside before reaching hospitals. This is very 
dangerous for our wives and daughters. The nearest facility like Shibuye health centre 
does not have enough facilities. Patients go all the way to Kakamega General Hospital 
where they can get proper medical attention. However, to visit Kakamega General 
Hospital, you need to have transport. If you want to take your patient to this hospital 
at night, the transport cost is normally between Sh5 000 and Sh7 000. Our people are 
poor and they cannot afford this mode of transport. We are endangering their lives. 
My recommendation is that we equip all our district health centres and hospitals so 
that they serve our sick people.257
Employment
399. Nairobi, Coast, Western and North Eastern provinces have more people who 
are unemployed than employed.258 The unemployment rate of persons aged 
between 15 and 64 years dropped from 27.5 percent in 1998/99 to 9.6 percent in 
2005/06.259 The limited number of factories employs only a few people. In Kenya, 
youth unemployment is a major development issue. Unemployment of the youth in 
Western is also high. The major challenges posed by unemployment are participation 
in social ills and high dependency rates.
257 TJRC/ Hansard/ Women’s Hearing / Kakamega/ 28 June 2011/ p. 22
258 Pulling Apart Facts and Figures on Inequality (2004)
259 http://mirror.undp.org/kenya/NESCUnemploymentinKenya.pdf
Commissioner Prof. Ojienda walking to a commission forum in Mt Elgon.
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Busia County Case Study
400. Busier comprises five constituencies of Budalang’i, Amagoro, Nambale, Butula 
and Funyula. Like in the entire Western region, the main economic activity of 
Busia is agriculture. Fishing is the second most important economic activity. It is 
the poorest county in Western.260 According to the Kenya poverty maps, about 
two-thirds of the county’s residents are unable to meet their basic minimum 
requirements.261 Busia is one of the counties faced with many challenges, high 
poverty levels262, the complex effects of HIV/AIDS, a high TB burden and a high 
HIV/AIDS prevalence rate. The rate of mortality in Busia is relatively high with the 
key causes being malaria, HIV/AIDS, anaemia, pneumonia and gastro-enteritis.263 
The major development challenges and constraints facing the county include 
increased food insecurity, declining levels of agricultural production and poor 
conditions of roads.
401. Busia has various sources of water including Lake Victoria and two main rivers, 
Nzoia and Soi. In relation to piped water, access is different in rural and urban 
areas. The urban areas in Busia tend to have a higher percentage of access to 
piped water (14.7 %), compared to rural households (3.6 %). These differences are 
also visible in access to main sewer and septic tank with urban areas having 4.4 
percent access compared to 0.2 percent access in rural areas.264 
402. Infrastructural facilities in Busia are generally under-developed. Most of the 
roads are impassable during the rainy season.265 Regular flooding in areas like 
Budalang’i worsens this situation. Lack of industries inhibits infrastructural 
development and the low supply of energy is a major impediment to 
industrialization. Most of the energy needs of households are met through 
use of firewood, posing negative environmental consequences as it leads to 
depletion of forest cover. Industrialization is a major factor in the provision 
of infrastructure since areas with industries attract construction of roads, 
settlement and investment opportunities. For agricultural development to 
thrive in Busia, it is necessary that industries are built to facilitate development 
in terms of raw materials, agro-processing, value addition sales and marketing 
of produce.
260 Little Fact Book. (2002). Social Economic & Political Profiles of Kenya’s Districts. Institute of Economic Affairs
261 CBS (2003). Geographical Dimensions of Well-Being in Kenya. Who and Where are the poor? From Districts to Locations. Volume 
1. Figures in parentheses in the table are the poverty gaps, expressed as a percentage of those living below the poverty line
262 The poverty index stands at 68 percent
263 http://www.husobusia.org/
264 http://opendata.go.ke/Counties/Busia-Fact-Sheet/snf5-d89k
265 Food Security District Profile, District Profiles for 23 Districts(2007) FAO Kenya
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403. Agriculture is the main economic activity in Busia, contributing nearly 36 percent 
of household income and employing over 81 percent of the workforce. The 
major cash crops are rice, sugarcane, cotton and coffee. Sugarcane and coffee 
production are carried out in the high-potential areas of Butula and Nambale. 
The unemployment rate in Busia stands at 13.65 percent.
404. Fishing is the second most important economic activity in Busia County. The 
Busia people’s livelihoods largely depend on agriculture and fishing, which 
provides employment. The major problem fishermen in Busia face is cross-border 
conflict between fishermen in Kenya and Ugandan security forces. Robbery on 
the lake has also become a major issue because armed pirates/robbers from 
Uganda often steal fishing boats and fish.266 Other challenges of fishing in Busia 
include lack of storage facilities, poor marketing infrastructure and lack of a fish 
processing plant.
405. Busia still has a high prevalence of absolute poverty. According to the Kenya 
poverty maps, about two-thirds of the district’s residents are unable to meet 
their basic minimum requirements and the majority of the populace lack proper 
employment. The informal sector accounts for a large number of employment 
opportunities. At the divisional level, the poverty incidence ranges from 63 
percent to 74 percent, with Budalang’i, Funyula and Butula divisions registering 
the highest proportions. The major causes of deprivation are low and poor 
utilization of agricultural land, collapse of the cotton industry, lack of organized 
marketing channels and widespread unemployment. 
406. Despite agriculture being the main economic activity, food shortage is a major 
concern. Cases of malnutrition are also common and are attributed to the low 
purchasing power due to widespread poverty and over-reliance on starchy foods. 
Generally, food insecurity is common in Funyula and Budalang’i divisions that 
experience flooding annually.
407. Adequate and affordable health services lack in Busia, with few public health 
facilities. Statistics show that in 2003 there were 29 health facilities in the district; 
two government hospitals, 17 dispensaries, six health centers and 10 private or 
mission hospitals. Busia, Funyula and Budalang’i had hospitals with resident 
doctors.267 The number of private or mission hospitals supersedes that of 
government hospitals, evidence of limited government support to develop health 
266 Special Report: Kenya’s Lake Region Short Rains Rapid Food Security Assessment (2006) USAID
267 Kenya Country Programme Annual Report (2003)
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in Busia. Morbidity rates in Busia differ for men and women, with women having a 
higher morbidity rate (50 %) than men (46 %).268 Infant mortality stands at 75/1000, 
while life expectancy is at 210/1000, with a crude death rate of 23/1000.
408. Busia has low enrollment in schools, attributed to high poverty levels. A 
large number of children are school drop-outs as evidenced by the levels of 
education attainment in the region as well as transition from one level to the 
next. Statistics in 2009 show that the transition from pre-primary education 
to primary education is very encouraging in Busia, with 16.4 percent of the 
school-going population attaining pre-primary education and 72 percent 
primary education. It is the transition from primary to secondary education 
that is worrying. 
409. Out of the 72.3 percent of those that attain primary education, only 9.8 percent 
attain secondary education; while only 1.4 attain tertiary education. Some of 
the direct consequences of dropping out are the use of child labor and early 
marriages. Apart from the discouraging levels of education attainment, the 
level of school performance in national exams is also very low. This is attributed 
to factors such as poverty, inadequate infrastructure: classrooms, learning 
materials and a limited number of schools that increases distances for school-
going children. In addition, the student-teacher ratio is very low. This is a major 
development challenge. 
 
410. Floods in some parts of Kenya including Kano plains in Nyanza and Budalang’i in 
Busia, Western have become a major development challenge. The Nzoia River in 
Budalang’i is annually prone to flooding and many people are displaced during 
these periods. More than 28 000 families were affected by floods in Budalang’i in 
2007 with 6 000 to 8 000 displaced and 2 000 marooned. 
411. Negative economic and social impacts of floods include reduced or hampered 
economic growth and development, damage to buildings, roads and other 
infrastructure, loss of lives from drowning, outbreak of diseases, contamination of 
water and loss of food due to destruction of crops. Flood control in this area is 
dependent on dykes. The 1997 El-nino rains destroyed some of the dykes in this 
area. Over the years, the maintenance and rehabilitation of the dykes has been 
poor, posing serious challenges for future flood control. The persistence over 
many decades of a problem that can be solved has consigned many residents of 
Budalang’i to a life of destitution.
268 http://opendata.go.ke/Counties/Busia-Fact-Sheet/snf5-d89k
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North Rift
412. The North Rift region comprises districts of the Rift Valley to the north of Nakuru 
district and is generally accepted to comprise the districts of Turkana, West Pokot, 
Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu, Marakwet, Baringo, and Samburu. This area suffers from 
developmental and educational neglect, and violence from cattle rustling, both 
within Kenya and across the border with Uganda, Ethiopia, and Sudan.
413. Marginalized under the colonial government and isolated politically and 
developmentally after independence, the North Rift shares characteristics of 
pastoralist poverty with other arid and semi-arid land (ASAL) districts such as 
Marsabit, Moyale, Mandera, and Wajir.269 Unlike the named districts from the former 
North Eastern and Upper Eastern provinces,  the marginalisation of Turkana, and 
by extension the North Rift, is due in large part to its distance from seat of the 
central government in Nairobi, rather than perceived ‘political incorrectness’ or 
‘political dissidence’.
414. Turkana District, part of ASALs, is arguably the most challenging region of Northern 
Kenya and the people of Turkana are some of the most marginalized people living 
in the country. According to the 2009 census, the Turkana number close to one 
million, approximately 2.5 percent of the Kenyan population. Turkana comprises 
of 6 districts: Turkana North, Turkana Central, Turkana West, West Pokot and Pokot 
North and has an area of 77 000 square kilometers. It shares international borders 
with the three countries of Ethiopia, Uganda and Southern Sudan. 
415. A combination of climate and conflict makes the Turkana region of Kenya a very 
difficult place to live in, and results in high levels of malnutrition, poverty and 
unrest. Nearly 75 percent of the population relies on food aid to survive. The 
region’s remote location and poor infrastructure make the area inaccessible to 
most government and development efforts to improve the local economy and help 
people achieve a better way of life for themselves. Increasing drought has obliged 
pastoralists to travel further in their search for pasture and water. This often brings 
them into conflict with rival pastoralist communities such as the Pokot.270 
416. Turkana is home to Kakuma, one of the largest refugee camps in Kenya. The 
communities hosting the camp, like their counterparts in Fafi and Lagdera districts 
which are home to the other major camps, are characterized by widespread 
269 Taya Weiss, Guns in the Borderlands, North Rift (2006), [Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria]. Available at- www.iss.co.za/pubs/
monographs
270 Northern Kenya caucus- http://nkcaucus.blogspot.com/search/label/United States African Development Foundation (USADF)
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poverty, with absolute poverty at 74 percent; a high level of dependency on relief 
food and scarcity of water supply both for livestock and human consumption. 
417. According to a UN report, since the establishment of the refugee camp in 1992 
adjacent to Kakuma town in Turkana North and Dadaab/Fafi, there has been an 
increase in rural-urban migration in search of food, employment and other services 
in the camps. This has resulted in increased urban destitution, family separation, 
child labour, and increased petty crimes, leading to a significant breakdown of 
the social fabric. The presence of the camp resulted in an increase in population 
density in the area surrounding the camp. 
418. For example the population of Kakuma town grew from 5 000 in 1991 to 
approximately 40 000 by the year 2000. The population of Dadaab refugee camp 
now stands at almost 200 000.271 The increased feeling of marginalisation among 
the Turkana and Dadaab people compounds the problem. The community 
views the international agencies with wariness, and believes that the refugees 
are leading a better life than they are, characterized by their adequate access 
to social services. Hostilities, latent and violent conflicts often characterize the 
relationship between the two communities.272
Insecurity and marginalization
419. Insecurity is rife in the North Rift region. Cross-border conflicts between Kenya, 
Uganda, Ethiopia and Southern Sudan have continued without or with limited 
government action. Neigbouring foreign armies attacking communities in the 
North Rift and even shelling bombs by rockets have continued without any 
government intervention. Inter-district boundaries not marked by councils lead 
to conflicts among communities. These inter-district conflicts are encouraged by 
the absence of government protection or by insufficient, demoralized security 
personnel at the outpost:273
Turkana borders Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Pokot on the southern part and no border 
is peaceful. Turkana is even protecting these borders for the country, but massacres have 
been happening all over. Much has been discussed in different meetings. The government 
has also sometimes come down, but little has been done. Sometimes we speak to the 
government to put offices to guard the border, but you find that little is done. Recently 
we had some attacks at Todonyang’, Lokori and Kainuk in the months of June and July, 
whereby even policemen were killed. These were husbands and fathers. So, we feel that 
the government of Kenya is lacking somewhere.274
271 Refugee Host Communities - Joint Agencies Project. Available at- http://mirror.undp.org
272 Refugee Host Communities - Joint Agencies Project. Available at - http://mirror.undp.org
273 Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs, April, 2010 Report of the Committee of National Elders Conference 
on Cohesion and Integration. Nairobi: Government Printers. 210
274 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Lodwar/ 10 October 2011/ p. 11
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420. Small arms and light weapons’ proliferation has made traditional raiding (cattle 
rustling) a commercial venture, more deadly and severe. Small arms including 
automatic and semi-automatic weapons have become widely available and are 
increasingly used in the pastoralist districts. These weapons have come from a 
variety of sources, including conflict-prone neighbouring countries such as Sudan, 
Somalia, Ethiopia and Northern Uganda. With each community constrained to arm 
itself due to the inability or unwillingness of the government to assure residents of 
security, local “arms races” are created.275 There is inadequate policing of pastoralists 
areas as both the national and district police and security forces are either unable 
or are unwilling to confront cattle rustlers who have more often than not struck 
with impunity. The state’s obligation and duty to provide security to her citizens is 
conspicuously under siege in Northern Kenya. This has greatly contributed to the 
spiraling gun culture, self-defence and retaliation missions. The arming of local 
vigilante groups, popularly known as ‘Home Guards’ by the state, in response to 
security problems, has exacerbated the cattle rustling conflict rather than ease the 
situation. There are credible reports suggesting that legal state arms issued to these 
groups have been used in criminal activities, including cattle rustling raids.276 
Political exclusion and marginalisation
421. The North Rift region has experienced political marginalisation since the colonial 
period. Regarded as part of the Northern Frontier region (together with North 
Eastern Province), the closed-area policy imposed by the colonial regime isolated 
the region from the rest of the country and made it impenetrable by ‘outsiders’. 
Later, successive regimes imposed the kipande, a pass system or a traveling permit 
that made it difficult for the community to interact with the rest of the country. The 
colonial administration suppressed any form of development, terming residents as 
‘fierce’, ‘savage’, ‘warlike’ and had to be separated through a variety of restrictions.277 
In contemporary times, the people of North Rift have complained that they are 
inadequately represented in national political institutions and the public service 
since independence. It is a glaring contradiction that in representation in Parliament, 
a vast county like Turkana with an area covering 77,000 square kilometers with a 
population of one million, only has three constituencies. Furthermore, for a long 
time it has been administered as one district until recently, when President Kibaki 
created new districts. Equally, new constituencies were proposed for the region by 
the Interim Independent Boundaries Review Commission (IIBRC) and later ratified 
by its successor, the Independent Elections and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), 
which conducted the March 2013 General Election, in which they participated. 
275 R Pkalya, M Adan and I Masinde. (2003). Conflict in Northern Kenya: A Focus on the Internally Displaced Conflict Victims in 
Northern Kenya. Nairobi: ITDG-EA 64
276 Pkalya, Adan and Masinde (n 275 above)
277 Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs (n 297 above) p.209
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422. The people within this region feel inadequately represented not only in 
government and national elective bodies, but also allege marginalisation 
in public employment in relation to other ethnic communities due to the 
perception that they are not educated. People from outside the region also form 
an overwhelming majority in local public service positions: an estimated 99 
percent of departmental heads in Turkana County are not ethnic Turkana. This 
is the trend even in UN agencies and NGOs that operate in Turkana. Therefore, 
there is a perception that all avenues through which the locals could channel 
their grievances are blocked. The new county dispensation however presents 
better prospects for the community. 
423. Because of the harsh climatic conditions in the region, many public servants 
including teachers regard a posting in Turkana as a disciplinary measure. Practices 
abound within the civil service whereby disciplinary cases and those who fall out 
of favour with their superiors are sent to the ASAL regions like Turkana as a form of 
punishment. The perception among locals is that those posted there have no passion 
in tackling concerns that afflict the community. Poor leadership is also a hurdle to 
participation by the community. They blame the government’s wrong methods of 
decision-making in processes such as disarmament and the misuse of the provincial 
administration in dictating to the community on what to do. Many government 
projects in the region have turned out to be white elephants due to failure to consult 
and involve the community in the design and planning of such activities.
Inter-ethnic conflicts, cattle rustling and droughts
424. Various factors compound the effects of economic marginalisation. Physical 
boundaries cutting across traditional migratory routes and wars in neighbouring 
countries continually bring increased problems in accessing traditional 
grazing resources by the people in the North Rift. Weapons entering Kenya 
from neighbouring war-torn countries have made raids between communities 
increasingly dangerous and sophisticated. In addition to traditional cattle raiding, 
conflicts in the region have at times assumed economic and political proportions. 
There have been allegations in the past that economically-powerful people fund 
livestock thefts and politicians are encouraging conflicts to flush out would-be 
supporters of political opponents from their political turfs.278 These factors have 
compounded and complicated conflict management processes, especially when 
remoteness and the nomadic nature of the pastoralists are taken into account. 
Any positive impact of the work of development agencies is negated by persistent 
conflict:279 
278 Pkalya, Adan and Masinde. (n 275 above).
279 Pkalya, Adan and Masinde (n 275 above).
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I would like to make a presentation about raids and killings and other occurrences within 
Turkana South District. It is the same issues concerning Turkana East District, which was 
part of Turkana South until it was hived off. In the previous years, especially in the 1970s 
and 1980s, there were cattle rustling between the Turkana and the Pokot. This was not 
taken very seriously, because they thought it was just raids; the Pokot stealing from the 
Turkana, and the Turkana stealing from the Pokot. They killed each other. But in the 1990s, 
the cattle rustling changed into something completely different. It became attacks. It was 
transformed into burning of villages, killing people in villages, attacking government 
camps, and there was lot of more killing than when the traditional cattle raids used to be 
there. This went on from 1992 and led to the people from areas of Katilu, Kainuk, Kaptiur 
and Lokori to move towards the north. They all moved towards the north. These raids 
made them to be poor. But because of the mercy of the Almighty God, he got us manna 
from heaven, and put gold in some of the northern areas. The people of south and east 
moved into the north. They started surviving on gold. The rest of us who were left in those 
centres would not sleep. We did not have morning, or evening. It was fighting all through. 
This went on for many years until, eventually, we had a bit of peace. This peace was short-
lived. They, eventually, came back.280
425. The North Rift region has suffered perennial drought over the years with devastating 
effects for human and animal life. Images of starving children and dead livestock 
have become almost synonymous with the experience in North Rift and Northern 
Kenya in general. Yet despite the regularity and predictability of drought, adequate 
arrangements to enhance communities’ resilience to cope with severe droughts 
and other disasters have not been undertaken in northern Kenya. During droughts, 
the pastoralist’s livelihoods become particularly precarious. There are worrying 
incidences of conflict over scarce water and pastures during dry spells, which can 
last for as long as eight months. Economic insecurity and deprivation during drought 
has increased the risk of violence and social breakdown.281 
426. There have been persistent food shortages among the pastoralist communities. 
Food insecurity in the region arose due to the collapse of irrigation schemes and 
the construction of a hydroelectric dam/power plant that has interfered with 
the Turkwel River.282 The effects of drought produce displacement. Women and 
children bear the brunt of these forms of violence and many of them go without 
food for days. They depend on wild fruits (Elamach and Edapal), which are scarce 
and seasonal. Cases of malnutrition are rampant in these conflict-prone districts, 
as the communities’ traditional diet consisting of meat, milk and blood becomes 
increasingly unavailable. Deaths from starvation have become a common feature 
of life in this part of the country.283 
280 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Lodwar/ 10 October 2011/ p. 25
281 Pkalya, Adan and Masinde (n 275 above).
282 Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs, April, 2010 Report of the Committee of National Elders Conference 
on Cohesion and Integration. Nairobi: Government Printers 210.
283 As above. 
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 427. In terms of public employment, the North Rift region lags behind because of the 
high levels of illiteracy due to the low number of schools in the region, especially 
secondary schools. Insecurity has been a major challenge to school attendance, as 
children fear going to school. There have been reports of children being attacked in 
schools by bandits and rustlers. Some schools have closed due to insecurity and the 
effects of drought. According to a website operated by Turkana professionals, many 
Turkana graduates are jobless. Yet, almost all employees in government offices in 
Turkana and NGOs are non-Turkana. Even in the newly-created districts, no District 
Education Officer (DEO), District Officer (DO), or District Commissioner (DC) from the 
community was posted to the district.284
428. The North Rift is almost without any physical infrastructure. The Kitale-Lokichoggio 
road is the only meaningful road in the region which is tarmacked. It has however 
eroded badly over the years. There are no access roads to rural land and cross-
border roads have been neglected.285   
Land and investment
429. The land tenure system in Turkana is in need of serious reform. While collective 
holding of land is useful in protecting land resources for a pastoralist community, 
the near absence of individual titles poses serious problems for would-be investors. 
Most of the land in the region is held as trust land by the county council. Animals are 
not insured and when stolen in raids, the owners are not compensated. According 
to the KIPPRA…….. Land Reform and Poverty Report286 the region has shown low 
levels of land ownership rights which is indicated by the proportion of individuals 
with title deeds to a parcel of land. The fact that the people are not issued with 
title deeds limits them economically as they cannot access loans from financial 
institutions or any commercial use.
430. Conflict acts as a disincentive to investment by the communities and development 
agencies, both in the long-term and short-term. At the local level, a lot of effort 
and funds go to contain conflicts and to mitigate against conflict-related effects, 
rather than being channeled to development work. Similarly, market centres such 
as Chesegon, Marti and Nachola are virtually deserted due to conflict and the 
resultant insecurity. Many roads are no longer useful economically. The Turkana, 
Pokot, Marakwet and the Samburu communities have lost between 50 percent 
and 80 percent of their livestock to either drought or cattle rustling. It is extremely 
difficult for pastoralists to get started over again after such heavy stock losses.287 
284 Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs (n 307 above).p.210
285 As above, 209
286 Joseph Kieyah and Robert K Nyaga Land Reform and Poverty in Kenya. Nairobi: Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and 
Analysis (KIPPRA) p.8 
287 Pkalya, Adan and Masinde (n 295 above) p.15
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431. Turkana in itself is richly endowed with natural resources, but which remain 
largely untapped. Turkana District has rich building sand and quarry materials. 
Small-scale mining is found in the southern part of the district at Nakwamoru 
and central parts at Makutano near Kakuma. While there are some reported gold 
deposits, mining is not of a commercial nature, though an alluvial type of gold is 
being exploited.288 
Pastoralism and other cultural practices
432. Most of the people living in the North Rift region are pastoralists. Pastoralists 
are some of the most marginalized people in Kenya, often having virtually no 
say over the changes that are impacting on their lives. Pastoralists derive their 
livelihoods mainly from natural resources - pasture, water, natural vegetation 
and livestock. However, reduced access to these resources, particularly land and 
water, has increasingly put pastoralists under intense pressure. As a result, they 
are increasingly finding themselves fighting for their survival.289 
433. In most of the areas in the North Rift, conflicts have increased economic hardship 
as the people’s only livelihoods option (pastoralism) has been ravaged. Cattle have 
been stolen in raids, increasing the vulnerability of resource-poor pastoralists 
to hunger, malnutrition and abject poverty. Livestock, food, crops, money and 
property are looted in raids and schools, health facilities and settlements are 
destroyed.
434. Cultural practices such as cattle rustling and banditry have led to the loss of many 
human lives and the displacement of various population groups. The raiding is 
accompanied by indiscriminate killing of innocent people, the majority of them 
women, children and the elderly. One morning alone in Marakwet District, more 
than 50 people were killed in cold blood in one cattle rustling incident. The 
practice has undergone fundamental transformation from a cultural practice of 
replenishing cattle, to a more militarised, predatory and destructive practice. The 
practice has experienced significant commercialization.
Education
435. Learning is affected when teachers are forced to withdraw from conflict-stricken 
areas and the communities re-locate their settlements for fear of being invaded. 
Education for children and the youth is affected and interrupted in the short and 
long run. In the conflict between the Marakwet and the Pokot, about 25 schools 
have been abandoned, while at least 27 schools have been closed in Samburu 
288 Security Research and Information Centre Terrorized Citizens p.16
289 Pkalya, Adan and Masinde (n 295 above)
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District. Moreover, although primary schools are widely available, secondary 
schools are few and tertiary colleges are non-existent, except for some few 
satellite programmes at certificate and diploma level confined in Lodwar town 
run by Mt Kenya University. Turkana District has about 175 pre-primary schools, 
136 primary schools, eight secondary schools, two youth polytechnics and one 
medical training college.290
436. Efforts have been made to improve access to education by pastoralist 
communities. The first one is the creation of mobile schools, whereby around 50 
mobile schools are now in operation in six arid districts including Turkana and 
Samburu in the North Rift. Teachers in these schools are attached to a nomadic 
family or group of families. After three years in the mobile school, the children 
are supposed to enrol in conventional boarding schools. The advantage of this 
type of schooling is that children do not have to leave home and can continue 
their household work. The disadvantage is that mobile schools are difficult to 
staff, manage and monitor. Households can scatter at any time, causing students 
290 J Kamenju, M Singo and F Wairagu. (2003). Terrorized Citizens: Profiling Small arms and Insecurity in the North Rift Kenya. 
Nairobi: Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC) p.17
Commissioners touring the collapsed Turkana Fishermen Cooperative Society in Lodwar.  
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to move in and out of the system with negative consequences.291 There are 
also sedentary schools for mobile populations. Alternative Basic Education for 
Turkana (ABET) has set up learning centres at semi-permanent villages near 
important roads. In Samburu District, shepherd schools (Ichekuti) have evening 
classes in conventional schools for village children who spend the day herding.292
437. In his 2011/2012 budget speech the Finance minister recognized that education 
is a lifelong investment that should be extended to Kenyan children so as to 
secure the future of the nation. So Sh8.25 billion was allocated for free primary 
education, Sh18.5 billion for free day secondary education and Sh1.67 billion 
for the free school feeding programmes in the ASALs areas like those in the 
North Rift. Sh387.7 million was allocated for early childhood development.293 
For educational development and infrastructure, Sh750 million was allocated 
to upgrade national schools, Sh680 million for the purchase of computers for 
schools to enhance access to quality learning materials, Sh780 million for the 
improvement of infrastructure in schools and Sh380 million for the construction 
of low-cost boarding schools in ASAL areas.
Health Services, social amenities, water and sanitation
438. The number of health facilities has increased in all the districts, but most of them 
remain under-utilized probably because of cultural reasons, cost-sharing and 
insecurity. In many cases government hospitals do not have drugs to dispense. 
Malnutrition among children below five years is rampant, especially among the 
poor.294 There is limitation in the number of health facilities in Turkana, with only 
one district hospital serving the entire county of six vast districts. 
We find that some facilities like maternity wards are not found back in our villages 
and even here in town. You just find that it is only the district hospital that has such 
facilities. Most of the hospitals or dispensaries are owned by a church diocese and 
other institutions like Care International and the Africa Inland Church (AIC). The 
government has not put up dispensaries and hospitals for the people. In many cases, 
our women want to go for delivery services, and when there are complications, they 
take time to reach the district hospital; as a result many die on the way.295
291 David Siele, Jeremy Swift and Saverio Krätli (2011). Reaching Pastrolists with Formal Education: A distance-Learning Strategy of 
Kenya. Paper presented at the International Conference on the Future of Pastoralism, 21-23 March 2011. Organized by the Future 
Agricultures Consortium and the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sessex and Feinstein International Center of Tufts 
University 5.
292 Siele, Swift and Krätli (n 291 above)
293 2011-12 Budget Statement for the Fiscal Year 2011/2012 (1st July-30th June) by Hon. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta
294 R Pkalya, M Adan and I Masinde (2003). Conflict in Northern Kenya: A Focus on the Internally Displaced Conflict Victims in 
Northern Kenya. Nairobi: ITDG-EA. P.20
295 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Lodwar/ 10 October 2011/ p. 14
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439. Conflict also leads to destruction of social amenities. Postal services, social 
amenities are only dotted along the dilapidated highway road linked to South 
Sudan. Water is a scarce resource, particularly during the dry season. People 
often travel more than 10 kilometres in search of water for domestic use and for 
livestock. Thus, conflict over water sources and pasture between Turkana and 
their neighbours is common.296 Most of the people in the North Rift also have 
no toilets or latrines. They help themselves in the bush. They have poor housing. 
Houses are made from brushes, wood, branches, leaves, grass and with no doors 
and windows for protection. Electricity penetration remains negligible. This is 
despite the fact that Turkwel gorge electric power originates from Turkana, but 
services other districts.
State Responses to Marginalisation
440. In analyzing the context within which economic marginalisation has occurred 
in Kenya, one of the main features noted is the centralised nature of the state 
and its, fusion with the private sector. This fusion generated client-patron 
networks as different actors vied to gain access to resources at the centre. In 
the face of agitation linked to economic marginalisation, the state traditionally 
responded in one of two ways. The first impulse on the part of the incumbent 
government was invariably to work against any attempt to weaken the power 
of the centralised state and to defend the incumbent leader’s hold on power 
and the economic trappings that came with it. Some of the political events that 
have defined Kenya - assassinations (Pio Gama Pinto, Tom Mboya, JM Kariuki 
and Robert Ouko), major political fallouts (Kenyatta-Odinga; Moi-Odinga; 
Kibaki-Odinga), and recourse to authoritarianism marked by detention without 
trial and torture - can be attributed to the fear of those at the centre that they 
would lose power or their perch at the economic table that holds the proverbial 
‘national cake’.
441. Where grievances were acknowledged, the state  responded by ceding to minor 
demands for inclusiveness and the wider distribution of national resources, but 
largely channeling this through co-opted individuals from particular ethnic/
regional constituencies. Such a response did not touch the existing political 
structure or dislodge patronage networks and the inequitable resource flows 
from the centre to ‘favoured regions’. In the early years of independence and 
296 J Kamenju, M Singo and F Wairagu. (2003). Terrorized Citizens: Profiling Small arms and Insecurity in the North Rift Kenya. 
Nairobi: Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC) 17
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early in President Moi’s rule, changes in the law (the constitution) were not 
directed at empowering the regions, but rather were geared towards creating 
a stronger, more centralised state marked by personalisation of power. These 
changes produced a state that ended up being less just, more authoritarian and 
exclusionary. 
442. The second way in which the state responded was politically through co-option, 
especially of key leaders from marginalised communities. However, since the 
clamour for economic goods was invariably linked to, and in fact preceded 
demands for greater democratic space, co-option of certain groups was often 
accompanied by continued marginalisation of the respective community and 
clamping down on popular dissent that was expressed politically from respective 
communities. Apart from failure to confront embedded structural economic 
injustice, co-option almost always brought no benefits to communities from 
which beneficiary leaders hailed. Benefits accrued only to those co-opted 
and in very exceptional situations other elites around the co-opted individual 
or indirectly to their respective groups of origin. This is an approach that was 
perfected by both the Moi and Kenyatta regimes. Asingo’s comments relating to 
the latter apply with equal force to the former:
In order to entrench his leadership, Kenyatta perfected the art of neo-patrimonialism. 
This involved incorporating into the political system and the bureaucratic institutions 
the patrimonial logic of ascribing the right to rule to a person rather than to an office. 
Kenyatta’s neo-patrimonialism was characterized by what Bratton and Walle refer to 
as systematic clientelism, where public sector jobs, material rewards and economic 
opportunities were offered as favours to clients who in turn mobilized political support 
and loyalty to the patron.297
443. While co-option can be regarded as a response to marginalisation to the extent 
that it brought particular individuals within existing client-patron networks, co-
option had a marginalizing effect in respect of non-cooperative elites and the 
broader community; and was perhaps designed to pacify a few while consigning 
the majority to the fringes of the economic system. In any case, providing 
any economic incentive for political support for the broader group appeared 
unnecessary because their support was presumed once their leaders had been 
accommodated somewhat within the economic patronage network.
444. Throughout the years, the tokenism involved in co-option of leaders from different 
ethnic communities who then became ‘point men’ for political mobilization not 
297 Asingo (n 30 above)
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only lent an appearance of inclusiveness to an otherwise exclusionary economic 
and political system, but also ensured that the national leader had just enough 
support beyond his ethnic base to hold onto power and to command a level of 
popular legitimacy. 
445. Once this support was secured, the rest of the population was dispensable. 
Asingo blames the patron-client system for Kenya’s slide into dictatorial rule and 
corruption. In this regard, he notes of the Kenyatta regime - a statement that 
applies as well to the post-1982 Moi regime - that “the corporatist aspirations 
of the state elites and their reliance on patron-client political ties was largely 
responsible for the transformation of the Kenyatta regime to an authoritarian 
state”. Bratton and Wale, cited with approval by Asingo have observed in this 
regard that:
[r]elationships of loyalty and dependence pervade a formal political and administrative 
system and officials occupy bureaucratic positions less to perform public services, 
their ostensible purpose, than to acquire personal wealth and status. Although state 
functionaries receive an official salary, they also enjoy access to various forms of illicit 
rents, pre-bends, and petty corruption, which constitute a sometimes important 
entitlement of office.298
446. A lot more than dictatorship and corruption can be blamed on the patron-client 
political relations in post-independence Kenya. 
Responses to Marginalisation in the pre-2010 era
447. The struggle for economic empowerment and inclusion in Kenya is inseparable 
from the struggles for the expansion of political and democratic space. Minimal 
reforms of the political system undertaken in the 1990s form the basis of the 
more fundamental changes introduced by the 2010 Constitution. The democratic 
reforms have relevance at two levels at least. 
448. First, the repeal of Section 2A of the previous constitution that allowed the 
introduction of multi-party politics opened up the hitherto closed political space 
for the oppressed and marginalised sections of society to speak up and express 
their concerns. Before 1990, any form of agitation was ruthlessly suppressed, with 
those involved thrown into jail, often without trial. Civil society groups equipped 
with the tools of mobilization, an essential element in securing social goods for 
economically marginalised groups, began to take root. 
298 Asingo (n 30 above). 
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449. Secondly, by expanding political participation, divergent views and leaders 
acquired increased space for expression and accommodation at the national 
level. Although the political and economic structure had not changed in 
any fundamental way, their participation started to chip away at the system, 
culminating in the Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group Reforms (IPPGR) in 1997 that 
opened further the democratic space while repealing numerous oppressive laws 
including emergency laws under which the former NFD had been governed since 
the late 1960s as well as laws that authorized detention without trial. However, 
while political space opened up, the economic structure largely remained intact 
and with the independence party KANU retaining power in both multi-party 
elections in the 1990s (1992 and 1997), the old patronage networks remained 
undisturbed. 
450. Moi as president had managed to retain power in both elections through the 
expansion of the patronage network by co-opting from opposition ranks, thus 
weakening the opposition. As the economic situation worsened in the 1990s, 
public land - including forests and land set aside for utilities - became the main 
currency used to purchase political support. It is reported that the worst forms of 
grabbing of public land, including forests, happened during this period.
451. The nature of the economic structure and the manner in which it furthered 
economic marginalisation of those not at the centre in post-independence 
Kenya was examined in Part II of this chapter. As noted, Kenya has had two 
long-term development policy frameworks and subsequently, several five-year 
policies. The two long-term policy frameworks were: 1) Sessional Paper No. 10 
of 1965 entitled ‘African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya’ and; 
Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986 entitled ‘Economic Management for Renewed 
Growth’. 
452. Sessional Paper No 10, the blueprint for economic development at independence, 
had several objectives: to ensure equal opportunities for all citizens; to provide 
democracy; to ensure that resources were used for the benefit of society and its 
members; to encourage various forms of ownership of property; and, to promote 
freedom of conscience and human dignity. As earlier discussed, although newly-
independent Kenya and subsequently the Moi regime had developed a useful 
economic framework that would have created an equitable, inclusive and fair 
economic system, these frameworks were never really properly put to use. What 
ruled the day was political survival and the use of the state machinery to enrich 
those at the centre of power or those connected to power and to some degree 
their respective communities. 
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453. A state that had responded forcefully to the marginalisation of Africans by 
introducing affirmative action measures through the Africanisation programme 
soon adopted the exclusionary practices of the departing colonial administration 
that was once loathed. Only this time the divide was not racial but rather ethnic 
and regional. In the Moi era, there were fringe and token measures that did 
not touch the core architecture of the exclusionary state, notwithstanding the 
good record that the Moi regime had in the education sector. (In discussing the 
case of Nyanza, it is acknowledged that there were attempts to reorient policy 
- especially in education - to benefit areas that had been marginalised under 
Kenyatta). However, the manner in which corrective measures were implemented 
was such that it had the effect of not only erasing the legacy of lagging behind, 
but also tilted the balance completely in favour of certain regions, thus creating 
new ‘victims’ of marginalisation. 
454. Although co-option seemed to be the favoured approach to inclusion, there 
is evidence of policy measures that benefited or that at least had the effect of 
benefiting the wider population in regions that were considered marginalised. 
One of the programmes that received attention in our hearings was the district 
focused-development instituted by Moi. In his communication to the Commission, 
Moi cited this programme as one of his major projects that was meant to enhance 
equitable development. Moi asserts that his policy of ‘District Focus’ brought 
development to the previously marginalised areas and should be applauded as 
the basis of devolution as conceived in the current Constitution, stating:
In an effort to create equitable system of development countrywide, I also formed the 
district focus for rural development, which is a concrete pre-cursor of devolution, which 
we have formally adopted in our Constitution.299
455. Indeed, testimonies were heard from Kenyans who said they had benefited in 
some way from the ‘District Focus’ programme, which they claimed was a success. 
Daniel Chacha Muherei, from a region itself regarded as marginalised and one of 
the poorest districts in Nyanza, testified on behalf of Kuria MP Wilfred Machage:
In a teacher training intake, huge disparities occurred with other Nyanza communities 
grabbing most of the chances, including those designated for the Kuria students. For 
example, in 1973, Kuria was given five chances to train P3 teachers, but instead only 
two were taken and the rest of the positions were filled by other communities. Such 
a practice continued for a long time until former President Moi sympathised with 
the Kuria people and gave us our own Kuria District, which became the focus for the 
teacher recruitment.300
299 Written Submission by Former President Daniel arap Moi to the TJRC (2012) p.24
300 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Kuria/ 25 July 2011/ p. 5
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456. The north of Kenya is one region that has received special attention in terms of 
targeted projects, all of which unfortunately failed either because they were ill-
conceived, were not funded, money was lost through corruption, or they did not 
receive local buy-in. Rejecting the claim that his government had economically 
marginalised that part of the country, Moi appears to cite the creation of a special 
ministry for that region as evidence of inclusion, adding that his government took 
various measures to promote equitable development, including that of North 
Eastern and North Kenya: 
[…] But despite these natural impediments, my government made a big effort to 
reach our people there, and today, despite all the challenges, the people of the dry 
areas feel as Kenyans, as the rest of the citizens… I created the Ministry of Reclamation 
of Arid and Semi-arid Lands and appointed Hon Justus Ndotto as its first Minister. This 
was one of my attempts to speed up development in the arid areas.301
457. What is not stated is that little was achieved through this ministry, for reasons 
that the Commission was not able to ascertain. A similar ministry was created 
by the Kibaki administration, but complaints relating to lack of a specific kitty 
allocated to it to carry out development projects were voiced. MPs from Northern 
Kenya complained that they had thought that this would not be the case, but to 
their chagrin, the ministry made no difference because it ‘had been reduced to 
coordinating other government agencies’. 
458. These examples led the conclusion that while the need to address marginalisation 
in certain regions was clear and programmes had been created for this purpose, 
there was lack of implementation. The Commission concurred with views 
expressed by some that such programmes were only initiated ‘”for political 
reasons” to give the impression that something was being done could be justified.
Responses to economic marginalisation in the period 2003-2011
459. Kenyans began 2003 with great euphoria. They had, in the historic elections of 
2002, brought to an end the 40-year dictatorial and exclusionary rule of KANU, 
the independence party. When supporting the Kibaki-led ‘Rainbow Coalition’ 
of key leaders from different parts of Kenya, they were rejecting ills associated 
with the previous regimes, including marginalisation, widespread inequity and 
exclusion. Writing just before the 2002 elections, Odhiambo Mbai, (an eminent 
scholar and head of the Devolution Committee during the National Constitutional 
Conference held at Bomas of Kenya, Nairobi) described the elation that met the 
appointment of a generally balanced cabinet on January 3, 2003:
301 Written Submission by Former President Daniel arap Moi to the TJRC (2012) p.23
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President Kibaki announced his new cabinet at a function at State House, witnessed 
by the media. It was a leaner cabinet than the one that had been presided over by 
Moi. It comprised 24 Ministers and 24 Assistant Ministers. He named three women to 
full ministerial positions and four Assistant Ministers—the highest number of women 
ever appointed into the cabinet since independence. Despite a few murmurs, the 
cabinet was hailed as truly representative of the country.302
460. Mbai then captured the beginning of disappointment with the Kibaki government, 
one that would partly precipitate fallout within the coalition in 2004, serving as a 
precursor to the hotly-contested National Referendum on the Constitution in 2005 
while setting the stage for the tragic events of 2007-2008:
[…] when it came to the second batch of appointments of permanent secretaries, 
widespread outrage was expressed. The appointments included people who are well 
past their official retirement ages and thus lack in energy, drive and creativity. Besides, 
the appointments reflected an attempt to recycle key officials from the Moi regime 
who had been responsible for the excesses of the regime in the first place. Due to this 
fact, the majority of Kenyans were already wondering whether the new government 
was serious about implementing the change for which they had voted.303
461. Although at its core, the Kibaki administration can be said to have largely maintained 
most of the practices of the previous regimes - concentrating appointments to 
key public positions in one region and similarly focusing development money, 
especially for infrastructure - it must be given credit for increased inclusion at the 
centre It can be argued that this has perhaps been the case because inclusion was 
in part mandated by political agreements (NARC in 2002 and the National Accord in 
2008). Increased scrutiny of governmental processes by citizens, itself attributable 
to increased political consciousness among Kenyans has had an important role in 
forcing inclusion, at least in appointments. 
462. One of the key responses to marginalisation that had a visible structural impact 
in thinking at the centre as well as visible economic effect in the regions was the 
introduction of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF). Perhaps because of 
the involvement of MPs (who are national political actors) and the larger sums of 
money involved, CDF has had great visibility.  It is often forgotten that CDF operates 
alongside other devolved funds, most of which pre-date the CDF.  As of 2011, there 
were about 13 different devolved funds. 
463. It is arguable that in the period 2000 to 2011, Kenya tried to shift its approach to 
development from the top-down to a more people-centered, bottom-up approach 
302 C Odhiambo-Mbai ‘The rise and fall of the autocratic state in Kenya’ in W Oyugi (eds) The politics of transition in Kenya: From 
KANU to NARC (2003) 51, 92. 
303  As above. 
147
Volume  I IB    Chapter O N E 
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
to development. This is perhaps best seen in the increase in both the devolved 
funding initiatives and increased funds allocation to particular devolved funds. 
In the 2007/2008 budgetary allocation, more than Sh58 billion went to devolved 
structures. Despite some challenges, milestones have been marked under the 
decentralised funds regime: schools, health centers and recreation facilities 
have been built, water and sanitation facilities have become more accessible, 
employment opportunities have been created through enterprise and the roads 
network has been improved.
464. The CDF has become one of the more successful devolved funds since its 
inception. According to a report on devolved funds, CDF has been viewed as a key 
strategic driver of socio-economic development and regeneration within Kenya. It 
is a development initiative targeted at the constituencies by devolving resources 
to the regions to meet socio-economic objectives which have previously been 
managed from the centre established in 2003 through the CDF Act as published in 
the Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 107 (Act No. 11) of 9 January 2004 (later replaced 
by the CDF Amendment Act of 2007), the main objective of CDF is to fight poverty 
and shift planning and identification of projects to local communities. At least 2.5 
percent of Government revenue is allocated to the Fund. It is reported that almost 
KES 60 billion has been channeled through CDF since its inception. CDF is reported 
to contribute over 10 percent of all development in Kenya.
Responses to economic marginalisation in the new constitutional era
465. The main and most structured response to economic marginalisation in post-
independence Kenya is the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. Other than its specific 
provisions that relate to particular groups considered as marginalised, such 
as women, ethnic minorities, indigenous people and the disabled, there are 
provisions that are overarching in nature. They have relevance for all groups that 
have previously suffered economic marginalisation. These provisions relate to: 1) 
national values; 2) the Bill of Rights; 3) the devolution framework; 4) affirmative 
action and; 5) land reforms.
National values and the interpretive process
466. Unlike the previous constitution, the entire constitutional framework is today 
underpinned by certain fundamental principles provided for under Article 10(2) 
and provides that the national values and principles of governance include:
	 patriotism, national unity, sharing and devolution of power, the rule of law, 
democracy and participation of the people;
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	 Human dignity, equity, social justice, inclusiveness, equality, human rights, 
non-discrimination and protection of the marginalised;
	 Good governance, integrity, transparency and accountability; and
	 Sustainable development.
467. While all the principles are important, those captured under Article 10(2) (b) 
have direct relevance for marginalised groups. There are specific provisions 
elsewhere in the 2010 Constitution that regulate specific issues, granting rights, 
imposing duties, prescribing actions, donating powers and so on. However, the 
importance of constitutional values and principles is that they tie everything 
together. Principles and values are really the soul of the Constitution, the 
guiding light providing a kind of roadmap and justification of the entire laws. 
While principles and values stand as a pursuit of their own, their main function 
is to guide the interpretation of specific provisions of the Constitution and 
of legislation (Acts of Parliament, county legislation and local government 
by-laws). 
468. Article 10(1) provides that the values bind all state organs, state officers, public 
officers and any person who applies or interprets the Constitution’ as well 
as any of these when they enact, apply or interpret any law. Similarly, these 
constitutional values enumerated in Article 10 must underpin the making and 
implementation of public policy decisions by the named individuals and entities. 
Legislation, policy, regulations, administrative directions or other measures that 
do not accord with these values and principles are in their face, unconstitutional 
and thus null and void. Accordingly, measures taken by various state organs in 
respect of previously marginalised groups can, and should be tested against 
these values and principles for constitutional validity.
The Bill of Rights and socio-economic rights
469. One of the main claims made by those clamoring for a new constitution was that 
it must come equipped with a comprehensive Bill of Rights that would provide a 
bulwark against a powerful and unaccountable Executive that routinely cracked 
down on dissent by all means available to it. People wanted a constitution that 
would guarantee them justice whenever any of their rights were violated by the 
state or private entities. Today, it is accurate to state that one of the main gains for 
Kenyans in general in the new Constitution is a robust Bill of Rights, which boldly 
addresses the claims already enumerated, but goes much further in a number 
of respects. From the perspective of social exclusion and marginalisation, the 
Bill of Rights forms the basis, both of claims specific to marginalised groups, and 
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a robust adjudication framework that could be activated when these rights are 
breached. 
The Bill of Rights as a mandatory framework for social policies
470. The Bill of Rights is a mandatory framework for social policies. Under the new 
Constitution, the Bill of Rights is a central pillar for inclusion. The Constitution 
locates social, economic and cultural policies within the Bill of Rights. This means 
that the government - at national and county level - must ensure that all policies 
they adopt are Bill of Rights compliant. In this regard, Article 19(1) provides that “the 
Bill of Rights is an integral part of Kenya’s democratic state and is the framework 
for social, economic and cultural policies.” It continues to state at sub-section 2 
that “the purpose of recognizing and protecting human rights and fundamental 
freedoms is to preserve the dignity of individuals and communities and to promote 
social justice and the realization of the potential of all human beings.”
471. It is also crucial to note that the Bill of Rights binds all organs of state. Article 2(1) 
enacts that “this Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic and binds all 
persons and all state organs at both levels of government”. In the exercise of their 
functions - the executive, legislative and judicial arms of government at both levels 
- must be guided by the Constitution. This provision renders any act performed by 
these actors unconstitutional if it done outside the bounds of the Constitution. 
In dealing with previously marginalised groups (women, the poor, minorities and 
indigenous people) relevant constitutional provisions discussed here must be 
adhered to.
472. In terms of implementation, the responsibility of all state organs is also engaged. 
Article 2(1) provides that ”it is a fundamental duty of the state and every state 
organ to observe, respect, protect, promote and fulfill the rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the Bill of Rights.” It is also important to note that one of the principles 
to guide state action is equality and non-discrimination. Article 27(4) prohibits 
direct or indirect discrimination of any person on any ground, including race, 
sex, pregnancy, marital status, health status, ethnic or social origin, colour, age, 
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, dress, language or birth. This 
provision, as well as other provisions in Article 27 on equal opportunities, is a 
potent tool that previously marginalised groups can use to attack discriminatory 
legislation, policies and other measures in a variety of sectors including public 
employment, distribution of resources and social goods. 
473. The Constitution itself empowers the government by providing it with a 
constitutional mandate to remedy marginalisation. Article 27(6) provides that 
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the state is required to take measures, including instituting affirmative action 
measures, to ensure that the right to non-discrimination is enjoyed by those 
previously marginalised. As will be clear later in this Report, this provision 
would sanction measures such as reservation of political seats for previously 
marginalised groups and special budgetary allocations that benefit these groups 
alone to the exclusion of other groups or the broader public.
Socio-economic rights as a framework for social Intervention
474. One of the greatest innovations in the Bill of Rights is the inclusion of a catalogue 
of socio-economic rights (SERs). By providing for these rights, the Constitution of 
Kenya, 2010 stands among few in the world. This inclusion is revolutionary for at 
least one reason which is relevant for marginalised groups. Like the South African 
constitution, the Kenyan Constitution differs from the traditional liberal model 
(with its minimalist state with limited powers) to a transformative model, which 
requires state intervention to advance equality, human dignity and social justice. 
To be specific, Article 43 of the Constitution provides in part as follows:
Every person has the right— (a) to the highest attainable standard of health, which 
includes the right to health care services, including reproductive health care; (b) to 
accessible and adequate housing, and to reasonable standards of sanitation; (c) to be 
free from hunger, and to have adequate food of acceptable quality; (d) to clean and 
safe water in adequate quantities; (e) to social security; and (f ) to education.
475. For its part, Article 20(2) recognizes the difference in the nature of rights (especially 
civil and political and social economic rights) by providing that ”every person shall 
enjoy the rights and fundamental freedoms in the Bill of Rights to the greatest 
extent consistent with the nature of the right or fundamental freedom”. Other than 
the nature of the right, the Constitution also recognizes that SERs impose certain 
burdens — especially budgetary — on the state and that realization of this category 
of rights should be progressive. However, the state cannot just sit by because these 
rights impose special obligations. In terms of Article 21(2) of the Constitution, the 
State is required to take legislative, policy and other measures, including the setting 
of standards, to achieve the progressive realization of these rights.
476. The state must demonstrate that the stated goals can be achieved. The test of 
compliance will include criteria relating to whether the state has taken any measures 
and whether the measures taken can reasonably be considered to advance the 
realization of the right in question. Since the marginalisation of groups often has 
the result of depriving them of social goods, vast opportunities are presented by 
SERs in the Constitution (Article 43) for previously marginalised groups, including 
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possibilities for litigation to hold government to account. To ensure that these 
groups can benefit from this facility, several measures are recommended for 
relevant actors at the end of this chapter.
Access to Justice Rights
477. Informed by Kenya’s past history where ‘Executive-friendly’ courts found reasons 
to refuse to hear or order remedies in cases of human rights violations, the 
Constitution provides for the right of access to justice as a free-standing right. 
This is a right that is of particular importance for previously marginalised groups 
who often not only operate on the fringes of the mainstream socio-economic 
system, but also struggle to access justice in a variety of ways. 
478. As a new right in the Constitution, the High Court will have to consent to it. In 
this exercise, there are likely to be theatres of contest. For our purposes, it is 
suggested that the following elements – already flagged in certain provisions of 
the Constitution – should be considered as integral to the discussion: distance 
(relating to geographical reach of forums of adjudication by litigants); cost (which 
is often-times prohibitive, especially for the poor); process (in terms of rules and 
procedures that hinder or facilitate adjudication of claims) and; time (the need for 
expeditious justice).
479. The 2010 Constitution has put to rest the heated philosophical debate that 
continues to rage elsewhere: whether claims related to SERs are knowable in law, 
and that they can be adjudicated upon by a court as legal claims. It is important to 
remember that rights in the Bill of Rights, including SERs, are justiciable claims. This 
means that they impose certain obligations on the state (vertically) and on private 
actors (horizontally), and that when these are breached, they can be adjudicated by 
a court of law. Those with tangible claims of a socio-economic character, including 
those around dispossession of land can bring them to a court of law.
480. When the provision on access to justice is read with those that deal with locus standi, 
(that is, the ability of an individual, group or entity to bring claims before a court of 
law) it becomes evident that previously marginalised groups have at their disposal 
a very robust mechanism within which they can articulate their interests. Article 
258 and Article 22 of the Constitution provide for the most expansive possibilities 
on who can bring a claim to court. Article 258, which relates to the enforcement of 
the Constitution as a whole and is thus the basis of locus for any claim relating to 
the enforcement of the Constitution, provides in sub-section 1 that every person 
has the right to institute court proceedings, claiming that this Constitution has 
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been contravened, or is threatened with contravention. Sub-section 2 then adds 
that in addition to a person acting in their own interest, court proceedings under 
clause (1) may be instituted by: 
	 a person acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own 
name;
	 a person acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons;
	 a person acting in the public interest; or
	 an association acting in the interest of one or more of its members.
481. Article 22, which is located in Chapter IV of the Constitution (Bill of Rights) 
reproduces the terms of Article 258, but adds a provision for the Chief Justice 
to make rules relating to human rights claims and criteria for bringing the 
same. The test of compliance will include criteria relating to whether the state 
has taken any measures and whether the measures taken can reasonably be 
considered to advance the realization of the right in question. Vast opportunities 
are presented by SERs in the Constitution for previously marginalised groups, 
including possibilities for litigation to hold government to account. To ensure 
that previously marginalised groups can benefit from this facility, this Report has 
recommended several measures for relevant actors. 
Devolution framework
482. Although at independence Kenya bucked the trend in the majority of African 
countries by adopting a devolved system of government, it was dismantled by 
1966, paving way for a centralised state. Centralised systems of government that 
were preferred by newly-independent states began to be associated with state 
failure in Africa and the developing world. 
483. The abuse associated with a centralised system, including exclusion and 
marginalisation of certain regions by successive post-independence governments 
led to the clamour for a devolved system that was more equitable, fair and 
accountable. In Kenya like in many other countries, devolution of powers was 
touted as a means of enhancing participatory governance, accountability, good 
governance and equitable development. Thus during the making of the current 
Constitution, devolution of powers became a major feature. 
484. The 2010 Constitution creates 47 Counties in Kenya as centres of devolution. 
The main objectives of devolved government are to: promote democratic and 
accountable exercise of power; foster national unity by recognizing diversity; 
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give powers of self-governance to the people and enhance the participation of 
the people in the exercise of the powers of the state and in making decisions 
affecting them. It also recognises the right of communities to manage their 
own affairs and to further their development; protect and promote the interests 
and rights of minorities and marginalised communities and to promote social 
and economic development and the provision of proximate, easily accessible 
services throughout Kenya. Devolved government also aims at ensuring the 
equitable sharing of national and local resources throughout Kenya; facilitating 
the decentralization of state organs, their functions and services, from the capital 
of Kenya and also to enhance checks and balances and the separation of powers.
485. The 2010 Constitution, through the introduction of devolution, supports 
development of infrastructure in the country and ensures that all marginalised 
areas are developed and up to pace with other areas. Devolution will result in 
general increase in supply, distribution and access to goods and services through 
decentralization. Each county will independently plan for its residents’ basic 
amenities such as water, energy and infrastructure, tourism, agriculture, building 
and construction at county level. There will also be increased access to financial 
services such as banking, capital markets (stock exchanges), insurance and fund 
management.
486. Devolution has many benefits. For our purposes, we focus only on the economic 
aspects of devolution. Devolution financially empowers the regions. Revenue 
raised nationally is to be shared equitably among the national and county 
governments. County governments may be given additional allocations from the 
national government’s share of the revenue, either conditionally or unconditionally. 
Criteria for equitable sharing are set out in Article 203, but the amount allocated 
to county governments must not be less than 15 percent of the national revenues 
of the preceding year. Marginalised areas will receive an additional 0.5 percent of 
all the revenue collected by the national government to bring the quality of basic 
services including water, roads, health facilities and electricity in those areas to the 
same level as that generally enjoyed by the rest of the nation. 
487. The Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA) was established under the Constitution 
to make recommendations for equitable sharing of national government revenue 
between the national and county governments, and among the county governments. 
At the national level there is a Consolidated Fund and for all counties there is a 
Revenue Fund. Into these funds are placed all revenues from which payments must 
be approved by the respective legislative assembly. Only the national government 
may impose income taxes; value added taxes; excise taxes as well as customs and 
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other duties on the import and export of goods. A county may impose property 
rates; entertainment taxes; and any other taxes authorized or imposed by an Act 
of Parliament. Both the national and county governments may impose charges for 
services.
488. The socio-economic status of those previously marginalised at the periphery 
will be enhanced. With outflows of finances to the regions, devolution can lead 
to more rapid and more balanced economic and social development.  Writing in 
2007 about the proposed regional and district governments, Prof Yash Pal Ghai 
noted that the centralised system - with the concentration of all government 
institutions and decision making at the centre - leads to the concentration of 
economic activities in the capital city area. The result is uneven development and 
growing disparities of economic opportunities and attendant impoverishment 
of regions and communities. This explains rural-urban migration into already 
crowded Nairobi. With county governments with the constitutional mandate and 
responsibility for the welfare and development of their constituents, new centers 
of growth can emerge. 
489. Devolution introduced by the Constitution would provide a solution and alternative 
to the under-development problem in the regions. According to the Task Force on 
Devolution, the building blocks of developmental devolved government include 
the growing and sustaining of county cooperation and competitiveness; county 
public service delivery; building and maintaining quality places for investment 
and living and; managing counties for prosperity. One commentator notes that 
devolution could provide for an enhanced framework for economic management 
of Kenya at national and devolved levels. The two-tier government introduces a 
new threshold for investment through counties with the potential to enhance 
service delivery to citizens and to promote economic growth, especially since 
counties will have financial security and independence. 
Affirmative action and the equalization fund
490. Article 27 (6) obliges the government to devise legislative and affirmative action 
programmes and policies to redress the disadvantage suffered due to past 
discrimination. Affirmative action is defined at Article 260 as “any measure designed 
to overcome or ameliorate an inequity or the systemic denial or infringement of a 
right or fundamental freedom.” It is a deliberate policy or programme that seeks to 
remedy past discrimination by increasing the chances of the affected to participate 
in what they were previously denied. The object of affirmative action otherwise 
known as positive discrimination is to enhance the participation of marginalised 
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groups in decision-making and implementation and make a difference in the 
political climate and culture.
491. Affirmative action policies are recognized as useful mechanisms through which 
states can redress past and existing injustices and inequalities. Accurate statistics 
often reveal the outcome of discrimination against, neglect of and unconcern for 
the marginalised populations within a state.  Affirmative action performs three 
key functions. First, it remedies past discrimination through programmes to 
benefit individuals or society as a whole. Article 56 of the Constitution provides 
for both. Second, affirmative action enhances diversity so that a state will be able 
to grow with better values, peace and stability. Third, affirmative action increases 
political power of the marginalised, enabling them to influence decision-making. 
Affirmative action is thus used to ensure fairness and equal representation in all 
spheres of life in a state.
492. Article 56 obliges the government to put in place affirmative action programmes 
for minorities and marginalised groups to allow them to participate in governance 
and other spheres of life. 
493. Such programmes further provide special opportunities for marginalized groups 
in educational and economic fields, access to employment, development of their 
cultural and linguistic heritage and ensure access to water, health services and 
infrastructure. Article 27 (8) seeks gender balance in elective and appointive bodies 
by obliging the state to ensure that no more than two-thirds of the members of such 
bodies shall be of the same gender. To this end, it provides that the state shall take 
legislative and other measures to implement the principle that not more than two-
thirds of the members of elective or appointive bodies shall be of the same gender. 
In line with the need to have affirmative action on this issue, Article 203 (1) (h) on 
public finance enacts that one of the criteria for determining budgetary allocations 
is the need for affirmative action in respect of disadvantaged areas and groups.
494. The Equalisation Fund for marginalised areas is established under Article 204 as an 
affirmative action towards economic and social rights. The fund consists of money 
amounting to one half of one percent of all revenue collected by the national 
government each year. This fund is to be used by the national government only for 
the purpose of providing basic services such as health, water, roads and electricity to 
marginalised areas. The fund may also be directed to the provision of either direct or 
indirect conditional grants to counties in which marginalised communities exist. 
495. The government, and in particular Parliament that has power to legislate on 
this issue should devise criteria - based on the less than adequate definitions of 
156
Volume IIB    Chapter O N E  
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
‘marginalised community’ in Article 260 of the Constitution - for the purpose of 
identifying groups and areas that are marginalised. It is hoped this TJRC Report 
on economic marginalisation will inform the process of identifying marginalised 
areas and devising ways of deploying the Equalization Fund as addressed with 
recommendations in Part IV of this chapter. 
496. Parliament may only pass Bills that appropriate funds from the Equalisation Fund 
on the recommendation of the Commission on Revenue Allocation that must 
obtain approval by the Controller of Budget for all withdrawals from the fund. 
With the understanding that affirmative action introduces reverse discrimination 
(although constitutionally-sanctioned) and that it serves a crucial but limited 
purpose of improving the situation of previously marginalised regions, the fund 
is set to lapse in 20 years from the effective date, unless Parliament extends it for 
a fixed period of years as per Article 204 (6) and (7). 
Public service and employment
497. We have previously described how ethnicity has played an important role 
in Kenyan politics and the fact that the composition of the public service has 
mirrored the ethnicity of those in power. Partly as a reaction to a report by the 
National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) that painted a damning 
picture of the outlook of the public service, the then Head of the Civil Service 
Francis Muthaura directed permanent secretaries to ensure that members of 
one community should not take up more than 25 percent of the jobs in the 
civil service and in government. Heads of state corporations, departments and 
institutions were requested to comply with the directive immediately, although 
the Commission is unable to establish whether this directive has been complied 
with.
498. Article 27 of the Constitution breaks with the past and will hopefully introduce 
a new practice in public employment. In general terms, it provides for non-
discrimination in all spheres of life, including in employment and calls for 
affirmative action. Article 232 (h) (i) puts representation of Kenya’s diverse 
communities and affording equal opportunities for appointment, training 
and advancement for members of all ethnic groups in the public service as 
part of its core values and principles. Article 227 (2) (b) puts,” the protection 
or advancement of persons, categories of persons or groups previously 
disadvantaged by unfair competition or discrimination” as one of the 
considerations to be factored in the procurement and disposal of public goods 
and services.
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Land reform and economic inclusion
499. Kenya had not had a clearly defined a National Land Policy since independence 
until one was adopted in 2009. This, together with the existence of many land laws, 
some of which were incompatible, resulted in a complex land management and 
administration system.
500. From the advent of colonialism, Kenya has grappled with the land question, which 
subsequent regimes have been unable or unwilling to resolve. Challenges relating 
to land include fragmentation, breakdown in land administration, disparities in 
land ownership, landlessness and poverty. This has resulted in environmental, 
social, economic and political problems, including deterioration in land quality, 
squatting and landlessness, disinheritance of some groups and individuals, urban 
squalor, under-utilization and abandonment of agricultural land, tenure insecurity 
and conflict. 
501. Item Number 4 of Kenya’s National Dialogue and Reconciliation Process clearly 
articulated the need for comprehensive land reforms on three fronts: anchoring 
the Land Principles in the constitutional reform process; finalization, adoption and 
implementation of the National Land Policy; and redressing historical injustices in 
order to foster national harmony through the National Land Commission and the 
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation process.
502. Discussions in Part III show that land is Kenya’s most intractable national issue. 
Access to and ownership of arable land underlines the deep-seated political, 
socio-economic and regional inequities in Kenya. According to the Kenya Land 
Alliance, more than half the arable land is owned by 20 percent of the population 
while 13 percent of Kenyans are landless. Land is tied with ethnic identity. There 
are lingering claims by communities related to alienated ancestral lands. The 
Pokot say they were not compensated for the alienation of what is now Trans 
Nzoia District. Similarly, the Maasai assert that they were swindled out of their 
land through the Maasai Agreements of 1904 and 1911.
503. The Ndungu Commission Report revealed that landlessness among squatters 
is linked to the failure of the post-independence governments to implement a 
comprehensive resettlement programmed and because they lack ethnic entitlement, 
squatters are vulnerable to frequent displacements and dispossession. 
504. The unresolved grievance of colonial land alienation underlies the risks of social 
and political conflict. Many analysts have argued that land is the main reason why 
Rift Valley was the epicenter of the 2007-2008 post-election violence. Unresolved 
historical claims to ‘ethnic territory’ render existing property rights weak or uncertain. 
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505. The Commission notes that the recognition of communal title to land in the 
Constitution as well as the creation of the National Land Commission, whose 
mandate includes settling historical land injustices, provides a basis for 
addressing some if not the majority of these claims.
506. One of the major problems that has bedeviled Kenya since independence is 
the illegal allocation of land. People entrusted with the protection of public 
property infringed on the rights of the masses by grabbing huge tracts of land 
as allowed by the old legislative and constitutional framework. For instance, 
the Government Lands Act that empowered the President to grant titles in 
‘unalienated government land’ was for years at the centre of massive alienation 
of land. The Commissioner of Lands, on behalf of the government, would issue 
a simple letter of “reservation” on government land to individuals. Provisions 
under the Agriculture Act that enabled the Agriculture minister to alienate idle 
land and give it to others, led to mass grabbing of Agricultural Development 
Corporation (ADC) farms. 
507. Various studies have disclosed that Kenya had a complex land regime, yet 
the administrative framework that oversaw it was poorly coordinated and 
gave excessive power to administrators, without establishing mechanisms to 
ensure that they not only performed their duties, but that they did not abuse 
their powers, thereby breeding corruption in the relevant agencies. Land 
redistribution schemes initiated in the post-independence period have been 
rightly criticized for unfairness. Amendments to the Constitution that vested 
power of alienation of public land in the President created more problems in 
part because access to land was determined by political influence.
508. Most holders of the huge parcels of land are concentrated within the 17 to 20 
percent of the country that is arable, such that more than a half of the arable 
land is in the hands of only 10 percent of the 40 million Kenyans. That leaves up 
to 29 percent of the population absolutely landless while another 60 percent 
on average own less than one hectare of land. According to the National 
Development Plans from 2001 to 2008, pastoral activities occupy 70 percent of 
Kenya’s land mass area, and support 25 percent of the human population and 
50 percent of all livestock. Less than 20 percent of the land in Kenya is high 
potential and accommodates about 70 percent of the population. The result is 
landlessness and squatting in both rural and urban areas, leading to congestion 
and fragmentation of land into uneconomic units and subsequently ethnic 
conflicts, particularly in the pastoral areas.
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Changes introduced in land by the new Constitution
509. It is in the light of these historical injustices that far reaching reforms relating to 
land were formulated in the new Constitution. Chapter 5 of the new Constitution 
establishes a framework to ensure that the process of allocation, adjudication, 
consolidation and registration of land is done equitably, transparently and 
sustainably. 
510. The National Land Policy approved by the Cabinet at the end of 2009, 
introduces far-reaching reforms that will go hand in hand with the provisions 
in the Constitution, paving way for the resolution of perennial land problems 
and to redress historical injustices inherited from the colonial administration. 
Major highlights of the new policy include barring non-citizens from absolute 
ownership of land and subjecting them to a leasehold system as well as a set 
of principles developed to govern land ownership and safeguard women’s land 
rights. The policy gives the government powers to reclaim grabbed public land, 
to tax idle land, and reduce all leaseholds to 99 years. Furthermore, Article 68 
requires Parliament to enact a law that will “enable the review of all grants or 
dispositions of public land to establish their propriety or legality.”
Principles governing land ownership
511. The Constitution enacts a set of principles on issues relating to ownership of 
land under Article 60, which stipulates that land in Kenya shall be held, used and 
managed in a manner that is equitable, efficient, productive and sustainable, and 
in accordance with principles which include: equitable access to land; security of 
land rights; sustainable and productive management of land resources; transparent 
and cost effective administration of land; sound conservation and protection 
of ecologically sensitive areas and elimination of gender discrimination in law, 
customs and practices related to land and property in land. The Constitution also 
establishes principles and mechanisms for resolving the claims of dispossession 
that have so often been used by political actors to mobilize their constituents 
along ethnic lines. Its principles and mechanisms on the resolution of historical 
land injustices and on state acquisition of unlawfully-acquired private property so 
that it can be used to benefit the public, should be analyzed from this perspective.
Taxation of idle land and reduction of 999-year leaseholds
512. There are so many people in Kenya who own huge tracts of land, which remains 
idle and is held largely for speculative purposes. The Constitution introduces tax 
on idle land or else its reclamation. It also solves the problem of absentee land 
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ownership which has been a serious problem especially at the Coast. Article 65 of 
the new Constitution provides that a person who is not a Kenyan citizen may hold 
land on the basis of leasehold tenure only. It reduces the maximum period to hold 
leasehold retroactively from 999 to 99 years, which means that all land currently on 
999-year lease automatically reverts to 99 years. Article 65(2) specifically stipulates 
that, if a provision of any agreement, deed, conveyance or document of whatever 
nature purports to confer on a person who is not a citizen an interest in land 
greater than a 99-year lease, the provision shall be regarded as conferring on the 
person a 99-year leasehold interest, and no more. An independent National Land 
Commission has been created to maintain oversight and manage all public land 
among other related duties.
Land Acreage
513. Article 68(c) (1) of the Constitution requires Parliament to enact legislation to 
prescribe minimum and maximum land holding acreages in respect of private land 
to protect the public against land grabbing. 
514. Other than just ensuring fair distribution of land resources from those owning more 
than 10,000 hectares to those owning less than one hectare, this clause also guards 
against congestion and parceling of land into uneconomic units. A combination 
of these clauses in the Constitution and ongoing computerization at the Central 
Land Registry in Ardhi House, will contain land grabbers. A general overview of 
Article 68 reveals that it provides for the regulation of the minimum and maximum 
land-holding acreages, thus promoting sustainable use of land resources and 
conservation. This provision will prevent a few individuals from hoarding arable 
land to the exclusion of the majority.
Protection of community land
515. Article 61(1) classifies land and provides that all land in Kenya belongs to the 
people of Kenya collectively as a nation, as communities and as individuals. It 
therefore makes provision for communally-owned land unlike before, thus it 
protects the interest of the various communities, especially the marginalised 
ones. Article 63(1) goes further to provide that community land shall vest in and 
be held by communities identified on the basis of ethnicity, culture or similar 
community of interest. Any unregistered community land is required to be held 
in trust by county governments on behalf of the communities for which it is 
held and such land shall not be disposed of or used except in the terms of a 
legislation which specifies the nature and extent of the rights of members of 
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each community individually and collectively. The government is required to 
enact legislation to give effect to these provisions.
516. To this extent, community land in Kenya shall consist of land lawfully registered in 
the name of group representatives under the provisions of any law; land lawfully 
transferred to a specific community by any process of law; any other land declared 
to be community land by an Act of Parliament; land that is lawfully held, managed 
or used by specific communities as community forests, grazing areas or shrines; 
ancestral lands and lands traditionally occupied by hunter-gatherer communities; 
or land that is lawfully held as trust land by the county governments, but not 
including any public land held in trust by the county government under Article 
62 (2). For its part, Article 66 seeks to ensure that investments in property such 
as land benefit local communities. This provision would, for example, address the 
grievances of the residents of the Coast region, who claim that they have been 
excluded from sharing the revenues generated from tourism and other coastal 
resources.
Policy responses
517. The Kenya Budget 2011/2012 makes efforts towards remedying marginalisation. 
For the poor, it provides for funds to support education (free primary and 
secondary education) and health. It also expands spending on safety nets to 
cushion the vulnerable from the challenges of high food and fuel prices. For the 
youth, the Budget continues to provide resources by supporting existing public 
works programmes that the government started two years ago, commonly known 
as the Economic Stimulus Programme (ESP) and Kazi Kwa Vijana (KKV) (Work for 
the Youth). The Budget will also scale up programmes aimed at increasing labour 
absorption, skills training and enhancing the employability of the youth. 
518. For farmers, the Budget has set aside funds for agribusiness to begin the journey 
of leveraging lending to the agricultural sector and rural development, targeting 
1.5 million smallholder farmers and over 10 000 agribusinesses throughout the 
country. For the rural and marginalised, there is increased funding for CDF to 
complete critical projects that benefit the poor and earmarked sources for basic 
services in the marginalised areas in the spirit of the Constitution as relates to 
progressive equitable development.
519. One policy response that the government has established is through annual 
budgetary allocations to increase steadily the amount going to the devolved 
funds. In his 2011/2012 Budget Speech, the then Finance minister Uhuru Kenyatta 
stated that funds will be provided for the poor to support education (free primary 
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and secondary education) and health as well as to expanding spending on safety 
nets to cushion the vulnerable from the challenges of high food and fuel prices.
 
520. The Youth Enterprise Development Fund and the Women Enterprise Fund was 
further enhanced by the government’s contributions of Sh385 million and Sh440 
million. Consequently, the minister challenged the management of these funds 
to show results for Kenyans. Sh667 million was awarded for physically challenged 
persons. 
521. The (appropriate) budgetary allocations to the various marginalised groups and 
various devolved funds is an assuring way of the Government acknowledging 
and responding to marginalisation. Despite the response through budgetary 
allocations, there has been criticism that the allocated funds to the different groups 
of persons or devolved funds are not enough when held against the actual number 
of people who need the resources. 
Vision 2030
522. Vision 2030 is Kenya’s current development blueprint covering the period 2008 
to 2030. It aims to transform Kenya into a newly-industrialising “middle-income 
country providing a high quality life to all its citizens by the year 2030”. It is 
anchored on three ‘pillars‘: economic, social and  political. 
523. The economic pillar aims to improve the income and livelihoods of all Kenyans 
through an economic development programme, covering all regions of Kenya, 
and aiming to achieve an average gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of 
10 percent per annum beginning 2012 through focus on tourism; agriculture, 
wholesale and retail trade, manufacturing, business process outsourcing and 
financial services. To realise these aims, there is a commitment to develop a 
governance system that is able to support the governance demands of a middle-
income, rapidly-industrializing country. To achieve this goal calls for deep structural 
reforms to strengthen the rule of law and transparency, accountability and integrity 
in the public and private sectors.
524. Perhaps the most relevant pillar for economic marginalisation from the perspective 
of rhetorical commitment, the social pillar seeks to build a just and cohesive society 
with social equity focusing on eight key areas of education and training, health, 
water and sanitation, environment, housing and urbanization, and gender, youth 
and vulnerable groups. 
525. There is commitment to develop social safety nets that re-orient service delivery 
and public funding towards vulnerable, disadvantaged and marginalised groups in 
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order to build a just and cohesive society that enjoys equitable social development 
in a clean and secure environment. On education, Vision 2030 provides that Kenya 
recognises that the education and training of all Kenyans is fundamental to the 
success of its aims. It further acknowledges regional disparities and inequality 
especially in the marginalised ASALs. It provides that ”although the primary school 
enrolment rates increased from 70.4 percent in 2002 to 83.7 percent in 2005, there 
exist great gender and regional disparities, with the ASAL areas being the worst 
affected.” To address this issue, Vision 2030 will anchor the promotion of equity in 
access to education through a variety of measures. 
526. Vision 2030’s political pillar aims to realize a democratic political system founded 
on issue-based politics that respect the rule of law, and protect the rights and 
freedoms of every individual in Kenyan society through focus on six strategic 
areas - the rule of law, electoral and political processes, democracy and public 
participation, transparency and accountability; public administration and service 
delivery; security, peace-building and conflict management.
527. Vision 2030 also recognizes vulnerable people to include widows and widowers, 
orphans and children at risk, persons with disabilities, under-age mothers, the poorest 
of the poor, internally and externally displaced persons and the elderly. Some of the 
strategies identified to reduce marginalisation among this group include expanding 
pro-poor financial services, for example, through micro-finance institutions and 
village financial associations, full implementation (including appropriate budgetary 
allocations) of the Disability Fund, building more financial institutions in rural 
areas for access, increasing savings by rural poor and improving access to food and 
healthcare services for marginalised groups and ensuring adequate representation 
of marginalised groups in decision making.
Conclusion
528. It is going to take years for Kenya to reverse the legacy of economic marginalization 
of regions identified as marginalized in this Chapter: North Eastern, Upper Eastern, 
Nyanza, Western and North Rift. However, it is encouraging that positive steps are 
being taken towards that direction. This Chapter has provided detailed discussion 
of the historical context for understanding economic marginalization in Kenya, 
which context must be taken by the relevant authorities charged with dealing with 
the multiple legacies of economic marginalization. The Commission’s findings and 
recommendations in this regard are contained in the findings and recommendations 
volume of this Report. 
Volume IIB    
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION164
165REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
CHAPTER
TWO
Land and Conflict
Introduction 
1. The Republic of Kenya is approximately 581,751 square kilometres (44.6 million 
hectares) of which 97.8 percent is land and 2.2 percent is comprised of water 
surfaces.  Only 20 percent of the land surface could be classified as medium to high 
potential land, while the remaining 80 percent is either arid or semi-arid.  Forests 
and woodlands occupy about 7 percent of the country’s land mass. Some of the 
forests and woodlands form part of national parks and reserves.1  The analysis 
shows that there is only about 43.62 million hectares of land in Kenya that is 
suitable for human settlement for the more than 42 million Kenyans. In the absence 
of any possibility of elasticity of available land to accommodate an increasing 
human population, the situation points to the reality of land scarcity, a challenge 
that is compounded by the critical nexus between land and both subsistence and 
economic development in the country.
2. In Kenya, the availability of land to both the private and the public sectors remain 
vital to the country’s development and to the subsistence of its increasing human 
populations. The reason is that Kenya is a country that is endowed neither with 
sufficient mineral resources, nor with a strong manufacturing base. This provides 
an understanding of the significance of land for both subsistence and commercial 
agriculture and as the basis of many of the related economic activities, especially 
manufacturing of raw agricultural products. For the majority of the Kenyans, land is 
1 National Development Plan 2002-2008, Government of Kenya, Nairobi, 2002.
166
Volume IIB    Chapter T WO  
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
the basic, and in most cases, the only economic resource from which they eke out a 
livelihood.2 The ability to access, own, use and control land has an implication, not 
only on one’s ability to feed and provide for his/her family but it also determines 
his/her socio-economic and political standing in society. 
3. Moreover, it is around land that socio-cultural and spiritual relations among 
community members are defined and organized. It is viewed as having an ancestral-
cultural bond, spiritual and philosophical dimensions, thus linking the physical 
and metaphysical worlds. To this extent, land provides some form of ethno-cultural 
identity and social security: the medium which defines and binds together social 
and spiritual relations within and across generations. 
4. For the foregoing reasons, individuals and communities have developed a 
sentimental attachment to land and any significant loss of land not only threatens 
the basic means of subsistence for many, but also a fundamental aspect of 
the foundation of their socio-cultural system.3 It is no wonder then that land 
retains a focal point in Kenya’s history, culture and politics and access to land 
as well ownership, use and control remains an emotive and politicized issue in 
contemporary Kenya,4 with many being prepared to risk their lives to acquire or 
defend it from real or perceived threats. It is not surprising, therefore, that land 
has since the colonial times to the present day, been the subject of myriad state-
managed policy and legal relations. Neither is it surprising that it has been the 
subject of several commissions of inquiry.5 
5. The situation summarized in the foregoing paragraphs explains why ownership 
and use of land in Kenya or the absence thereof is very closely linked to poverty 
on one hand and improved livelihoods on the other, and hence the quest for every 
Kenyan to own land and the actual and likely determination by every landless 
person in Kenya and every person facing land ownership and use injustices in the 
country to explore every possibility, including those of a violent nature, to acquire 
or recover and own land.
6. In order to fully understand the causes of land-related conflicts in Kenya, one needs 
to trace the problems of land acquisition, ownership and use to the pre-colonial 
period to properly appreciate where the problems currently causing land-related 
2 RR Simiyu, ‘Militianisation of resource conflict: The case of land-based conflict in the Mount Elgon region of Western Kenya’ (2008) 
Institute for Security Studies 4 available at http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/M152FULL.PDF (accessed on 3 May 2012).
3 ML Kilson, ‘Land and the Kikuyu: A study of the relationship between land and kikuyu political movements’ (1995) 40 (2) The 
Journal of Negro History 104.
4 Robert Simiyu, ‘Militarization of resource conflict: The case of land-based conflict in the Mount Elgon region of Western Kenya’ 
(2008) Institute for Security Studies 4 available at http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/M152FULL.PDF (accessed on 3 May 2012).
5 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land, (2004) Government Printer xvii. 
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conflicts and violence originated and to design mechanisms that are cognizant of 
both root causes of the problem as well as historical factors that continue to foster 
the problems and related violence and strife so that the underlying fuelling factors 
may also be addressed. 
7. Therefore, the following section presents a historical background to the existing 
land tenure and related acquisition, ownership and use problems, some of which 
continue to bedevil Kenyans to date. This section explains, among other things, 
how settlement patterns of the various ethnic communities in the region now 
called Kenya attracted ‘tribal’ identities to land in various parts of the country and 
how colonial policies and practices generated some of the current land-related 
problems [with acquisition, ownership and use] including landlessness of a large 
segment of Kenya’s population, such that any effort to address the problems, 
as presently manifested, ought also to factor what occurred with acquisition, 
ownership and use at that point in time.
8. The presentation in the following section provides the basis for understanding 
why colonial land policies and practices regarding land acquisition, ownership 
and use partially, but significantly prompted the struggle for independence. 
Most importantly, it explains why, at independence, many Kenyans who had 
suffered land-related injustices awaited anxiously for redress by the first 
independent government in the form of land restitution, restoration and/or 
compensation which is, significantly, the reason many who were disappointed 
have, over the years, resorted to self-help measures to realize what they believe 
to be injustices whose redress are long overdue, but have been flagrantly 
overlooked or ignored.
Historical Background  
9. This section explains the origins of land tenure (acquisition, ownership, use) and 
related problems in the coastal region of Kenya and in Kenya’s mainland. The 
explanation generally, demonstrates why and how colonial land policies and 
practices generated some of the land-related problems, including land scarcity 
and landlessness that have resulted in violent conflicts among Kenyans so that 
suitable measures may be designed in light of identified injustices from their very 
beginning. 
10. It is recognized that although land-related problems in the colonial period, 
especially at the Coast, predated occupation of Kenya by the British colonialists 
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and that although the manner of acquisition, ownership and alienation of land 
by Arabs at the Coast was slightly different from that of the British in relation to 
mainland Kenya, this fact has not been properly appreciated. Yet certain tenets of 
the “policies” and practices of Arabs, coupled with subsequent collaboration with 
the British and failures of the independent Kenya government, may have been the 
cause of widespread landlessness, land scarcity and absence of titles to occupied 
lands by many individuals, families and communities at the Coast. 
11. Therefore, an analysis of Arab land acquisition, ownership, alienation and related 
activities at the Coast is important in presenting some of the unique features 
of the land problems there. It goes without saying that colonialism includes 
colonization by Arabs, especially at the Coast and, subsequently, colonization by 
the British.
Land ownership before the advent of colonialism
12. Before the commencement of colonisation by the British, each of the various 
indigenous ethnic communities in the region now known as Kenya communally 
occupied distinct territories in various parts of what constitutes the land within 
the country’s internationally-recognised borders. The history of Kenya indicates 
inward migration of whole groups (ethnic communities) of people and settlement 
by the groups (communities/tribes) in areas distinctly identified by their presence, 
wherein land was allocated by tribal elders to families for cultivation or grazing, 
depending on need and in accordance with traditional customs and practices. 
13. Communities’ need for more land was identified collectively and the need was 
often satisfied by expansion onto nearby unoccupied areas. Because population 
in the region was generally low, community expansion to satisfy need for land 
occurred, in many cases, peacefully. However, where one community occupied 
land deemed necessary for expansion by another, land was, often, acquired 
through conquest, characterized by inter-tribal wars which, in many cases, 
resulted in the acquisition of land by one community from another. But history 
reveals that communities displaced from their homelands, as it were, through 
conquest, had no difficulty finding alternative land by moving away from 
invaders to unoccupied areas because the population was low and there were 
vast unoccupied lands in the region.
14. Even in the absence of conquest, communities, having exhausted land in one 
area, moved freely to other areas to allow already utilized lands (for grazing or 
cultivation), to regenerate. For pastoralists, movement was often extended over 
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long distances. In many cases, community members returned to areas where 
vegetation had regenerated and therefore, there was movement back and forth 
in areas that were, in the main, distinctly identified with specific tribes. One of 
the key factors that emerges from the manner of acquisition, distribution and 
utilization, is that the need for land of all individuals and families within each of 
the communities/tribes was fully satisfied. 
15. There is no known case of any individual member of a community or family 
within a community in need of land that community elders could not or did not 
satisfy. There is also no known case of land-related disputes that arose between 
individuals or families within a community that community elders failed to address 
conclusively. History shows that generally, there was peaceful co-existence within 
communities and that external threats to communal land ownership and use were 
tackled collectively. The situation was disrupted and distorted, first, by Arabs at 
the Coast and subsequently, the British, followed by individuals and groups of 
individuals in the succeeding independent Kenya government in ways that have 
had far-reaching consequences on the livelihood of the people of Kenya and the 
development of their nation.
Origins of land-related problems at the Coast
16. From the explanation presented in the foregoing paragraphs, especially that 
different ethnic communities/tribes in the region that is now the country called 
Kenya occupied distinct areas of land across the region, it can be understood 
that not all of the presently 42 tribes (ethnic communities) in Kenya occupied 
the coastal area or, as it is more otherwise known, the ‘Coastal Strip’. The fact 
provides basis for understanding that land problems at the Coast whose origins 
are traceable affected only some of the communities/tribes in Kenya which 
is why, if a peculiar or special factors is revealed that may have precipitated 
the current land problems at the Coast, those factors ought to receive specific 
consideration.
17. Against the backdrop of communal ownership and utilization of land at the 
Coast, characterized by general peaceful communal coexistence, Arab traders 
from Arabia and Persia invaded the coastal region in the early 1800s and their 
subsequent activities generated land-related problems first, by their practice of 
the slave trade and secondly, by their forceful acquisition of land occupied by 
local communities and land available for their movement and expansion, as they 
were accustomed to do. Arab traders, who occupied the region, were, under the 
leadership of the Sultan of Zanzibar, heavily involved in the slave trade. 
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18. The significance of this activity in relation to land is that it is a factor that made many 
indigenous communities, especially the Mijikenda, to flee areas that they were 
occupying around the beaches for fear of being captured and sold as slaves. Effectively, 
indigenous communities vacated their homes and grazing and agricultural lands 
which were soon thereafter occupied by the Arabs, especially along the beaches, 
which, today, constitute the most prime land in present-day Kenya. Questions arise: 
Are the Arabs still in control of the area and occupation of the lands? If not, who 
assumed ownership of the lands? How were the lands transferred successively to the 
current owners? Were the Mijikenda (comprising the Dorobo, Boran, Digo, Chonyi and 
Duruma, among others) and the Taita and Pokomo who also occupy the Coastal Strip 
rendered landless by occupation of the land by Arabs and their subsequent successors? 
Were the Mijikenda rendered landless by activities of Arabs and their successors? Has 
the fact that indigenous communities at the Coast were dispossessed and displaced by 
colonialists and subsequent governments been subject of land-related investigations 
in independent Kenya? If such investigations have been conducted, have there been 
recommendations for restoration, restitution or compensation in their favour? Have 
any of such recommendations been implemented, especially considering those who 
ended up as owners of the lands along the beaches that were previously theirs? Is the 
fact that some individuals and businesses from outside of the Mijikenda (as presently 
manifested) acquired land previously belonging to them likely to raise disquiet among 
the Mijikenda, especially if they have ended up as landless people or are facing land 
scarcity? Should subsequent acquisition of land (from the British onward) previously 
belonging to the Mijikenda be traced (to determine subsequent injustices from those 
of Arabs) for purposes of compensation or restitution?
19. In order to adequately address the foregoing questions, it is necessary to 
understand that changes in coastal land ownership and utilization, first, from Arabs 
to the British, and later, from the British to present owners. At the time of the arrival 
of the British, Arabs, under the leadership of the Sultan of Zanzibar, had already 
established control along the Coast, whose land they acquired and occupied, 
indigenous communities having been disposed of through the slave trade and 
direct forceful evictions. In 1888, the British Imperial East African Company (IBEA 
Co.) that had come, on behalf of the British government, to administer the present-
day Kenya - which was then referred to as the East Africa Protectorate -6 signed a 
concession agreement with the Sultan of Zanzibar in which all rights to land in his 
territory except “private lands” (which were land held under certificates of ownership 
issued by the Sultanate7), were ceded to IBEA.8 
6 Leys, C., Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-colonialism, Berkeley University of California Press (1994) at 
28. 
7 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Land System of Kenya on Principles of a National land Policy Framework, Constitutional 
Position of Land, and New Institutional Framework for land Administration (2002) 21.
8 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Land System of Kenya on Principles of a National land Policy Framework, Constitutional 
Position of Land, and New Institutional Framework for land Administration (2002) 21. 
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20. This agreement affected indigenous community ownership and occupation of land 
in the ten-mile coastal strip that runs from Vanga, at the border with Tanzania to 
Kipini on the mouth of River Tana, together with the Lamu archipelago. To gain 
control and administration over the areas, the British government, through IBEA 
signed an administration agreement with the Sultan in 1895 which, in effect gave 
it control over all the land that the Sultan had ceded to the British under the 1888 
concession agreement that it had previously concluded with the Sultan of Zanzibar.9 
The only parcels of land that were exempted from British alienation were the ‘private 
lands’10 which were not land held by the indigenous communities that previously 
owned them, but land held by Arabs under certificate of ownership issued by the 
Sultanate, having violently acquired it through the slave trade or forceful eviction.
21. The 1888 and 1895 agreements terminated the land rights of indigenous 
Africans at the Coast, especially the Mijikenda, Taita and Pokomo and formed the 
basis of acquisition, ownership and control of their land by the British colonial 
administration which, in 1895, declared a protectorate status over Kenya to mark 
its official assumption of jurisdiction over Kenya for a variety of reasons, including 
interest in establishing trade routes to Uganda through construction of the Kenya-
Uganda railway, which required huge financing and the Kenya colony had to be 
economically productive to generate finances to build the railway and to fund the 
colonial British administration.
22. To make the Kenya colony economically productive to be able to finance its 
administration and establish the Kenya Uganda Railway, the British colonial 
administration deemed it necessary to secure incoming settlers’ right to productive 
land, but the declaration of a protectorate status over Kenya in 1895 had not given 
the colonial administrators authority to deal with land, meaning that without 
further measures, the administration and its invited settlers could only acquire 
land from natives through conquest, agreements and treaty or sale, all of which 
proved inefficient means of acquiring land.
23. The hurdle was overcome, first, by extension of the application of the Indian Lands 
Acquisition Act of 1894 to East Africa Protectorate (including Kenya) in 1899. This 
piece of foreign land legislation converted all land in Kenya that had not been 
appropriated by individuals or by the colonial administration into ‘Crown Land’, 
meaning land belonging to Her Majesty, the Queen of England, which she could 
grant to individuals in leaseholds for a term of years or in fee simple.11 
9 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Land System of Kenya on Principles of a National land Policy Framework, Constitutional 
Position of Land, and New Institutional Framework for land Administration (2002) 21. 
10 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Land System of Kenya on Principles of a National land Policy Framework, Constitutional 
Position of Land, and New Institutional Framework for land Administration (2002) 21.
11 For further reading, see Okoth Ogendo, H.W.., African Land Tenure Reform in Agricultural Development in Kenya 152 (Heyer, J., 
ed., 1976). 
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24. However, there was no clarity on what constituted ‘Crown Land’ for purposes of 
acquisition and use by the growing number of settlers and it was limited in quantity 
for the desired ends. In response and to expand the scope of what constituted 
‘Crown Land’, an East Africa Order in Council was passed in 1901 in respect of land 
to define it, thereby to become public land, including all land under the control of 
the Queen through agreement, treaty or convention and all other lands that she 
was to acquire.12 
25. By the 1901 Ordinance, land that the British had acquired from the Sultan through 
the two agreements of 1888 and 1895 became ‘Crown Land’. However, part of the 
land ceded to the British by the Sultan had been occupied not only by indigenous 
communities, mostly the Mijikenda, but also by Arab traders who had settled 
at the Coast under the Sultanate and both groups had claims to it. Therefore, in 
order to “put to rest any claims by indigenous inhabitants of the Coastal Strip to 
land ownership’13 and ‘determine accurately how much land was actually “owned 
privately” so that the limits of ‘Crown Land’ at the coast could be defined,”14 and to 
ascertain land that was available for disposal to prospective settlers,15 the British 
colonial administration that was taking shape in Kenya, having assumed the 
position previously held by IBEA Co. in relation to land at the Coast, enacted a Land 
Titles Ordinance in 1908, with limited application to the Coastal Strip.16  
26. Accordingly, the Land Titles Ordinance of 1908 required “all persons being or 
claiming to be proprietors of, or having or claiming to have any interest whatever 
in immovable property within the ten-mile Coastal Strip to lodge their claims, 
whether of title, mortgage or other interest, within six months with a Land 
Registration Court which was presided over by a Recorder of Titles.17  Where the 
Recorder was satisfied that a particular claim was valid, he would issue a certificate 
to that effect.18 Such certificate was:
Conclusive evidence against all persons (including the crown) of the several matters 
therein contained, and a certificate of ownership shall be conclusive proof that the 
person to whom such certificate is granted, is the owner of the land.19
12 Section 1 of the East Africa Order in Council passed in 1901.
13 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Land System of Kenya on Principles of a National land Policy Framework, Constitutional 
Position of Land, and New Institutional Framework for land Administration (2002) 21.
14 Report of the Select Committee on the issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya (1978) Government 
Printer, 2.
15 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along The Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya 
(Government Printer, Nairobi, 1979) at 2.
16 No. 11 of 1908.
17 The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government 
Printer 2.
18 The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government 
Printer 2.
19 Reproduced in, The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, 
(1978) Government Printer 2.
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27. The Ordinance also declared that “all land ... concerning which no claim or claims 
for a certificate of ownership shall have been made ... shall be deemed to be ‘Crown 
Land’ ... and was henceforth to be governed by the Crown Land Ordinance, 1902.”20 
The Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902 applied to the whole of Kenya.
28. From the wording of the Land Titles Ordinance of 1908, it appears that the 
indigenous communities at the coast, notably, the Mijikenda, Taita and Pokomo, 
were, in the law, given a chance to present their claims to land that, much of 
which had, in the first place, been taken away from them by Arabs. However, the 
indigenous Africans within the ten-mile Coastal Strip did not make claims over 
land in the region during the six months provided by the Land Titles Ordinance 
for reasons revealed by the Select Committee that investigated the issue of land 
ownership along the ten-mile Coastal Strip as follows:
First of all, the indigenous people of the strip had no knowledge of the existence of 
the Ordinance. Even if they did, they never understood its provisions. Secondly, the 
Ordinance had no relevance to indigenous conceptions of land tenure. That they should 
be asked to lay claims upon the soil was a startling preposition. Third, the Ordinance was 
clearly biased against these people. For the colonial government and courts believed 
that no African, whether as an individual or a community had any title to land. Hence for 
purposes of the 1908 and other colonial land ordinances, land occupied by Africans was 
always treated as ownerless. Fourth, the actual investigations of claims were done mainly 
by Mudris - usually Mazrui Arabs absorbed into the colonial administration - who were 
generally unsympathetic to the indigenous people. Fifth, the time limit within which 
claims could be made was extremely short. And indeed after 1922 claims would no 
longer be received at all. Besides, when in 1926 three “native reserves” were established 
in Kwale and Kilifi, any further doubts concerning the possibility of ever receiving claims 
from indigenous coastal peoples were laid to rest. For with the exception of 13 pockets 
of land in Kwale, land comprised within these reserves was deliberately delineated 
outside the ten-mile strip…21
29. Moreover, apart from the Recorder himself, the only other statutory officers were 
surveyors and administrative officers. The duties of these two officers included 
boundary surveys and preparation of maps to be attached to certificates of 
ownership. The latter only had the duty to receive claims but had no power to 
adjudicate them. The process of adjudication was thus left to only one man, the 
Recorder.22 Although in practice, two intermediate committees were appointed to 
assist the Recorder, the process was one that would be difficult, if not impossible 
20 Land Titles Ordinance, No. 11 of 1908. 
21 The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government 
Printer 3.  
22 The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government 
Printer 3.  
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for indigenous Africans to know about or to follow. It remained essentially judicial, 
involving issuance of summons, administration of oaths and invitation of parties to 
argue their claims either in person or through lawyers. 
30. Matters were made worse by the fact that no proper investigations were conducted 
on claims presented. Most claims were presented on the basis of old Arabic 
documents or allegations of possession or inheritance that were mainly false. Where, 
as was often the case, no objections were raised or if an objector failed to appear 
altogether, no further proof was ever asked for. In the very few cases where claims 
by indigenous Africans were allowed, the size of their land was deliberately reduced 
by the Arab assistants of the Recorder.23 In such circumstances, Mazrui Arabs made 
claims to large tracts of bush lands whose boundaries they could not even point out, 
resulting in their appropriation of 18,000 hectares of land in Central Kilifi over which 
they declared a Mazrui trust. The same flawed process also allowed over 95 percent 
of land in Malindi to be taken by Arabs. Since very few claims were received in Lamu, 
much of the land there was declared ‘Crown Land’.24 In Kwale where there were fewer 
claims, much of the land was subsequently sold or granted in leaseholds to Indians, 
Europeans and other concessionaires interested in large-scale agriculture.25
31. For the reasons elaborated, indigenous Africans at the Coast lost a chance to lay 
claim to their land and their right to do so under the British administration was 
foreclosed even though many families and communities remained resident on 
some of the land which they would, for failure to lay claim, continue to occupy for 
years without any recognition or registration of title thereto. 
32. Arabs, on the other hand, were quick to lay claim over land along the Coastal Strip 
which was not originally theirs. A select committee established by the government 
in 1978 to investigate issues of land ownership along the ten-mile Coastal Strip 
established that the Registrar of Titles did not take time to verify the claims placed 
before him. 26 The effect of this was that the Mazrui Arabs took most of the land in 
the coastal strip, leaving the indigenous communities, including the Mijikenda, the 
Pokomo and the Taita, landless and as squatters on their farms.27
23 The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government 
Printer 3.  
24 The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government 
Printer 3.  
25 The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government 
Printer 3.
26 The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government 
Printer 3.
27 The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government 
Printer 3.  
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33. For the foregoing reasons, The Land Titles Ordinance has been attributed to the 
state of widespread landlessness in the coastal region, 28 and yet at independence, it 
was adopted as the Land Transfer Act. As explained subsequently, new legislations 
passed in 1938 extinguished any other rights that “natives” in Kenya as a whole 
might have had outside their respective reserves. 
34. Moreover, 1908 Ordinance introduced a British conception of land, that is; 
that whatever is attached to the land becomes part of that land, such that as 
indigenous ethnic communities at the Coast lost their land, they also lost 
whatever rights they may have had under Muslim or customary law to farm 
produce. In addition, many missed compensation for permanent improvements 
that they had made to land in the form of permanent structures. Therefore, the 
majority of the indigenous people who still remained on the land - because the 
new unjustified owners never resided on the land anyway - so simply in the belief 
that it was still theirs, recognised ownership and control having shifted to either 
the Arabs or the British and their collaborators.29
35. Unlike mainland Kenya which was under the control of the colonial government 
throughout the colonial period (from 1895 to 1963, first, as a protectorate and 
subsequently, as a colony), the ten-mile Coastal Strip remained under the control 
of the Sultan of Zanzibar until 1963, when the Sultan renounced sovereignty 
over the strip following the signing of an agreement between the British, Kenya 
and Zanzibar governments which effectively integrated the Coastal Strip into 
independent Kenya.30 
36. The foregoing explanation appears to be the genesis of the widespread squatter 
problem at the Coast, characterized by large numbers of families and communities 
occupying land for which they have no title and therefore, do not own and 
consequently, many indigenous people at the Coast are exposed to forceful and 
unexpected evictions by those who hold titles to the land they occupy, their 
assigns or successors in title. Resolution of the problem of landlessness at the coast 
was made more difficult, if not impossible by the provisions of section 75 of the 
independence constitution which provided that: 
28 The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government 
Printer 3.
29 The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government 
Printer 3.  
30 The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government 
Printer 4.
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all existing land rights irrespective of the manner in which they were acquired be 
confirmed and guaranteed.31
37. The independence constitutional provisions which were buttressed by those of 
sections 27 and 28 and the Registered Land act (Cap. 300, now repealed) ruled out 
the possibility that historical claims would ever be the basis for land distribution 
after independence, in the country as a whole.
38. Some of the pertinent questions that deserve answers integrated in national solutions 
to conflicts over land are: (a) whether the agreement signed at independence 
between Kenya’s government, the outgoing British administration and the Sultan of 
Zanzibar took cognisance of the loss of land by indigenous Africans to Arabs and the 
British and made provisions for them; (b) whether any scheme of land registration, 
compensation or restitution was implemented for the benefit of indigenous people 
who lost their land to Arabs and subsequently to the British; and (c) what measures 
have subsequent governments made to redress the situation?
39. Another factor that should be borne in mind in the a search for solutions to the 
land problem at the Coast is the subsequent establishment, in 1926, after much of 
the land there had been declared ‘Crown Land’, of three “native reserves,” mostly 
outside of the ten-mile Coastal Strip, in Kwale and Kilifi.”32 As subsequent sections 
of this chapter disclose, from the year 1926, the British colonial administration 
confined indigenous Africans to “native reserves”, meaning that those who 
continued occupying their land after it was acquired by Arabs or the British were 
compelled to move out of the land into the designated reserves. Many questions 
arise concerning the confinement of Africans to reserves, including land allocation 
practices and policies in the reserves, but for purposes of determining causes of 
current land-related conflicts, two pertinent issues arise.
40. Firstly, whether Africans occupying a particular reserve were considered to be 
collectively owning it. Secondly, whether, at the time a system of land registration 
was introduced in post-independent Kenya, land was distributed to all occupants 
of a particular reserve and registered in their names or land constituting any 
reserve remained in the collective unregistered ownership and use of a community 
as communal land, which was subsequently alienated to a few members of the 
reserve or sold to persons from outside the community, leaving original occupants 
as squatters or landless.
31 The provision was wrongly informed by a feeling that land redistribution should not be made at the expense of economic (mainly 
agricultural) stability, id., at 4.
32  The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government 
Printer 3.  
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Origins of land-related problems in mainland Kenya
41. For mainland Kenya, change in land tenure and related policies and practices 
first occurred with the coming of the IBEA Co. that was mandated by the British 
government in 1888 to administer the present-day Kenya, which was then referred 
to as the East Africa Protectorate and in the process, to facilitate construction of 
a railway to link Kenya and Uganda.33 The company also had the task of raising 
revenue to finance British administration of the protectorate and to accomplish 
the task, it encouraged and facilitated many settlers of British and, to a smaller 
extent, Dutch origin, to take up residence in Kenya for the purpose of undertaking 
agricultural activities in the hope that their agricultural productivity would 
generate much-needed revenue to fund construction of the railway as well as 
finance administration of the colony.34 
42. IBEA Co. was unable to administer the territory, prompting the British government 
to declare the region now Kenya a protectorate in 1895 and on 1 July 1895 the 
British government posted the first Governor, Sir Arthur Hardinge, to establish a 
formal British administration in Kenya.35 However, declaration of a protectorate 
status over Kenya had not conferred authority on colonial administrators to deal 
with land, meaning that without further measures, the administration and its 
invited settlers could only acquire land from natives through conquest, agreements 
and treaty or sale, all of which proved inefficient means of acquiring land. As 
already noted, the hurdle was overcome, first, by extension of the Indian Lands 
Acquisition Act of 1894 to the East Africa Protectorate, including the region now 
Kenya, in 1899. Through this piece of foreign legislation, the British administration 
developed rules to guide its acquisition of land in Kenya. 
43. Among other effects, the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 vested all unoccupied land, 
including all lands situated within one mile on either side of the Kenya-Uganda 
Railway that was deemed necessary for the construction of the railway on the 
Commissioner for the Protectorate and lands over which indigenous communities 
shifted back and forth for cultivation and grazing.36 The Act also allowed for the 
acquisition of land for the construction of government premises and roads.37 In 
addition, it empowered the Commissioner for the Protectorate to allocate land to 
settlers on leases not exceeding 21 years.38
33 Leys, C., Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-colonialism, Berkeley University of California Press (1994) at 
28. 
34 C Leys, ‘Underdevelopment in Kenya: the political economy of neo-colonialism’ (1994) Berkeley: University of California Press 28;
35 Kahl, C.H., Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, and State-Sponsored Violence: The Case of Kenya, 1991-93, 
International Security (1998), Vol. 23 (2) at 106; and Leo, C., The Failure of the “Progressive Farmer” in Kenya's Million-Acre 
Settlement Scheme, Journal of Modern African Studies,  (1978), Vol. 16 (4) at 620.
36 Land Acquisition Act of 1894.
37 Land Acquisition Act of 1894.
38 Land Acquisition Act of 1894.
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44. The Land Acquisition Act of 1894 had the effect of converting all land in Kenya 
that had not been appropriated by individuals or by the colonial administration 
into ‘Crown Land’, meaning land belonging to Her Majesty, the Queen of England, 
which she could grant to individuals in leaseholds for a term of years or in fee 
simple39 but  there was no clarity on what constituted ‘Crown Land’ for purposes 
of acquisition and use by the growing number of settlers and it was limited in 
quantity for the desired ends. 
45. Further, On 29 December 1897, the British administrators passed the East African 
Land Regulations which extended the period lease granted settlers to 99 years. 
The regulations also sought to safeguard some areas under African occupation 
described as those lands “that were cultivated or regularly used by any native 
or native tribes.”40 Alienation on such areas could only be permitted once the 
Commissioner for the Protectorate was satisfied that the land “was no longer in use 
by the native or native tribes and that the issuance of the certificate of title would not 
be prejudicial to the native interests.”41 
46. It appears from the wording of the East African Land Regulations of 1897 that initially, 
British administrators sought to protect land use and occupational rights of indigenous 
Africans in mainland Kenya. However, the years that followed saw an influx of settlers 
into Kenya, prompting the government to avail more land for their occupation and 
utilization. The colonial government realized that the 1897 Regulations were restrictive 
since they disallowed the alienation of land under occupation of natives or native 
tribes. Accordingly, it enacted the East Africa Order in Council in 1901 to provide the 
Commissioner with full authority to alienate ‘Crown’ lands. The Order in Council was 
also intended to define ‘Crown Land’ for purposes of acquisition and use by the growing 
number of settlers because until then, there was no clarity of what constituted it. 
Because ‘Crown Land’ was limited in quantity for the desired ends, the Order in Council 
also sought to expand the scope of what constituted ‘Crown Land’. 
47. The Order defined ‘Crown Land’ to include all land under the control of the Queen 
through agreement, treaty or convention and all other lands that she was to 
acquire.42 By the provisions of the order, all such land became public land which 
was, by the law, under the control of the Queen.43 However, the order fell short of 
conferring direct authority on the British administration to acquire land. Therefore, 
39 For further reading, see Okoth Ogendo, H.W.., African Land Tenure Reform in AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA 152 
(Heyer, J., ed., 1976).
40 East African Land Regulations.
41 East African Land Regulations.
42 Section 1 of the East Africa Order in Council passed in 1901.
43 Section 1 of the East Africa Order in Council passed in 1901.
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in 1902, another ordinance - the Crown Lands Ordinance - was passed, which vested 
power in the British High Commissioner to Kenya Protectorate both to acquire 
land, including land in native settlements and villages and to sell land acquired in 
freeholds to any settler in lots not exceeding 1 000 hectares.44
48. In the process of passing, importing and implementing legislation, including the 
Indian Land Acquisition Act of 1894 and the Crown Lands Ordinance, the British 
introduced a new concept of land ownership and use, with the ‘Crown’ or, in modern 
parlance, the state, asserting itself as a political entity owning land in Kenya and 
having the right to grant portions of it to individual users. In some cases, the state 
granted rights over land occupied by natives to settlers, where such land was 
perceived to be owned by it, the state, on the basis of newly-introduced legislation. 
49. It is important to note, for example, that section 31 of the Crown Lands Ordinance 
allowed the Commissioner to “grant leases of areas of land containing native villages or 
settlements without specifically excluding such villages or settlements.” The only land 
it excluded from leases to be so granted related to the “land in the actual occupation 
of natives at the date of the lease.” It has been argued that the failure of the colonial 
government to define “actual occupation” left land that was in actual occupation and 
use by indigenous communities which was, by provision of the Ordinance, excluded 
from alienation, undefined.45 The failure exposed such land to further alienation 
and indeed, in subsequent years, a meaning of actual occupation was adopted and 
thereby, the British alienated more land from Africans in the region now Kenya.46  
50. With a lot of land at its disposal, the British administration encouraged many 
Europeans to settle in Kenya and in order to facilitate their agricultural production 
to meet the objectives already stated, they allocated settler tracts of land of up to 
1 000 hectares as permitted by the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902. For purposes 
of understanding why certain areas in Kenya are, to date, prone to land-related 
conflicts, it is instructive to note that when European settlers arrived in Kenya, they 
preferred to live in certain areas that came to be known as the ‘White Highlands’. 
The areas include present-day Rift Valley, Western, Nyanza and Central regions 
which were considered as favourable for settlement because of their “temperate 
climate, fertile soil, and relatively disease-free environment.”47  
44 Section 4 of the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902.
45 ML Kilson, ‘Land and the Kikuyu: A study of the relationship between land and kikuyu political movements’ (1995) 40 (2) The 
Journal of Negro History 112.
46 ML Kilson, ‘Land and the Kikuyu: A study of the relationship between land and kikuyu political movements’ (1995) 40 (2) The 
Journal of Negro History 113.
47  CH Kahl, ‘Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, and State-Sponsored Violence: the Case of Kenya, 1991-93’ (1998) 23 
(2) International Security 106. 
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51. For further expansion, construction of the railway line and the extent of “unused 
land” were the main determinant of which areas became the ‘White Highlands’.48 
The railway was essential to the settlers since it not only determined the boundaries 
of the ‘White Highlands’;49 it also determined the usefulness of land since “only land 
within reach of it was regarded as being of any commercial use.”50 Despite the fact 
that local communities were in actual occupation of the ‘White Highlands’, settlers 
viewed the areas as unoccupied and thus available for their occupation because they 
equated uncultivated land as unoccupied, possibly because they did not understand 
the shifting nature of occupation of land by both agrarian and pastoral communities 
in the region. No wonder, Sir Harry Johnston, a British administrator, described 
‘White Highlands’ at the time as “utterly uninhabited for miles and miles or at most 
its inhabitants are wandering hunters who have no settled home, or whose fixed 
habitation is the lands outside the healthy area.”51 
52. To increase and expand settler occupation and utilization of the so-called ‘White 
Highlands’, British administrators applied the full import of provisions of their laws, 
including the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 and the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902, 
which authorized them to acquire land through conquest, sale and agreement but 
there are indications that the provisions of their laws were not strictly followed because 
in some cases, various tactics appear to have been applied in acquiring land, including 
tricking illiterate community leaders into signing land alienation agreements whose 
terms and implications they could not and did not fully understand.
53. Consequently, dispossessing whole communities of their land set the stage for 
some of the violent conflicts of land ownership and user rights that have been 
witnessed in recent years in Kenya.
54. There are examples of some of the methods the British applied to acquire land from 
indigenous Africans. They reveal the injustices perpetrated in the process, which, 
in subsequent years, precipitated violent conflicts between affected communities 
and individuals and families from outside of the affected communities who have 
been deemed as unjustifiably claiming land from communities that have already 
suffered what, in their view, is illegal land alienation. The very act of alienation of 
land was an injustice. In the process, several other injustices and atrocities were 
committed against indigenous Africans by the British, which is why as the country 
48  WTW Morgan, ‘The “White Highlands” of Kenya’ Vol. 129, No. (June 1963), The Geographical Journal, pg 144.
49  The boundaries were for many years described only by reference to two points on the railway, at first from Kiu to Fort Ternan [now 
Lake Victoria], and later from Sultan Hamud to Kibigori. The alignment of the railway therefore helped to determine the areas first 
settled by Europeans.
50  WTW Morgan, ‘The “White Highlands” of Kenya’ Vol. 129, No. (June 1963), The Geographical Journal, pg 144.
51  WTW Morgan, ‘The “White Highlands” of Kenya’ Vol. 129, No. (June 1963), The Geographical Journal, pg 140.
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approached independence, large groups of people anxious for justice, such that if 
their land-related grievances were not addressed, they were likely to resort to self-
help justice.It is important to consider British policies and laws which guided their 
contestable practices in relation to Africans’ land. 
55. The laws were, at independence, adopted with very minor changes and by so 
doing, the independent government of Kenya appears to have integrated, not only 
an alien land tenure on a people who had greatly suffered its injustices, but also 
embraced the spirit of the laws which was singly in favour of alienation of land 
from Africans for the benefit of the British administration and its invited European 
settlers. Could the spirit of the laws and, in cases where legal provisions were 
adopted verbatim, the letter thereof also, been the cause of failure to address land 
injustices at independence and the subsequent emergence of official practices in 
relation to land that were akin to those of the colonialists? Some insight might 
allow a deeper understanding of the root causes of land grabbing phenomenon in 
post-independent Kenya and the related violent conflicts.
Acquisition of land via agreements
	 1904 Anglo-Maasai Agreement 
56. The Maasai community remains one of the communities that has in post-
independence Kenya been engaged in perennial wars, especially with members 
of the Kikuyu community over land ownership and use, especially in Enoosupukia, 
parts of Naivasha, and in Molo. To a small extent, the Maasai have also been 
periodically engaged in violent conflicts with members of the Kuria community, 
their neighbours to the south, especially over utilization of pasture land and 
watering points. What could have placed the Maasai community in a situation of 
actual or perceived land scarcity to the extent of armed conflict in case of perceived 
encroachment by members of other communities? Causes of the conflicts should 
be understood in a historical perspective to factor the root causes of injustices that 
were perpetrated by the British and subsequently, at independence, in order to 
find lasting solutions to the problems.
57. The Maasai community is Nilotic, because of its movement into Kenya from the 
north, having followed the River Nile into the region that is now Kenya. Upon entry 
into the region, the Maasai originally occupied the area now bordered by Suswa, 
Ol-Joro Orok and Ol-Kalou. 
58. Being pastoralists, they moved freely with their cattle in the areas, especially 
in search of pasture and their movement was planned in a way that allowed 
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vegetation in overgrazed areas to regenerate before moving back with their 
cattle. Because their population was relatively low, it was not difficult for them 
to move back and forth with their cattle. However, they lost their land and all 
use rights to the British through a purportedly signed agreement in 1904.
59. In 1904, Maasai elders, known locally as laibons, through Lenana, their leader, 
entered into the first “agreement” with the British administrators in which they 
purportedly agreed to surrender their prime grazing lands in Suswa, Ol-Joro Orok 
and Ol-Kalou areas and move to Laikipia.52 It is estimated that under this agreement 
approximately 11 200 members of the Maasai community and over two million head 
of their livestock, lost their land to only 48 Europeans.53 
60. Those who signed the agreement on the part of the British administrators 
considered the agreement binding, even though the Maasai elders who signed 
it purportedly on the part of the whole community were, apparently, uneducated 
and may not have fully appreciated the full import of an agreement based on 
foreign and customarily incompatible notions of land use and related tenure. 
Nevertheless, once the agreement was considered to have been signed by the 
Maasai, they were driven to Laikipia, to pave way for settler occupation. The Maasai 
did not take long in their newfound land in Laikipia before they were, again, driven 
away, purportedly by another signed “agreement”.
	 1911 Anglo-Masaai Agreement
61. When the land in Laikipia became attractive to settlers, Maasai elders purportedly 
signed a second agreement with the British in 1911 in which the Maasai gave away 
the land in Laikipia and, purportedly, agreed to move many miles away to the more 
arid terrain of the southern Rift Valley in the current Narok and Kajiado districts. 
This long journey, coupled with harsh weather condition, saw the community 
suffer heavy losses of human life and livestock only to settle in an area with scarce 
pasture and water resources, not to mention the prevalence of livestock diseases 
which was worsened by the presence of wildlife in the area.
62. Realizing that the land to the south might not sustain their livelihood, and 
convinced of their inability to militarily resist their removal from Laikipia, 
52 See, generally, Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda, Indigenousness in Africa: A Contested Legal Framework for Empowerment of 
“Marginalized” Communities (2011).
53 JM Klopp, “Ethnic Clashes” and Winning Elections: The Case of Kenya’s Electoral Despotism’ (2001) 35 (2) Canadian Journal 
of African Studies 487; O Lumumba, ‘The National Land Policy in Kenya: Addressing Historical Injustices’ (2004) 2  Kenya Land 
Alliance Issues Paper 10; H Lotte, ‘Rough Time in Paradise: Blames, claims and memory-making around some protected areas in 
Kenya’ (2007) 5(3) Conservation and Society 310.      
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the Maasai challenged the 1904 and 1911 land agreements in a civil court in 
1913,54 demanding that they return to the northern highlands as well as receive 
compensation for the loss of their livestock.55 Among the arguments presented 
were that the community leaders who purportedly signed the two agreements 
were illiterate and therefore unable to enter into any valid agreement.56 They 
further stated that community leaders who purportedly signed the agreements 
had not consulted with members of the community and therefore could not be 
assumed to have acted on behalf of the whole community.  However, despite 
the active assistance of sympathetic British activists and lawyers, the Maasai lost 
the case, as it was dismissed on technicalities and received no compensation.57 
63. In rejecting their claim, the court stated that the Maasai ethnic community as 
living within the limits of the East Africa Protectorate are not subjects of the 
Crown, nor was East Africa British territory. East Africa, the court maintained, being 
a Protectorate in which the Crown has jurisdiction is, in relation to the Crown, a 
foreign country under its protection and therefore, its native inhabitants were 
not subjects owing allegiance to the Crown, but protected foreigners who, in 
return for that protection, owed obedience.58  The agreements were interpreted 
as, “…not constituting legal contracts between the protectorate government 
and the Maasai signatories, but rather, as treaties between the Crown and the 
representatives of the Maasai, a foreign tribe living under its protection.”59
64. By covering the heinous acts of the representatives of the British government under 
the protective umbrella of “acts of state”, the court found itself unable to grant 
relief to the Maasai plaintiffs for the serious damages suffered through deaths of 
their members and loss of livestock, among others. The court erroneously found 
that “acts of state” could not be subject of an examination by a municipal court, 
regardless of whether they were “just or unjust, politic or impolitic, beneficial or 
54 In Ole Njogo & Others v. The Attorney General & Others, Civil Case No. 91 of 1912 which was filed in the High court of East Africa 
Protectorate at Mombasa(reported in (1913) 5 EALR, 70- 80), the Maasai resorted to court as the platform where they could 
channel their opposition to illegal alienation of their land by the colonialists. The Maasai challenged both the British representatives 
of the Crown and Maasai signatories to the 1911 agreement. Specifically, they challenged the validity of the agreement on the 
ground that the signatories did not have the authority to represent the Maasai tribe. Invoking the terms of the 1904 agreement, 
they requested the court to issue an injunction restraining the British administration officials involved from preventing their return, 
together with their livestock to Laikipia District or from forcing those still in the District to move out.
55 See, facts of the case in, Ole Njogo & Others v. The Attorney General & Others, Civil Case No. 91 of 1912, id.
56 Who owns the Land: Blood and Soil issues in the Kenya Rift Valley (2008), available at www.ogiek.org/indepth/ind-who-owns-the-
land.htm, last accessed on (15 May 2011).
57  The case is reproduced, in part, in, Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda, Indigenousness in Africa: A Contested Legal Framework for 
Empowerment of “Marginalized” Communities (2011) At 273 - 274.
58 See the extract of the ruling in, Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda, Indigenousness in Africa: A Contested Legal Framework for Empowerment 
of “Marginalized” Communities (2011) at 274.
59 Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda, Indigenousness in Africa: A Contested Legal Framework for Empowerment of “Marginalized” Communities 
(2011) at 274. An ambiguity/contradiction in the ruling in the case relate to the fact, as stated by the court, that although East Africa 
was a foreign country outside of the dominions of the British crown, the Crown or its representatives had unlimited power in the 
protectorate.
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injurious to those whose interests are affected.”60 The Court of Appeal upheld the 
dismissal of the case by the lower court on the same grounds.
65. Two years after the court’s decision and perhaps, in recognition of the dire 
consequences that the two agreements had on the Maasai community and the 
embarrassment that it might have caused the British administration, it passed 
the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1915 which prohibited land transactions between 
white settlers and Africans without the prior consent of the Governor of Kenya.61 
The Ordinance also brought all land under the control of the ‘Crown’, including lands 
previously reserved and actually occupied by indigenous ethnic communities and all 
lands reserved for the use of any particular ‘tribe’.62 
Acquisition of land through establishment of reserves
66. In investigating the causes of land-related conflict in Kenya, the establishment of the 
so-called “native reserves” is relevant for a variety of reasons. First, the establishment 
of the reserves was another tool applied by the British colonial administration to 
further alienate local communities’ prime land, thereby exposing communities, over 
time, to land scarcity and landlessness. Secondly, the establishment of reserves for 
exclusive of use specific communities created a sense -   in the minds of community 
members - of exclusive domains from which various tribes did and to date, seek to 
exclude members of other ethnic communities from occupation, to the point of 
violent conflicts, as clearly manifested, for example, soon after national elections in late 
2007 and early 2008. Further, the establishment of reserves and confinement of African 
communities therein made it easier for the British colonial administration to undertake 
further draconian measures against local communities and their members, including 
the introduction of forced labour upon populations captivated in the reserves, which 
further exposed individual community members to loss of land and use rights during 
long periods of forced service in European farms, as elaborated next.
67. The British administration’s efforts to alienate land in mainland Kenya accelerated 
after World War I, when former British soldiers were encouraged to settle and 
engage in agricultural production activities and for that purpose, they were allowed 
to acquire land, ostensibly from the Crown, at concessionary rates.63 Settlement of 
ex-soldiers was facilitated by the Ex-Soldier Settlement Scheme and backed by the 
Crown Lands (Discharged Soldiers Settlement) Ordinance of 1921, Kenya having 
60  Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda, Indigenousness in Africa: A Contested Legal Framework for Empowerment of “Marginalized” Communities 
(2011) At 274.
61 Crown Lands Ordinance of 1915.
62 Crown Lands Ordinance of 1915.
63  CH Kahl, ‘Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, and State-Sponsored Violence: the Case of Kenya, 1991-93’ (1998) 23 
(2) International Security 106.
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been declared a British colony in 1920. However, only a limited amount of ‘Crown 
Land’ was suitable for settler cultivation and this provided impetus for the colonial 
government to alienate more land from indigenous Africans, in areas that were 
deemed to be of high agricultural potential by establishing and confining African 
communities to what was referred to as “native reserves.”
68. As was the custom and policy of the British, a law called the Kenya (Native 
Areas) Ordinance, was passed in 1926 to provide basis for the establishment of 
reserves and to confer official recognition of their existence.64 By then, the colonial 
government, had, in 1915, amended the Crown Lands Ordinance which brought 
all designated reserve lands occupied by Africans under the control of the Crown, 
thus paving way for their various forms of control of not only allocation and use 
of the land, but also movement within and between the lands, including forced 
migration onto settler farms. The 1926 Native Areas Ordinance and subsequently, 
the Lands Trust Ordinance passed in 1930, had indications of intention to confer 
Africans ownership and use rights over land in the reserves and to protect the rights 
by stating, for example, that in the reserves, land was set aside for use and benefit 
of African communities for ever and by prohibiting alienation of such land except 
for public purposes, in which case, land of equal value was to be substituted.65 
However, the colonial system of reserves proved to be another tool for alienation 
of local communities’ prime land.
69. As the British colonial administration forced Africans into reserves purposely 
designated in marginal and unproductive areas which were also very limited in size, 
considering the numbers of individual community members and the likely increase 
in their population, they took over African communities’ land left behind, which 
then formed part of ‘Crown Land’ to be made available to an increasing number of 
settlers. In most cases, reserves were designated for occupation by particular ethnic 
groups. The colonial government defined the boundaries of each reserve and later 
established the kipande system, an identification system, aimed at controlling the 
movement of local communities and their individual members from one reserve 
area to another. Over time, the system created, in the mind of confined communities 
and their members, the sense that the reserves were their exclusive domains. 
70. It is on this basis that such communities sought to resist what they perceived as 
intrusion of their spaces, by the immigrant communities, 66 a notion that persisted 
64 ML Kilson, ‘Land and the Kikuyu: A study of the relationship between land and kikuyu political movements’ (1995) 40 (2) The 
Journal of Negro History 115.
65 EW Smith, ‘Land in Kenya’ (1936) 35 (140) Journal of the Royal African Society 246.
66 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Land Law System of Kenya on Principles of a National Land Policy 
Framework, Constitutional Position on Land and New Institutional Framework for Land Administration, Nairobi, Government of 
Kenya,2002.
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to the present time, now manifested by contentious rejection of individuals and 
families seeking to undertake business or settle in areas considered as belonging 
to other tribes and forceful eviction of families and individual members of 
communities considered not to belong to a particular ethnic community, in 
various parts of Kenya. The Commission of Inquiry into the Land Law System in 
Kenya established in the year 2002 found that it is on the basis of the notion 
that reserves were their exclusive domains that communities (tribes) sought and 
still seek to resist what they perceive as intrusion of their space by immigrant 
communities and/or their members.67
Acquisition of land through coercive measures
71. Related to the establishment of reserves were other measures whose end result 
was exposure of individuals and families to landlessness and poverty - the 
introduction of forced African labour, forced military service and forced taxation 
upon communities already held captive in defined reserves. The financial and 
political measures introduced included the introduction of the Hut and Poll 
taxes under the Native Hut and Poll Tax Ordinance requiring payment of taxes 
by Africans, the Masters and Servants Ordinance mandating Africans to provide 
forced agricultural labour to Europeans, the 1918 Resident Native (Squatters) 
Ordinance and the kipande (pass book) system, to mention a few. Moreover, as 
African populations increased, the reserves, in time, became overcrowded and 
could not accommodate all community members and yet movement from one 
reserve to another was restricted. 
72. In order to create a large, cheap African labour force to serve as agricultural 
labourers in settler farms, the British colonial administration imposed taxes on 
individual Africans and tax had to be paid in the British currency, which could only 
be earned by employment in the service of the British and the only employment 
available for most Africans already quarantined in the reserves was labour on 
European farms.68 In many cases, Africans were also forcibly captured from the 
reserves and compelled to provide labour on European farms, while other captives 
served in the British military.69 
67 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Land Law System of Kenya on Principles of a National Land Policy 
Framework, Constitutional Position on Land and New Institutional Framework for Land Administration, Nairobi, Government of 
Kenya, 2002.
68 These financial and political measures included the introduction of the Hut and Poll taxes under the Native Hut and Poll Tax 
Ordinance, the Masters and Servants Ordinance, the 1918 Resident Native (Squatters) Ordinance and the Kipande (pass book) 
system to mention a few.
69 These financial and political measures included the introduction of the Hut and Poll taxes under the Native Hut and Poll Tax 
Ordinance, the Masters and Servants Ordinance, the 1918 Resident Native (Squatters) Ordinance and the Kipande (pass book) 
system to mention a few.
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73. Since most of the pastoralist communities in the ‘White Highlands’ did not have 
cultivation of land as an established practice, the colonial administration  resorted 
to forced recruitment of labour from the other areas, Central, Nyanza and Western 
provinces, which saw mass migration of the Kikuyu, Abagusii, Luhya, and Luo as 
‘squatter’ labourers on settler farms.70 As individuals entered into forced labour, 
they and in many cases, other members of their families, lost their lots in the 
increasingly crowded reserves. Immigrant communities were also victims of land 
alienation, having lost their land to the European settlers in other parts of the 
‘White Highlands’.71
74. As the population of Africans increased in the reserve confinement, families suffered 
land scarcity and landlessness, many ending up as squatter labourers on European 
farms to eke out a living. It also resulted in subsistence production pressures on 
land which had negative implications for the livelihoods of Africans, especially 
because native reserves consisted of large numbers of people concentrated in 
small land areas to allow intensive and extensive extraction of land resources in 
the settler farms. The capacity of Africans to purchase land elsewhere was curtailed 
by a blanket prohibition of African cultivation of cash crops and rearing of graded 
cattle as a way of shielding European settlers from economic competition.
Acquisition of land through forced evictions
75. Evidence obtained through testimonies of affected community members indicated 
that a number of African communities lost their land to British settlers through 
forced evictions. It emerges from the evidence that the British applied a number 
of tactics to first gain acceptance by Africans and then use their acquaintances 
to better understand community members enough to develop strategies for their 
eventual eviction from prime lands. 
	 Forceful eviction of the Talai, Pokot and Turkana 
76. Three of the communities that suffered loss of land through such schemes are the 
Talai, a sub-tribe of the Kalenjin community, and the Turkana. In both cases, white 
settlers who came as either investors or missionaries established their homes in 
close proximity to African families and first developed friendly interactions with 
the Africans, characterized by giving of free gifts to the Africans in circumstances 
shrouded in false religious piety. 
70 CH Kahl, ‘Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, and State-Sponsored Violence: the Case of Kenya, 1991-93’ (1998) 
23 (2) International Security 106; Human Rights /Africa Watch, ‘Divide and Rule: State Sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya’ 
(November 1993) Human Rights Watch 23.
71 CH Kahl, ‘Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, and State-Sponsored Violence: the Case of Kenya, 1991-93’ (1998) 23 
(2) International Security 106 quoting Africa Watch, ‘Kenya: Taking Liberties,’ p. 2
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77. Once they gained acceptance and trust of local communities, the settlers advanced 
their schemes to requests for farm produce from Africans and eventually, followed 
by demands for livestock and livestock products and, where families resisted, 
confiscation of the products. In some cases, African communities living in close 
proximity to Europeans making such advances fled their homes and farm lands 
when the settler demands became unbearable, whereupon, the settlers took over 
their prime lands. In other cases, African resistance of white settler demands caused 
the settlers to forcefully evict them from their homes and once they vacated their 
land, the settlers took them over without compensation or consideration of their 
plight at all. The situation is best described by the testimony of John Auta Asili below:
The colonialists came as investors and missionaries. They build their houses on top of 
the hill. During that time, the community was attracted to known white persons. First 
of all, they did not understand each other because their languages were different. The 
colonialists used to speak in English while the local people used to speak in Kikuyu and 
Kamba languages. They tried being friendly by using religious phrases....They built their 
houses near that community. During that time, the farms were so big that some of them 
were not used. First, they tried being friendly by giving sugar to Matongoro and Misooni 
communities in Garech, Jericho, Mti Mmoja and other areas. They even taught them 
how to make sugar. They attracted the community very much. They started to ask them 
about their ways of living. They started sending them to the communities to ask for 
milk. They would use sentences such as “Sir, I need milk”. The community used to think 
that these people were only being friendly to the community. Later on, terrible things 
started to happen. The colonialists started asking for cows so that they could slaughter 
for their visitors. Things started to become terrible because there were people who 
used to betray others in the community. The English people started using such persons 
to solicit for cows. So, there emerged a struggle between the local communities and 
the English people. That was when the community decided to move further away, and 
their friendship with the English people stopped at that time. The colonialists started 
grabbing the land of the communities and even took their animals by force. They started 
saying that all that property was theirs.72  
78. For the indigenous communities that attempted to resist the oppressive interactions 
of white settlers and fought back, such as the Pokot and the Talai, the manner of 
forced eviction attracted dire consequences. The colonial government responded 
with great force and evicted them from their land, with the Pokot being driven to 
Uganda while the Talai clan members were forced to move far away from the Rift 
Valley to Gwassi in South Nyanza. The testimony of David Nasura Tuwei, on behalf 
of the members of the Talai clan, explains the tribulations that the community 
underwent and the effects of forcible eviction that they suffered as follows:
72  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Murang’a/ 10 November 2011/p. 21, para 1-4.
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Our forefathers resisted the colonialists and were either exiled or imprisoned. The most 
interesting or sad thing is that never in the history of Africa regarding the European 
intrusion has a whole community consisting of children, women, old men and even 
animals been exiled. They were not given a chance to defend themselves in the court of 
law. Normally, leaders would be exiled or jailed just like Mzee Jomo Kenyatta and Nelson 
Mandela of South Africa. But in this case, it was hundreds of innocent people. This was 
the worst violation of human rights by the colonial government…They [the colonial 
administrators] chased them [members of the Talai clan] to Gwassi in South Nyanza 
which is a dry place with little rain and is infested with tsetse flies, snakes and other 
animals…In October, 1934, the Talai trekked for 13 days from Sondu, near the Kipsigis 
boundary to Gwassi. Within that period, 14 women who were pregnant miscarried while 
cows, sheep and goats died…several Talai women and children died as a result of the 
Gwassi bug. That confirms that the colonial government wanted those people to die…
The British Colonial Government uprooted the Talai from the prestigious positions of 
leadership to destitute marginalized minority groups that have been relegated from the 
leadership and reduced to useless beggars. Their position before the colonialists was 
equivalent to the British Royal Family and Uganda’s Kabaka Kingdom.73
79. The eviction of the Talai clan was apparently effected under the Laibon Removal 
Ordinance of 1934, which contained harsh provisions for forceful eviction of African 
communities, directing those removed, as the Tala:
to the settlement area and compulsory settlement in the “rocky area with high hills” on 
the shores of Lake Victoria and Mung’ori Bay.74 
80. On the basis of its provisions, the Talai appear to have suffered the worst form of 
human of human rights deprivation in Kenya.75
81. To ensure that resistant communities such as the Talai did not return and as a way 
of guaranteeing security of persons and property to the European settlers and 
that land alienation from Africans to white settlers proceeded without hindrance, 
the colonial government established a number of police forces and security 
73  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kericho/19 September 2011/p. 54 & 55.
74 The Laibon Removal Ordinance (1934) (Kenya), section 7.
75 Under the Ordinance, the Provincial Commissioners of Rift Valley and Nyanza were granted sweeping powers to take the 
fingerprints of all the members of the Talai clan for the purposes of compiling a register. The PC had the powers to demand answers 
to questions of ancestry from any person suspected to be a Talai and he, alone, could declare one a Laibon and cause him to be 
removed to Gwassi or other concentration camps. 
 “Any person who is aggrieved by any entry relating to him or his family made or proposed to be made in a register may appeal to 
the PC against such entry,” reads section 8 (5) of the ordinance. The law further gave the PC powers to establish concentration 
camps to collect and detain the Laibons and their families therein and also organise compulsory movement of the Laibons and their 
livestock.
 Section 10(c) of the Ordinance was meant to deter any escape as the PC was given powers to: “To arrange for the guarding of the 
Laibons and their families in camps or temporary halting places to prevent their escape.”
 The Law was very harsh on any member of the clan who withheld any information concerning their parentage and ancestral 
background and provided for the arrest of such individuals without a warrant who upon conviction could be jailed for six months or 
fined a maximum of Sh. 300.
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formations which included the White Settler Regiment, Police Reserve, the General 
Service Unit, and the Home Guard unit. The forces were notoriously associated 
with severe physical assault of community members prior to eviction from their 
land.76 The Home Guard unit grew into a formidable counter-African insurgency 
force under the control and command of chiefs, the provincial administration and 
local settlers.77
 Forceful evictions of the Elgon Maasai/Sabaot
82. The Sabaot, as they are widely known in Kenya today, offer the clearest example of 
a people in Kenya who have, in the recent past, organised what might appropriately 
be referred to as a ‘tribal army’ to fight for land-related injustices, especially forceful 
eviction and acquisition of their land. Although most Kenyans may be familiar with 
the internal wars waged by the Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF) in recent years, 
especially in 2008 to 2010 to evict those they perceive to have either directly illegally 
acquired their ancestral land or assisted members of other ethnic communities to 
acquire their land unjustifiably, few people, if at all, are aware that since the period 
of colonialism, the Sabaot have suffered systematic forced evictions and illegal 
alienation of their land, first, by the British and later, by officials in subsequent post-
independence governments. The Sabaot’s plight is hereby elaborated in the hope 
that it will elicit immediate government action to address both past and recent land-
related injustices that members of the community have been subjected to. It comes 
out clearly that had the previous post-independence governments addressed the 
land-related injustices that the Sabaot have suffered, the country would not have 
experienced repercussions of the self-help measures of SLFD.
83. As early as 1913, the Sabaot, then known as Elgon Maasai, suffered forced evictions 
by the British settlers who ordered them to move out of Trans Nzoia to pave way 
for white settlements.78 In 1914, the following year, forceful eviction of the Sabaot 
community was intensified by settlers in an operation dubbed, “Elgon Kwenda 
Operation” which involved, among other things, confiscation of their livestock 
while the livestock belonging to Africans who collaborated with the British were 
spared, in order to force the community to move further away from Trans Nzoia, 
which was their homeland.79
84. Forceful actions targeting the whole community were complemented by actions 
targeting key members of the community who were deemed to be occupying 
76  Gertzel, Cherry, The Politics of Independent Kenya, 1963-8 (Nairobi, 1970),pp.13-5.
77  See, Gertzel, Cherry, The Politics of Independent Kenya, 1963-8 (Nairobi, 1970),pp.13-5.
78  The eviction is recognized in Gazette Notice No. 418 of 11th June 1932 which details the finding by the Carter Commission.
79  The Indigenous- Elgony-Maasai (Kony) Sabaots Memorandum Presented to the TJRC at Kitale, Trans Nzoia County, 20th October 
2011, at page 16 (TJRC/KTL/001(Exhibits).
191
Volume  I IB    Chapter T WO 
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
prime land. For example, in 1920, Sabaot Chief Kasis arap Kipkwemboi was forced 
to give his homestead to a Mr Arthur M. Champion, the First District Commissioner 
for Trans Nzoia District, to establish an administration centre, and his homestead 
later became the DC’s office.80
85. Between 1921 and 1922, more members of the Sabaot community were moved 
out of Trans Nzoia after the land they were occupying was declared part of ‘Crown 
Land’.  The rest of the people were forcibly recruited as farm labourers for Europeans. 
In 1924, all of the members of the community who had, for one reason or another 
remained in the region were declared squatters in Trans Nzoia. When, in 1929, an 
opportunity became available, they were the first African community in the region 
now Kenya to present their claims to the Carter Commission on land that had been set 
up by the British.81 However, although the commission, headed by Sir William Morris 
recommended that the community be given 80,000 hectares of land in compensation 
for lost land and two million pounds in compensation for lost livestock and homes, 
the recommendation was never honoured. Instead, the community was further 
dispossessed when in 1931, the then District Commissioner, John Lionel Bretherton 
Llywelyn, moved 200 members of the tribe with their 5,600 heads of cattle to Sebei 
country (District) in Uganda while between 12 and 15 remaining families were sent 
off to the  Maasai reserve in Narok and West Suk (Pokot District).82
86. The situation of the Sabaot including their livelihood was worsened by the fact that 
when, in 1938, a Native Land Trust Ordinance was passed for the purpose of settling 
African communities that had been dispersed and detribalized through forceful 
evictions, no reserve was established for the Sabaot/Elgon Maasai.83 Moreover, in 
1940, male members of the Sabaot were deliberately recruited as carrier corpse 
while their wives were encrypted into forced labour force for white settlers.84
87. During negotiations for independence, the British government and representatives 
of Kenyatta’s government that was to take over governance agreed to resettle African 
communities that had been displaced by white settler activities in the country. To 
give pre-eminence to resolution of their grievances over land, the Sabaot, then 
known as Elgon Maasai, were represented in Lancaster House conferences where 
80 The Indigenous- Elgony-Maasai (Kony) Sabaots Memorandum Presented to the TJRC at Kitale, Trans Nzoia County, 20th October 
2011, at page 17,(TJRC/KTL/001(Exhibits)..
81 The Indigenous- Elgony-Maasai (Kony) Sabaot Memorandum Presented to the TJRC at Kitale, Trans Nzoia County, 20th October 
2011, at 17 – 19, (TJRC/KTL/001(Exhibits).
82  The Indigenous- Elgony-Maasai (Kony) Sabaot Memorandum Presented to the TJRC at Kitale, Trans Nzoia County, 20th October 
2011, at 19, (TJRC/KTL/001(Exhibits).
83  The Indigenous- Elgony-Maasai (Kony) Sabaot Memorandum Presented to the TJRC at Kitale, Trans Nzoia County, 20th October 
2011, at 19, (TJRC/KTL/001(Exhibits).
84  The Indigenous- Elgony-Maasai (Kony) Sabaot Memorandum Presented to the TJRC at Kitale, Trans Nzoia County, 20th October 
2011, at 19, (TJRC/KTL/001(Exhibits).
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it was agreed in 1961 and 1962 that land that had been forcefully taken away from 
African communities, including the Sabaot, would be restored to them. Kenyatta 
who was to become the first president affirmed the agreement on 5 February 1962 
upon his return from London by stating that:
Katika katiba mpya, serikali yenu imeahidi kila sehemu ya inchi, kama ni ya Maasai, itakaa 
kama ilivyo, ikitawaliwa na Maasai wenyewe… kama ni ya wa Nandi, wa Nandi watatawala 
inchi yao, hiyo ni kusema, ardhi yao. Hakuna mtu kutoka inje kwenda kunyakua mali yao. 
Mashamba yao ni shauri yao kujua watafanya nini nayo.85 
88. Kenyatta’s sentiments and pledge echoed the intention and measures that the British 
government had established to resettle African communities that were evicted 
from their homelands during the colonial administration which had, by the time 
of the negotiations, also established a Ministry of Lands and Resettlement for the 
purpose of resettling African communities that had lost their land to white settlers 
through forced evictions. However, Kenyatta never honoured the promise. Instead 
of resettling the Sabaot community in Trans Nzoia, parts of Trans Nzoia District, 
including Uasin Gishu District (now, Lugari), were carved out and made settlement 
schemes for members of the Luhya communities from North Kavirondo.86
89. Members of the Sabaot community claim that, in an unexplained change of mind, 
the Kenyatta administration not only changed the name of the Ministry of Lands 
and Resettlement to the Ministry of Lands and Settlement, for which the Sabaot 
still demand an explanation, but also “facilitated the re-grabbing of the Sabaot 
homeland by Luhya political allies of both Kenyatta and Moi, including Masinde 
Muliro.”87 It was shocking for members of the Sabaot community that in 1963, 
when Masinde Muliro became Member of Parliament for Kitale East, he moved to 
Trans Nzoia in the Rift Valley Province to campaign for or advance the interests of 
the Bukusu community who, by then, occupied parts of former ‘White Highlands’ 
farms that had been forcibly taken away from the Sabaot community.88
90. By the time Moi took over power, some members of the Sabaot community had 
settled at Kiboroa as a result of forced evictions during the colonial period.89 A head 
count conducted in 1987 by the provincial administration in efforts to re-settle 
85  The Indigenous- Elgony-Maasai (Kony) Sabaot Memorandum Presented to the TJRC at Kitale, Trans Nzoia County, 20th October 
2011, at 20, (TJRC/KTL/001(Exhibits).
86  The Indigenous- Elgony-Maasai (Kony) Sabaot Memorandum Presented to the TJRC at Kitale, Trans Nzoia County, 20th October 
2011, at 19, (TJRC/KTL/001(Exhibits).
87  The Indigenous- Elgony-Maasai (Kony) Sabaot Memorandum Presented to the TJRC at Kitale, Trans Nzoia County, 20th October 
2011, at 19, (TJRC/KTL/001(Exhibits).
88  The Indigenous- Elgony-Maasai (Kony) Sabaot Memorandum Presented to the TJRC at Kitale, Trans Nzoia County, 20th October 
2011, at 20, (TJRC/KTL/001(Exhibits).
89  The Indigenous- Elgony-Maasai (Kony) Sabaot Memorandum Presented to the TJRC at Kitale, Trans Nzoia County, 20th October 
2011, at 20, (TJRC/KTL/001(Exhibits).
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members of the community found that 1 062 families had settled in Kiboroa. However, 
instead of affirming their re-settlement in the area, the provincial administration 
evicted them after the count and in the process, they were scattered, some living 
in forests, others in trading centres, while some ended up as farm labourers.90 Thus 
Moi’s administration failed to recognise and address the community’s land problem.
91. Apparently, members of the Sabaot community had very high hopes for the 
addressing their land grievances through a new national constitution. During the 
National Referendum held in 2010, they voted in favour of a new Constitution 
that would establish a National Land Commission to address the historical land 
injustices that they have suffered over the years.91 However, to their dismay, instead 
of resolving their land grievances, the government, in February 2011, brought 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) to settle on part of their land in Chepchonia.92
92. The foregoing analogy of the Sabaot’s land problem indicates that when members 
of the community finally decided to take matters in their hands to resolve their 
problem through self-help measures, they had valid reasons for doing so. 
Therefore, it is very unfortunate that the Mwai Kibaki administration responded to 
the problem with brutal force that was never complemented by any meaningful 
efforts to address the root causes of emergence and activities of the SLDF.
Land alienation and displacement by multinational corporations
93. Apart from the colonial administration and its white settler demand for land, 
multinational corporations, many of which had European origin, also contributed 
to displacement and landlessness of African communities, especially in Kericho 
and other parts of  the Rift Valley. In various parts of Rift Valley, especially in 
Kericho, such companies acquired large tracts of land that was initially meant for 
the resettlement of African communities in the area for cultivation of tea.93 
94. Companies that were allocated most of the productive land in the Rift Valley in 
1923 on lease for 999 years were, notably: James Finlay Company Limited (formerly 
the African Highlands Produce Company Ltd) and Unilever Kenya Ltd (formerly 
Brooke Bond). These companies, among others, acquired land at the expense of 
the local landless Africans in the affected areas. 
90  The Indigenous- Elgony-Maasai (Kony) Sabaot Memorandum Presented to the TJRC at Kitale, Trans Nzoia County, 20th October 
2011, at 20, (TJRC/KTL/001(Exhibits).
91  The Indigenous- Elgony-Maasai (Kony) Sabaot Memorandum Presented to the TJRC at Kitale, Trans Nzoia County, 20th October 
2011, at 20, (TJRC/KTL/001(Exhibits).
92  The Indigenous- Elgony-Maasai (Kony) Sabaot Memorandum Presented to the TJRC at Kitale, Trans Nzoia County, 20th October 
2011, at 20, (TJTC/KTL/001(Exhibits).
93  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kericho/19 September 2011/ p. 49 & 50.
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95. Land leases granted to the companies by the colonial government was also for 
very long periods of time, being 999 years from 1923, yet the leases covered 
very large tracts of land that should have benefited the landless at the time of 
allocation and provided room for local community expansion necessitated by 
population growth.94 It is recommended that on the basis of permissive provisions 
of the current Constitution, the 999 lease period should be reviewed with a view to 
reducing it to no more than 45 years.
Land alienation during the Mau Mau movement
96. Repressive tendencies of the British, especially forced eviction of Africans from 
their homelands, coupled with alienation of evictees’ land, which was made 
worse by, among other things, the suffering of Africans in squalid conditions in 
the overpopulated reserves and restrictions on African commodity production, 
precipitated an African freedom movement in the nature of a land and freedom 
army, known as Mau Mau.95 The Mau Mau, which comprised members of a number 
of African ethnic communities that had, among other things, been dispossessed of 
their land, under the leadership of members of the Kikuyu community, launched 
several violent assaults against officers serving the colonial administration in Kenya 
and their African collaborators, in a bid to recover their land and regain freedom 
from oppression.96  Attacks organized largely in forest areas and staged by the 
Mau Mau prompted the colonial government to declare a ‘State of Emergency’ in 
Kenya in 1952 and that provided the colonial administration another chance to 
unjustifiably alienate Africans’ land.
97. During the emergency period, persons suspected to be members of the Mau 
Mau movement were either killed, detained or repatriated from their settlement 
schemes, including Olenguruone Settlement Scheme in Nakuru, Rift Valley, from 
which some of the members of the Mau Mau were repatriated to Central Province.
98. Under the guise of the declared State of Emergency, the British colonial 
administration took draconian measures against Africans, including repatriation 
from their settlements, arrest and detention of members or sympathizers of 
94  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kericho/19 September 2011/ p. 49 & 50.
95  Kanyinga, k., ‘Land Redistribution in Kenya’ in HP B Mkhize Et al (eds) Agricultural land redistribution: Towards greater consensus 
(2010) 93; JW Wakhungu, C Huggins & E Nyukuri, ‘Land tenure and violent conflict in Kenya’ (2008) African Centre for Technology 
Studies 2; C Leo, ‘The Failure of the “Progressive Farmer” in Kenya's Million-Acre Settlement Scheme’ (1978) 16 (4) The Journal of 
Modern African Studies 620; Human Rights/ Africa Watch, ‘Divide and Rule: State Sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya’ (November 
1993) Human Rights Watch 23; RR Simiyu, ‘Militianisation of resource conflict: The case of land-based conflict in the Mount 
Elgon region of Western Kenya’ (2008) Institute for Security Studies 4 available at http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/M152FULL.PDF 
(accessed on 3 May 2012).
96  CH Kahl, ‘Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, and State-Sponsored Violence: the Case of Kenya, 1991-93’ (1998) 
23 (2) International Security 107; C Leys, ‘Underdevelopment in Kenya: the political economy of neo-colonialism’ (1994) Berkeley: 
University of California Press 49;
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the Mau Mau. Land was alienated from those associated with the Mau Mau and 
allocated to those who were loyal to the administration as a punishment for 
what it considered as acts of terror against the settler community.97 Thus the 
Mau Mau movement attracted further African land alienation by the colonial 
administration and attendant landlessness and destitution because when Mau 
Mau fighters and their collaborators returned from war, they found that their 
land and other property had been confiscated by British administration loyalists 
including ‘home guards’ and the provincial administration. It is noted that the 
declaration of emergency also, as a colonial measure, permitted the colonial 
administration to suspend hearing and determination of land-related suits in 
African courts through the enactment of the 1957 African Courts (Suspension of 
Land Suits) Ordinance, which made it impossible for affected Africans to present 
their claims in court for redress and thus foreclosed their right to justice in respect 
of land ownership and utilization in the colonial period.98
97 JW Harbeson, ‘Land reforms and politics in Kenya, 1954-70’ (1971) 9 (2) The Journal of Modern African Studies 236; C Leys, 
‘Underdevelopment in Kenya: the political economy of neo-colonialism’ (1994) Berkeley: University of California Press 48.
98 JW Harbeson, ‘Land reforms and politics in Kenya, 1954-70’ (1971) 9 (2) The Journal of Modern African Studies 236; C Leys, 
‘Underdevelopment in Kenya: the political economy of neo-colonialism’ (1994) Berkeley: University of California Press 48.
Mr. Charles Njaraba testifying on the plight of Mau Mau families during the TJRC’s Rumuruti hearings.
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99. The significance of loss of land through alienation during the Mau Mau movement 
lies not only in its precipitation of land scarcity, landlessness and destitution, but 
also in the fact that it precipitated inter and intra-ethnic tensions and subsequent 
violent conflicts among ethnic communities, including the Kikuyu and between 
the Kikuyu and Maasai and the Kalenjin before and after independence.99 Some 
of the then precipitated land-related violent conflicts have been witnessed 
between the Kikuyu and the Maasai in Olenguruone and also between the 
Kikuyu and the Kalenjin in the Rift Valley, even as late as the year 2008. That 
said, it is worth noting that in post-independent Kenya, certain factors emerged 
soon after independence that have fostered and worsened inter-ethnic land-
related conflicts in the areas cited, among others, in the country. For a better 
understanding, the factors are elaborated in following sections of this chapter.
Land alienation and the Swynnerton Plan
100. The Mau Mau uprising, being the only concerted and determined violent effort 
by Africans from across the ethnic divide - with sustained impacts on white 
settlers since invasion by Arabs at the Coast of Kenya to gain independence 
from colonialism - compelled the British colonial administration to reconsider 
their policies and practices in relation to Africans’ land, apparently to make land 
concessions to Africans. In that regard, a policy in the form of the Swynnerton 
Plan was developed in 1954 which stated that the traditional system of tenure 
in African reserves promoted fragmentation of the land holdings into smaller 
and uneconomical land units for production and sought to provide solutions 
to improve and make African land tenure systems contribute to the economic 
development of the colony.100 For the first time, the colonial administration, 
through the Swynnerton Plan, allowed Africans to not only buy land and acquire 
titles to land in the White Highlands but also, facilitated the acquisition of credit, 
and removed the restriction on the cultivation of export crops by Africans.101 
However, the Swynnerton Plan generated serious negative consequences, which 
are, to some extent, still being felt in Kenya to date, as the following paragraphs 
reveal.
101. Measures that were provided for and implemented under the Swynnerton 
Plan failed to properly factor African’s widespread customary land tenure 
and introduced a title registration aspect of a colonial land tenure that was 
both alien and incompatible with Africans’ land holding, use, distribution and 
99 JW Wakhungu, C Huggins & E Nyukuri, ‘Land tenure and violent conflict in Kenya’ (2008) African Centre for Technology Studies 2.
100  The Swynnerton Plan was named after R.J.M. Swynnerton, the then Assistant Director of Agriculture who designed it.
101  CH Kahl, ‘Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, and State-Sponsored Violence: the Case of Kenya, 1991-93’ (1998) 23 
(2) International Security 107; K Kanyinga, ‘Land Redistribution in Kenya’ in HP B Mkhize Et al (eds) Agricultural land redistribution: 
Towards greater consensus (2010) 92.
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transmission customs and practices. It also failed to recognize and redress of 
previous cases of Africans’ land alienation by both the British and Arabs and 
resulted in more landlessness and scarcity in many areas and communities 
across the country. 
102. The Swynnerton Plan provided for, among other things, a process of land 
adjudication, consolidation and registration of adjudicated parcels of land in the 
names of those identified as owners.102 However, under the plan, land was registered 
in the names of present male-heads of households who were conferred use rights 
without recognition of use rights of female heads of households whose husbands 
were still operating in the Mau Mau, largely outside of designated settlement areas. 
It did not also recognize the use rights of those whose husbands had died - some 
of them at the hands of the British and female relatives who had use rights over the 
land.103 
Effects of colonial land laws, policies and practices
103. In a number of paragraphs in the foregoing section, a various impacts of 
colonial land policies, laws and practices on Africans and their land ownership 
and use rights have been explained in the expectation that it provides the 
basis for factoring the injustices in current measures for redress. The discussion 
reveals, among other things, that colonial policies, laws and practices had both 
immediate and long-term effects on African communities, including permanent 
displacement. They further created arbitrary ethnic specific boundaries, thus 
generating a notion of exclusivity of land rights by certain communities in certain 
areas. They disrupted the socio-cultural and economic life of many communities, 
including those at the Coast, thus exposing families and succeeding generations 
to landlessness. These policies, laws and practices promoted inequality in land 
and related rights, poverty and destitution in addition to barring Africans from 
owning land in the White Highlands. 
104. When, in subsequent years, the ban was lifted; the interests of communities and 
families that were evicted from prime lands in the highlands ought to have been 
considered first. They also created a system of land tenure based on hitherto, 
alien principles of English property law, with limited application to high-
potential areas, while largely neglecting the regime of customary property law in 
the marginal areas to which they were confined with negative consequences on 
Africans’ land use practices,  productivity and progress. They diminished African 
102  Swynnerton, R.J.M., A Plan to Intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya, (Nairobi, 1954), Government Printer.
103  Wakhungu, J. W., Huggins, C. & Nyukuri, E., Land Tenure and Violent Conflict in Kenya, African Centre for Technology Studies 
(2008) at 2.
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customary land tenure, making the establishment of an appropriate, comparable 
and compatible tenure necessary during and after independence. They caused 
many local communities including the Maasai and Nandi lose an estimated five 
million hectares of land to white settlers.104 Further, they generated equality and 
discrimination in access to land and related infrastructure and social amenities 
that were mainly concentrated in the areas occupied exclusively by the colonial 
administrators and the white settlers and thus was the genesis of the current 
imbalance in the country in the various respects. The selective registration 
system generated tension within and between families and several land-related 
injustices that required immediate redress after independence. 
105. The elaboration also shows why land-related conflicts were likely to arise 
among various communities in the country and between communities and the 
government, if prompt and appropriate redress measures took long to genuinely 
implement. It reveals, for example, that reserves for confinement of Africans 
were created by the British arbitrarily in various parts of the country and their 
boundaries defined, regardless of previous occupations by communities (tribes) 
in the pre-colonial period, thus compelling communities of different origins to 
live together as neighbours regardless of whether they had nothing in common 
such as shared ancestry, identity, language, economic livelihood or culture.105 The 
situation did and has, over the years, resulted in ethnic suspicion, mistrust, tension 
and structured violent conflicts.106 
106. Further, elaboration on the preceding paragraphs show that although the letter 
and spirit of colonial land laws and related facilitating laws and regulations such 
as the Masters and Servants Ordinance were intended to extract both Africans’ 
land and labour for the benefit of the British and their collaborators, many of the 
laws (including their letter and spirit) were adopted at independence without 
overhauling their basic tenets that were, not at all, in the interest of Africans. 
Therefore, the laws could have hindered an acceptable transition in terms of land 
ownership and use rights from the British to Africans at independence and in 
years to come thereafter.
104  See for example Maloba, Wanyabari, Mau Mau and Kenya: An Analysis of a Peasant Revolt (London, 1993), p.27. ; Lonsdale: 
‘Conquest State” in Berman, Bruce and Lonsdale, John, Unhappy Valley, Book One: State and Class (London, 1992), p.38.
105  Anderson, David M. , ‘Yours in Struggle for Majimbo’, Nationalism and the Party Politics of Decolonization in Kenya, 195564’, 
Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 40,  no. 3 ( 2005) confirms that  ethnicity was an important variable in the definition of 
administrative boundaries, since it was based on the colonial policy of divide and rule.
106   Kenya Regional Boundaries Commission, Report of the Regional Boundaries Commission (London, 1962).
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Land and the Transition to Independence
107. This section of this chapter explains, among other things, that there has always 
been a strong linkage between land and politics in Kenya. It also explains that land 
occupied settler politics throughout the colonial period and was the fundamental 
issue in the independence movement,107 which helps to understand why land 
remains a politically sensitive issue in the country. It is revealed that the role of 
political parties in addressing land questions at independence was significant in 
so far as party founders, members and their leaders embraced the land question 
as key. The section further demonstrates that land was the focus of negotiations 
for independence between the British colonial administration and the local elites 
and the negotiations raised the hope of Kenyans at the time that upon attaining 
independence, all land-related claims would be resolved with finality, which is why 
failure by the first independent government to fully address existing land issues 
was likely to perpetrate inter-ethnic conflict for years to come. Further, it reveals 
the historical roots of some of the current political and related land struggles.
108. All of the foregoing colonial policies, laws and practices, as well as the negative 
impacts that they engendered, collectively generated a land question embodying 
various land issues arising during colonialism, which became a key motivation for 
the formation of various local political groups pressing for Kenya’s independence.
Political parties which emerged from various parts of the country in the late 
1950s with land rights for Africans and freedom from colonisation as a common 
agenda included the Kikuyu Central Association, the Young Kavirondo Tax Payers 
Association and the Mwambao United Front. 
109. Although land was a common agenda for all the groups, there was constant tension 
and conflict between their members representing Africans in the Legislative 
Assembly (Legco), especially in the late 1950s and early 1960s on modalities and 
arrangements for independence, which would have skewed negotiations between 
them and their British counterparts. In order to overcome the hurdle, on 14 May 
1960, the Kenya Africa National Union (KANU) was founded as some sort of umbrella 
political organization, but with leadership dominated by representatives from larger 
and more influential ethnic groups including the Kikuyu, Luo, Embu, Meru and 
Kamba. Divergence of views between KANU and other parties subsequently formed 
was to delay negotiations with the British on land but eventually, agreements were 
reached which Kenyans could lay their hopes on for resolution of land rights claims.
107  The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government 
Printer 1.
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110. KANU favoured rapid decolonisation, social reforms, a prominent state role in the 
economy and open competition for land, based on the willing-buyer, willing-seller 
options and availability of and access to resources, unfettered by ethnic boundaries, in 
which case, their communities would perform relatively well.108 The position was not 
well received by political representatives of other local communities who seemed to 
prefer a more cautious and tolerant (to settlers) approach to the land question. 
111. Consequently, on 25 June 1960, the leaders of four regional alliances - the Kalenjin 
Political Alliance of Daniel Moi and Taaita Towett, the Coastal African People’s Union 
of Ronald Ngala, the Maasai United Front led by John Keen and John Konchelah, the 
Kenya Africa People’s Party of Masinde Muliro and Somali leaders - agreed a merger to 
create a competing national coalition, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). Its 
key assets were its position on land, and the desire of the (more socially conservative) 
coastal and pastoral communities to avoid continued dominance by the Kikuyu and 
Luo themes in post-independence politics. KADU had the backing of the European 
settlers as it promised to protect their farms and support liberal economic policies.109 
The divergence of views, especially on land, between the then political coalition parties 
threatened to derail discussions between them and negotiations on land, as part of the 
independence package, but the situation was saved by a surprising position adopted 
by a British party leader during one of the conferences that were held in London to 
discuss the issues, known as the Lancaster House conferences.
The First Lancaster House Conference
112. At the First Lancaster House Conference held in London between January and 
March 1960, conflict between KANU and KADU arising from their divergent views 
on land marred negotiations. However, with the continued African pressure for 
independence, the toll it wrought on British settlers and continued conflict over 
land, strengthened by changing British attitude over Kenya colony prompted Mr 
Harold Macmillan, a British Conservative Party leader, and the newly-appointed 
British Colonial Secretary Ian Macleod to agree that British rule could no longer 
hold in Kenya simply because of the white settlers’ interests, which were mainly in 
land within the White Highlands.110 Both British representatives also expressed the 
view that since multi-racialism policy attempts could not offer a long- term solution 
to conflicts between white settlers and Africans, the legitimacy of African nationalism 
must be accepted.111
108  Charles Hornsby, KENYA, A History Since Independence, 2012, p.61
109  Ibid.p.61.
110 The First Lancaster House Conference is described in Oginga Odinga, ‘Not Yet Uhuru’, pp.178-82, see also Kyle: Politics, pp.102-
8.
111  Kyle, Keith, ‘The Politics of Independence of Kenya’ (Basingstoke, 1999), pp.99-102.
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113. On the basis of strong sentiments expressed by the colonial administration’s 
representatives to Kenya, the colonial administration declared Britain’s intent to 
recognize a “wind of change” blowing across the continent of Africa that colonial 
powers could no longer hold back and the need for it to withdraw from all its 
remaining colonies. Although they feared that their African colonies, including 
Kenya, were not ready for independence, the British judged the dangers of delay 
- violence, radicalization and a turn to communism - to be a higher risk. As part of 
the package of the expected political change, the colonial secretary appointed a 
new British representative, Sir Patrick Renison, to replace Governor Evelyn Baring in 
Kenya.112
114. After the deliberations at the First Lancaster House Conference, many European 
settlers felt abandoned by the British government, with no guarantee of what would 
happen to their land if Kenya attained independence. Unless they were willing to 
resort to violence, the colony would move towards a majority rule, dominated by 
Africans. To avert looming danger to settler interests, an arrangement was made, 
under the British influence, to include four African leaders, Ronald Ngala, James 
Muimi, Gikonyo Kiano and Taaita Towett, under the African Elected Member 
Organization (AEMO), in the colonial government, to represent the interests of 
Africans. However, hard-line members of KANU, led by Oginga Odinga, in contrast, 
rejected the arrangement - until Kenyatta was released from detention.113
115. Finally, Jomo Kenyatta was released from detention and he joined the KANU 
leadership as chairman, after James Gichuru stepped down in his favour. Despite 
the new dynamics that came with Kenyatta’s release, the KANU leadership 
remained sharply divided on the land question. One group led by Odinga Oginga, 
Bildad Kaggia and Paul Ngei opposed recognition of pre-independence land 
deals, believing it would entrench European interests. They even went ahead and 
campaigned against the sale of any European land to Africans.114 
116. The other group led by Jomo Kenyatta, James Gichuru and Mbiyu Koinange were 
in support of the settler proposals for a large-scale , foreign–funded, buyout policy 
arrangements with the colonial administration.115 According to Jomo Kenyatta, 
the British had to fund a large-scale settlement programme that would settle 
the landless, using long-term loans with easy repayment conditions.116 The KANU 
faction of Odinga remained unhappy and only reluctantly accepted that land was to 
112 Kyle, Keith, ‘The Politics of the Independence of Kenya’ (Basingstoke, 1999), pp.99-102.
113 Goldsworthy: Mboya,pp.137-8
114 See Harbeson, John ‘Nation- Building in Kenya: The Role of Land Reform’ (Evanston, 1973), p.122..
115 Harbeson, John, ‘Nation- Building in Kenya: The Role of Land Reform’ (Evanston, 1973), p.122.
116 Kenyatta, Jomo, ‘Suffering Without Bitterness: The Founding of the Kenya Nation’  (Nairobi, 1968), pp.163-4
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be purchased from the European settlers to settle the squatters and the landless.117 
The reason was that Africans could not buy back land that was originally theirs and 
that during their election campaigns, the leaders had promised their supporters 
that when the country attains independence, they would get their land back at no 
charge. 
117. The perception of Odinga and his allies in KANU did not go down well with Kenyatta 
and Mboya. Kenyatta categorically maintained that there were no free things and 
that land was not free, but must be purchased. His position shocked many of the 
KANU supporters who felt that he and his allies betrayed them because the political 
leaders had made election pledges to the effect that Africans would recover their 
stolen land after independence.118
The Second Lancaster House Conference
118. The Second Lancaster House Conference took place between 24 February and 6 April 
1962 in London and was attended by representatives of KANU, KADU, communities 
in North Eastern and Eastern provinces and delegates of the Mwambao United 
Front (MUF) from the Coast of Kenya. At the conference, political differences within 
KANU and between KANU and KADU especially over the unresolved land question, 
which was not concluded during the First Lancaster House Conference, featured 
again. Notwithstanding the political differences, an agreement was reached to grant 
Kenya autonomy, based on KADU’s regionalist/federal model of governance. The 
British government favoured KADU’s views, mostly because of its concerns about 
land and the future of the white settlers and their economy under KANU. Also, KADU 
represented ethnic groups that had remained loyal to the British during the State 
of Emergency, and whose leaders had agreed to take office when KANU refused. In 
addition, KADU represented many of Kenya’s pastoralists. Moreover, the Maasai and 
Kalenjin leaders, including Justus ole Tipis, William Murgor and John Marie Seroney, 
had threatened civil war or violent conflict if their demands were not met.119
119. At the Second Lancaster House Conference, an agreement was also reached on 
the outline of Kenya’s independence land programme. KANU and the settlers later 
agreed that there was a desperate need for rapid expansion of the land purchase 
and settlement programme, while Rift Valley KADU leaders, including Moi and Tipis, 
defended the historical right to land of the Rift Valley people and the centrality 
of communal land rights, which would give the Maasai and Kalenjin most of the 
White Highlands.  Contrary to the position of Rift Valley KADU leaders, KANU, 
117 Oruka, H. Odera, ‘Oginga Odinga: His Philosophy and Beliefs’ (Nairobi, 1992), p.75.
118  Kyle Keith, ‘The Politics of Independence of Kenya’, ( Basingstoke, 1999), pp.99-102
119  Report of the Kenya Constitutional Conference ( London, 1962)
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especially its Kikuyu leaders and supporters (both loyalists and ex-detainees), was 
vehemently opposed to proposals that recognized communal land rights. The fear 
of the big ethnic community elite was that any sub-division based on pre-colonial 
occupation or spheres of influence was unlikely to give them the lion’s share of the 
land that they desired. 
120. Therefore, senior Central Province personalities led by Gichuru, Koinange, Kiano, 
among others, well before independence, began to scheme for the willing-buyer, 
willing-seller option of land re-distribution. To them, it was clear that the populist 
campaign of Oginga Odinga and his allies about free distribution of land after 
independence to KANU supporters was not a viable option.120 
121. There was a third position to the land question which only made resolution of 
outstanding issues more difficult. KADU members, led by Muliro, Moi, Towett and 
Ngala, with dominant support from the Kalenjin, Luhya, Mijikenda and Maasai 
communities, preferred a multi-racial approach that guaranteed security of land 
rights for the settlers who wished to stay on after independence as well as the 
systematic transfer of land to the Africans. 
122. Because of their position regarding the land question, the colonial administration 
and white settlers rallied their support behind KADU and also orchestrated the 
split of the AEMO.121 Whereas KANU’s dominant position at the Second Lancaster 
House Conference was that the sanctity of individual titles for settlers only should 
be respected, KADU demanded that it should apply to both ethnic communities as 
well as to individuals.122 The confluence of land and negative ethnicity, apart from 
personal interests among the elites, created ethnic tensions and conflicts that were 
to dominate the next four or more decades.123 
123. The Report of the Second Lancaster Constitutional Conference indicates that in 
accordance with agreements made between representatives of the British and 
Africans, former Crown lands became the responsibility of the regions, while 
the un-demarcated ex-reserves were handed over to the new county councils to 
allay fears about their future. However, not all of the representatives of African 
communities who attended the conference were satisfied with the outcome of 
deliberations and the dissatisfaction, with a feeling of betrayal underlying most of 
the political and land-related struggles in Kenya for years to come.
120  Leys: Underdevelopment, pp.56-7.
121  Rothchild, Donald, ‘Racial Bargaining in Independent Kenya: A study of Minorities and Decolonization’ (London, Oxford University 
Press, 1973); AEMO was a loose political organization of African leaders elected to the Legislative Council between 1957 and 1960, 
before the formation of KANU and KADU.
122  Harbeson, John, Nation- Building in Kenya: The Role of Land Reform (Evanston, 1973), p.115.
123  See Goldsworthy, David, ‘Tom Mboya: The Man Kenya Wanted to Forget’ ( London,1982), pp.173-8
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124. The report indicated that the Maasai who attended the conference in a unique status 
because of previous land treaties made on their behalf with the British colonial 
administration were left with little apart from the promise of the ethnic purity of 
their districts. Their delegation refused to sign on the Land Deal at the Second 
Lancaster Conference, claiming a second British betrayal, although their refusal to 
sign had no practical effect on the land deal.124 Resolutions of the Second Lancaster 
Conference may have been a good compromise for the British, but for the Maasai, 
failure to discuss the land question and the future of the Maasai in light of the two 
agreements made between their leaders and the British, before independence 
would have left them with serious liabilities in the event of future expropriation.125 
The Maasai were and continue to this date to be dissatisfied with the agreements 
reached at the conference over land.
125. Representatives of other communities, including the Mijikenda at the Coast and 
pastoral communities in North Eastern and parts of the Eastern provinces were 
equally dissatisfied with the outcome of deliberations on land at the conference. 
Representatives of the communities were and still are dissatisfied, not only with the 
land agreement made at the Second Lancaster House Conference, but also with 
policies adopted at the conference and by the post-independence governments. 
As a result, soon after independence, pastoral communities from the region that 
became known as the North Eastern Frontier (NEF) demanded to be joined with 
the ‘Greater Somalia’ country than to remain in Kenya. 
126. For communities at the Coast, dissatisfaction with agreements over land arrived 
at the conference, made worse by exclusionary policies and practices of post-
independent governments, could have been the genesis of land and related 
political struggles at the coast, which have given rise to the emergence of the 
Mombasa Republican Army (MRC). At the Second Lancaster House Conference, 
delegates of the Mwambao United Front (MUF) from the Coast Province 
attempted to introduce the ‘Land Question of the Ten- Mile Coastal Strip’ through 
a memorandum that demanded their autonomy from mainland Kenya after 
independence, but their move was rejected by the conveners of the Conference, 
on the advice of the Secretary of State, who argued that the Coastal Strip land 
question fell outside the scope of the conference. In addition and unfortunately, 
the conference, instead of addressing the real and pressing land question at the 
Coast, took note of “Her Majesty’s Government’s intention to continue to discharge 
as hitherto, its responsibilities with regard to land matters at the Coast under the 
existing Agreement with the Sultan of Zanzibar.”126 
124  Report of the Kenya constitutional Conference (London, 1962), Annex C pp.29-30; Hughes, Lotte, ‘Malice in Maasaland: The 
Historical Roots of Current Political Struggles’, African Affairs, Vol.104,No.415( 2005),pp.209-11
125  Leo, Christopher, ‘Land and Class in Kenya’ (Toronto, 1984), pp.91-4.
126  Robertson, James, W, ‘The Kenya Coastal Strip: Report of the Commissioner Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State 
for Colonies by Command of Her Majesty’ (Cmnd.1585, London, December 1961), p.13.
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127. The situation at the Coast was particularly complex because of the size and 
influence of the Muslim Arab and Swahili communities, many of whom saw 
little future in an African dominated Kenya, and who campaigned for coastal 
autonomy. Ronald Ngala, the coastal Mijikenda communities’ representative, 
pushed for a middle ground position, but was not supported by representatives 
of the Muslim Arab, Swahili, Shirazi and Bajuni communities who had also 
attended the conference. Eventually Ngala reluctantly supported the integration 
of the 10-mile Coastal Strip into mainland Kenya for the sake of harmony and 
transition to independence.127 
The Third Lancaster House Conference 
128. During the third and final Lancaster House deliberations of September to October 
1963, KANU successfully managed to weaken the ‘Majimbo Constitution’ that 
was drafted during the Second Lancaster House Conference, which proposed 
an independent government based on regionalism. KANU, with the unexpected 
support from the British, reneged on the constitutional agreement which had 
incorporated regionalism (a Majimbo system of government) before even it was 
implemented to address land issue, among other things. Therefore, although on 20 
October 1963 Kenyatta issued a categorical assurance that under the independence 
Constitution, “all ‘tribal’ land would be entrenched in tribal authority and that no 
one could take away land belonging to another tribe,”128 that appears to have been 
just an attempt to appease Ronald Ngala and other minority community leaders 
who were planning secession or alliance with Kenyan Somalis on account of failed 
promises on land restoration and establishment of regional governments across 
the country. Indeed, it was a vain hope that was likely to engender anger and 
frustration in communities that had hinged their hope in recovering land lost to 
Arabs and European settlers after independence. 
129. By the time land issues were negotiated at the Lancaster House Conferences, African 
elites appear to have known that a redistribution of land in the White Highlands 
was inevitable and therefore, they positioned themselves for competition for 
the land, based on colonial tenure. Contrary to their expectations and schemes, 
communities that had unjustifiably and painfully lost the land, such as the Maasai, 
the Kalenjin and other pastoralist communities, based their claims on pre-colonial 
usage of land. The situation was made more tenuous by the Kikuyu and other 
sedentary African communities who also claimed land in the White Highlands, also 
basing their claim upon colonial tenure. 
127  Salim A. I., ‘The Movement for Mwambao’ or Coast Autonomy in Kenya, 1956-63, in Ogot, Bethwell (ed), Hadith 2 (Nairobi, 1970).
128 Letter from Kenyatta, Kenya Independence Conference 1963, Cmnd.2156 (London, 1963), Annex C; see also Kenyatta, Jomo, 
Harambee! (Nairobi, 1964), p.14. The assurance soon turned out to be false as the powers of the regional or federal government 
over trust land was eroded and transferred to the central government through a stage managed constitutional amendments and 
defections to KANU by KADU proponents of federalism. In fact regionalism was crippled before it was implemented. 
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130. The varying positions, worsened by the failure of regionalism and the land buyout 
scheme discriminately implemented at independence, became the genesis of inter-
ethnic tensions and perennial conflicts between the communities over the former 
White Highlands.129 The potential for conflict was made worse by the fact that due to 
increase in population and pressure on land, many ‘squatters’ from Central Province, 
who were not lucky to get land allocations from the White Highlands in their ancestral 
homeland, either bought land through land-buying companies or were allocated 
land by the government in areas perceived to belong to other communities, north-
west of their province, as far as Uasin Gishu and Trans Nzoia.  
131. From the foregoing and other relevant literature, Kenya’s independence was a 
negotiated process between the British colonial administration and a group of 
African elites in their position as representatives of their people, in which there was 
a strong expectation on the part of the British that the colonial system (including 
its system of land ownership and use already established) would continue, in order 
to allow settlers to adapt to changed political circumstances.130 
132. Most importantly, the British considered that protection of property rights already 
acquired by settlers was vital to the conclusion of independence negotiations 
held between 1960 and 1962.131 On the basis of that understanding, part of the 
land deals made at Lancaster House Conferences which were based largely on 
proposals from white settlers was that regionalism would be the supportive 
governance structure and that it would be accompanied by a dramatic extension 
of settlement such that most settler ranches and plantations would remain intact 
in the White Highlands, while a million acres of mixed farms (half of what settlers 
already owned) would be taken by the independent government and used to 
settle Africans.132 
133. The one million acres of land to be acquired from white settlers for settlement of 
Africans displaced during colonialism was to be funded by the British government 
and international loans, and executed through private land purchases. However, 
both KADU and the white settlers had favoured a more limited settlement 
approach. The fear of KADU was that the Central Land Board that was proposed to 
manage the transfer of white-owned lands to Africans would favour the majority 
ethnic communities such as the Kikuyu, and therefore it sought to ensure that the 
regions would play a role in the board, but this was not to be.133
129  Wasserman, Gary, Politics of Decolonization: Kenya Europeans and the Land Issue, 1960-65(Cambridge, 1976), p.120.
130  Wasserman G., ‘The Independence Bargain: Kenya Europeans and the Land Use’, 1960-1962, 11 J. Comm. Pol. Stud.
131  Report of the Kenya Constitutional Conference (1962).
132  See, Wasserman, Gary, ‘Politics of Decolonization: Kenya Europeans and the Land Issue, 1960-65(Cambridge, 1976)’, p.120.
133  Wasserman, Politics of Decolonization, p.120.
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Resettlement programmes
134. By the early 1960s, the problem of landlessness had been worsened by population 
increase in the designated native reserves, thus heightening desperation for 
lasting solutions. As the country approached independence in 1963, many 
communities that had lost land to the colonial administration and its settlers were 
eagerly awaiting restoration of their land, at no charge. While some of the landless 
community members ‘squatted’ in certain areas in the hope that their occupation 
would be regularized by the government, others took a confrontational and violent 
approach to the land question on grounds that they were just recovering their land 
which had been ‘stolen’ or annexed by force by the colonialists, with the help of 
their African collaborators. 
135. As explained in the preceding section, there had also emerged a group of African 
elites and business people who were eager to acquire land, especially in the White 
Highlands, for commercial purposes. Thus African interests generated a near 
scramble for land in the former White Highlands and other strategic areas. However, 
as demonstrated by the divergent views of Africans’ political representatives 
during the Lancaster House conferences where the existing land questions were 
negotiated as part of the independence package, some of the proposed measures 
would not be favourable to many of the communities that had lost their land to 
colonialists. Moreover, the colonial government changed its attitude towards Jomo 
Kenyatta whom it initially perceived as a radical or trouble maker and maintained 
cordial working relationships with him, thus compromising his perceived capacity 
to genuinely address land issues after independence.134
136. The situation resulted in agitation by Africans who were dissatisfied with the buyout 
policy arrangement between the incoming independence administration and the 
outgoing colonial administration, especially in view of the fact that the African 
communities were pressing for a return of their land that was forcibly and unjustifiably 
taken away from them. There were also those who fought for independence with the 
expectation that they would recover their alienated land or, at least, compensation 
for the loss of their main source of survival and livelihood, whose claims threatened 
to turn the White Highlands into battle grounds between Africans who remained 
landless on the one hand and African elites who were poised to acquire land 
therefrom, based on British land tenure and remnant white settlers on the other. 
137. To avert political pressure and the looming dangers from agitated Africans, the 
incoming independent government, with approval and financial backing of the 
British colonial government in its last years of administration in the early 1960s, 
134  H.O.Oruka, ‘Oginga Odinga: His Philosophy and Beliefs’ (Nairobi, 1992), p.75.
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made settlement proposals including offers for British funding of settlement 
schemes for Africans, but as is shown next, subsequent implementation of the 
schemes failed to fully address the existing land question, at the time. 
138. Instead, officials of the newly-formed independent government in Kenya turned 
the foreign-funded settlement schemes into cartels for their own acquisition of, 
and benefit from large tracts of land in the Rift Valley, among other parts of the 
White Highlands and in the process, defrauded communities that were affected by 
land alienation by the British even more and set the stage for some of the battles 
over land witnessed in recent years.
	 The Mackenzie scheme
139. At independence, Jomo Kenyatta became Prime Minster of Kenya and soon, at his 
insistence, the Constitution was amended to create the position of an Executive 
President, as both Head of State and Head of Government. Kenyatta appointed 
James Gichuru as Minister for Finance, Bruce McKenzie Minister for Agriculture 
and Jackson Angaine Minister for Lands and Settlement. The three ministers 
played key roles in the design of settlement programmes and in the acquisition of 
loans granted by the British government to buy out white settlers for purposes of 
resettling African communities that lost their land, in both low and high-density 
settlement schemes. Settlement arrangements had been agreed during the 
Lancaster House conferences.
140. In 1964 Mackenzie, as Minister for Agriculture, made some initial proposals for 
resettlement. His proposals were more concerned with the highest quality of 
land, and were based on a large farm model. Such a model would never meet the 
political demand for land among the majority of Africans who had held higher 
expectations about independence and the opportunity to own land or recover 
what was alienated from them by the white settlers with the support of the colonial 
administration.135 
141. However, McKenzie’s recommendations had key ingredients for a final resettlement 
plan. He spearheaded the design of two types of resettlement schemes. The first a 
‘yeoman’ scheme, in which large farms would be created for experienced farmers and 
were to be interspersed with European farms. For that category of farms, recipients 
would contribute five hundred (500) sterling pounds. The second was a peasant 
scheme designed to create smaller farms for which recipients would contribute 
one hundred (100) sterling pounds. The peasant scheme category was planned for 
establishment in the borderlands between native reserves and the highlands.  
135  Ibid., pp.59-61.
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142. To capacitate Africans to make payment for farms in the two categories, the British 
government, with contribution from the World Bank, advanced a loan of 7.5 million 
sterling pounds to the incoming government of Kenya. 
143. The funding was intended to facilitate the buyout and resettlement programme 
in different parts of the country, especially in regions previously occupied by the 
white settlers.136 However, the scheme also offered credit facilities to non-affected 
Africans who wished to purchase farmlands in the White Highlands. The ‘Yeoman 
Programme’, as it was called, which was later renamed the Assisted Farmers Scheme 
(AFS), envisaged buying 240,000 acres in the White Highlands to be sub-divided 
into 100 acres parcels and distributed to a select group of Africans who would 
farm alongside white settlers.137 However, access to loan facilities and subsequent 
allocation of land in the Mackenzie schemes to certain groups of individuals, 
especially ex-loyalists of the colonial administration, did not please members of 
communities that had genuinely lost land to the colonialists. 
144. In particular, the arrival of the first wealthy Africans who happened to be ex-loyalists 
of the outgoing colonial administration from their native reserves to acquire the 
newly-demarcated large farms on the basis of loans facilitated by the independent 
government attracted resentment from communities that felt entitled to the land 
on the basis of having lost it to white settlers and in some instances, resulted in 
violent conflicts between the new African elite settlers and those who remained 
landless.138 Moreover, resettlement schemes based on the Mackenzie proposals 
were focused on the former White Highlands without serious consideration of the 
dire need to resettle the Mijikenda who also lost their land at the Coast and were, 
by then, largely, landless. 
145. In addition to imbalanced allocation of land to ex-loyalists who were deemed to be 
undeserving of land allocations by landless African communities and communities 
facing land scarcity, other political developments introduced by the Kenyatta 
administration further diminished the chances of landless and land-scarce local 
communities to recover their lost land or receive compensation therefore.
146. Land, or more specifically, recovery and restoration thereof to African communities 
in their regional enclaves, was the main factor underlying negotiations for Majimbo 
or regional government between African community representatives and the British 
colonial administration in the Lancaster House conferences and in subsequent 
meetings, including the meeting of October 1963 at which a draft of the independence 
136  Leo: Land and Class, p.111.
137  Leo: Land and Class, p.111.
138  ‘Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet’, 21 November 1963, in CAB 128/38, p.5.
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constitution including a regional governance structure, was agreed. However, 
Kenyatta’s administration soon introduced radical changes to the independence 
constitution which eroded the regional basis for recovery, retention and utilization of 
communal lands to the chagrin of many communities and their leaders.
147. In 1964, the Kenyatta administration introduced two major amendments to the 
Independence Federal Constitution. The first and second amendments abolished 
significant sections of the Federal (Majimbo) Constitution. These amendments 
ensured that all land vested in the regions was transferred back to central control 
by the President and his associates, including the Commissioner of Lands and the 
Minister in charge of Lands and Settlement.139 
148. Central government also conferred upon itself the power to unilaterally take over 
trust lands which were, formerly, African reserves for specific ethnic groups, which 
counties were to hold in trust for the groups, collectively, without compensation. 
The administration’s surprising move weakened regional governments further, 
leaving them without power over land or money, yet many people in the regions 
were still suffering land scarcity and landlessness. Discontent of representatives 
of affected communities from various regions was openly expressed, for example, 
in the fiery speeches by KADU leaders who preferred a Majimbo system such as 
Murgor and Seroney from Rift Valley and Ngala from the Coast, who, consequently, 
demanded autonomy from central government.140 
149. The leaders clamour for autonomy in ways reminiscent of the MRC’s current 
demands for secession from Kenya, met with stern warning of dire consequences 
from Kenyatta and his lieutenants.141 As the current political situation shows, 
discontent which the Kenyatta administration compelled affected community 
leaders to conceal would feature in later years through calls for a Majimbo system 
of government that culminated in a constitutional referendum accepting that 
system. It would appear that suppression of the discontent also precipitated the 
emergence of the present MRC’s belligerent activities at the Coast, whose end 
is currently, not in sight. An interview with MRC representatives discloses that 
frustration, destitution and under-development resulting from landlessness at 
the hands of colonial and post-independent Kenya governments, coupled with 
intentioned failure by the governments to address the dire land needs of the 
people at the Coast lie at the root of the MRC’s activities.142
139  ‘Amendments and Additions to be made to the Constitution’, Kenya Independence Conference 1963, Cmnd 2156 ( London, 
1963),pp.12-22.
140  Odinga: Not  Yet Uhuru, pp.242-247.
141  Odinga: Not  Yet Uhuru, pp.242-247.
142  See, Paul Goldsmith, Report Based on Research Commissioned by Pact Kenya, The Mombasa Republican Council, Conflict 
Assessment: Threats and Opportunities for Engagement, October 2011 (copy with the TJRC).
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150. Further, amendments to the independence constitution of 1963 exposed Africans 
who acquired land rights to one of the vagaries of the British land tenure - the 
institutionalization of the policy and power of compulsory acquisition of land by 
the state. On the basis of the constitutional amendments, the state acquired the 
power to extinguish any title or other interests in land held by any individual or 
corporate personality and subsequently, acquire it for public or any other purpose. 
This power of compulsory acquisition was derived from the feudal notion that as 
sovereign, the state holds the radical title to all land within its territory. Acquisition 
of land was, therefore, regarded merely as a form of re-possession by the state 
of that which is its own, without recognition of the sanctity of each community’s 
ownership of land for the benefit of community members that prevailed before 
alien notions of land tenure were, unacceptably, wrought upon them. 
151. From that particular period in time, state power of compulsory acquisition of land 
was entrenched in the independence constitution of Kenya. Thus section 75 of 
the constitution vested such power in the state and made it exercisable on the 
state’s behalf by the responsible minister, acting through the Commissioner of 
Lands. Further, the Land Acquisition Act (Cap 295 now repealed) was enacted to 
give effect to section 75 of the Constitution.143 For trust lands which were meant 
for local communities, the constitution, in Chapter IX, simplified the process of 
compulsory acquisition, specifying that such process involved  merely “setting 
apart” of the land, by the Head of State or the county council holding it in trust for 
a local community.144 
152. Initially, the principle of compulsory land acquisition seemed noble; the state could 
use it to acquire land in the interest of the public. However, in time, the public 
trust doctrine was relegated to the periphery by state officials who, with wanton 
impunity, resorted to illegal/irregular allocations, a widespread phenomenon 
which became popularly known as ‘land grabbing’ in Kenya.145 
153. It is noted that besides authorisation of compulsory acquisition of land, there 
were negotiated provisions in the independence constitution whose effect 
watered down claims of historical land injustices. For example, Article 75 of the 
constitution provided that all the existing land rights, irrespective of the manner in 
which they were acquired, would be confirmed and guaranteed.146 The provision 
143 See section 75 of the Constitution of Kenya (1998 Edition). The first and second constitutional amendments  not only centralized 
authority of Government in the Office of an Executive President but also returned the control of land to the centre, thus at the 
disposal of the Head of State, Minister for Lands and Settlement and the Commissioner of Lands. Indeed, the Kenyatta Government 
succeeded to get the legal authority to acquire and allocate land at will.
144 See The land Acquisition Act ( Cap 295) of the Laws of Kenya and Chapter IX of the Repealed Constitution of Kenya.
145 Seethe Ndung’u Report on Illegal/ Irregular Allocation of land. 
146 See Section 75 of the Former Constitution of Kenya, which recognized and upheld the sanctity of the Land Title deed regardless of 
the manner in which it was acquired. 
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was based on the notion that land redistribution should not be undertaken at 
the expense of economic stability, which was dependent largely on agricultural 
productivity. While the provisions favoured land merchants and speculative 
owners, it diminished chances of redress for those who lost land through the 
various land reform processes including alienation by the colonial administration 
and adjudication and registration as already explained. Further, it opened avenues 
for the phenomenon of land grabbing and related corrupt transactions involving 
land, including irregular allocations of public land. It also attracted a counter 
argument that historical claims were not valid in the post-colonial period and 
hence the ensuing conflict of interest between the proponents and opponents of 
finality in irregular acquisition, registration and award of land titles.
154. Provision for confirmation and recognition of land titles regardless of how they were 
acquired may be considered as the most critical resolution in the constitutional 
settlement arrived at Lancaster House. It foreclosed chances that historical claims 
would ever be the basis of land distribution after independence in the whole 
country, including the 10-mile Coastal Strip. 
155. Yet there were and still are many individuals and communities experiencing land 
scarcity, landlessness and related poverty and destitution as a result of alienation 
of their ancestral land in the colonial days, not to mention that many people 
and families also, as explained, lost land unjustifiably during the process of land 
adjudication and registration. 
156. The situation at the Coast was compounded by the fact that by an agreement 
signed in 1963 between the British, the newly-independent Kenya and Zanzibar 
governments, the Sultan of renounced sovereignty over the Coastal Strip, known 
also as Mwambao, which, thenceforth, became fully integrated into independent 
Kenya, the rights of coastal communities that lost their land to Arabs and the 
British having been completely ignored or overlooked.147 That was a recipe for 
conflicts in subsequent years. The only hope for a lasting solution to the problems 
of communities affected by historical land injustices lay in a new constitutional 
settlement to undo the legal entanglement enacted to their disadvantage during 
the negotiations for Kenya’s independence.
157. In addition, the land adjudication, consolidation and registration process introduced 
in the former African reserves continued in post-independent Kenya, regardless of 
strong opposition to it, especially in areas that were occupied by the Maasai and the 
147 Kenya Independence Conference 1963, Cmnd 2156 ( London, HMSO, 1963); Land Acquisition Act ( Cap.295), Registration of Land 
Act ( Cap.300 ), Land Titles Act ( Cap. 282) 
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Kalenjin on that basis that to the communities, land had never been an individual 
asset. Moreover, in the areas occupied by the communities, the process was marred 
by corruption, which in the first phase of the process, raised tensions that forced 
a complete re-demarcation and re-registration. However, Kenyatta’s administration 
continued implementing the process on the basis of the Swynnerton Plan already 
discussed, in the belief that individual title and the consolidation of fragmented 
holdings were essential for long-term agricultural improvement, in addition to 
reducing the cost of land litigation and the fear of land expropriation.
	 The One Million Acre Scheme
158. The One Million Acre Scheme, hereinafter referred to as ‘the scheme’, was 
negotiated as part of the independence package between representatives of 
Kenyan Africans and representatives of the British colonial administration. After 
lengthy negotiations which were sustained by intense pressure on the British 
government from Africans as well as white settler farmers and British politicians 
to speed up land transfer plans prior to independence, details of the scheme were 
agreed. However, although with regard to the land question in Kenya, the scheme 
was intended to resettle Africans who had lost their land, while at the same time to 
ensuring that white settlers were compensated for their farms and developments 
thereon, its objective was largely political, namely: to secure an orderly transition 
to independence without destroying the large farm sector and foreign aid 
opportunities, and to avoid a land grab or a new emergency. As the following 
discussion shows, none of the objectives was fully met, to the disappointment of 
many landless and land-scarce Africans.
159. The scheme was established on the basis of agreement between the British 
administration and Kenya’s elites who were preparing to take over power and 
was to be implemented between 1962 and 1967, with financing mostly by the 
British government. In accordance with the agreements, the British government 
subsequently advanced to Kenyatta’s government a loan of 21 million sterling 
pounds for the purchase of one million acres of land out of the 7.5 million acres 
that was held by European settlers in the White Highlands, for the settlement of 
landless and land-scarce Africans.148 Each would-be African beneficiary of land was 
to be advanced a loan proportionate to the amount necessary to purchase land 
from the fund and the loan was to be repaid over a period of 30 years. Part of the 
reason the loan was advanced was to promote a rapid transfer of ownership of 
farms belonging to settlers who wanted to leave the country after independence.149 
148 It is noted that West Germany, the Land and Agriculture Bank (LAB), the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) and the United 
Kingdom contributed to the development loan, but the World Bank declined to make contribution because it was not comfortable 
with the resettlement arrangement.
149 Wasserman: Decolonization , pp.158-9
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The arrangement was also to safeguard European settler possessions in the event 
of power transfer, thus necessitating an elaborate scheme of constitutional and 
statutory guarantees of property rights,150 mostly in favour of the settlers.
160. Contrary to the expectation of affected Africans, the outgoing colonial administration 
made it clear that African settlers could not get free land but were expected to either 
purchase it directly with their money or borrow the loan that was to be repaid back 
to the British government. Therefore, the approximately 35,000 families that were 
eventually settled on the One Million Acre Scheme had contractual obligations to 
repay their loans.  
161. The scheme was designed to comprise small to medium-size holdings covering a 
total of 1.5 million acres to be sold to individuals who would be facilitated by the loan 
from the British government to buy out the departing white settlers. Land transfers 
were based on a willing-seller, willing-buyer principle, but the people earmarked 
for resettlement on the former White Highlands were supposed to be landless and 
unemployed, even though long-term workers on farms identified for purchased had 
priority, provided they were “acceptable to the regions”, that is; of the “right ethnic 
group.”151 Once the landless and unemployed and former farm workers received land 
allocations, the provincial administration selected additional beneficiaries by lot.
162. Clearly, the One Million Acre Scheme was well-planned and had many of the 
ingredients that would have ensured satisfactory settlement of many of the 
individuals, families and communities affected by British alienation of Africans’ land 
and resultant landlessness and land scarcity. The scheme’s components included 
the availability of an apparently accessible loan facility, very long-term repayment 
period, settlement in one’s former ethnic domain and priority to the most needy. 
163. However, as revealed next, its method of implementation which was skewed 
largely by personal and ethnic interests of the government’s implementation 
officials defeated its African resettlement purpose.
164. The government established an Agricultural Settlement Fund Trust whose trustees 
were mainly James Gichuru, Jackson Angaine and Bruce Mackenzie who, in liaison 
with the British, controlled the fund into which all settlement loan was paid. A Central 
Land Board with regional representation was established to take responsibility for 
land purchase, but it was chaired by a Briton, thus ensuring only nominal autonomy. 
Further, actual settlement of the landless was placed with the Ministry of Lands 
150 Paul Syagga, Public Land, historical land injustices and the new Constitution: Working Paper No.9 ( Society for International 
Development), p.10
151  Carey-Jones N.S., The Anatomy of Uhuru (New York, Praeger, 1966), p.157.
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and Settlement, but in practice, the ministry took over most of the functions of the 
Central Land Board.152 In addition, President Kenyatta appointed Bruce McKenzie 
as the Minister for Agriculture and a representative of white settlers to become 
Parliamentary Secretary for Lands and Settlement, to reassure the United Kingdom 
and its European settlers, in general, that their interests were being taken care of by 
their own people. A question that arises is whether any of the African leaders was 
incorporated into any of the established institutions to safeguard the interests of all 
the landless families and communities, including those at the Coast.
165. The resettlement plan was informed by several factors. First, there was a perceived 
need on the part of colonial administration to entrench the settler community firmly 
in Kenya and maintain their land rights, without having to return back to the Africans. 
Secondly, the colonial administration sought to achieve the aim of socializing the 
new African elites into the colonial political, economic and social patterns through 
the establishment of a multi-racial alliance of European settlers and African 
landowners to facilitate both independence and a majority rule under KANU. Thirdly, 
the land acquisition process was geared towards preventing the mobilization of a 
radical nationalist base that would be opposed to the continuation of colonial land 
policies in the country after independence. Would the underlying factors facilitate 
satisfactory land transfers in the interest of landless and land scarce Africans? 
166. The One Million Acre Scheme and others established for similar purposes did not 
resolve the land problems facing Africans in Kenya.153 Instead, their implementation 
increased the potential for violent conflicts over land in the country, mainly 
because in the process of their implementation, mainly the rich and those who 
were politically connected in the public and private sectors benefited. Loans 
could only be given to those who qualified to repay or had the financial means 
to pay on cash basis. Moreover, funds from the British government that were 
advanced as loans for purchase of land from the White Highlands also appear to 
have been misused by officials in the administration who were entrusted with their 
dispensation.154 The fact that land transfers were based on a willing-seller, willing-
buyer principle, and that loans could only be advanced to those who qualified to 
repay and had cash to make a down payment, also meant that the poor who could 
not raise the required deposit and security to guarantee their loans were left out in 
the resettlement process.
152 The fact that the Ministry of Lands and Settlement was headed by Jackson Angaine, President Kenyatta’s long term ally and friend, 
cast doubt on his capacity to guarantee impartial land transactions in the interest of all affected tribes.
153 See Christopher, Leo, ‘The Failure of the “Progressive Farmer” in Kenya's Million-Acre Settlement Scheme’ (1978) 16 (4) The 
Journal of Modern African Studies 622.
154 See W, G, Lamarque confidential correspondence with the London Office, 7th January, 1969, p.2.
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167. Moreover, resettlement programmes were marred by malpractices like irregular 
land allocations, land grabbing, permitted engagement in settlement programmes 
of corrupt land-buying cartels, political patronage in the process of land allocation 
and negative ethnicity and nepotism in land allocation processes in several parts of 
the country. For example, in the new settlements, several hundred white farmers’ 
houses and 100-acre plots around them, marked as “Z plots” were kept intact and 
reserved by Angaine, the then Minister for Lands and Settlement, reportedly with 
instructions from the President in May 1964 to sell them only to “senior community 
figures.”155
168. In addition, there was no competitive pricing for sale of prime land and other 
property such as houses in the White Highlands and many were, on the basis of 
British settlement funds, sold to ministers, members of Parliament, ambassadors, 
permanent secretaries and provincial commissioners, all with little farming 
experience. Apparently, the irregularities were ignored by officials in charge of 
administering the fund.156 As a result, rich businessmen and businesswomen, rich 
and powerful politicians who were loyal the colonial administration, managed 
to acquire thousands of acres at the expense of the poor and landless.157 Instead 
of redressing land-related injustices perpetrated by colonialists on Africans, the 
resettlement process created a privileged class of African elites, leaving those who 
had suffered land alienation either on tiny unproductive pieces of land, or landless. 
169. A good example of illegal and irregular acquisition of the Million Acre Scheme 
can be found in the case of Sitatunga, Maridadi and Liyavo Settlement Schemes 
in Trans Nzoia, which in this case can be used to paint a global picture of what 
happened and continues to happen in the Settlement Schemes. To quote from the 
late Mzee Jomo Kenyatta Letter of Offer;
“ I, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, EGH, MP, the President of the Republic of Kenya offers Sitatunga 
Farmers Co-operative Society Ltd, a co-operative society registered under Certificate of 
Reg. No. 2037 under the Co-operative Societies Act, Cap.490; the piece of land containing 
the measurements 1,683 acres ( 665 hectares) and known as land Ref. No. 5519 and 5520 
which piece of land is situated in Trans Nzoia District. This offer is subject to and grant 
will be made under the provisions of the Government land act (Cap 280) Laws of Kenya”
170. From the above quote, it’s clear that the land was given to the registered members 
of the Sitatunga Farmers Co-operative Society who were 100 as per the letter of the 
Ministry of Cooperative Development and Marketing dated 1st September, 2011;
155  See  for example W.G. Lamarque’s  Communication to the London Office,  7th January 1969, pp.1-2
156  Letter from B. Greatbatch to W.G. Lamarque, Ministry of Overseas Development, ‘Kenya Land Settlement Account: CAG Refused 
to Certify Accounts, 1964-65’, 3 February 1965, p.2, in DO 156-15, Kenya Land Settlement Account, 1964-5.
157  Wasserman: Decolonization, pp.171-5.
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“The Society was registered on 30th March 1972 as a farm purchase co-operative society 
and its registration number is C2037, the same is captured in the letter of offer that was 
given by President Kenyatta in 1972. The society managed to acquire the farm through 
Government assistance as per letter of offer dated 16th November, 1972 from Office 
of the President. The 100 member remained active up to 1980 when they cleared the 
loan advanced to them by the Settlement Fund Trustees having cleared the loans on 
purchase of land”
171. Adjudication was set to begin in the early 1980s and the farmers genuinely 
anticipated that they would benefit from the adjudication. However, it is at this 
stage that senior government and military officers who were not members of the 
society and had not been part of the group that repaid the loan  were allocated 
huge tracts of land in the scheme contrary to the initial objectives of setting up the 
schemes which was to settle the poor and landless.
172. The members of the society who were landless, destitute and poor had little 
recourse but to. Settle for the five acres that was allocated to them. The 100 acres 
plots known as ‘Z plots’ were reserved for senior government officials and military 
officers. At the TJRC hearings in Nairobi, Mrs. Kegode and Rtd. Lieutenant General 
Sumbeiywo who were mentioned as having been irregularly allocated land in the 
scheme stated that they were not aware that the land belonged to the members of 
Sitatunga Farmers Co-operative Society. Mrs. Kegode stated as follows:
“As a Kenyan, if I were to advise our beloved Government, I would tell them to never 
double-allocate land because we are all Kenyans. There are people who are landless, 
and who are now the society people. Those are my brothers and sisters. Some of them 
are my children. It will not be nice for us to have a dislike for one another or blame one 
another over something we did not create”.158
173. Rtd. Lieutenant General Sumbeiywo stated:
“I feel I have provided what the Commission required but I do not know how the people 
who may have been wronged will be reconciled with me because for 31 years they have 
been looking at me as the person who took their rightful thing without telling them. I 
do not know how it will go. I would have wished that we talk to each other so that I can 
know what to do”.159
174. Though non members benefited from the land as stated above, one aspect 
that comes out clearly is the role that was played by the Manager of  Sitatunga 
Farmers Co-operative Society namely James Gichogo, who was invited for a 
hearing at the Commission but declined to appear. He would have assisted in 
158  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nairobi/4 April 2012. 
159  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nairobi/4 April 2012. 
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shedding light on how the land was distributed to the disadvantage of the real 
members. He was in charge of the process leading to the distribution of the land 
to non members.
175. The Director of Land Adjudication and Settlement, the Directorate that  is 
charged with the management of SFT’s, Mrs. Esther Ogega presented before the 
Commission on the same issue of Sitatunga, but her explanations were found 
not convincing. The land belongs to the members of the Sitatunga Farmers 
Co-operative Society and the Commission recommends that members of the 
Sitatunga Co-operative Society be compensated and or the land is reverted back 
to them. 
176. In the case of Liyavo Settlement Scheme, the members registered themselves as 
Liyavo Farmers Co-operative Society Limited on 1st April 1972 under the Cooperative 
Societies Act, Cap 490, Section 7. The farm has an average of 2802 acres (1123 
hectares) and the same is comprised in Land Reference Number 5751 situated in 
Trans Nzoia County, Kwanza Division, Kapsitis Location in the Rift Valley. The said 
parcel of land was given to 150 families who were squatters and landless by the 
late President Mzee Jomo Kenyatta on 1 November 1972 under the provisions of 
the Government Lands Act. 
177. On 10 October 1974, the Liyavo members were settled on Two and a Half acres 
for their homestead and subsistence farming and thereafter the members were 
to work very hard on the remaining piece of land of 2427 aces as co-operators 
to raise funds in order to offset the outstanding loan advanced to them by 
the Settlement Fund Trustee for purposes of purchasing the farm.In 1978, the 
members of the society went and visited Mzee Jomo Kenyatta at State House 
Nakuru and informed him about the clearance of the loan. The then President 
promised to send surveyors to go adjudicate the land so that members could 
get their rightful shares. The land had 786 heads of cattle, 630 pigs and stakes of 
maize crop that were left behind by the departing white settlers that assisted in 
clearing the loan.
178. Indeed in 1983, during President Moi’s tenure, the land was demarcated and 
only Two and a Half acres were added to the existing Two and a half acres that 
the members were holding previously and the rest of the acreage was unlawfully 
subdivided amongst top civil servants in government during Moi’s time and 
contrary to the terms and conditions of settlement in the Shirika Settlement 
Programme dated 10th November 1974, which was the constitution of the 
society.
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179. The case of  Maridadi farm, which is  in Kwanza Division of Trans Nzoia County, is 
equal and  similar to that of Sitatunga and Liyavo. 
180. Also, resettlement in the One Million Acre Scheme took an ethnic dimension 
in favour of members of some specific ethnic communities against others. 
This created suspicion, mistrust, tensions and conflicts among other ethnic 
communities, who felt discriminated against by the Central Land Board and its 
subsidiaries. There were instances where some ‘squatters’ could be evicted from 
areas they already occupied and denied land allocation simply because of their 
ethnicity, regardless of their landless status. For example, squatters and former 
farm workers from the Central Province were evicted from the Lugari Settlement 
Scheme in Western to make way for members of the Luhya community. Similar 
evictions took place in the Aberdares where those who did not belong to 
the Kikuyu community were evicted by the government to pave way for the 
resettlement of the Kikuyu people. 
181. It also emerges that although all Africans who were rendered landless or left 
with too little pieces of land were entitled to resettlement anywhere in the 
White Highlands under the arrangement with the British, meaning that any 
parts of the highlands was available for their resettlement, officials in Kenyatta’s 
administration reserved large former settler farms in Central and North Rift Valley 
around Nakuru, Kitale and Eldoret for the willing-buyer, willing-seller arrangement, 
deeming it to be the only practical approach. The Kalenjin and the Maasai who 
were evicted from the reserved areas during the period of colonisation opposed 
the move, considering it to be unfair and an unjust attempt to cause them to buy 
land which had been alienated from them by the British from members of the 
Kikuyu community to whom the large farmlands were allocated during the flawed 
resettlement process.160 
182. During the KADU days, Moi supported regionalism and a decentralised system 
of land tenure that recognised both individual and ethnic land rights based on 
historical claims. However, after the merger of KANU and KADU in 1964, Moi 
changed his open resistance to centralisation of land administration under a 
Central Land Board. As an influential political leader, his appointment obligated 
him to support the government’s land re-settlement plans in the Rift Valley, 
especially of the Kikuyu, even though he was an influential Kalenjin leader.
183. Because of his position in Kenyatta’s government, Moi abandoned any open attempt 
to restrict or resent immigrants from Central Kenya and other parts of the country 
160  Tabitha Kanogo, Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau, 1905- 1963 (London, James Currey, 1987), at 150-152.
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into the former White Highlands in Rift Valley, perhaps for fear of creating suspicion, 
mistrust and tension with his boss, Jomo Kenyatta. Tensions arose over Moi,161 who, as 
the most senior Kalenjin in Kenyatta’s government, was seen as allowing immigrants 
from Central Province to acquire white-occupied land in Nyandarua, Laikipia, Nakuru 
and other parts of the Rift Valley, outside their “traditional” areas in Central Kenya.  It is 
reported that, while he could not challenge the process publicly though, Moi worked 
behind the scenes to help Kalenjin farmers compete with the Kikuyu to buy settler 
farms.162 One of Moi’s close allies, Taita Towett, who was similarly influential, also 
pressurized European land owners to sell their land within the Kalenjin spheres of 
influence.163 However, the little efforts made by Moi and his close political allies from 
the Kalenjin community did not fully address the land-related needs of members of 
the Kalenjin community.
184. In subsequent years, for example, during Daniel arap Moi’s regime, the situation 
increased tension between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin and other communities that 
similarly felt entitled to resettlement in the former White Highlands. For instance, 
in 1985, Kipsigis leaders ordered members of the Kikuyu and other communities, 
including the Luo who were working in tea farms in Kericho to leave Rift Valley.164 
Tension and ethnic strife over flawed land settlement schemes also revived political 
debates for the re-establishment of a regional (majimbo) government in Kenya, in 
which case, regionalism would be understood to mean that each ethnic community 
occupies its tribal domain along establishments that existed before colonisation.165 
185. Therefore, it is no wonder that the majimbo debate dominated political discussions 
in post-independent Kenya and that the debates were, in many cases, accompanied 
by ethnic violence over land-related claims in areas such as Molo and Burnt Forest, 
where communities felt that members of other communities were settled and 
thereby, imposed in their areas while they remained landless or suffered land 
scarcity. As early as the late 1960s and early 1970s, militia groups comprising 
members of certain communities who felt defrauded of their land by the Kenyatta 
administration were already taking shape, especially in the Rift Valley. One of 
such groups was the Land and Freedom Army comprising non-Kikuyu members 
who felt betrayed after independence by the Kenyatta administration in terms of 
getting resettled on free lands acquired from the white settlers.166
161 Widner, Jennifer A., The Rise of a Party-State in Kenya: From Harambee! to Nyayo! (Berkeley, 1992), 8.81, quoting the unpublished 
thesis of Apollo Njonjo.
162  See for example letter from T. J. Bellers to Counsell, ‘Kenya Internal’, 28 April 1971, in FCO 31/854 Political Developments in 
Kenya, 1971.
163  Letter from Clay to Joy, “National Assembly,” 13 October 1971, in Foreign Commonwealth Office 31/853 Affairs of the National 
Assembly in Kenya, 1971.
164  Tabitha Kanogo, Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau, 1905- 1963 (London, James Currey, 1987), at 150-152.
165  Tabitha Kanogo, Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau, 1905- 1963 (London, James Currey, 1987), at 150-152.
166  Leo: Land and Class, p.132
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186. The general result was that the majority of the people who were actually settled 
through the One Million Acre Scheme were not necessarily the landless people 
who had demanded and fought for the establishment of those schemes.167 The 
beneficiaries were a few individuals, mostly Kikuyu, who had freely accumulated 
money through farming, small business ventures, wage employment or sale of 
their existing holdings during and after the period of colonisation. For example, 
some people in Central Province simply disposed of their land or assigned it to 
relatives in order to qualify for the cheaper and comparatively larger settlement 
plots in the Rift Valley. Terms of the repayment loans provided by the British 
government were also flexible, representing about 90 percent of the purchase 
price in low-density schemes and 100 percent in high-density schemes.  Ironically, 
those settled in the schemes included President Kenyatta with about 216.5 acres 
and his long-serving Minister for Lands and Settlement Jackson Angaine, with 252 
acres; while the majority of deserving allottees were allocated between 5 and 20 
acres of land only.168
187. The foregoing elaboration illustrates the fact that the multi-million resettlement 
schemes were not only mismanaged but were also ethnicised and politicised, 
despite its noble goals of resettling the landless across the country.169 
The competition and conflict over access, utilization and ownership increasingly 
took an ethnic dimension akin to tribal political alignments in the period just before 
and after independence.  As a result, settlement processes intended to create 
harmony among local communities as they increased their status of livelihood 
instead created suspicion, mistrust, tensions and conflicts between the Kikuyu 
and other ethnic communities, especially the Kalenjin in the Rift Valley, who felt 
discriminated against by the Central Land Board and its subsidiaries.170 A report of 
a ‘Stamp Mission’ assigned to evaluate the outcome of the One Million Acre scheme 
in October 1965 found it to be a complete failure, due to numerous instances of 
corruption, misallocation and mismanagement of funds by the top government 
officials involved in the resettlement process. The report concluded that Britain 
would reduce financial commitment to the settlement programmes in Kenya.
188. The conclusion one would make from the foregoing discussion is that Kenyatta’s 
administration squandered the opportunity to fully and adequately address the 
land question. Had it not, the current violent conflicts over land with political 
undertones would have been prevented.
167  See Ndung’u Report findings, pp.125-128 and details in Annexes 52 and 53 in Vol.1 of the Annexes to the Ndung’u Report, 2004.
168  President Jomo Kenyatta and Minister for Lands Jackson H. Angaine were allocated large parcels of land in the settlement 
schemes at the expense of the poor, landless and needy and needy individuals in society.
169  Carey- Jones: Anatomy of Uhuru (New York, Praeger, 1966).
170  Carey-Jones : Anatomy, p. 157 explains how the One Million Acre Scheme took an ethnic approach to the high density schemes, 
allocating European land within their ‘sphere of influence’ each of the major ethnic groups. Few if any schemes were multi-ethnic. 
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Land issues and Related Conflicts in Post 
Independence Kenya
189. The overall objective of this section is to interrogate land problems in post-
independent Kenya, in order to determine underlying causes of violent conflicts 
that have arisen in relation to land for purposes of recommending appropriate 
redress, in accordance with of the TJRC mandate. The mandate of the Commission 
was to investigate causes of land-related conflicts from the post-independence 
period to the present. The period before independence has been considered in 
detail, with clear indications of the adoption of British colonial laws, policies and 
practices in relation to land at independence.
190. Since independence, there have been three political regimes in Kenya - the 
Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki regimes. This section presents findings of the various 
methods of irregular and corrupt land acquisition and allocation methods that 
have occurred over the years, perpetrated mostly by government officials, and how 
the land-related activities have, over the years, fuelled land-related ethnic tension 
and strife whose roots are, in many cases, traceable to land-related injustices 
committed during the colonial period.
191. The discussion is divided into three parts, each addressing land-related challenges 
during a particular regime and consequences thereof and indicates whether or 
not consequences were sufficiently address or still endure, as land issues awaiting 
redress. The first part considers Jomo Kenyatta’s regime, beginning with a summary 
of land policies and laws that were applicable soon after independence which 
should have guided official dealings with land and, in the process, demonstrates 
the extent of official failure to adhere to the laws and policies, thereby occasioning 
injustices to people, many of whom already suffered land alienation and related 
consequences during the colonial administration and attendant victims’ resistance, 
rebellion and violent retaliation.
Land irregularities at independence as causes of violent conflicts
192. This section presents findings on land-related irregularities and attendant violent 
conflicts and related issues during the Kenyatta regime, beginning with mainland 
Kenya and then the Coast, many of which have endured, to this day. As the previous 
discussion shows, irregularities involving land acquisition, ownership and use take 
many forms, including discriminatory land allocation practices, based on ethnicity 
and unjustifiable allocation of land by government officials to themselves or to 
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their affiliates. The foregoing section elaborates irregular land allocation practices 
that occurred during Kenyatta’s administration through land allocation schemes. 
However, irregularities and malpractices that characterised land allocation in the 
settlement schemes were not the only form in which official corruption in relation 
to land was manifested. Therefore, in order to design meaningful measures to fully 
address the root causes of land-related violent conflicts that have been witnessed 
in the recent years, other forms of land-related injustices that occurred during 
Kenyatta’s administration are presented in this section.
193. The presentation in this section explains that official corruption in the acquisition, 
allocation, ownership and disposal of land in Kenyatta’s era continued unabated 
regardless of the existence of applicable laws and policies that were intended to 
govern dealings in land. This raises the question whether there might have been 
some inherent loopholes in the laws and policies or in their implementation that 
should also form the focus of analysis as the country seeks to design appropriate 
measures to address land-related conflicts with finality. 
194. A number of terminologies are used in this section of the chapter on land which 
require definition in order to clarify the meaning, for the purposes of this report. The 
first is “irregular allocation of land”, which refers to official actions and procedures 
in relation to land, leading to land acquisition, ownership, occupation and/or use 
which do not conform to applicable laws and regulations. 
195. The second terminology that deserves definition is “land grabbing”, which is used 
here to mean official and private actions, steps and procedures in relation to land 
acquisition, ownership, occupation, use or any other dealing in land, both private 
and public, that is not only illegal, but is also conducted with wanton impunity, 
recklessness and is blatant and widespread. An elaboration follows:
196. As the country approached independence in 1963, many communities that had 
lost land to the colonial administration and its settlers were eagerly awaiting 
restoration of their land, at no charge. As previously explained, there also emerged 
a group of African elites and business people who were eager to acquire land, 
especially in the White Highlands, for commercial purposes. African interests 
generated a scramble for land in the former White Highlands and other strategic 
areas. While some of the landless community members squatted in certain areas 
in the hope that their occupation would be regularized by the government, others 
took a confrontational and violent approach to the land question on grounds that 
they were just recovering their land which had been ‘stolen’ or annexed by force 
by the colonialists, with the help of their local loyalists. However, individuals and 
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communities that had genuine expectations of land restoration at the instance 
of the government suffered great disappointment when the first government’s 
response came in the form of an announcement by President Kenyatta’s 
administration that there was no free land, despite having used land as a tool to 
mobilize Africans to support KANU and its struggle for independence and self-
governance of the country.
197. The frustration of communities disappointed by the administration’s sharp response 
was expressed by Mr David Nasura Tuwei, an 85-year old member of an affected 
community in the following terms:
After 1963, the Talai had hoped that our government would give us priority in the White 
Highlands resettlement project as we had lost our land to the Kipsigis community.171 
When the whites left the country, the leaders of the time who came into power took 
over the farms that we have specified and they did not regard us. We were left on the 
rocky, waterless and the barren lands.172
198. Besides continued landlessness, land scarcity, destitution and poverty, failure 
to give priority, in land allocation or, more accurately, re-allocation in favour of 
those who genuinely lost their land to the colonialists soon after independence, 
generated another problem - the scramble for land by African elites and businesses 
for purposes other than settlement. However, what heightened the situation 
to propositions of violence was the engagement of public officials in Kenyatta’s 
administration in irregular and illegal land acquisition and use, at the expense of 
landless and land-scarce communities. 
Nature of land-related illegalities and irregularities after independence
199. During Kenyatta’s administration at independence and for several years thereafter, 
illegal dealings in land which left many individuals, families and communities 
landless and land-scarce took many forms. They included outright land grabbing, 
preferential treatment of certain communities, especially the Kikuyu, in land 
allocations and settlement, establishment of settlement schemes selectively for 
the benefit of members of certain communities, while other deserving individuals 
and families from other communities remained unattended, and illegal alienation 
of land from what was designated as public land for public purposes.
200. The early years of Kenya’s administration ushered in Kenya, the beginning of mass 
land grabbing and irregular allocations of public land and other resources, which, 
in time, became a widespread and almost endless phenomenon throughout the 
171  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kericho/19 September 2011/p. 56, para 1.
172  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nakuru/23 September 2011/p. 5, para 3.
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country. Throughout the years of his administration, both land grabbing and 
irregular land allocations were perpetrated by and for the benefit of the President 
himself, members of his immediate family, his relatives and friends and officials in his 
administration, including political leaders from other tribes, with wanton impunity.
201. Existing literature indicates that between 1964 and 1966, one-sixth of European 
settlers’ lands that were intended for settlement of landless and land-scarce 
Africans were cheaply sold to the then President Kenyatta and his wife Ngina, his 
children, Daniel Moi who succeeded him as president, other political leaders at 
the time including  Mbiyu Koinange, Ronald Ngala, Oginga Odinga, through the 
Luo Thrift and Trading Company, Gikonyo Kiano, J.M. Kariuki, Masinde Muliro and 
Paul Ngei.173
202. Kenyatta himself appears to have benefited immensely from irregular allocations of 
land that should have benefited those who lost land to Arab and British colonizers. 
By 1965, Kenyatta is reported to have been using his position as president to buy 
numerous settler farms in the White Highlands and also excising and allocating 
to himself and family government forest in Kiambu.174 President Kenyatta’s direct 
engagement in irregular land allocations compromised his position to prevent or 
remedy similar cases of land grabbing by his close associates.175
203. In addition, there were peculiar cases of land grabbing and related malpractices 
during Kenyatta’s administration which serve to illustrate how deeply the problem 
of land grabbing had cut into Kenya and the wanton manner in which key 
government officials, including the president grabbed what should have been 
public or communal land and “dished” it to relatives.176 
204. Further, there were cases involving President Kenyatta’s personal approval of the 
purchase of large farms by his family, exempting the transactions from review by 
the respective land control boards. In the process, his family acquired vast farms in 
Nakuru, Njoro and Rongai areas in the Rift Valley.177
205. Moreover, the president and his family owned several beach plots and hotels on 
the Coast where, as previously stated, many African communities lost their land, 
first, to Arabs and later to Europeans, rendering many landless, to this day. It was 
revealed that by 1972, the President and his family had more than eleven properties 
173  Kenya National Archives on African Political Elites at Independence.
174  Hornsby Charles: Kenya, A History Since Independence ( I.B.Tauris and Co Ltd, 2012), pp.107- 108
175  Hornsby Charles: Kenya, A History Since Independence ( I.B.Tauris and Co Ltd, 2012), pp.107- 108
176  See Hornsby, Charles, Kenya: A History since Independence, p.314.
177  See Hornsby, Charles, Kenya : A History Since Independence, p.314.; see also Sunday Times, 10 August 1975, p.12
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at the coast including hotels, in addition to those he owned through proxies, yet 
Mombasa Municipal Council waived all land rates due on his property in the same 
year.178
206. As already noted, other key personalities also benefited from irregular land 
deals during Kenyatta’s administration, especially his close associates who 
also irregularly acquired prime land at the coast, mostly beach plots, including 
Eliud Mahihu, the Coast Provincial Commissioner then, Isaiah Mathenge, former 
Provincial Commissioner, Rift Valley, Matu Wamae, John Michuki and Beth 
Mugo.179 Other long-serving provincial commissioners during the administration 
who similarly acquired land irregularly at the expense of landless and land-scarce 
Africans were John G. Mburu, Charles Koinange, Isaiah Cheluget, Paul Boit and 
Simon Nyachae.180 Not surprisingly, all of the land allocation beneficiaries who 
at the time they irregularly acquired the land served as PCs were sons of either 
former colonial home guards or chiefs.181 
207. Commission has compiled a list of individuals for whom there is evidence of 
illegal or irregular acquisition of land during the Kenyatta administration.  This list, 
along with a similar list of names from the Moi and Kibaki administrations, will 
be handed over to the National Land Commission for further investigation and 
action. Two constitutional amendments conferred upon the president the power 
to make grants of unalienated government land to himself and others, together 
with corresponding parcels of land, all of which were acquired through abuse of 
constitutional powers vested in the presidency.182 In the process that might be 
suitably referred to as the scramble to irregularly acquire land in the former White 
Highlands, key personalities from various ethnic backgrounds also acquired large 
tracts of land in areas that formed part of former reserves for other different ethnic 
communities. 
208. For example, in Uasin Gishu, key personalities from the Kalenjin community 
dominated the east and west of the region, those from the Kikuyu community 
occupied the south, while those from the Luhya community occupied the north-
west. In addition, members of the same communities acquired parts of the White 
Highlands as follows: the Kikuyu - Nyandarua, Laikipia and most of southern 
178 Ibid., pp.315-16.
179 Ibid., pp. 314-16, see also the Sunday Times, 17 August 1975.
180 Nellis, John, The Ethnic Composition of Leading Kenyan Government Positions, Research Report No. 24 (Uppsala, 1974), Table 
III reinterpreted.
181 Nellis, John, The Ethnic Composition of Leading Kenyan Government Positions, Research Report No. 24 (Uppsala, 1974), Table 
III reinterpreted.
182 Table 2. below illustrates some of the prominent people who were allocated land during the Kenyatta administration. The Ndung’u 
Report of 2004 on the Illegal/ Irregular allocations of Public Land also describes some of Kenyatta’s activities. Unfortunately, very 
few scholars have had the courage to interrogate and document the abuse of office and land grabbing witnessed during his regime 
for fear of repression and attracting unspecified consequences from the family or beneficiaries of the ill gotten public lands and 
property, yet silence on such malpractices is in itself part of the historical land injustices.
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Nakuru, the Luhya - western Trans Nzoia and Lugari and the Kalenjin - eastern 
Trans Nzoia and northern Nakuru.183 The intermingling of communities in areas 
that were not their original “homelands” resulted in competition and conflicts 
throughout Kenyatta’s administration because what was perceived as foreign 
settlements in the ex-reserves of other communities remained deeply unpopular, 
despite official policy that was permissive of African settlement anywhere in the 
country.184
209. Besides the direct engagement by key individuals in irregular land deals, various 
kinds of land-buying businesses, many with questionable legal status, were 
established for purposes of irregularly acquiring land meant for the landless, for 
profit. Examples of such land buying companies were the Gikuyu, Embu and Meru 
Association (GEMA), NDEFO and Nyakinyua, to mention a few, which operated 
mainly in the Rift Valley and in Central Province, but with outreach offices in 
other parts of the country.  Some of the companies managed to acquire land and 
re-distribute it to their members who were mostly kinsmen of their founders, 
while others went underground or closed business, having received large sums 
of money from their members or shareholders, thus worsening the situation of 
landlessness and land scarcity in the country. 
210. Although land remained a key source of political patronage and the government’s 
primary tool in controlling dissenting voices or opposition, there were challenges 
against the manner in which land was corruptly acquired by key government 
officials and their close associates that should have warned the government of 
the day of the short and long-term dangers of official malpractices in relation to 
land. For example, in October 1973, Martin Shikuku, the then Butere MP, warned 
that if the Kikuyu did not share the fruits of Uhuru with others, they would 
eventually be “eaten by the other 41 tribes like a satisfied hyena was eaten up by 
hungry hyenas.”185
211. The politician’s warning was indicative of the ethnic perception of land grabbers 
and hatred and animosity that was building up over the years because of skewed 
allocation of land and other public resources in favour of individuals mainly from 
the Kikuyu community by the Kenyatta administration. The likelihood of land-
related conflict was enhanced by findings that during Kenyatta’s administration, 
members of the Kikuyu community held 50 percent of the top jobs in the 
country.186
183  Carey- Jones: Anatomy, p.157.
184  Carey- Jones: Anatomy, p.157.
185  Legum, Colin, Africa Contemporary Record 1973-74 ( New York, 1974), B.172.
186  See Table 5.5 Senior Kikuyu parastatals heads in the 1970s in Hornsby, Charles, Kenya: A History since Independence, p.256-258.
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212. Further, the link between irregular land allocations during Kenyatta’s era and 
political discontent of a nature that could cause violence was demonstrated by 
sharp reactions to the malpractice by members of Parliament who were opposed 
to them. Official records of the National Assembly indicate that during one of the 
parliamentary sessions in 1974, the then Moyale MP Osman Araru criticized Jackson 
Angaine who had been Lands and Settlement minister for 15 years for openly 
facilitating the settlement of members of the Kikuyu ethnic group in the Rift Valley. 
The enraged MP is reported to have asked Angaine whether he was only interested 
in land that members of his community were grabbing from the Kalenjin people 
in the Rift Valley, stating that land was already “finished” there.187 The Moyale MP’s 
open criticism of Angaine was a strong indicator of displeasure, not just by affected 
communities, but also by other communities in Kenya that were not partaking in the 
malpractices related to land. Further, in 1974, a Kalenjin MP demanded Angaine’s 
sacking and referred to him as “a leader to hell and darkness.”188 Both sentiments 
pointed to the ethnic resentment of the Kikuyu due to the phenomenon of land 
grabbing perpetrated by their leaders which could and, in subsequent years, did 
result in violent conflicts among the communities living in Rift Valley. 
213.  It is noted from the sharp remarks directed at Angaine by fellow MPs, that his Ministry 
of Lands and Settlement also played a facilitating role in irregular land allocations 
in the country. There are indications that in addition to mounting discontent over 
irregular land allocations during Kenyatta’s administration, the malpractices also 
threatened to mar the relationship between the administration and its external 
partners, especially the British government. The British government was worried 
about the negative publicity in the press and parliamentary criticism of their aid 
administration which seemed to have facilitated the irregular land transactions 
involving key government officials.189 In spite of its concern about the likelihood of 
strained relationship with Kenya, the British government failed to intervene to stop 
the corrupt practices. Instead, it continued funding the failing land resettlement 
process.190
Land Problems at the Coast in Post-independent Kenya: Kenyatta’s 
Administration
214. As already explained, the coastal region, unlike mainland Kenya, was first colonised 
by Arabs who, during their colonisation, enslaved members of the Mijikenda 
community and also took over a lot of their land. Subsequently, the Sultan of 
Zanzibar who was governing the coastal area, having brought African communities 
187  Osman Araru, Member of Parliament for Moyale, in NAOR, 23 November 1973, col.535.
188  Moses arap Keino, in NAOR, April 1974; Moses Keino also quoted in  East African Standard, 26 April, 1974, p.1
189   See  W.G. Lamarque’s   confidential correspondence with the London Office, pp.2-3
190  See F.H.  partridge’s letter to Hansford dated 27th August 1968. 
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living there under his control, handed over power to the British, as protectors of the 
coastal region. In the process, much of the land previously owned and occupied by 
African communities was also handed over to the British colonialists. At some point 
in time, the British established a claims process through which private persons 
who had lost land could seek restoration and other redress for land, but African 
communities did not benefit from the process because, among other things, they 
were not aware of its existence. 
215. As a result, most of the individuals, families and communities at the Coast 
ended up living as ‘squatters’ on land that had either been acquired by Arabs 
or the British such that  by the time Kenya attained independence, many at the 
Coast had no titles to their land. The situation seems to have been confused 
by the takeover of power by the British from Arabs in a procedure that local 
communities did not well understand, especially the progression from the 
Coastal Strip as a sultanate to a protectorate under the British. Equally unclear 
was the status of the Coastal Strip, including land at the time of independence 
when the Sultan renounced his sultanate over the region to allow it to be 
merged with the mainland as Kenya.
216. The foregoing factors present unique features around land at the Coast which 
make it deserve special consideration. With regard to land issues and the need for 
their redress, the coastal region is also unique because very many different kinds 
of land problems have arisen there requiring redress. Land problems there are 
widespread and transcend many decades, including pre and post-independence 
administrations. Land problems remain largely unaddressed in the coastal 
region which has the largest number of landless people and has been severely 
marginalized in terms of land adjudication, consolidation and registration. Because 
of the myriad land problems, the majority of people at the Coast remain very poor; 
it is the region where land acquisition by individuals and other bodies from outside 
of the indigenous ethnic communities (considered as up country people) has been 
the largest. It is also the region where land-related injustices appear to have been 
the gravest and the longest lasting. For these reasons, land issues at the Coast 
require urgent redress by first enumerating the kinds of land problems that have 
continued to affect the region and its people.
217. As explained, there exists myriad land problems relating to alienation, acquisition, 
occupation, ownership, use and disposal at the Coast including forced eviction 
of coastal families and communities by private individuals and entities as well as 
public entities in the process of irregular acquisition of land. There has also been 
forced eviction of families and communities from community ranches, without 
compensation, to pave way for large-scale government projects. Furthermore 
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there has been a notable absence of consultation with potentially affected local 
communities in the acquisition of land for government projects.
218. This in addition to forced evictions by private individuals from upcountry in the 
process of grabbing their land and the establishment of settlement schemes 
which end up benefiting individuals and families from certain upcountry ethnic 
communities. The indigenous coastal people’s predicament has been compounded 
by the personal and irregular alienation of land at the Coast by government officials, 
including some of the former presidents, for their own private use. Their litany 
of woes continues with the failure to identify and recognize certain indigenous 
communities at the Coast for purposes of settlement and re-settlement and the 
illegal alienation of parcels designated as trust land for the benefit of specific 
coastal communities by government officials and their close associates. Then 
there has been the establishment of protected wildlife areas on land occupied 
by local communities without recognition of their existence and compensation, 
declaration of illegal settlements in coastal communities homelands to pave 
way for annexation of land for the benefit of people from outside of the region, 
as well as illegal acquisition of land at the Coast by private individuals from the 
mainland. Failure to complete the processes of land adjudication, consolidation 
and registration exercises at the Coast and allocation of large communal lands, 
including ranches and trust lands to foreign individuals and business entities 
add to the grievances. These problems underlie the emergence of the MRC in the 
region and threaten to give rise to more violence there unless urgent measures are 
purposefully and systematically taken to address them. 
	 Failure to re-settle and register coastal people as owners of land
219. The large number of the Mijikenda and other coastal communities who should 
have been settled as part of the independence package negotiated at the Lancaster 
House conferences in London were never settled. It has been explained that the 
negotiations included an undertaking by the British government to provide a 
loan for payment of white settlers to acquire part of the land they occupied for 
settlement of Africans, but settlement programmes in that scheme excluded 
the whole coastal region. Later, other settlement programmes were introduced, 
including one also supported by the Word Bank but that too, was concentrated on 
mainland Kenya. As a result, large numbers of families and communities occupied 
lands for which they had no title deeds or any other form of proof or ownership 
and thus became susceptible to land grabbers. Much of land at the Coast, including 
land in Malindi was, at independence, categorized as government land, yet local 
communities were living on the land. In Lamu, for example, all the land in what 
currently constitutes Lamu County was categorized as government land, while 
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the local indigenous population was considered as ‘squatters’ on the land, yet it 
was their own.191 The same situation prevails in the Tana Delta which has, in the 
recent past, featured in the media prominently when violence broke out between 
communities living there over land.192
220. The squatter problem was made worse by that fact that in many cases, the process 
of land adjudication, consolidation and registration was not conducted at the 
Coast, thus leaving families without evidence of ownership of the land they occupy. 
Since people did not have title documents to the land they occupied, it appeared 
and still does appear to land grabbers that the land they occupy does not belong 
to them.193 The situation was and continues to be exploited by individuals and 
corporations, especially from upcountry, who consider such land as belonging to 
no one and therefore available for their acquisition, regardless of the presence of 
families living on the land. It has made it easy for private individuals, government 
officials and local as well as foreign investors to transact irregular deals leading 
to acquisition of land, whereupon, the genuine inhabitants are forcibly evicted 
without compensation.
221. Lack of title deeds has also exposed coastal communities to violent evictions by 
government functionaries, especially security forces in the pretext of carrying out 
security operations. For example, in Kiunga, at some point, people from Somalia 
crossed the border into Kenya and killed one police officer. The Kenya government 
was quick to blame local people for the officers’ death and on that basis, assigned 
GSU officers to the area. The GSU, in addition to torturing the local Bajuni 
communities, demolished their villages, including Rasini and Mtanga Wanda 
islands, causing them to flee. Upon return, community members found that their 
land had been taken over and registered in the names of upcountry people who to 
date, claim to be owners of the land.194
222. In Kipini where the Swahili, the Giriama and the Pokomo have been living since 
the pre-independence period, the situation reflects selective adjudication and 
registration exercises. Witnesses testified that although they lived together 
awaiting title deeds for their land, in time, they discovered that people from other 
upcountry community, especially the Akamba and the Kikuyu as well as soldiers 
who had descended in the area for unexplained reasons, had sub-divided the land 
and obtained title deeds while they, indigenous communities, had none and were 
unable to access government land registration services.195
191  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January 2012/p. 3. 
192  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p. 12.
193  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p. 21.
194  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p. 42.
195  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p. 46.
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223. The problem was worsened by the growing commercial value of coastal land 
for tourism-related development. The government made grants of coastal land 
suitable for tourism, often in areas already occupied by the Mijikenda, resulting in 
mass evictions and subsequent conflicts. Lamu reached a boiling point after the 
government failed to address the historical injustices as well as curtail ongoing 
fraudulent land procurement in the area.196 Related to it is failure to resettle those 
who were internally displaced at the Coast during the post-election violence (PEV) 
of 2007-2008 is lack of compensation for displaced individuals and families there. 
Affected people at the Coast have complained that while Kenyans displaced by 
the 2007-2008 PEV have been recognized as internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) and many, especially in mainland Kenya have been re-settled, the 
government of Kenya has given very little, if any, consideration to large 
numbers of people at the Coast who have been displaced over the years, 
including those who have been, from time to time, displaced as a result of 
Shifta incursions in Lamu.197
224. It has been stated that in Lamu, since the 1960s, there have been Shifta-related wars 
between the communities in the area and either local communities or government 
security forces every time the Shifta from Somalia cross the border into Kenya to 
either steal cattle or to perpetrate other kinds of raids.198 However, every time Kenyan 
security forces are sent to the area to respond to Shifta attacks, they turn against 
community members and torture them, destroy their crops, demolish their homes 
and forcibly evict them. As a result, community members have been forced out 
of twelve villages in the area including Shakani, Shendeni and Vundeni. All of the 
community members who were evicted from their homes during such operations 
became internally displaced but the government has failed to recognise them as 
such and re-settle them, rendering many landless and poor. Many have resorted to 
living in slums, while some moved to Tanzania in search of homelands when their 
own government failed to come to their aid. Neither has the government provided 
affected coastal communities any form of redress of atrocities committed against 
them by the GSU and other security agencies that have tortured and rendered many 
homeless in the course of conducting security operations.199
225. The Boni and the Bajuni communities have suffered similar evictions since the 
early 1960s. Soon after independence, there were people at the Coast who 
declined to join Kenya in preference for Somalia and crossed the border into 
Somalia. However, they soon began to cross back into bordering areas in Kenya 
196  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p. 3.
197  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p. 4.
198  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p. 4.
199  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p. 4.
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to steal livestock from local communities. However, the GSU that the government 
sent to the areas from time to time to repel the attackers, turned against affected 
community members.
226. They accused them of collaborating with the Shifta raiders, shot and killed many 
of them, forcing many families to flee, having lost their livestock, crops that were 
destroyed by the GSU and homelands, yet to date, the government has failed to 
compensate or re-settle them.200 Because of the government’s persistent failure 
to recognise and address the plight of coastal communities that have suffered 
forceful evictions at the hand of the government’s own security functionaries, 
many affected people hold the view that they were better off during the colonial 
period.  In the words of one affected person who, at the time of his testimony, 
was still nursing scars from torture by the GSU who also shot him and fellow 
community members as well as forcibly evicted them on account of anti-Shifta 
operations:
We, as the Bajuni feel that we were better off when we were under the colonial 
government than during the post-colonial period. During the colonial period, we 
did not have any problems because at that time we even had our own villages. After 
independence, our villages were destroyed. They were at Kiunga, Kishakani, Funambai, 
Vibondeni which is our home, Ashwei and Materoni. These are the villages which were 
destroyed after independence. We were left with two villages and we had the Bajuni. 
We did a lot of farming and exported a lot of farm produce during the colonial period. 
We were better off during the colonial period than the post-colonial period. I can tell 
you that when we got independence, we were very happy and we celebrated.201
227. The foregoing statement discloses the potential danger of violent conflicts by 
Kenyans whose government has not only committed atrocities against, but has 
also failed over the years to recognize their plight and redress them.
	 Fraudulent Allocation of Government Land at the Coast
228. Coastal communities have also suffered illegal alienation of government land 
in terms of manner of acquisition and allocation. Many coastal families and 
communities settled on what was designated as government land upon losing 
their own land, in the hope that the government would settle them on the 
land. However, from the time Kenya attained independence, officials in the 
administration engaged in illegal excision of the land without following the 
mandatory substantive and procedural provisions of the Government Lands Act. 
200  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p. 17.
201  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p. 44.
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229. In many places, including Lamu and Taita Taveta, government officials annexed 
and allocated land as gifts to individuals deemed loyal to the administration 
and also on the basis of ethnicity, thus advocating nepotism within government 
ranks. Officials involved in illegal allocation of government land were surveyors, 
physical planning officers, local authority officials including the Lamu County 
Council Chairman, MPs, chiefs, the District Commissioner and the Commissioner 
of Lands. While government officials benefited from illegal acquisition and 
allocation of government land to themselves and their close associates, 
coastal communities that were in dire need of re-settlement were excluded. 
Unfortunately, local residents, for example, in Lamu, were not aware of the extent 
of government land in their areas.202
230. In Taita Taveta District, many coastal families and communities settled, at 
independence, on what they believed to be government land, hoping that 
the government would officially re-settle them on it. However, in 1972, the 
Greek Criticos family, in partnership with the then President Kenyatta himself, 
acquired the land to establish sisal plantations, leaving many families living on 
the land as ‘squatters’. A letter from Basil Criticos, a senior member of the family, 
dated 25 November 2011 indicates that the Criticos family, alone, owned 30 000 
acres of land next to a bigger parcel of land owned by the Kenyatta family.203 
This meant no one could construct a permanent building or enclose land to 
signify exclusive occupation and/or use, generating another source of long-
running conflicts over access to, ownership and use of land involving not only 
the Taita and other coastal communities, but those from upcountry who had 
settled on large farms as farm workers. 
231. Apparently over time, especially between 1996 and 2003, the Criticos family 
offered a substantial proportion of the 30,000 acres of land to the government 
for purchase at low rate of only KSh600 per acre to settle landless squatters. 
However, after acquiring the land, the government, in its usual style of irregularity, 
began to settle people from upcountry, especially the Kamba and not the coastal 
communities that the land was meant for.204 The Criticos family further offered 
to sell land at concessionary rates to landless communities from the Coast and 
from upcountry, including those from Nyanza who had settled on the land as 
farm workers but the family’s efforts were thwarted by the government which, 
through the provincial administration, forcibly evicted the Criticos family from 
the whole parcel of land and began to irregularly settle people on it.205 By 2008, 
202  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p. 4.
203  Letter from Hon. Basil Criticos dated 25th November 2011, at pages 1- 3 (Copy with the TJRC).
204  Letter from Hon. Basil Criticos dated 25th November 2011, at pages 1 & 2 (Copy with the TJRC).
205  Letter from Hon. Basil Criticos dated 25th November 2011, at pages 2 & 3 (Copy with the TJRC).
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the Criticos family’s efforts to give up a large portion of the land for re-settlement 
of the landless appears to have been completely disrupted, to a halt, as a result if 
illegal dealings with the land on orders of the then President, supplemented by 
support of the local MP and the Ministry of Lands and Settlement.206 However, the 
Commission could not independently verify these allegations from independent 
sources.
232. In addition, the following parcels of land belonging to the government were 
illegally acquired, mostly by key government officials and subsequently sold to 
private individuals or private and public entities: Plot No. L.R. 16121 measuring 
2.5 hectares in Shimoni, Kwale, was illegally acquired by Ali Korane, former 
District Commissioner in the KANU government and later Permanent Secretary 
in the NARC government. Korane subsequently sold the land, through Rahole 
Enterprises, to the Kenya Ports Authority (KPA) for KSh8 million.207 Harry Mutuma 
Kathurima illegally acquired plot No. L.R. 9093 in Malindi, measuring 7.0 hectares 
and subsequently sold the land for KSh12 million.208 In the same manner, the 
late Sharriff Nassir, then an MP, illegally acquired land title number Mombasa/
Block 1/ 1682, measuring 2.78 hectares in Mtongwe creek, Mainland South and 
subsequently sold it for Sh10 million. The same politician also illegally acquired 
land title number Mombasa/Block v/1614 in Kibarani, Mainland North and sold it 
for KSh6 million.209
233. While individuals with connections to the government were personally acquiring 
land illegally, others established companies through which land was siphoned 
from the public domain. A case in point involves Winworld Limited, which 
illegally acquired land title number  Mombasa/Block 111/528 in Kilifi/Takaungu 
(Mainland North), measuring 173 hectares. It subsequently sold the land for 
KSh150 million.210 Erastus Muthamia Kiara also illegally acquired land title number 
Mombasa/Block v/ 1683 in Mombasa, Mainland North, which he subsequently 
sold for KSh1.2 million.211 While people, mainly government officials and their 
associates, acquired land for speculative purposes and subsequently sold 
it, making huge profits, indigenous individuals and families at the Coast who 
had been living on the land were evicted and in most cases, left landless and 
destitute while the affluent, some of whom were politicians, expected to protect 
their interests, enriched themselves.
206  See, page 3 of Letter from Hon. Basil Criticos dated 25th November 2011(Copy with the TJRC).
207  Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002) at page 95.
208  Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002) at page 95.
209  Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002) at page 95.
210  Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002) at page 95.
211  Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002) at page 95.
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	 Irregularities involving protected wildlife area lands
234. Apart from the numerous cases of illegal allocation of government land at the Coast, 
there have been cases involving establishment of protected wildlife area on lands 
occupied by local communities as their homelands since the pre-independence 
period. Affected areas include those over which Kiunga Marine National Reserve 
and Dundori National Reserve were established. It was stated that prior to the 
establishment of Kiunga Marine National Reserve in 1979, local communities had 
lived on Kiwayu Island for decades, as their homeland. However, when the Kenya 
Wildlife Service (KWS) was establishing a marine reserve on the land, it did not 
consider that it was the people’s homeland and evicted community members 
without providing them with alternative land. Upon eviction, community members 
sheltered at the Dundori National Reserve, but they were evicted from there also.212
235. Chances of affected communities recovering their land in the areas aforementioned 
was diminished when KWS irregularly permitted foreign investors to acquire title 
deeds to lands from which communities were evicted from the island and to 
establish large tourist hotels while continually harassing community members, 
making it impossible for them to even cultivate land and earn a living from it.213 
Moreover, community members have been denied resource rights to the gazetted 
reserve despite their having lived in the reserve for long; for example, community 
members lived in the temporary shelter in Dundori National Reserve. Community 
members consider that by so doing, the Kenya government has applied double 
standards by allowing foreigners and people from upcountry, based on their 
ethnicity, to gain financial benefits from land previously theirs, while failing to 
recognize indigenous people’s land rights. To affected communities, this is a gross 
violation of the provisions of the new Constitution.214
	 Outright land grabbing
236. Coast people emphasize that the biggest problem there is land and that the problem 
has persisted since Kenya attained independence.215 Coast people maintain that in 
1963, at the time Kenya attained independence and the Coastal Strip became part 
of it, some land was released by the Sultan of Zanzibar and the agreement then 
between the Sultan and Jomo Kenyatta, then Prime Minister, was that the land would 
be given back to the rightful owners immediately after independence. However, this 
did not happen for reasons that were never explained to the coastal people.216
212  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p. 4.
213  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p. 4.
214  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p. 4.
215  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kwale/ 23 January 2012/ p. 11.
216  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kwale/ 23 January 2012/ p. 11.
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237. As time went on, demand for land at the Coast rose with growth of the tourism 
industry which attracted both local and foreign investors to the coast.217 However, 
instead of re-settling local communities and issuing them with title deeds for 
their land to allow them to trade freely with investors, the government left 
them to continue living on their land as ‘squatters’ and exposed them to loss of 
land through land grabbing by both local and foreign investors. In many cases, 
investors from upcountry took advantage of settlement exercises meant for 
coastal communities to acquire land for themselves, for their own settlement, for 
speculation, for business establishment and for subsequent sale to other local 
and foreign investors.218 In many cases, people from outside of the coastal region 
also outrightly took land belonging to coastal families and communities without 
compensation.
238. The process of land grabbing at the Coast increased in the early 1970s and was 
perpetrated by the then president himself, who is stated to have issued a decree 
barring the sale and other transactions involving all beach plots without his 
permission.219 It was argued that his objective was to control the lands and direct 
their transactions in his favour, through irregular land transactions that were 
overseen by the then Coast Provincial Commissioner Eliud Mahihu. On behalf of 
the president, it was Eliud Mahihu who decided who could and who could not 
acquire beach plots, of the people scrambling for the same from upcountry.220
239. In time, the then president, through Mahihu, allocated a lot of land at the 
beach and in other parts of the coast in Likoni, Waitiki Farm, Casalak in Diani, 
Msambweni and Lunga Lunga, among others, to himself, members of his 
family, his relatives and friends. Other people in his government including 
politicians, provincial commissioners and foreign investors also grabbed land 
at the expense of coastal families and communities.221 Affected people recalled, 
for example, that Msambweni land was given to Kinyanjui, the Casalak land 
was given to then minister Darius Mbela and the one in Waitiki was given to 
Kenyatta’s relatives.222 
217  The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government 
Printer 5.
218  The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government 
Printer 5.
219  There was a Presidential Edict issued by Jomo Kenyatta over the sale of beach plots. No one was allowed to buy any of them 
without his personal permission or his right hand man, Eliud Mahihu, the long serving powerful Provincial Commissioner for Coast 
Province. He presided over the allocation of beach plots to himself, Kenyatta family and prominent people in government and 
private sector. See also Daily Nation, Business Daily, 12 and 13 November 2009, online edition.
220  See, See also Daily Nation, Business Daily, 12 and 13 November 2009, online edition.
221  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kwale/ 23 January 2012/ p. 11. The same sentiments were reiterated by other witnesses who 
testified before the TJRC at the coast.
222  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kwale/ 23 January 2012/ p. 11.
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240. There are also cases where coastal families were forcibly evicted, just to pave way 
for occupation by people from upcountry. For example, after independence, the 
following villages that were occupied by the Bajuni as their homelands were 
destroyed - Kiunga, Kishakani, Funambai, Vibondeni, Ashwei and Materoni. The Bajuni 
were, in the process, displaced without any form of compensation or assistance and 
have, over the years, been rendered poor and destitute. As a result, members of the 
community strongly feel that they were better off when they were under the colonial 
government than during the post-colonial period because during the colonial 
period, they had their own villages, were farming and exporting crops and had no 
problems of the nature that they have experienced as a result of landlessness.223 
241. Due to land grabbing and resultant landlessness and destitution at the Coast, 
the numbers of coastal communities has reduced, while that of invaders from 
upcountry has steadily risen. For example, the indigenous Bajuni have either been 
displaced or outnumbered by immigrants and thus they have become a minority 
in their own homeland. As a consequence of their numerical strengths, immigrants 
from upcountry also began to exercise political influence, with their civic and 
parliamentary candidates contesting in the elections. This in itself created fear 
and suspicion between the local host community and the immigrants. As a result 
of this scenario, the region continued to experience ethnic tensions and conflicts 
during the electioneering period. 
242. The kind of blatant land grabbing described by affected community members left 
many of them poor and without education because they have no means to afford 
it. Admittedly, land grabbing has angered Coast people, the majority being jobless, 
uneducated and poor youth. The volatile situation created that threatens to result 
in violent conflicts was described as follows:
They took our land and this brought about a lot of bitterness. The young people found 
themselves without jobs. Moi’s government continued dishing out land as reward to 
councilors and MPs. You would find a councilor from Duruma selling land in Digo land 
and that brought a lot of enmity among the people. That is why the coastal community 
feels that all people from upcountry are bad because all their land has been given 
free of charge to people from upcountry. A councillor is given a beach plot and he 
then sells it and buys a nice car yet the people do not have anything... the majority of 
the youth are annoyed because they are supposed to be employed somewhere and 
contribute economically, but they were denied that right. That is why the young men 
are easily bribed because they are unemployed and their rights have been given to 
other people.224
223  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p. 42 and 44.
224  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kwale/ 23 January 2012/ p. 11.
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243. Evidently, the problem of land grabbing continued after Kenyatta’s administration, 
leaving the coastal people in perpetual poverty. In addition to individuals and 
groups of individuals who obtained land irregularly at the Coast through key 
officials in both the Kenyatta and Moi administrations, there were cases involving 
private individuals and corporate bodies acting on their own, in collusion with 
local authority officials. In Tana River where most of the land is communal land, 
many rich people have managed to acquire land and title deeds therefore, while 
indigenous communities living there and their families have no titles.225 
244. The situation was worse on Manda Island where the then PC Mahihu took the 
opportunity between 1974 and 1976, using his junior officers, DCs and chiefs 
to forcefully acquire land on Manda Island from local people. In the process six 
people were killed who, together with their families, lost their right to the property 
they possessed on the island and all the developments they were undertaking 
thereon.226
245. The abuse of state office to aid private individuals to gain land from coastal 
communities without consultation, compensation or mitigation extended to 
ecologically-sensitive areas including fish landing areas in Kiwayu, Mkokoni, 
Manda Island, Manda Toto, Tenewi among other areas that have been grabbed by 
renowned politicians and their cronies. The practice threatens the local peoples’ 
livelihood as well as ecological sustainability in affected areas.227
246. In addition, there are areas that are still regarded as government land at the Coast, 
without clear delineation, including large areas in Tana River. Some of the land in 
the area is considered as community land but the boundaries are not clear to local 
communities. Lack of clear delineation or designation of such areas has allowed 
rich and influential people to acquire land and related title deeds while members 
of the local indigenous communities do not have title deeds.228 Therefore, 
community members demand that land adjudication should be conducted in 
every area, especially in Tana River where very few people have title deeds. They 
also demand that the government ensures that everyone at the Coast, including 
the Tana River area, has access to land in accordance with the new constitution to 
prevent upcountry people from coming to the areas any time to claim land. They 
also demand that families who lost their members due to forceful evictions from 
their land in affected areas be compensated.229
225  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kwale/ 23 January 2012/ p. 4.
226  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kwale/ 23 January 2012/ p. 4.
227  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kwale/ 23 January 2012/ p. 4.
228  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kwale/ 23 January 2012/ p. 4.
229  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kwale/ 23 January 2012/ p. 4.
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247. Although a large number of people from outside the coastal area were quick to 
illegally acquire land at the expense of coastal communities, many of the illegal 
landowners there have held land for speculative purposes and as such they have 
not put land into actual use as they wait for the value to appreciate. This has not 
only reduced land available for resettlement of landless people, but has also 
contributed to cases of unutilized or under-utilized land in the region. In some 
cases, landowners do not live on the farms, accounting for the many cases of 
absentee landowners in the region. In the meantime, indigenous communities 
rendered landless by land grabbers ‘squat’ on the farms where they constantly face 
evictions. Some have also, in the quest for justice, been engaged in endless court 
battles as those claiming to be landowners seek to evict them from their land.230 
	 Irregular acquisition of Tiwi and Diani trust lands
 At independence, the Trust Lands Ordinance passed by the colonial government 
to establish trust land for the benefit of African communities was adopted, with 
little changes, as the Trust Lands Act. Both the Act and the constitution (both 
the independence and the subsequently adopted constitution) provided not just 
for establishment of trust lands, but also for their administration by respective 
county councils, utilization by respective communities collectively and, in, any 
unlikely event, alienation for public purposes, but strictly in accordance with the 
law.
248. Disposal of trust lands to individuals and the issuance of individual titles to trust 
lands are authorized by section 116 of the Constitution. The relevant section 
provides that:
A county council may, in such manner, and subject to such condition as may be 
prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament, request that any law to which this section 
applies shall apply to an area of trust land vested in that county council, and when the 
title to any parcel of land within that area is registered under any such law otherwise 
than in the name of the county council, it shall cease to be trust land.
249. This authorization does not indicate exactly which law the section applies to, or the 
considerations a county council should make before proceeding to deal with trust 
land in a manner that eventually causes it to cease to be trust land. Therefore, we 
look to the other statutes governing trust lands for clarification on the procedures for 
disposing of trust lands to private individuals. The statute with relevant provisions in 
this regards is the Land Adjudication Act. Section 3 of the Act states that:
230  The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government 
Printer 5.
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The Minister may, by order apply this Act to any area of Trust land if-
(a) the county council in whom the land is vested requests; and
(b) the Minister considers it expedient that the rights and interests of 
persons in the land should be ascertained and registered;…231
250. The law proceeds to specify steps in the adjudication process. First, the Land 
Adjudication Act is applied to the area in question. In light of section 116 of the 
Constitution, the above provision constitutes the first requirement in the process 
of alienating trusts lands to private individuals resident therein.  It requires a county 
council in whom the land has been vested to request the minister for the time 
being responsible for matters concerning land to apply the Land Adjudication Act 
to the area intended to be alienated. If, upon receiving such a request, the minister 
considers that it is expedient for the rights and interests of persons living on the land 
to be ascertained and registered, he issues a legal notice of the application of Cap 
284 to the area of trust land in question in the Kenya Gazette. The remainder of the 
process leading to the issuance of private individuals with titles to portions of trust 
land (which thereupon, ceases to be trust land) is governed by the Land Adjudication 
Act (unless a recording of existing rights had not been completed and certified, in 
which case, the Land Consolidation Act is applied to accomplish it, before the process 
of adjudication proceeds).232
251. The Land Consolidation Act provides for the following procedures to be gone 
through before any portion of trust land is registered in the name of an individual 
person or other body: 
	 establishment of an adjudication for purposes of ascertainment and recording 
of interests, or to establish several adjudication sections within the adjudication 
area,233 
	 publication of notice in respect of each adjudication section defining the 
area of adjudication section be defined as clearly as possible and issuing a 
declaration to residents that interests in land within the adjudication section 
will be ascertained and recorded in accordance with Cap 284, 
	 fixing of a period within which a person claiming an interest in land within 
the adjudication section must make his claim to the recording officer, either in 
writing or in person or by agent (any person making a claim may be required 
to point out to the demarcation officer or to demarcate, or to assist in the 
231  Land Consolidation Act, Cap 284, section 3(1)(a) & (b).
232  Land Adjudication Act, Cap. 284, Sections 3(1) (c) & section 16.
233  Adjudication Act, Cap 284, Section 5(1).
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demarcation of the boundaries of the land in which he claims to have an 
interest. 
252. Such person may also clear any boundaries demarcated by a demarcation officer, 
conducting a survey and demarcation of parcels of land for persons therein and 
preparation of a demarcation map showing every parcel of land identified by a 
distinguishing number.234 
253. If in the process of conducting the foregoing activities, an act is done, an omission 
made, or a decision given by a survey officer, demarcation officer or a recording officer 
that is objectionable to any resident of the adjudication section, if there are two or more 
conflicting claims or if there is an objection to the adjudication register, the aggrieved 
party is authorized to bring the matter before an adjudication officer, an adjudication 
committee or arbitration board established under the Act.235 These bodies must be 
comprised of residents if the adjudication area, and not by persons with pecuniary or 
personal interest in the land in question, or in the adjudication process.236 
254. Subsequently, forms for every parcel of land is prepared for every parcel of land 
shown on the demarcation map (in duplicate) (which may be land belonging to 
an individual, or to a group).237 These forms, together, comprise an adjudication 
record.238 Each form is required to contain the number of a parcel as shown on the 
demarcation map and its approximate area, the name and description of the owner, 
year and number of gazette notice setting apart land and purpose for setting apart. 
In cases of land set apart, it must indicate the fact that land is in the ownership of 
a county council and remains trust land, in cases of land entirely free from private 
rights or all rights have been relinquished in favour of a county council. There 
should also be an indication that any person or group is entitled to any interest in 
land not amounting to ownership (including any lease, right of occupation, charge 
or other encumbrance including those recognized under customary law). It should 
indicate joint or ownership in common, where two or more persons are recorded 
as owners of land.239 The law allows correction of errors in the adjudication record. 
Finally, the original adjudication register must be available for inspection by any 
interested person.
234 Land Adjudication Act, Cap 284, section 16.
235 Cap 284, section 6, 7, 8, 21, 22.
236 Cap 284, section 8.
237 Cap 284, section 19.
238 Cap 284, section 23.
239 Cap 284, section 23. Where a group is recorded as the owner of land or as entitled to an interest not amounting to ownership of land, 
the adjudication officer is authorized and required to cause the group to be advised to apply for group representatives to be incorporated 
under the Land (Group Representatives) Act, Cap 287; cause the recording officer to record that the group has so been advised and 
notify the Registrar of Group Representatives that the group has been so advised. See section 23(5).
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255. Clearly, there were ample and elaborate provisions of law to guide dealings 
with trust land countrywide in order to ensure that beneficiaries of the lands 
do not suffer injustices related to their acquisition, ownership and utilization. 
However, in blatant breach of the law, the Kenyatta and Moi administrations as 
well as county councils entrusted with the lands for the benefit of communities 
irregularly excised and allocated parcels therefrom and had the parcels registered 
in their names and that of their cronies, friends and family members. A case in 
point is the Tiwi trust land.
256. The Tiwi trust land was established for the benefit of coastal communities before 
independence. In 1936 after the 1st World War, the British government rewarded 
those who fought on their side with land at Tiwi. Each of the beneficiaries was 
allocated two acres. The remaining land in the area was established as Tiwi and 
Diani trust lands. Although both trust lands were not demarcated, members of 
local communities used them in common for a variety of purposes including 
grazing. 
257. However, in 1972 members of the local communities were evicted when a  private 
individual unlawfully alienated 250 acres of the land to himself.240 
258. Other trust lands that suffered a similar fate were those in Shimba Hills and Kwale, 
where settlement schemes were established to settle some 3,000 people from 
upcountry. The local Digo and the county council were hostile to permanent land 
rights of the people, who included many of the Kamba community. Therefore, 
at independence, Kwale County Council took over the scheme as trust land and 
leased it to the settlers for 33 years. Although the move left the upcountry people 
with no title deeds and therefore no security for loans, their presence in the 
area created instances of conflicts between upcountry settlers and indigenous 
peoples.
	 Fraudulent acquisition of Mazrui trust land in Takaungu, Kilifi
259. Evidently, fraudulent acquisition of trust lands exceeded those established 
under the Trust Lands Act and the old constitution. Illegal acquisition of trust 
lands extended to those established by private trusts and wakfs (Islamic trusts, 
like the Mazrui wakf land at Takaungu. The trust was established under the 
Wakf Commissioners Act, Cap 109 of the Laws of Kenya over land measuring 2 
741 acres, registered under the Land Titles Act as Number 409.241 The wakf was 
240 Testimony of Mr Salim Ali Toza, Oral submissions made to the truth, justice and reconciliation commission held on Monday 23rd 
January, 2012, at the Kwale County Council Hall, at 37.
241  Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002) at 144.
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established for the benefit of certain known beneficiaries. However, in 1989, 
Parliament enacted the Mazrui Trust Repeal Act, which purported to convert 
the land into either government or trust land under the Trust Lands Act. Instead 
of preserving the land for the intended beneficiaries under the Act, the area 
was subsequently declared an adjudication area,242 an illegal because the wakf 
was private land. 
260. It is recommended that the declaration that the area is an adjudication area be 
revoked as a matter of urgency and the land reverted to the intended Mazrui 
beneficiaries. Any title that has resulted from adjudication of the area should 
similarly be revoked and the land restored to the trust.  If, for any reason, the 
land or part of it is necessary for settlement of the landless at the Coast, the 
government, through the National Land Commission, should negotiate with 
the beneficiaries of the trust for land purchase or free donation from the 
beneficiaries.
	 Failure of illegal settlement schemes at the Coast
261. Since Kenya’s independence, settlement schemes at the Coast have been 
fraught with irregularities and outright discrimination of landless coastal 
communities. Settlement schemes at the Coast are occupied mainly by 
upcountry communities.  As a result, many members of coastal communities 
who lost their land during colonialism remain landless, poor and, in many 
cases, destitute, their means of livelihood having been forcefully taken away, 
as described below.
	 Illegal settlement scheme in Magarini
262. In the Magarini Settlement Scheme, for example, malpractices abound. Settlement 
officers sidelined the intended landless coastal community beneficiaries and instead 
of allocating to them land for settlement, facilitated their eviction from the scheme 
and replaced them with persons from upcountry.243 Discussions over land allocations 
in the scheme held in Parliament revealed that “senior government officials listed 
their constituents and friends and recommended them to be given plots by the 
settlement officers.”244 However, despite the revelation, no official action has ever 
been taken to correct the situation.
242  Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002) at 145.
243  K Kanyinga, ‘Politics and struggles for access to land: “Grants from above” and “squatters” in coastal Kenya’ (1998) The European 
Journal of Development Research 57.
244  K Kanyinga, ‘Politics and struggles for access to land: “Grants from above” and “squatters” in coastal Kenya’ (1998) The European 
Journal of Development Research 57.
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	 Illegal Settlement Schemes in Lamu
263. The unprocedural manner of establishing settlement schemes at the Coast, 
especially during Kenyatta’s era, was reflected in many other areas than Magarini.245 
In Lamu, Kenyatta’s administration, in the 1970s embarked on implementing what 
appeared, on the surface, to be a policy of re-distribution of settlement schemes in 
the area now falling under Lamu County were established in a dubious manner as 
numerous former coastal land owners were not informed or compensated for their 
land that was appropriated for resettlement.246 
264. In the end, the proportion of the indigenous coastal community members settled 
was much lower- between 15 and 20 per cent only, than that of members of 
communities from up country.247 To make matters worse, some of the members of 
coastal communities who received letters of allotment had their land subsequently 
illegally misappropriated from them despite their having paid all the fees 
demanded for allotment to the Ministry of Lands.248
	 Failed Baraka settlement schemes
265. During the 1960s and 1970s, several Baraka Settlement Schemes were established 
at the Coast to provide land for about 5,000 members of coastal communities 
that had been rendered squatters when their land was taken away, first, by Arabs 
and subsequently, by the British. However, only a small number of the landless 
was settled in Kilifi. In Lamu District where a larger settlement programme was 
implemented, supported by aid from Germany, 10 000 members of the Kikuyu 
community were settled between 1969 and 1979, including ex-Mau Mau soldiers. 
The irregular move raised the population of the Kikuyu to 20 percent in the 
district.249 
	 Failure to consult with affected communities
266. Regarding construction of a new port in Lamu, coastal communities blame the 
government for having known that the port would be built there as early as 
1965, but failed to consult with affected communities; having settled people 
from upcountry on part of the land on which the port would be built to make 
them beneficiaries of compensation; having settled some coastal communities on 
land meant for the port without re-settling them before port construction work 
began. The coastal communities further claim that the government designated 
245  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January, 2012/4. 
246  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January, 2012/4.  
247  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January, 2012/4.  
248  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January, 2012/4.  
249  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January, 2012/4. 
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a lot of community ranches as land on which the port would be built without 
compensating communities and finding them alternative land and failing to 
consult with potentially affected coastal communities over construction of the 
port.250 
267. It is stated that Lamu Port, currently under construction, is being established 
on a number of community ranches measuring a total of 85,000 hectares. They 
included Galana Ranch, the biggest, Majengo Ranch measuring 12,000 hectares, 
Umoja Ranch measuring 5,000 hectares, a ranch now registered as Abothei Limited 
measuring 7,000 hectares, Mongone Ranch measuring 10,000 hectares and a 
proposed ranch measuring 8,000 acres which is currently Magogoni Settlement 
Scheme.251
268. The problem is that although local coastal communities were living on the land 
later established as ranches, people from up country were brought in 1972 and 
settled in the areas in which the ranches were established for their benefit.252 
In the process of their settlement, coastal families that were living on the land 
were displaced, As a result, it is the people brought in from up country who have 
benefited economically from the land over the years. Thus historical injustice was 
planned.253
269. Further, communities living in areas around the port that is currently being 
constructed at Lamu assert that one of the ranches in the area, namely: Enkamani 
Ranch belonged to their forefathers and was occupied by them. However, the 
head of Kenya Navy illegally acquired it and subsequently advertised its sale on 
the internet for the sum 2 million Euros on 2nd November 2009. Therefore, the 
person who illegally acquired the land stands to profit immensely from its sale at 
the expense of local community members without any compensation.254
270. It is maintained that there has not been any historical injustice worse than what 
we Lamu people experienced because they were evicted at independence and 
people from up country brought in and settled on their land.  Further, on 25th 
December 1963, the then President Kenyatta ordered people in areas from Witu 
to Mashakani to give up their firearms only for them to be subjected to Shifta 
activities followed by torture by GSU and now, Lamu Port is being constructed 
on their land without consultation or compensation. People have lost their 
250  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January, 2012/p.16; TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January, 2012/4.
251  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January, 2012/p.16; TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January, 2012/4.
252  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/9 January, 2012/p.4.
253  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January, 2012/p. 3, 30 & 32.
254  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/9 January, 2012/p. 30.
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Abubakar Kuchi taking oath before testifying on Lamu land issues in Kilifi
livelihood as a result if the government decision to construct a new port there 
but, they ask, where is the compensation? Why were they not consulted? What 
other means of livelihood will they get, having lost their homelands, pasture 
lands and fishing areas?255
271. It is claimed that the government itself has misused its power to procure 
land in Magongoni and other areas under the pretext of public use while 
poorly compensating those concerned. The government is accused of having 
misinformed communities in the area that the land was to be used for a Navy 
Base in 1965.  Only recently did they find out that a port is to be constructed in 
the area. Moreover, the majority of Kenyans from outside of the coastal region 
were settled in Hindi Magogoni area now meant for the port and they were issued 
with title deeds. They now stand to benefit from compensation while affected 
coastal communities in the same area that have lived on the land for over 300 
years do not.256
255 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/9 January, 2012/p.7.
256  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/9 January, 2012/4.
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272. Further, a rush by upcountry people to develop the area around the new 
port to enhance its activities and open up transport to Ethiopia, is likely 
to cut deeper into indigenous communities’ lands but the government has 
not made provisions for compensation or re-settlement of communities 
and families likely to be affected.257 When upcountry people come, they 
manage to quickly obtain title deeds, while indigenous people living there have 
been trying to obtain the same for years. So upcountry people “…laugh at us and 
say we are just sleeping around…”258 
273. Considering the prevailing volatile situation generated by the development of 
the Lamu Port and related activities, indigenous coastal communities did not 
conceal their urge on the government to take action quickly to avert looming 
conflict. In their own expression, the government needs to:
take a step before there is loss of life because we hear that people from other places are 
fighting each other but we have not fought. We know that a monkey is cowardly but 
when cornered, it can finish you. So we are like monkeys; we are cowardly but one day-
-- We are pleading with this Commission to take a step and ensure that the marginalized 
and minorities – the Boni, Bajuni and Somali - get their rights. Since the Constitution was 
changed, there is individual land and community land and government land. We were 
hoping that this would be so but the Constitution is being disregarded. Even regarding 
the port land, we cannot get compensation because we do not have documents. Do you 
think that is right? Will that not bring war? The war after independence was not because 
of elections results; people were just bitter from before and it is the same thing we are 
seeing here. This will later bring problems and will mess up the peace in the area. If you 
keep on trampling upon people, one day they will look for a knife and injure you in the 
stomach.259
Obviously, the root causes of land-related violent clashes are preventable, if only the 
government could take practical steps to meaningfully address them.
	 Incomplete land adjudication, consolidation and registration 
274. Although the Land Adjudication Act, the Registration of Titles Act and other 
enabling laws were passed to facilitate land adjudication in the whole country, 
certain areas, especially at the Coast, were left out, thus perpetuating landlessness 
and vulnerability of coastal lands to the phenomenon of land grabbing.
275. To date, land adjudication and registration have not been initiated or concluded in 
large areas including Mombasa, Malindi, Taita, Taveta, Kwale and Malindi. In many 
257  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/9 January, 2012/p.4.
258  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/9 January, 2012/p.16.
259  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/9 January, 2012/p.16.
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places, local people live on land claimed to belong to the government without 
clear designation of the status of the land. In other places, people live on either 
communal land or ancestral land that could be recognized as communal of trust 
land but without any title deed or ascertainment of their rights in the first place. 
The resulting problems have been explained by an affected person as follows:
I would like the government to take steps to make sure that everybody has the right 
of accessing land. Adjudication should be done in every area, especially in Tana River 
where very few people have title deeds. Any rich person seems to be able to get 
title deeds. Most of the land is community land. When you go down, we border the 
Tharaka people. The land belongs to the government and anybody can come in and 
claim it at any time; these people have no way of claiming this land. So, I would like 
the government to ensure that everybody gets their own area according to the new 
Constitution. Most of the people from this community who were evicted died, but 
their children are still there. I would like these people to be compensated.260 
276. Failure to adjudicate and register land at the Coast is not just the main reason for 
the widespread squatter in the region; it has also, for very many years, exposed 
coastal communities’ land to land grabbers, especially from mainland Kenya 
and foreigners. The problem has been made worse by the growing commercial 
value of land for tourist development and the government’s decision to make 
grants of coastal land suitable for tourism, often in areas already occupied by the 
Mijikenda, resulting in mass evictions and subsequent conflicts.
277. No doubt, the constant unpredictable eviction of indigenous communities in the 
region has made it impossible for them to engage in any meaningful development 
activities, rendering many poor and destitute. The anger and frustration that the 
situation has engendered, which is a key recipe for violence is elaborated in the 
following testimony from a Lamu resident:
Why is it that we are not Kenyans? We are human beings! We could get angry later. We 
are old now but the youth will not accept the injustice to go on forever. When the war 
starts, you will start wondering why the conflict has broken out but that is because 
somebody has gone to Nairobi and managed to get ownership documents.261 
278. For reasons which have never been explained, the process of land adjudication 
at the Coast and in surrounding areas has been slow and often done in favour 
of the immigrants who ended up having land title deeds at the expense of local 
communities. The selective application of land laws in Lamu, Kwale and Tana 
River districts, among other places, has been the source of ethnic suspicion, 
tension and conflicts between the locals and the immigrants. 
260  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/9 January, 2012/p. 13.
261  Testimony of Mr Ali Gubo Baldo, Oral Submissions Made To the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Held on Monday, 
9th January, 2012, at Mkunguni, Lamu Fort, Lamu, at 16.
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Illegal Land Acquisition in Mainland Kenya during 
the Post-Independence Period
279. By the time Kenya attained independence in 1963, the British colonial administration 
had established a new system of land tenure, based on a number of laws which 
were adopted by independent Kenya at independence. In the newly-introduced 
land tenure, ownership of land would be (and still is) signified and evidenced by 
ownership of title to land. Therefore, ownership of title to land provided (and still 
provides) a strong basis for access to and use of land such that if any person owned 
land but did not have title to it, such ownership would not be recognized in law 
and in practice, unless the area in question was one pending land adjudication, 
consolidation and registration or was considered trust land. The process of issuing 
titles to land was also governed by law. 
280. However, customary tenure continued to operate among African communities, 
alongside official tenure. In customary tenure, members of a tribe/community 
or family acquired rights to use land and to pass it on (transmitted it) to their 
descendants without any formal procedure of conveyance. In the tenure systems 
operating at independence, three main categories of land emerged - government 
(including local authority land), trust land/community land and private land. The 
three categories of land were governed by specific pieces of legislation in terms 
of acquisition, ownership and disposal.262 This section begins by presenting key 
features/provisions of the laws governing land transactions, namely: acquisition, 
ownership and disposal to provide basis for understanding the extent of non-
compliance with the laws, which rendered related transactions irregular and illegal, 
with attendant consequences on peaceful co-existence of the people of Kenya.
Government land
281. At independence, the land laws adopted introduced various regimes for issuing 
titles to land, depending on the type of land. Therefore, included in this section is 
an examination of the procedures for issuing titles to each of the categories of land 
separately, beginning with government land. What was considered as government 
land becomes necessary to analyse in this section for a number of reasons. First, 
262  At independence, the Kenya government inherited the following ordinances with very slight amendments: the Crown Lands 
Ordinance (renamed Government Lands Act, Cap 280 laws of Kenya), the Trust Lands Ordinance (renamed the Trust Land Act, 
Cap. 288), the Registration of titles ordinance (renamed the Registration of Titles Act, Cap 281), the Survey Ordinance (renamed 
the Survey Act, Cap 299), the Land Titles Ordinance (renamed the Land Titles Act), The Land Consolidation Ordinance (renamed 
the Land Consolidation Act, cap 283); and the Registration of Documents Ordinance (renamed the Registration of Documents 
Act, cap 285). In addition, the following statutes were enacted to govern transactions in land: The Registered Land Act, Cap 300, 
1963 [which was intended to replace the Registration (Special Areas) Ordinance; The Land Planning Act of 1968 (repealed); The 
Sectional Properties Act of 1987; and the Physical Planning Act of 1986. 
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there were large numbers of landless people who occupied land designated as 
government land, in the hope that since the land belonged to government, they 
would not be evicted from the land or, eventually, they would be settled thereon. 
283. Secondly, any unauthorised activity involving government land was likely to expose 
dependent communities and families to landlessness, poverty and destitution 
and therefore, such activities were and still are likely to attract resistance, 
including violence. Third, in later years of independence, public lands included 
public amenities such as schools, hospitals, beach access routes and children’s 
playgrounds for the benefit of the public and therefore any illegal dealing with 
such land would and did, in many cases, attract violent reactions from the public. 
Law governing government land
284. For purposes of the Government Lands Act,263 government lands are land (for 
the time being) vested in the government by virtue of section 204 and 205 of 
the Constitution, as contained in schedule 2 of the Kenya Independence Order–
in-Council of 1963, and sections 21, 22, 25 and 26 of the Constitution of Kenya 
(Amendment) Act of 1964.264 
285. The Kenya Independence Order-in-Council of 1963 (which came into effect on 11 
June 1963) provides that land vested in the government of Kenya are all estates, 
interests or rights over land situated in Nairobi area that were vested in the 
Queen or Governor; lands registered in the name of the disbanded Trust Lands 
Board and lands situated in regions (provinces) designated by the Governor as 
government land.265 To these, the (former) Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act 
adds all estates, interests and rights in, or over land situated in a former region 
that immediately before the 22 October 1964 were vested in the former regions 
(provinces); all estates and rights in, or over land that immediately before 12 
December 1964 were vested in the Queen of England or the Governor-General on 
behalf of the government of Kenya and lands formerly registered in the name of 
the Trust Land Board under the Land Registration (Special Areas) Ordinance. 
286. It also adds all movable and immovable property and all lands that were, before 
12 December 1964 held by the Governor-General, the government of Kenya, or 
by any person in trust for them; and all immovable property acquired for the 
263  This is implied in the preamble to Cap 280, which states that the Government Lands Act is an Act of parliament to make further 
and better provisions for regulating the leasing and other disposal of government lands, and for other purposes. The original intent/
objective of the Act (ordinance) to enable the Commissioner of Lands to set aside land for alienation to European settlers for 
commercial and agricultural developments seem to have been retained.
264  The Government  Lands Act, Chapter 280, Laws of Kenya 1984 (Rev. Ed., 1972), section 2
265  The Kenya (Independence) Order-in-Council, Section 3(1)- (3) [1963].
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use of regions and former regions.266 In effect, these refer to lands that are not 
trust lands and have neither been alienated to private bodies (lands not privately 
owned), nor currently owned by public authorities, including ‘Forest Areas’. 
287. The foregoing provisions do not provide a clear and full picture of what forms 
government lands. Other sources indicate other categories of government 
land including remnants of land in the City of Nairobi and Mombasa that were 
acquired for town planning purposes but were never used therefore;267 forest 
reserves; other government reserves; lands within townships and other urban 
centers; alienated government lands (for example, lands in the City of Nairobi 
that have been leased for 1999 years with reversionary interest in the state); 
unalienated government lands; and national parks.268 
288. It is noted with concern that government lands for purposes of the Government 
Lands Act may not necessarily include all land owned by the government. 
Land owned by the government includes land owned by the government 
for government use, for example, because it is a chief ’s office, or provincial 
commissioner’s office or residence, or land owned by the government by virtue 
of its reservation by the government for specific purposes, such as the protection 
of flora and fauna therein. The substantive law (statute) governing government 
lands is the Government Lands Act, Cap 280, which, as already noted, was 
derived from the colonial Crown Lands Ordinance of 1915, with only minimal 
amendments. The Government Lands Act is both a substantive and procedural 
statute with respect to government lands and provides for both administration 
and conveyance of government lands. In addition, the Registration of Titles Act, 
Cap 281, and the Registered Land Act, Cap 300, may apply in certain cases. 
289. The Act, now repealed, provides that all conveyances, leases, and licenses of, or 
for the occupation of government lands are to be done, subject to the provisions 
of the Act.269 Statutes governing other lands owned by the government, such as 
the Forests Act and the Wildlife (Management and Conservation) Act also establish 
requirements and procedures for disposal and issuance of title to those other 
government lands. 
290. The issuance of titles to government lands is a step subsequent to the alienation 
and disposal of the lands. The latter steps are also governed by the law, which 
266  The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act No. 28 of 1964, sections 21, 22, 25 & 26.
267  See the list of the functions of the Commissioner of Lands with respect to government lands shows that government lands include 
remnants of land in the City of Nairobi and Mombasa that were acquired for town planning purposes but were not used therefore, 
section 3, Cap 280.
268  The Principal Registrar of Government Lands has a list of government lands.
269  The Government Lands Act, Cap 280, 1982 (Revised Edition, 1962), Section 4.
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specifies that with respect to government lands, all of the procedures subsequent 
to alienation must be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Act 
itself.270 Therefore, in the process of examining the actual procedures for issuing 
titles to government lands, procedures for alienation (disposal) of government 
lands will be considered first. 
291. The key point is that the validity of titles issued with respect to government lands 
depend on the validity of procedures followed in disposing of the lands. Where 
procedures prescribed by the Act are not followed, any titles subsequently issued 
are irregular.
292. For purposes of disposal of government lands under Cap 280 (which leads to the 
issuance of title to government lands), government lands may be divided into 
two categories - town plots and agricultural land.271 For both categories of lands, 
Cap 280 provided for alienation and disposal primarily by grants of land to various 
recipients for a variety of purposes; by leases of town plots and agricultural lands 
for specified periods of time; and by sale of agricultural land, thereby conferring 
freehold (absolute) titles thereto to a beneficiary.272 
293. The only criterion to be met prior to disposal of government lands was that the 
lands were available, meaning that they were not, at the time of proposed sale 
lease or grant, needed or required for government purposes, or that land was 
required for purposes of a municipality (in cases of applications by municipalities 
for land grants). In the absence of proper criterion for disposal, there are dangers 
with the exercise of the Commissioner of Lands of the President’s discretion with 
respect to disposal of government lands. 
Procedures for disposal of government lands by way of grants
294. The Governments Land Act authorised the president to make grants of any 
estate, interest, or right over unalienated government land. The Act does not 
prescribe the circumstances under which grants may be made. By these powers, 
grants of land may be made for religious, charitable or sports purposes; for town 
planning exchanges on recommendation of the town planning authority of 
Nairobi; and for the use of local authorities for municipal or district purposes (for 
office accommodation, town halls, public parks, fire stations, etc).
270  Section 4, Cap 280.
271  See Sections 4, 7, 9 & 19 of Cap 280.
272  See sections 4, 7, 9 & 19 of Cap 280. Mortgages and temporary occupational licenses may also be granted on government lands 
but these may not require the issuance of titles thereof. There are also cases where government land may be disposed of by court 
order. See section 106.
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295. Any grants of land are to be made in accordance with the provisions of Cap 280 
and subject to any other written law. Cap 280 does not prescribe requirements 
for the exercise of the power to grant land, and lacks provisions, which say, for 
example, that land grants are to be made upon application by an interested party, 
and only if the president, or the Commissioner is satisfied that the purposes for 
which the land is required are valid. In practice, applications for land grants may be 
made, for example by the City Council of Nairobi to the Commissioner of Lands and 
it is usual for applicants to state the purposes for which land grants are needed. 
296. However, there are no requirements for verification of purpose statements and Cap 
280 did. There was also no clear government policy on government land grants. 
The foretasted omissions notwithstanding, where the Commissioner decided to 
grant land located within an urban area (a town), the Act authorised the President 
or the Commissioner to specify conditions for grant. However, conditions have so 
far not been effected for grants of land in urban areas. In addition to any conditions 
that may be created by the President, or Commissioner, the Act contains implied 
covenants against sub-division, assignment, and sub-letting, unless prior written 
consent of the Commissioner is obtained. 
297. In practice, where a grant of land is made, the steps are as follows: Valuation of 
land for purposes of determining rent;273 Issuance of a letter of allotment; and 
conveyance and registration thereof. The Act required that all transactions with 
respect to government lands be registered in the Government Lands Registration 
Offices in Nairobi and Mombasa (or in the registration districts within which the 
land is located, in case of land located outside of Nairobi and Mombasa.274Prior to 
registration, the Act required that conveyance documents be properly executed 
by both parties - the Commissioner on behalf of the government, and the grantee, 
but the Act does not specify what kind of document is to be executed.275 It is 
presumed that a grant or a letter of allotment in one form or another would be 
prepared by the Commissioner, stating that land has been granted to a person or 
body, and then delivered to that person or body for execution. In practice, leases 
and transfers have been prepared, depending on the statute under which the 
government land in question was subsequently registered. 
298. Upon execution, the original conveyance document and two copies thereof are 
delivered by the Commissioner to the Principal Registrar of Government Lands 
for registration.276 The statute provides that registration shall be effected by the 
273  GLA, Cap 280, section 18.
274  See Part X Cap 280.
275  Section 7 of Cap 280 authorizes the Commissioner to execute conveyance documents on behalf of the government.
276  Sections 94 and 95.
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Registrar by binding (filing) a copy of the conveyance document delivered to 
him in the Register of Government Lands and entering an abstract or note of the 
document in a part of the volume of the register that relates to the land affected 
by the document.277 He is also required to indicate the number of the volume 
and folio of the document on the filed photostat copy and to make and sign 
an endorsement on the original of the document registered and the filed copy. 
Finally, the original document, which is the document of title, is delivered to the 
grantee.278Cap 280 did not describe or name the document of title to be issued 
to a grantee at the end of the registration process but the standard application 
for registration form appearing in the subsidiary legislation under the Act (Form I) 
suggests that it would be a certificate of title. 
299. Further, the Registration of Titles Act, Cap 281, which applied to certain government 
lands, stated that title to land comprised in a grant was evidenced by the issuance 
of a certificate of title thereof.279 In practice, certificates of title have been issued 
conferring leasehold as well as freehold titles to government lands, including 
lands within townships, pursuant to applications for land grants. In many cases, 
land grants were further sold, sub-leased, or sub-divided with prior consent of the 
Commissioner of Lands. It is emphasized that any title issued for government land 
grants without following, or in breach of the procedures stipulated under Cap 280 
was an irregularly issued title.
Disposal of government lands by leases
300. In addition to issuing grants of land for various purposes, Cap 280, the substantive 
and procedural law then governing government lands, authorised disposal of 
government lands(unalienated plots within township and agricultural lands) 
through leases. The only requirement was that the lands were available, that is, the 
lands were not, at the time of proposed lease, required for government purposes. 
The procedure for disposal of the lands through leases culminated in the issuance 
of titles to the lands bearing a leasehold interest for a term of years, or a freehold 
interest. The procedures for issuing leasehold titles to government lands within 
townships and those within agricultural areas entailed procedures for alienation 
and disposal, and had to be in conformity with Cap 280.280 The procedures were: 
	Availability of unalienated government lands: The first procedural requirement 
was availability of government land within a township, (that is; availability of 
a town plot belonging to the government, for example, because it remained 
277  Sections 95, 97 & 118.
278  Sections 95, 97, 118 & 119.
279  Se sections 21, 22 & 23 of the Registration of Titles Act, Cap 281.
280  Section 4.
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unsold in previous auctions), or within an agricultural area that was not 
required for public purposes.281 
	The Commissioner’s exercise of the power to cause the lands to be sold: 
The next requirement was that in exercise of powers conferred on him with 
respect to such lands, the Commissioner caused such lands to be disposed 
of in the manner prescribed by the Act.282  
	Establishment of an “up-set” price: Once surveys and divisions of urban plots 
and agricultural lands were completed, the Act required the Commissioner 
to establish an “up-set” price at which leases were to be sold. He could 
also establish building conditions and special covenants to be inserted in 
leases, but this is not mandatory. 
	Establishment of lease periods: In addition, he was required to establish  
the periods into which the lease terms were to be divided (for not more 
than 100 years in case of town plots and 999 years for farm plots)283 and 
establish the annual rent to be paid in respect of each period.
	Advertisement of availability of government lands and proposed sale by 
public auction: The next step was for the Commissioner to advertise the 
availability of town and agricultural plots for sale by public auction in 
the Kenya Gazette, indicating the up-set price and other terms of sale. In 
addition, the notice of sale was required to indicate the number of plots 
available, the area of each plot and their location, the amount of survey 
fees required, the cost of deeds for each plot, and the time and place where 
the plan of each farm could be inspected.284 The statute authorised the 
Commissioner to carry out all of these tasks alone, without any requirement 
for consultation with other concerned parties or an advisory body.
	Informing bidders of the terms and conditions of sale: Further the statute 
required that before the commencement of sales at public auctions, 
bidders be informed of the terms and conditions of sale.285  Every sale of 
leases carried implied covenants and restrictions against sub-division of 
plots, assignment, sub-letting, or use not specified in the lease, except with 
the written consent of the Commissioner.286 Bidders were required to be 
made aware of these conditions.
281  Sections 9 & 19 of Cap 280.
282  Section 9, Cap 280.
283  Sections 10 & 27 (2), Cap 280.
284  Section 13, 20 & 21.
285  Cap 280, sections 14, 15, 22 & 23.
286  Section 18 & 39.
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	Sale by public auction: The Commissioner was required to dispose of 
government lands through sale by public auction. Before a public auction 
was held (or before some other mode of sale was adopted, if the President 
so directed as authorised under section 12 of the Act), lands available within 
urban areas were to be divided into plots suitable for the construction of 
buildings for business or residential purposes.287 An auction would ensure 
the government gets the best price; transparency in the process; and would 
ensure equity between members of the public.
	Sale to the highest bidder: The Commissioner was also required to ensure 
that sales of government lands were made to the highest bidder.288 The 
Commissioner was also charged with ensuring that the highest bidder paid 
the deposit and the balance of the purchase money, rent, stamp duty and 
fees for preparation and registration of lease within seven days of the date 
of the auction.289 The Commissioner was also the recipient of payments 
and the statute did not specify an account or fund into which purchase 
moneys were to be deposited immediately after auctions. If payments were 
not made in time, within a month of the date of auction, the purchaser lost 
the right to lease and the deposit was forfeited.290 This latter provision was 
unconscionable. It failed to take into consideration various genuine factors 
that may hinder a purchaser from completing payments within one month 
of the date of auction. At least, deposit of the purchase price should be 
refunded if a purchaser loses the lease.
	Preparation of conveyance documents: Subsequent to the foregoing 
procedures, the Commissioner prepared a lease of town plot or agricultural 
land, which he executed on behalf of the government, then presents to the 
leasee for execution.
	Registration of title: The registration requirements under Part X formed 
the last stage of the procedures for issuance of titles in respect of leases 
of government lands. Once a lease was prepared and executed by both 
Commissioner and lessee, the Commissioner was required to deliver the 
lease to the Principal Registrar, with a copy thereof.291 The lease had to 
clearly describe the property affected thereby and its boundaries and 
situation. It had also to indicate a reference to the volume and folio of the 
register in which the property has been previously registered, or a reference 
287  Section 9.
288  Sections 14, 15, 22 & 23.
289  Section 10 & 16.
290  See sections 16, 17 & 26.
291  Section 95.
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to the lease from the government relating to the land affected by the 
transaction.292 Registration was effected by filing a photostat copy of the 
document accepted for registration, and by entering an abstract or note of 
the document in a part of the volume of the register of government lands 
relating to the leased land. The filed photocopy had to bear the number 
of the volume and folio in which the sale was registered and the date of 
registration. Immediately thereafter, the Registrar signed an endorsement 
on the registered document and on the photocopy and delivered the 
original to the leasee.293 In practice, a certificate of lease is issued to signify 
ownership of a leasehold interest in government lands.294 
Disposal through sale of freehold interest in land
301. Cap 280 allowed disposal of freehold interest in government lands - town plots 
and agricultural lands in two basic ways - by failing to stipulate that only leases of 
government plots in urban areas could be sold, and by expressly authorising the 
sale of freehold interests in the government’s agricultural lands. Section 12 which 
provided for sale of government urban plots merely said that “leases of town plots 
shall, unless the President otherwise orders in any particular case or cases, be sold 
by auction.” 
302. Similarly, with regard to agricultural lands, the statute provided that “leases of 
farms shall, unless the President otherwise orders in any particular case or cases, 
be sold by auction.”295 There was nothing in the Act to stop sales of town plots and 
agricultural lands otherwise than by sale of leases thereof. There was nothing that 
says, for example, that only leases for a term of years shall be issued on government 
town plots and agricultural lands. 
303. It is thought that in practice, freehold titles may have been conferred upon 
disposal of urban plots and agricultural lands in addition to leaseholds. Regarding 
agricultural lands, the statute made express provisions for the issuance of freehold 
titles upon sale.296 Section 20 (1) provided that “when agricultural land is available 
for leasing, it may be sold by auction after giving notice of sale on the gazette.” 
Section 20(2) (d) went further to provide that in the notices of auction: 
292  Section 97.
293  Section 118 & 119.
294 In addition to leases issued through this procedure, Cap 280 authorizes leases of government lands to be granted for “special 
purposes” by the Commissioner, with the president’s approval (Part V), but it does not define what special purposes are, or any 
special procedure for applying for such leases.
295  Section 20.
296  See section 20(2)(d).
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the Commissioner shall state the annual rent to be paid for each farm under the lease 
and the capital sum to be paid for a grant of freehold of the land, on due compliance 
with conditions thereof, under section 27
304. This is an indication that freehold titles could be issued for alienated government 
lands, in addition to sale of leases of the lands. 
Other laws governing the issuance of titles to government lands 
305. The laws considered herein include the Forests Act, the Wildlife (Management and 
Conservation) Act and the Local Government Act. The Forests Act297 is the basic 
statute that regulates dealings with lands reserved as forests, or ‘Forest Areas’, 
which are government lands. Regarding alienation of forest lands, section 4 of the 
Act applies. First, it authorises the minister to declare any unalienated government 
land to be a forest and to declare the boundaries of a forest. Secondly, it authorizes 
the minister to alter those boundaries from time to time, and to declare that a forest 
area shall cease to be a forest area.298 Use and occupation of forests is expressly 
authorized, and the minister has the responsibility of making rules therefore.299  
306. One of the statutory requirements for alienation of forest lands is that any 
declaration that a forest area ceases to be a forest area must be preceded by notice 
to that effect in the Kenya Gazette.300  The Act does not specify purposes for which 
forest lands may be alienated, nor does it, or any other statute restrict alienation 
of forest lands for certain purposes only. Nevertheless, the requirement of notice 
in the Kenya Gazette does constitute a procedure that must be followed before any 
alienation takes place and if ignored, any titles issued will be irregular.
307. Similarly, sections 6 and 8 of the Wildlife (Management and Conservation) Act 
provides for the creation wildlife protected areas - game parks, game reserves, 
wildlife sanctuaries, etc, out of private lands, government lands, and trust lands. 
Once protected areas are created, the lands become government lands. Alienation 
of protected areas can be effected under section 8 of the Act which authorizes the 
minister to alter the boundaries of a national park by adding to, or subtracting from 
it. Subtraction from protected areas would constitute alienation for other purposes. 
The Act does not specify procedures for subtraction, or purposes for which 
alienated lands can be devoted. With respect to lands owned by municipalities, 
297  Kenya Forests Act, Cap. 385, Laws of Kenya 1982 (Rev. Ed., 1992).
298  Kenya Forests Act, Cap. 385, Laws of Kenya, section 4 (a)-(c), 1982 (Rev. Ed., 1992. Unalienated government lands are lands 
for the time being vested in the government, which has not been dedicated or set aside for the use of the public and has not been 
declared to be a central forest, or a forest area.
299  Section 15.
300  See section 4.
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including the City Council of Nairobi, the Local Government Act, cap 265, is the 
statute that applies.
308. Lands owned by the local authorities are government land and should have been 
included under the Government Lands Act, but they have not. The relevant section 
of Cap 265 with respect to alienation of local authority lands is section 144, which 
authorizes local authorities to acquire and to hold land for their purposes and 
functions. The same provisions authorize local authorities to sell, grant or lease any 
land which it may possess and which is not required for the purposes for which it was 
acquired or being used, subject to approval by the Minister for Local Government.301 
In addition to these provisions, the City Council of Nairobi has created by-laws that 
require that any sale, lease or grant of lands that they do not need must be approved 
by a resolution of the council. These constitute procedures for issuing titles to lands 
owned by local authorities that must be adhered to in any alienation. Breach of or 
failure to adhere to the provisions in issuing titles gives rise to irregularly issued titles, 
something that is not uncommon with many local authorities.
Procedures for issuing titles to trust lands
309. Previous discussion noted that the phenomenon of the government as an owner 
of land in the region presently Kenya was introduced by the colonial Crown Lands 
Ordinance of 1902. The ordinance declared “all waste and unoccupied land” in the 
Kenya protectorate, ‘Crown’ land. In 1915, the Crown Lands Ordinance re-defined 
the concept of ‘Crown’ land” to include land that was in actual occupation by 
indigenous African communities. Later in 1938, the Crown Lands (Amendment) 
Ordinance of the same year excised native reserves - areas occupied by African 
‘tribes’ from ‘Crown’ lands, thereby designating them trust lands. These were 
subsequently invested in an independent Native Lands Trust Board (NLTB) by 
the Native Lands Trust Ordinance of 1938 (it is not clear whether the lands were 
registered in the name of the NLTB)
310. At independence, the NLTB was abolished and what was left of trust lands vested 
in the County Councils within whose jurisdiction the lands were located to hold 
the lands for the benefits of the ordinary residents therein.302 
311. As will be discussed in detail shortly, the legal regime governing trust lands allow 
for disposal of various interests in trust lands, including freehold interests therein. 
301  Cap 265, section 144 (6).
302  Currently, the following County Councils hold land for the benefit of people ordinarily resident in their areas: Taveta Area Council, 
The Pokot Area Council, Mosop Area Council, Tinderet Area Council, Elgeyo Area Council, Marakwet Area Council, Baringo Area 
Council, Olenguruone Local Council, Mukogodo Area Council, Elgeyo Local Council, and Kuria Local Council. See section 114 (2) 
of the Constitution.
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Upon adjudication and registration, trust land ceases to be trust land.Currently, trust 
lands are basically the remainder of lands that were, in the colonial days, designated 
as native reserves. These lands include former special reserves, temporary special 
reserves, special leasehold areas, special settlement areas, communal reserves, and 
lands situated outside the Nairobi Area as it was at independence in 1964, if the 
freehold title thereof is registered in the name of, or vested in a county council by 
escheat.303
312. An examination of the First Schedule to the Trust Land Lands Act, as in force on 31 
May 1963 (The Trust Lands Ordinance of 1963), which established the boundaries 
of trust lands (then native reserves) reveal that the boundaries were established 
along tribal lines such that the lands comprised the Kikuyu land unit, The Maasai 
land unit, the Kamba land unit, Nandi land unit, Kavirondo land unit, Kipsigis land 
unit, North Pokomo land unit, the Coast land unit, and the Meru land unit. One 
of the challenges currently facing administration and disposal of trust lands is 
that the first schedule to the Trust Lands Ordinance defining their boundaries was 
repealed. This makes it difficult to ascertain the boundaries of trust lands.304 The 
relevant provisions in the Trust Lands Act describe them as certain areas in Kwale 
District, Makueni area in Machakos District, Arthi-Tiva area in Makueni District, 
Lambwe Valley, Sarora Settlement Area in Nandi District, Kaimosi Settlement Area 
in Kakamega, Meru Concessional Area, and others.
313. The legal regime governing trust lands falls into two categories, one dealing with 
the management of trust lands and the other with disposal/alienation of trust 
lands at which the land ceases to be trust land and becomes either government 
land or land privately owned. The substantive and procedural law governing trust 
lands are primarily the Constitution, the Trust Lands Act, the Land Consolidation 
Act and the Land Adjudication Act. The laws define trust lands and provide for their 
administration, management, alienation (disposal) and registration.  In addition, 
the Registered Land Act and the Group Representatives Act apply in certain cases 
of registration of trust lands. Upon adjudication and registration, trust lands cease 
to be trust lands. Besides the statutes, trust lands are, in all respects, subject to “the 
general law that may, from time to time be in force,” unless express provisions are 
made in the statutes to the contrary.305 This implies that trust lands are subject to 
Common Law.
303  Section 114 of the Constitution defines trust lands to include lands that were known before June 1, 1963 as Special Reserves, 
Temporary Special Reserves, Special Leasehold Areas and Special Settlement Areas, and certain areas that were defined under 
the Crown Lands Ordinance. At present, Trust Lands include Lambwe Valley and a few other areas that have not been alienated to 
private individuals.
304  The boundaries of trust lands do not seem to have been surveyed on the ground in the first place.
305  Trust Lands Act, Section 59.
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Administration and management of trust lands
314. Section 115 of the Constitution lays out a framework for the management of trust 
lands. It stipulates that trust lands shall vest in the county councils within whose 
area of jurisdiction the land is situated. This section of the Constitution set out a legal 
framework for the public trust in respect of land - here trust lands.  In this respect, 
the Constitution states that county councils in whom trust lands are vested shall 
hold the land for the benefit of persons ordinarily resident thereon, and to give 
effect to such of their rights, interests, or other benefits in respect of the land as 
may, under the African customary law for the time being in force and applicable 
thereto be vested in any ‘tribe’, group, family, or individual. Only customary rights 
repugnant to written laws are to be disregarded. Having firmly placed the authority 
to manage and regulate trust lands in county councils, the constitutional provisions 
are confused by provisions of the Trust Land Act which give overlapping authority to 
the Commissioner of Lands to administer trust lands “as an agent for the council,” in 
addition to the numerous other functions and powers of the Commissioner.306
315. In administering trust lands as agent for county councils, the Commissioner is 
authorised to perform certain functions relating to issuance of tiles to trust lands. 
He is authorised to exercise on behalf of the council (either in person or though an 
agent) powers of the council to set aside land for public and private purposes; and 
to execute on behalf of the council grants, leases and other documents relating to 
trust lands.307 There is no mandatory requirement that powers of the Commissioner 
be exercised in accordance with any standards, guidelines or rules to ensure that 
the powers are exercised in a way that would allow county councils to manage the 
lands so as to give effect to the interests of people ordinarily resident therein.
316. Having placed the management, control and administration of trust lands in the 
arms of the central government (county councils and the Commissioner), the 
Constitution goes further to provide for alienation/disposal of trust lands. The 
provisions with regard to alienation are buttressed by similar provisions in the 
Trust Lands Act. In addition, the Land Adjudication Act and the Land Consolidation 
Act specify procedures for alienation and disposal of trust lands to both public 
and private bodies. Procedures for issuing titles to trust lands entail procedures for 
their alienation and disposal and are governed by the laws. 
317. In the process of examining these procedures, any existing loopholes in the laws 
will be highlighted and suggestions will be made for necessary changes/measures. 
306  Trust Lands Act, Section 53.
307  Trust Lands Act, section 53 (a) & (b).
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Currently, the legal regime governing trust lands authorises disposal of the lands 
to the government for public purposes; to private individuals; as well as to private 
bodies. In the process, freehold as well as leasehold titles can be issued.
Alienation of trust lands to individuals
318. Disposal of trust lands to individuals and the issuance of individual titles to trust 
lands are authorized by section 116 of the Constitution. The relevant section 
provides that:
A county council may, in such manner, and subject to such condition as may be 
prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament, request that any law to which this section 
applies shall apply to an area of trust land vested in that county council, and when the 
title to any parcel of land within that area is registered under any such law otherwise 
than in the name of the county council, it shall cease to be trust land.
319. This authorization does not indicate exactly which law the section applies to, 
or the considerations a county council should make before proceeding to deal 
with trust land in a manner that eventually causes it to cease to be trust land. 
Therefore, we look to the other statutes governing trust lands for clarification on 
the procedures for disposing of trust lands to private individuals. The statute with 
relevant provisions in this regards is the Land Adjudication Act. Section 3 of the Act 
states that:
The Minister may, by order apply this Act to any area of Trust land if-
(i) the county council in whom the land is vested requests; and
(ii)  the Minister considers it expedient that the rights and interests of persons in 
the land should be ascertained and registered;…308
Steps in the adjudication process
	Application of the Land Adjudication Act to an area: In light of section 116 
of the Constitution, the above provision constitutes the first requirement in 
the process of alienating trusts lands to private individuals resident therein. 
It requires a county council in whom the land has been vested to request 
the minister for the time being responsible for matters concerning land to 
apply the Land Adjudication Act to the area intended to be alienated. If, 
upon receiving such a request, the minister considers that it is expedient 
for the rights and interests of persons living on the land to be ascertained 
308  Land Consolidation Act, Cap 284, section 3(1)(a) & (b).
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and registered, he issues a legal notice of the application of Cap 284 to the 
area of Trust land in question in the Kenya Gazette. The remainder of the 
process leading to the issuance of private individuals with titles to portions 
of trust land (which thereupon, ceases to be trust land) is governed by 
the Land Adjudication Act (unless a recording of existing rights had not 
been completed and certified, in which case, the Land Consolidation Act is 
applied to accomplish it, before the process of adjudication proceeds).309
	Appointment of adjudication officers: The Land Adjudication Act (LAA) 
provides that before the process of adjudication of trust land commences, 
the minister appoints a public officer to be the adjudication officer for the 
adjudication area to which he has authorized the LAA to apply. The statutes 
do not provide any criteria, such as qualifications, experience or personal 
integrity to guide the minister in his appointment of an officer to such a 
crucial task. It goes further to authorize an appointed adjudication officer 
to appoint (subordinate) demarcation, survey and recording officers to 
demarcate, survey and record interests of residents within the adjudication 
area. Additional adjudication officers may be appointed by the minister if 
the situation so requires.
	Establishment of an adjudication section: The next step is for the adjudication 
officer to establish the whole adjudication area as an adjudication section 
for purposes of ascertainment and recording of interests, or to establish 
several adjudication sections within the adjudication area.310 
	Publication of notice: Once an adjudication section is established, the 
Act requires that another notice be published by the adjudication officer 
in respect of each adjudication section and that in the notice; the area 
of adjudication section be defined as clearly as possible; and issue a 
declaration to residents that interests in land within the adjudication 
section will be ascertained and recorded in accordance with Cap 284.
	Fixing of a period for making claims to land: After publication of notice, 
the Act requires adjudication officers to fix a period within which a person 
claiming an interest in land within the adjudication section must make his 
claim to the recording officer either in writing or in person or by agent (there 
is no statutory guidance as to what period of time may be appropriate for 
residents to make their claim of interest); and he may require any person 
making a claim to point out to the demarcation officer or to demarcate, 
309  Land Adjudication Act, Cap. 284, Sections 3(1) (c) & section 16.
310  Adjudication Act, Cap 284, Section 5(1).
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or to assist in the demarcation of the boundaries of the land in which he 
claims to have an interest. Such person may also clear any boundaries 
demarcated by a demarcation officer.
	Conducting a survey and demarcation: Upon completion of the foregoing, 
survey officers are required to carry out a survey of the adjudication area 
or areas and to demarcate parcels of land for persons therein. The Act does 
not indicate whether parcels of land are to be demarcated for each adult 
resident member of the adjudication area, for each family, or for a head 
of a family and this raises serious ownership (including trust and gender) 
issues in relation to registration of interests in trust land. It does provide for 
demarcation of interests of a group of residents.311 
	Preparation of a demarcation map: Upon demarcation, survey officers 
are required to prepare a demarcation map of the adjudication section, 
showing every parcel of land identified by a distinguishing number.312 
In carrying out demarcation of parcels of land, adjudication officers 
are empowered actually to enter upon any land and to summon any 
person to give information regarding boundaries of a parcel or to point 
out boundaries. They may lay out fresh boundaries. If in the process of 
conducting the foregoing activities, an act is done, an omission made, 
or a decision given by a survey officer, demarcation officer or a recording 
officer that is objectionable to any resident of the adjudication section, if 
there are two or more conflicting claims or if there is an objection to the 
adjudication register, the aggrieved party is authorized to bring the matter 
before an adjudication officer, an adjudication committee or arbitration 
board established under the Act.313 These bodies must be comprised of 
residents of the adjudication area, and not by persons with pecuniary or 
personal interest in the land in question, or in the adjudication process.314
	Preparation of forms for every parcel of land: In the process of recording 
of interests and demarcating parcels of land therefore, forms are to 
be prepared for every parcel of land shown on the demarcation map 
(in duplicate) (which may be land belonging to an individual, or to a 
group).315 These forms, together, comprise an adjudication record.316 
Each form is required to contain the number of a parcel as shown on the 
311  Land Adjudication Act, section 18(1) (d).
312  Land Adjudication Act, Cap 284, section 16.
313  Cap 284, section 6, 7, 8, 21, 22.
314  Cap 284, section 8.
315  Cap 284, section 19.
316  Cap 284, section 23.
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demarcation map and its approximate area, the name and description of 
the owner, year and number of the Kenya Gazette notice setting apart 
land and purpose for setting apart, in cases of land set apart; the fact 
that land is in the ownership of a county council and remains trust land, 
in cases of land entirely free from private rights or all rights have been 
relinquished in favour of a county council; and indication that any person 
or group is entitled to any interest in land not amounting to ownership 
(including any lease, right of occupation, charge or other encumbrance 
including those recognized under customary law); and an indication of 
joint or ownership in common, where two or more persons are recorded 
as owners of land.317
	Correction of errors in the adjudication record: Adjudication officers 
are authorized to correct any errors in adjudication records.318 When 
completed, the forms are to be signed by the chairman and executive 
officer of the adjudication committee and by the owner of each interest 
in the parcels of land demarcated. No alterations are to be made after the 
forms are so signed, unless an adjudication officer does so upon objection 
and arbitration, or appeal to the minister.319
	Display of the original adjudication register for inspection: Upon 
completion of the adjudication register, the adjudication officer is required 
to so certify on the adjudication record and map and then deliver the 
duplicate adjudication record (bearing a copy of the certificate) to the 
Director of Land Adjudication; display the original adjudication register 
for inspection at a convenient place within the adjudication section and 
give notice to residents that the adjudication register had been completed 
and may be inspected at a particular place during a period of sixty days 
from the date of the notice.320 Any objections may be raised during the 
period and the adjudication officer is authorized to determine them, 
and to alter the register as he deems necessary. It is curious that the Act 
allows the adjudication officer to recommend compensation to the Minister 
rather than rectification of adjudication records in cases where he “considers 
that altering an adjudication register would incur unreasonable expense, 
delay or inconvenience.”321 The statute does not give any guidance as to 
317 Cap 284, section 23. Where a group is recorded as the owner of land or as entitled to an interest not amounting to ownership of 
land, the adjudication officer is authorized and required to cause the group to be advised to apply for group representatives to be 
incorporated under the Land (Group Representatives) Act, Cap 287; cause the recording officer to record that the group has so 
been advised and notify the Registrar of Group Representatives that the group has been so advised. See section 23(5).
318  Cap 284, section 11
319  Cap 284, section 23(7). The demarcation map and the adjudication record are collectively known as the adjudication register, 
section 24.
320  Cap 284, section 25.
321  Cap 294, section 27(2).
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circumstances under which rectification of the register may be deemed 
as unnecessarily expensive or inconvenient. It also authorizes divesting an 
individual of interests inland without due consideration of the statutory 
requirements for compulsory acquisition of land.
	Presenting adjudication register to Director of Land Adjudication: After 
determination of all objections and appeals, the adjudication officer is 
required to send the adjudication register, along with particulars of all 
determinations and objections to the Director of Land Adjudication. At 
that point, only the director is authorized to make any alterations and then 
certify on the adjudication register and its duplicate that it has become 
final (subject to outstanding appeals) and then forward the register to the 
Chief Land Registrar, together with a list of the appeals.322 Here lies another 
loophole. 
	Certification of the adjudication register: The Act authorizes the Director of 
Land Adjudication to certify that an adjudication register has become final 
so that the Registrar can proceed to register and issue titles to land when 
there are outstanding appeals that might even require overhauling of the 
whole adjudication exercise.
	Registration of titles: Upon receiving the adjudication register, the Chief 
Land Registrar is authorized to cause registrations to be effected in 
accordance with the adjudication register. The Act authorizes registrations 
of lands on which there are outstanding appeals as well, except that 
restrictions are to be placed on them until the appeals are determined.323 
Moreover, it prohibits any person from instituting suits and any courts from 
hearing suits concerning an interest in land in an adjudication section, 
unless that person has first obtained consent of the adjudication officer.324 
This provision defeats all suits that might arise from the conduct of an 
adjudication official with respect to trust lands. Moreover, suits can only 
be filed after the adjudication register has become final, by which time 
interests in land are authorized to be registered, including land on which 
there are outstanding disputes.325
	Issuance of titles: The LAA is a procedural statute providing for ascertainment 
and registration (recording) of individual or group interests in trust lands. It 
does not clearly specify the manner of registration, or the nature of titles to 
322  Cap 284, section 27.
323  Cap 284, section 28.
324  Cap 284, section 30.
325  Cap 284, section 28 & 30.
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be issued with respect to registered (recorded) interests in parcels of trust 
lands. Therefore, we look to the Registered Land Act (RLA), Cap 300, which 
is specifically referred to in Rule 5 of the Land Adjudication Regulations.326 
The RLA, which commenced on September 16, 1963, is an Act of Parliament 
to make further and better provisions for the registration of titles to land, 
and for the regulation of dealings in lands so registered, and for purposes 
connected therewith.327
320. The RLA applies to trust lands by virtue of section 2 thereof, which provides, 
inter alia, that the Act shall apply to any area which immediately before its 
commencement, the Land Registration (Special Areas) Act (Ordinance) applied;328 
any area to which the LAA has been applied for purposes of ascertainment, 
recording and registration of interests in land;329 and to all land which from 
time to time, is set apart under sections 117 and 118 of the Constitution. Under 
section 4, the RLA prevails over any written law that conflicts with its provisions 
(here, with respect to trust lands).330 
321. This leads one to the section of the Act that provides for registration of titles, 
specifically section 32.  Section 32 of the RLA authorizes the Registrar of Titles 
to issue a proprietor of land or lease (if requested by that proprietor) with a title 
deed or a certificate of lease where no certificate of lease or title deed has been 
issued in the prescribed form. The effect of this section is that a proprietor of 
land, whose proprietorship has been evidenced (in the case of rights ascertained 
in trust lands) by the recording of the interests of that person in an adjudication 
register, and by the registration of that interest in the prescribed form, shall be 
issued with a title deed, and in cases of leasehold interests, a certificate of lease 
and that a title deed or certificate of lease shall be the only prima facie evidence 
of ownership of land. The meaning conveyed is that issuance of first registration 
titles to trust lands are to be effected under the RLA.
322. The provision goes further to state that only a title deed or a certificate of 
lease shall be issued in respect of each parcel of land,331 and that a title deed or 
326 The Rule provides that a party to section 29 of the LAA (which provides for appeals to the Minister against determinations made in 
the process of adjudication) are entitled to obtain copies of demarcation maps on payment of fees at the rates prescribed for certified 
copies of registry maps by the Fifth Schedule to the RLA, as well as copies of relevant documents, including the proceedings and 
decisions of committees, boards and adjudication officers in respect of the holdings in dispute.
327 See Preamble to the RLA.
328 These areas were later included in the designation of trust lands.
329 Section 2 of the RLA.
330 Section 4 of the RLA provides that Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no other written law and no practice or procedure relating 
to land shall apply to land registered under this Act, so far as it is inconsistent with this Act: Provided that, except where a contrary 
intention appears, nothing contained in this Act shall be construed as permitting any dealing which is forbidden by the express 
provisions of any other written law requiring the consent or approval of any authority to any dealing.
331  Certificates of lease are issued only if leases are for a period exceeding 25 years.
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certificate of lease shall be the only prima facie evidence of matters of ownership. 
Further, the Act provides that when there is more than one proprietor, the 
proprietors shall agree among themselves as to who shall receive the title deed 
or the certificate of lease,332 yet section the Act also provides that the registration 
of a person as the proprietor of land vests in that person the absolute ownership 
of that land, together with all rights and privileges belonging or appurtenant 
thereto.333
Alienation of trust lands at the instance of the government
323. The procedures for alienation of trust lands at the instance of the government, which 
would lead to the issuance of titles thereof to the government, are established under 
section 118 of the Constitution, and sections 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the TLA.
	The President’s satisfaction: The first statutory requirement in the process 
is that the President be satisfied that the use and occupation of an area of 
trust land for specified purposes, namely: the purposes of the government 
of Kenya; the purposes of a body corporate established by an Act of 
Parliament; the purposes of a company registered under the law relating 
to companies in which shares are held by or on behalf of the government; 
and for purposes of prospecting or extraction of minerals and mineral 
oils.334  The laws do not state exactly how the President gets satisfied 
of the need of land for these purposes and there is no requirement for 
verification of the needs and the suitability of the lands in question for 
the purposes.
	Consultation with respective county councils: Upon satisfaction with 
matters as stated, the laws authorize the President to consult with the 
respective county council and to give them notice that land is required 
for one or more of the specified purposes for the setting apart of land. 
After consultation and notice, land is set apart in the same manner as 
in section 117 of the constitution. The setting apart extinguishes any 
rights, interests and benefits of local residents of the land provided that 
compensation is paid as in cases of compulsory acquisition under section 
75 of the constitution. Payment must be made promptly and in full.
324. Since this setting apart, or alienation of land is to be conducted in a similar manner 
as under section 117 of the constitution, a county council may subject the land in 
332  Section 32(3) of the RLA. Failing agreement, the title deed or certificate is to be filed in the land’s registry.
333  RLA, section 27.
334  The Constitution, section 118(2) (a)-(d).
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question to “any law” for purposes of issuing a grant, or making a disposition of 
some other kind of any estate, interest or right in the land (including leaseholds, 
freeholds and licenses) to the government of Kenya, a body corporate, or any 
other body or person for purposes of prospecting minerals or mineral oils. This 
permits the issuing of a grant, a title deed, a certificate of lease or a license 
to the government or any one or more of ten other bodies and persons upon 
demarcation of land and execution of conveyance documents in respect thereof 
by the Commissioner of Lands on behalf of the government or one or more of the 
listed persons and bodies. 
325. Where lands so conveyed are no longer required for the purposes for which they 
were alienated, the TLA requires that they revert to the respective county council, 
that is; they revert to trust lands.335 There is no authorization for lands no longer 
needed to be disposed of to private individuals and bodies as has been happening 
in some parts of Kenya including Kajiado District and any titles issued in respect 
of land that should have reverted to trust land as provided by law will be irregular 
(unlawful). Similarly, any titles issued without following any aspect of the stipulated 
procedure for alienation of trust land at the instance of the government will be 
irregular.
326. Parties aggrieved by the setting apart or any other dealings with trust lands are 
authorized to seek redress in the High Court, but the provisions regarding law suits 
are contradictory and difficult to reconcile. Section 54 of the TLA prohibits actions 
against the government or its officers for acts done for purposes of carrying out 
the provisions of the Act into effect. Section 58 thereof prohibits appeals from 
any decision given, order made and matters and things done under the Act. Yet 
section 63 of the same Act states that nothing contained in the TLA shall prevent a 
prosecution under any other law, so long as a person is not punished twice for the 
same offence.
How privately-owned lands come into being
327. Consideration of procedures for issuing titles to private lands (or lands privately 
owned) requires a summary of how original titles were/are acquired in the first 
place.As already noted, in the region now Kenya, land was communally and 
customarily owned in pre-colonial societies without any formal titles.  In the 
colonial era, first, all land was ‘Crown’ land and subsequently, trust lands were 
delineated and through tenure reform, large portions of trust lands all over the 
country have been registered in the names of private individuals and private 
335  Trust Land Act, section 119.
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groups of individuals, and land titles signifying ownership thereof issued, these 
being first registrations. It has also been noted that even before this process of 
creation of private land ownership began, white settlers had been allocated titles 
to private lands as early as 1902 (if not earlier). 
328. Colonial legislation, which introduced the idea of private ownership of land and 
post-colonial legislation outline three distinct stages in the process of tenure 
reform - the process leading to the issuance of first registration titles to private 
owners of land. 
	Ascertainment of individual or group interests in land: The first stage 
involves ascertaining individual or group rights under customary tenure. 
Rights were, or are to be determined according to native law and custom 
and with the assistance of adjudication committees constituted from the 
inhabitants of the adjudication sections.
	Consolidation of land: The second stage involves the aggregation of all 
pieces of land over which each individual or group has rights and the 
allocation to the individual or group of a single consolidated piece (that is 
the process of consolidation). 
	Recording of rights in an official register: The last stage involves the entry of 
rights shown in the Record of Existing Rights or Adjudication Register into 
an official Land Register.
	Issuance of title deeds: Entry of rights in an official land register is followed 
by the issuance of a certificate of ownership or a title deed. That is the 
process of registration.
329. Land registration in the trust lands started in 1956 and has been completed in most 
of the regions in the country with high agricultural potential, including Nyanza, 
Western and Central Provinces. In the areas with low agricultural potential where 
pastoralism is predominant, a slightly different registration system with respect 
to trust lands was adopted under the regime of the Land (Group Representatives) 
Act. Under this regime, communal lands were registered into group ranches 
(comprised of smaller units of land) in the names of three to ten members of the 
group for the benefit of all members. In recent years, the group ranches have been 
subjected to sub-division, registration and the issuance of freehold titles thereon 
to individual members, thereby making the lands subject to disposal through sales 
by the owners.
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330. In addition to these, freehold and leasehold titles have been issued upon 
alienation to private individuals and bodies upon alienation of government lands 
as discussed in previous sections. These form the basis of private ownership of land 
in respect of which subsequent titles (of the registered lands) may be issued upon 
sale by owner, sale by chargee (mortgagee) exercising statutory power of sale, by 
transmission (upon death), upon liquidation or winding up of a company, upon 
registration of a land trust, and in pursuance of a court order.
The substantive and procedural law governing privately-owned land
331. The RLA lays down the legal framework that governs registered land.336 The Act 
expressly applies to areas of trust land to which the LAA has been applied, meaning 
that it applies to portions of trust lands alienated to private owners through the 
consolidation, adjudication and registration process already discussed. All dealings 
with registered lands must be in conformity with the RLA and it supersedes any law 
that conflicts with it with regard to registered lands.337
332. One of the key provisions of the RLA with respect to privately-owned land and 
the issuance of titles thereto is that registration of a person as the proprietor of 
land vests in that person the absolute ownership of the land, together with all 
rights and privileges relating thereto. Similarly, the registration of a person as the 
proprietor of a lease vests in that person the leasehold interest described in the 
lease, together with all implied and express rights and privileges relating thereto.338 
Such rights cannot be defeated, save as provided for in the Act, and are to be held 
free from all other claims and interests.339
333. The rights conferred on a registered proprietor of land as foretasted were part 
of a process intended to transform the legal status of registered land from one 
susceptible to multiple customary claims, to individual absolute ownership that 
would secure credit for purposes of development. However, the guaranteed 
rights of a registered proprietor of land have caused considerable confusion and 
insecurity of tenure in many parts of rural Kenya with respect to customary rights 
of family members who entrusted one person to be registered as a proprietor in 
trust for the rest, only for it to turn out that the registered individual had secured 
absolute title.
336  The preamble states that it is an Act of parliament to make better provisions for the registration of titles to land and for the regulation 
of dealings in registered land.
337  Section 4, Cap 300.
338  RLA, section 27.
339  RLA, section 28. The title, if freehold, is however, subject to such leases, charges, conditions and restrictions shown on the 
register, and the rights of compulsory acquisition, but do not include rights of people claiming as beneficiaries of a land held in trust. 
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334. Section 28(b) of the RLA states that nothing contained in the provisions for absolute 
ownership and absolute rights should be taken to relieve a proprietor from any 
duty or obligation to which he is subject as a trustee, but it is mandatory that a 
person be described in the register as holding land as a (customary) trustee.340 
Moreover, customary interests over land are not among the overriding interests 
that the RLA recognises.341 These provisions have caused considerable difficulty of 
interpretation, particularly with respect to the effects of registration on customary 
property rights and interests. 
335. In the confusion surrounding tenure reform, land is still regarded largely as a 
communal (family/clan) asset. The predominant belief is that registration did not 
oust family or clan title, especially where a family or clan member was registered 
as proprietor with the understanding that he would hold for the benefit of all 
others, but changed his mind once absolute title is issued. This has led to the 
filing of many land cases in various courts across the country and increased 
disputes and litigation with regard to land, challenging registered title on the 
basis that the registered land is former family or clan land. In the court, the legal 
provisions have given rise to two interpretations in the High Court, which is yet 
to be resolved. 
336. One of the views is that registration of a person as an absolute proprietor 
extinguishes all customary rights and interests,342 the only exceptions being 
overriding interests and beneficial interests under a trust. The position here is 
that customary rights and interests if not noted in the register are consequently 
extinguished since they are not overriding interests within the meaning of the Act. 
337. The Court of Appeal has advanced this view further by holding that once land is 
registered, not only are customary rights extinguished, but customary property 
law is also, by the fact of registration, ousted by statute and Common Law.343 Given 
the history and objectives of the tenure reform in Kenya, this would be the correct 
interpretation under the law. However, a minority opinion in the High Court that 
has found favour in the Court of Appeal asserts that in settling disputes arising out 
of land registration, the vital consideration is to determine the capacity in which 
the “absolute proprietor” was registered.344 If in the capacity of a trustee, then 
he or she must be called upon to perform the obligation inherent in that status. 
340  This was the holding in the case of Mwangi Muguthu vs. Maina Muguthu, HCCC No. 377 of 1968.
341  See section 30 of the RLA.
342  This was the position in the case of Selah Obiero vs. Orego Opiyo [1972] E.A. 227.
343  See the case of Belinda Murai & Ors vs. Amos Wainaina, C.A No. 46 of 1977.
344  The view was advanced in the cases of Mwangi Muguthu vs. Maina Muguthu, H.C.C.C. No. 377 of 1968; Samuel Thata Micheck 
& Ors vs. Priscilla Wambui & Another, H.C.C.C. No. 1400 of 1973; Edward Limuli vs. Marko Sabayi, H.C.C.C. No. 22 of 1978; Alan 
Kiama vs. Ndiya Mudhunya & Others, C.A. No. 42 of 1978.
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This position ought to be supported by law to redress cases where family or clan 
members were disinherited by registration of clan or family land in the name of an 
individual.
338. Land problems are compounded by provisions of the RLA that authorise 
rectification of the register of titles, amendments and cancellation of titles where 
the registrar is satisfied that registration was obtained, made or omitted by fraud 
or mistake, but prohibits rectification of a first registration.345 This has allowed 
people who intentionally defrauded relatives and clan members of their land to 
acquire and remain in possession of absolute titles thereto .346
339. The RLA also prohibits rectification of registration that would affect the title of a 
proprietor who is in possession of land, having acquired the land, lease or charge 
for valuable consideration, unless he had knowledge of the omission, fraud, or 
mistake in consequence of which rectification is sought. It is not clear whether 
knowledge on the part of a purchaser that warrants rectification is actual or 
constructive. What is clear is that lack of clarification creates room for one to 
insist that knowledge must be actual. It has also given rise to many cases where 
people purchase land with full knowledge of fraud, mistake and/or omission but 
take cover under these provisions and insist that they had no actual knowledge. 
After all,
 
 No person dealing or proposing to deal for valuable consideration with a proprietor 
shall be required or in any way concerned- 
(a) to inquire or ascertain in or the consideration for which that proprietor or 
any previous proprietor was registered; or
(b) to see to the application of any consideration or any part thereof; or
to search any register kept under  the land Registration (Special Areas) Act, the 
Government Lands Act, the Land Titles Act or the Registration of Titles Act…
340. In the interest of justice, knowledge should be both actual and constructive 
(covering even cases where a party negligently fails to find out details about a 
particular title), to make it possible for registers to be rectified and titles cancelled 
where a title holder ought to have known of fraud, mistake or omission.
  
345  RLA, section 143.
346  This was the case in Selah Obiero V. Orego Opiyo (1972) E.A. 227 in which the court ruled that the title fraudulently obtained was 
indefeasible because it was a first registration.
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Issuance of title to registered land
(i) Upon sale by a proprietor
341. Sale transaction: Section 27 of the RLA provides that registration of a person 
as proprietor of land - here first registration vests in that person the absolute 
ownership together with all rights and privileges belonging or appurtenant 
thereto. These rights and privileges include the right to sell, charge (mortgage) or 
convey land as a gift.
342. Registration of transfer: Upon sale, ownership passes to a new owner (proprietor/
purchaser) and a new title is issued to the purchaser.  The RLA, the Land Control 
Act, the Government Lands Act and other laws regulate sale of registered land 
and provides, first and foremost that transactions in respect of registered lands 
shall be conducted in accordance with its provisions. The procedure for (voluntary) 
sale leading to the issuance of title to a purchaser requires that: an agreement for 
sale be entered into between a proprietor and a purchaser347 and that rules and 
conditions developed by the Law Society of Kenya and the minister be adhered to.
343. The procedure also requires that in cases of agricultural land, consent to transfer of 
the respective Land Control Board must be obtained; that the subject land be free 
from encumbrances including cautions and caveats and that where land is charged 
or mortgaged, consent of the chargee or mortgagee to transfer be obtained.
344. Further, it requires that in case of leases from the government, prior written consent 
to transfer must be obtained from the Commissioner of Lands; that transfer be 
effected by an instrument (a transfer form) in the prescribed form and that all land 
rents, rates and all outgoings due to local authorities be paid in advance. Stamp 
duty must be paid to the Commissioner of Lands as assessed and instruments 
of disposition (transfer forms) executed by the person shown by the register of 
lands to be the proprietor of the interest affected and the purchaser. Executions of 
parties to a sale transaction must be verified (attested) and the transfer instrument 
registered by the Registrar of Lands making an entry in the register of lands in 
respect of the subject land.348 
345. Issuance of a title deed or certificate of lease: After registration, the purchaser or 
transferee is issued with a title deed or a certificate of lease (in case of transfer or 
sale of lease for a period of more than 25 years).349 The RLA provides that a title 
347  A proprietor is defined as the person named in the register as the proprietor thereof (in case of leases) and, in relation to a charge of 
land or lease, the person named in the register of the land or lease as person in whose favour the charge is made.
348  See, among others, section 85 of the RLA.
349  RLA, section 32.
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deed or certificate of lease shall be the only prima facie evidence of ownership.350 If 
any of the stipulated procedures is not followed, but in the end, title is issued, the 
title will have been irregularly issued.
346. It should be noted that in cases of irregularities, although rectification of the 
register and cancellation of titles is authorised in cases where titles are obtained 
by fraud, omission or mistake, under the current legal regime, there is no 
system for the Registrar of Land, or the lands office to deal with cases requiring 
cancellation of titles fraudulently obtained. One has to go to court and seek an 
order for cancellation before the lands registry can act to rectify such a situation. 
The matter is complicated by the difficulty of telling (by the lands office) that 
a title has been obtained by fraud, unless and until evidence is tendered from 
external sources. 
(ii) Issuance of titles pursuant to the exercise of chargee’s power of sale
347. One objective of tenure reform in Kenya was to enable proprietors of land (including 
farmers) to obtain credit for purposes of agricultural and other developments on 
the security of their land. In line with this objective, the RLA accords wide powers 
of ownership including the power to lease, mortgage or charge one’s land.351 In 
case of default in repayment of loans, the RLA accords chargees and morgagees 
wide powers of sale of the charged (mortgaged) property, without first seeking 
any orders for sale from the courts.352 Once the proprietor (debtor) is given notice 
of the chargees’ intention to sell the charged property, the statute authorises sale 
to proceed by public auction for which a reserve price is required to be established 
at the discretion of the chargee exercising the power of sale. There is no statutory 
requirement that charged properties scheduled for auction be valued before 
reserve prices are established.
348. Further, although the statute requires a chargee to have regard to the interest of 
the chargor in exercising the power of sale,353 it authorizes the chargee to concur 
with any person in selling the charged property. It would appear that the statutory 
authority to concur has been interpreted in many cases to include collusion by the 
chargee with anyone to arbitrarily sell charged property without any regard for the 
interests of the chargee. What happens in practice is that in many cases, creditors 
arrange for sale of charged properties upon payment default, without proper notice 
to the chargor, to their employees, friends, and relatives, often at gross undervalue.
350  RLA section 32(2).
351  RLA sections 27, 28, 47, 49 & 66.
352  See RLA, section 74 & 77.
353  RLA, section 77(1).
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349. The situation requires statutory intervention through provisions that would 
allow chargers (property owners) to be involved in establishing a sale price, or to 
challenge sale and to recover their property upon payment of outstanding debts, 
but the RLA provides that a person suffering damage by an irregular exercise of 
the chargee’s power of sale has his remedy in damages only against the person 
exercising the power of sale.354 This forecloses any last-minute effort by chargors 
or their family members to redeem family land (property).
350. Once charged property, be it family agricultural land or a town plot or house is 
sold as authorised, the chargee is authorised to prepare a transfer in favour of the 
purchaser in the prescribed form and thereafter, to effect transfer by executing the 
transfer form as if the owner of land.355 
351. Upon execution of the transfer form by both chargee and purchaser, the form 
is presented for registration and at that point, the law authorises the Registrar 
of Lands to register the transfer in favour of the purchaser, at which point, the 
property passes and vests in the purchaser. Thereupon, the purchaser (transferee) 
is issued with title to the land - a title deed or a certificate of lease to the 
property.356 Once property vests in the new owner, he (the new owner) is freed 
and discharged from all liabilities that might arise on account of the charge, or on 
account of any other encumbrance to which the charge has priority (other than 
a lease, easement or profit to which the chargee had consented in writing).357
352. The exercise of the power of sale as authorised has occasioned great suffering to 
many family members across Kenya in cases where family land used to secure a 
loan by the head of the family or some other person (with consent of the head of 
the family), usually without first consulting with family members. In a lot of cases, 
family members are not even notified of the charge of family property to secure 
a loan. After sale of family land, many families have found themselves landless 
and without any recourse to the law. An attempt has been made in recent years 
to moderate the harshness of the provisions regarding a chargee’s power of sale 
by requiring that in cases of agricultural land, a notice of intention to sell be 
served on the District Commissioner of the area in which the land is situated by 
the chargee.358 Upon receipt of notice, the DC may, at the instance of an affected 
party, petition the High Court to postpone sale for a definite period of time on 
grounds that the sale would result in persons being evicted from the charged 
354  RLA, section 77(3).
355  RLA, section 77 (3). A chargee exercising his power of sale has the same powers and rights as a proprietor, section 77(5).
356  RLA, section 32.
357  RLA, section 77(4).
358  See Act 14 of 1991.
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land, thereby occasioning undue social difficulties, or cause public disorder in 
the neighbourhood. However, such application cannot be made to court if the 
people who would suffer eviction or some other difficulty are the family members 
of the chargor, or the chargor himself. 
353. Therefore, the power of sale of a registered proprietor still has great potential of 
exposing members of a family, among others, to great suffering and of causing 
social disorder. It would be in order for the law to prohibit use of agricultural, or 
family land to secure credit altogether, in the interest of social order and security. 
Some banks and other credit institutions have resolved not to accept agricultural 
land as collateral. In addition to voluntary sales and transfers upon the exercise 
of chargee’s power of sale, the legal regime governing private ownership of land 
(especially the RLA) authorises issuance of land titles to personal representatives, 
administrators of the estate of a deceased person, and to an executor of the will 
of a deceased person by transmission, upon the death of a sole proprietor, upon 
production of grant of letters of administration, grant of probate of the will, 
or grant of summary administration of the estate in favour of, or issued by the 
public trustee.359 
354. Titles to land can also be issued in respect of land owned by a company upon 
winding up or liquidation of the company, in which case, a transfer may be executed 
on behalf of the company by a liquidator, or sealed with the common seal of the 
company and attested by the liquidator.360 A liquidator may also be registered as 
proprietor of land upon the making of a vesting order under section 240 of the 
Companies Act.  
355. In addition, the law permits registration and issuance of land title to a person 
in whose favour a court has made an order of entitlement to land or lease.361 
The kind of evidence of entitlement the registrar should require ought to be 
stipulated by law, instead of leaving it up to the registrar to determine what 
kind of supporting evidence he deems fit to in cases where applications for 
registration pursuant to court orders are made. This is necessary, especially in 
view of rampant forgeries, even of court orders that have been occurring in 
recent years.
359  RLA, section 119.
360  RLA, section 124.
361  RLA, section 125.
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Breaches of the Applicable Provisions of Laws 
Governing Land
Irregularities and illegalities involving government lands
356. Over time, both the substantive and procedural safeguards in the Government 
Lands Act, Cap 280 have been blatantly disregarded as senior government officials, 
their cronies and relatives enrich themselves, at the expense of the public. In 
numerous cases, public land has been in post-independence Kenya, acquired and 
allocated in total disregard of the law, including the public trust doctrine. Instead 
of maintaining government land in various parts of the country for development 
purposes, senior government officials, over the years, intensified illegal transfer of 
land from the public domain to private individuals and entities through practices 
that have become commonly known as land grabbing. The practices, which became 
part of official grand corruption, has diminished government land to a point where 
it has become difficult to find land for public purposes, including establishment of 
government offices that are urgently required to establish regional governments 
in the country.
357. This section of this chapter on land presents a number of cases involving land 
grabbing from the public domain, by private individuals and entities, mostly senior 
government officials. It demonstrates that land allocation through direct grant 
which, in colonial times, succeeded in preserving government land and in ensuring 
justifiable and merited allocation for private purposes, failed in the period after 
independence. After independence, the very system of land grant that succeeded 
in colonial times facilitated massive illegal allocation of government land, largely 
because the government, specifically the president(s) and the Commissioner(s) 
of Land, abandoned a public auction system ingrained in the law and gave 
themselves opportunity to illegally acquire land in ways that amounted to flagrant 
abuse of office. In Kenya, the very officials supposed to be the custodians of public 
land under the public trust doctrine, became the facilitators of illegal allocation 
of the same and thereby, increased landlessness and land scarcity, especially 
of people who were living on government land in the hope that they would be 
resettled there, many of them having lost the same land to the government during 
the colonial period. The practice of land grabbing also, in many cases, resulted in 
violence, as ‘squatters’ on government land expecting to be settled on the land lost 
it to land grabbers.
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	 The case of Karura Forest
358. In 1997, 85 hectares of Karura Forest were illegally excised and allocated to S.K. 
Macharia, Joseph Gilbert Kibe and Ngengi Muigai. The beneficiaries almost 
immediately sold the land, registered as L.R. No. 216/8 to the Kenya Re-Insurance 
Corporation for KSh550 million. Allocation of the land coincided with the 1997 
General Election, creating the impression that public land may have been illegally 
allocated as a political reward.362 It is recommended that all such illegal land 
allocations should be nullified. Land should be repossessed and restored to the 
purpose for which they were reserved, in this case, a forest reserve.
	 The Case of Ngong Forest
359. In the year 2001, land which formed part of Ngong Forest was excised, sub-divided 
into thirty two plots and sold to 13 private companies. The 13 companies, in turn, 
sold the land to the Kenya Pipeline Company for KSh262,388,487.363
	 The Case of Bellevue
360. On unspecified dates, Micah Cheserem, Joshua Kulei and David Komen, all key 
government officials at the time, illegally acquired an undeveloped government 
land in Bellevue, Nairobi, registered as L.R. No. 209/10212, measuring 1.6 hectares. 
They subsequently sold the land to the Kenya Airports Authority for the sum of 
KSh2.6 million in 1985.364
Illegal allocation of land compulsorily acquired for public purposes
361. In addition to illegal acquisition of unalienated government land, land compulsorily 
acquired from individuals and families have been the subject of land grabbing, 
especially by key government officials. Under the Land Acquisition Act (now 
repealed), the government acquired large tracts of land in Nairobi, Mombasa and 
other towns for the construction of road by-passes to ease traffic congestion on 
the main roads. However, in disregard of the provisions of the former constitution 
and the Land Acquisition Act land set aside for road expansion was later 
allocated to private individuals who subsequently sold them to third parties. In 
Nairobi, land previously reserved for by-passes in several areas was allocated to 
Sterora Investment Ltd, Munir M. Chohan, Heron Trading Co., Henry Musamate, 
Maya Consultants Ltd, Lawinex Agencies Ltd, James S. Nyaga, Samuel Kiprono 
362  Report of the Ndung'u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002) at page 83. See, also Report 
of the Ndung'u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002), Annexes, Volume II, Annex 1, page 
6.
363  Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002) at page 93-94.
364  Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002) at page 95.
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Chepkonga, Esther Rotich, Kenneth Wainaina and other current owners.365 In many 
of such areas, violence has broken out as new illegal owners seek to evict ‘squatters’ 
in a bid to develop the land.
Local Authority Involvement in Illegal Land Allocations
362. Local government lands, including houses, have also been subjected to land 
grabbing, especially by local authority officials. In many cases, local authority officials 
have, especially during the Kenyatta and Moi administrations, illegally allocated 
property set aside for public purposes within their jurisdictions to themselves and 
their associates, without obtaining full council approval and without following other 
due procedures of law. A case in point is Woodley Estate in Nairobi. The estate was 
planned as a housing facility, complete with a primary school, playing ground, a 
public garden and a shopping centre for the benefit of City Council staff. However, 
in September 1992, Kuria wa Gathoni, then Director of City Planning, prepared a Part 
Development Plan, changing the user of the open public spaces in the estate into 
residential and other private purposes of a commercial nature. 
363. The Part Development Plan was approved by the then Commissioner of Lands 
Wilson Gachanja, and title deeds for each sub-plot subsequently issued in the 
name of the Council in 1993. In 1994, Zipporah Wandera, then Nairobi town clerk, 
prepared and signed documents transferring some of the public plots to Kuria 
wa Gathoni and companies and individuals related to him, including Ali Mwanzi, 
Andrew Isaac Hayanga, Wilson Chebyegon, Mary Akoth, Tom Koros, John Mwangi, 
and Archman Holdings, among others, who subsequently sold them to current 
owners.366 It is noted that the allocating authority in all the cases involving the 
Woodley property was the Commissioner of Lands. It should be recalled that the 
wanton allocation of Woodley property attracted public protests that resulted in 
the death of at least one person.
364. Illegal allocation of open spaces in estates for public use did not only affect 
Woodley Estate only. It has been a common occurrence affecting many estates and 
their developers in Nairobi and other towns in the country, including Lake View 
Estate in Nairobi. In the housing scheme, as was, in the case of Woodley Estate, 
the City Council of Nairobi required the developer to surrender 10 percent of land 
to be developed for public purposes as a condition for development permission. 
A developer would, as did in this case, surrender the acreage required to the 
government, on trust, for public purposes. 
365  Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002), Annexes, Volume 1, at 
pages 25 - 39.
366  For a full list of original and current allottees, see, Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry Into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation 
of Public Land (2002), Annexes, Volume 1, annexe 5, at pages 49- 85.
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365. However, once surrendered, the plot would not be used for the intended public 
purposes. Instead, certain private companies, mostly associated with government 
officials, individuals and their cronies, would immediately apply to the 
Commissioner of Lands to be allocated the surrendered land. A part development 
plan would subsequently be prepared in respect of the land and submitted to the 
Commissioner of Lands for approval and a letter of allotment would then be issued 
to the applicant(s) upon payment or promise of pay a token sum as standard 
premium.367 In the process of issuing part development plans, the Master Plan for 
the City of Nairobi was completely ignored to facilitate illegal allocation of land 
reserved for public utilities. 
366. Thereupon, the letter of allotment would be used to transfer the unsurveyed 
plot to a third party for millions of shillings by the allottee. The plots would be 
subsequently surveyed and a Grant of Lease made to the third party. In many 
cases, the entire process, from the surrender of the plot to the grant of lease over 
the plot to a third party would take a few months and at times, a number of days. 
As a result, there is hardly any open space in estates in Nairobi.
367. In the case of Lake View Estate, land surrendered by the developer of the estate 
was illegally allocated to four individuals in the manner described above. The 
original title, L.R. No. 2951/80 was held by New Homes Developers Limited. The 
company applied to the Nairobi City Council for consent to develop an estate. 
Consent was granted but on condition that the company surrenders a percentage 
of the land to the government to be used as a public utility. Consequently, the 
company surrendered plot L.R. No. 2951/89 to be used as a public open space. 
In 1992, four individuals, namely: J.K. Chepkwony, Geoffrey Kosgey, Peter Kosgey 
and J. Cheruiyot applied to the Commissioner of Lands to be allocated the plot 
which had been surrendered for public purposes. A part development plan was 
subsequently prepared and the land in question subdivided into three plots. 
Letters of allotment were issued to the applicants who paid a standard premium 
of KSh97,470 for each plot. The allottees then transferred the unsurveyed plots to 
Jitesh Shah and Highland Textile Ltd as co-owners for KSh1.7 million each. Titles 
were subsequently issued to the purchasers.368 
368. As a result of illegal acquisition of plots surrendered by private developers for 
public purposes, there have been battles between estate residents who were 
intended to benefit from the surrendered lands/plots and new illegal owners. 
367  See, findings of the Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002) at page 
79.
368  Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002) at page 80.
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In recent years, political representatives in Nairobi, especially in Eastlands 
have also been involved in public protests against illegal acquisition of open 
spaces reserved for public purposes which, sometimes, result in violence. Illegal 
allocation of public utility lands in estates has also diminished the concept of 
open spaces, with the result that there is hardly any open space for children to 
play and for estate residents to conduct public activities, thus denying many 
of them the right to a clean and healthy environment now incorporated in the 
Constitution.
Illegal alienation of state corporations’ land
369. Many of the 140 state corporations or parastatals have lost land reserved or 
set aside for their use through land grabbing. Due to the nature of functions 
of state corporations, large amounts of land were allocated for their use, thus 
becoming “alienated government land.” However, in total disregard of the law, 
during both Kenyatta and Moi eras, such land was, in many cases, allocated to 
individuals and companies with close ties to senior government officials, largely 
through the schemes of Commissioner(s) of Land. The lands so alienated were 
subsequently sold by allottees to other corporations and private individuals and 
entities for large sums of profit at the expense of the development objectives of 
the corporations and the public that was intended to benefit from their activities. 
370. In every case involving illegal allocation of state corporations’ land, the process 
was initiated by the Commissioner of Lands through correspondence, followed 
by issuance of a letter of allotment of land belonging to a state corporation to 
an individual or private entity, without any consultation with the management 
of the state corporation. In many cases, the managers of state corporations 
were surprised to learn that all or portions of their land had been hived off, 
allocated to private individuals or entities and titles issued therefore. There were 
also cases where illegal alienation of state corporations’ land were triggered by 
illegal surrender of the land by corporations’ management whereupon, the land 
became available for alienation, through allotment, to private or other public 
entities. 
371. Subsequently, allottees would sell the land for large sums of money. The following 
state corporations, among others, lost land in such schemes: the Kenya Railways 
Corporation, Kenya Agricultural Research Institute, Kenya Power and Lighting 
Company, Kenya Airports Authority and Kenya Industrial Estates Ltd.369 In addition 
to alienation of state corporations’ land at the instance of the Commissioner of 
369  For a complete list of state corporations that lost their land through land grabbing, see, Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry 
Into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002), Annexes, Volume 1, Annexe 22 – 39 at pages 449 – 549.
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Lands, state corporations also, in many cases, illegally sold their land at very low 
prices to individuals and entities that ended up selling them to third parties at 
colossal sums of money, thereby making huge profits. An example is the case of 
L.R. No. 209/6439 on Ojijo Road, a prime land which belonged to Kenya Railways 
Corporation. On 31 January 1996, the corporation illegally sold the land to Guardian 
international Ltd for KSh77 million. A few days later, on 8 February of the same year, 
the beneficiary, in turn, sold the land to the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) for 
the sum of KSh178 million.370
Settlement schemes for undeserving people
372. To establish human settlements and address the problem of landlessness 
facing many Kenyans at independence and stimulate agricultural production, 
the government, in both the Kenyatta and Moi administrations, introduced 
settlement schemes countrywide, besides the One Million Acre Scheme and 
others negotiated as part of independence package. The establishment of the 
settlement schemes has been a continuous process since independence. 
373. However, in mainland Kenya, as at the Coast, the main beneficiaries of the 418 
government settlement schemes in both high and low potential areas in mainland 
Kenya, were undeserving individuals, families and communities, especially those 
associated through ethnic affiliation to the two presidents.371 In the period 
immediately after independence, the Settlement Fund Trustees (SFT) was in 
total control of allocation and management of settlement schemes. However, in 
time, its role was diversified among the Ministry of Lands and Settlement and the 
provincial administration. The practice that emerged was that the government 
would set aside land for settlement, which land would, technically, fall under 
the administrative jurisdiction of the SFT. However, actual implementation of a 
settlement programme would be taken up by a District Plot Allocation Committee 
which comprises the DC as chairman, the District Settlement Officer as secretary, 
the local Member of Parliament, the District Agricultural Officer, the chairman of 
the local county council and the clerk to council. The committee of six, and not 
the SFT as was the case in the early days of independence, has wielded enormous 
powers in land allocation processes, with the SFT having no supervisory powers 
over them at all.
374. Left to their own devices, District Plot Allocation committees have, over the 
years, taken into consideration irrelevant and extraneous factors in allocation of 
land in settlement schemes. The committee in almost every case allocated land 
370  Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002), at page 102.
371  Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002), at page 125.
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to totally undeserving people including the official members themselves, their 
relatives, MPs, councillors and prominent politicians in areas where settlement 
schemes were established, Ministry of Lands and Settlement officials, other 
civil servants and individuals with connections to politicians. In the absence of 
accountability, settlement scheme procedures and outcome occasioned abuses 
and poverty and destitution of deserving Kenyans. Numerous irregularities also 
characterised allocation processes in newly-created settlement schemes, thus 
eliciting widespread public outcry and protests from members of the public, like 
in the case of the Kinale Settlement Scheme in Kiambu.
Kinale Settlement Scheme in Kiambu
375. In the scheme, intended for deserving individuals, the total number of plots 
scheduled for allocation to genuine allottees was 1 427. However, a second list 
including undeserving beneficiaries was prepared for 1 526 plots and a third and 
final one for 3 503 plots, without any explanation. To compound the problem, 
the original list of genuine allottees mysteriously disappeared from the records 
of the District Commissioner, Kiambu, who was the chairman of the allocation 
committee. 
376. A Task Force appointed to inquire into irregularities attendant the establishment 
of the scheme concluded that many undeserving people were allocated plots 
in the settlement scheme, while genuine landless were struck off from the 
allocation list.372
Illegal settlement in the Mau Forests
377. With respect to government lands, the issuance of titles to the Ogiek community 
over portions of the Mau Forests provides a good example. Forests or ‘Forest 
Areas’ in Kenya are government lands that have been reserved for purposes 
of protection of the forests and forest catchments, among others. Procedures 
stipulated for alienation of forests or forest areas for whatever purpose, are 
stipulated under the Forests Act, which requires that first, a declaration be made 
by the minister that a forest area shall cease to be a forest area, and secondly, 
that the declaration, which amounts to de-gazettement of the forest or forest 
area (and thereby removes it from legal protection), be published in the Kenya 
Gazette. 
378. In breach of this legal requirement (among others), the government made efforts 
to settle members of the Dorobo, also known as the Ogiek community between 
372  Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002), at page 127.
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1990 and 1993. Available information indicates that the process began when the 
provincial administration, including the local police moved into the forest and 
began allocating areas of the forest to members of the community, without any 
prior notice of intention to do so to the responsible minister, not to mention that 
there had been no publication of a notice that the areas would cease to be forest 
areas in the Kenya Gazette prior to the move. 
379. In the end, some 3 000 households (some sources indicate 3 500 households) 
were allocated portions of the forest (of 5 acres per household), when the 
number of the Dorobo (Ogiek) community that were to be settled was only 1 800. 
Further, although the settlement was intended to provide permanent homes for 
the Dorobo, allottees were issued with temporary occupation licenses. It was not 
until the year 2001 that several forest areas were de-gazzetted by publication 
of notices in the Kenya Gazette, ostensibly to “regularize” some of the previous 
forest excisions, including areas allocated to the Ogiek. However, settlement of 
the community was never finalized, thus exposing the community to further 
evictions. 
380. Further, between 2005 and 2011, the government, in a bid to conserve Mau Forests 
as a water catchment area, evicted the Dorobo from the settlements, prompting 
the community to file a case against the government in the African Commission on 
Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR). The ACHPR ruled against the Government of 
Kenya, directing that the community’s land be restored.
Other settlement schemes illegally established
381. Other settlement schemes that were riddled with irregularities including 
allocation to undeserving individuals, allocation of plots that exceeded 
recommended acreage and allocation of plots in a settlement scheme illegally 
established on government lands such as forests include the Kiboko “B” 
Settlement Scheme in Kibwezi,373 Ndathi, Tinet, Ndoinet, Kapsita-Molo, Kibunja, 
Tinet, Sigotic, and Kapchorwa settlement schemes in various parts of the Rift 
Valley and Central provinces.374 Further, there were settlement schemes illegally 
established in Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC) farms, including 
ADC Tall Trees Settlement Scheme in Nakuru, ADC Zea Settlement scheme, 
ADC Sirikwa in Nakuru, ADC Nyota Complex, ADC Jabali, Moi Ndabi Settlement 
Scheme, Ol Jorai Settlement Scheme and Milimani Settlement Scheme.375 
373  Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002), Annexes, Volume 1, Annex 
53, at pages 876 – 884.
374  Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002), Annexes, Volume 1, Annex 
54, at pages 885 – 886.
375  Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002), Annexes, Volume 1, Annex 
55, at pages 887 – 900.
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382. In all of the cases of settlement in ADC farms, not only were the settlements 
illegal because it was government land; land allocations were made to 
undeserving individuals with connections to government officials, including 
key politicians and, in almost all cases, the acreage allocated exceeded what 
was recommended by far. In some cases, beneficiaries were allocated double of 
the recommended acreage.376 In all of the foregoing cases, settlement schemes 
were established by the offices of the two presidents, outside of the established 
framework, at the personal initiative of the presidents. The mechanism used 
was a presidential directive to the provincial administration to settle specific 
groups of people, mainly members of their ethnic communities, in specified 
areas. No official records were kept detailing the procedures followed in the 
establishment of the schemes, but there was evidence that the due process of 
law was not followed. For example, schemes that were established in gazetted 
forest areas were not preceded with official degazettement of the forests as 
required by law.377
Illegal acquisition of ADC farms
383. The Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC) was established under the 
Agricultural Development Corporation Act, Cap. 444 of the laws of Kenya in 1965, 
with the objective to promote the production of the country’s essential agricultural 
inputs. 
384. The corporation was intended to provide an important link to the agricultural 
industry through specialized activities and services and in that regard, to: 
produce seeds and pedigree and high grade livestock including hybrid maize 
seed; provide agricultural finance by means of loans and undertake such other 
activities as it deemed fit to promote agricultural production in specific areas or 
specified fields of production. 
385. The corporation was expected, with intensified government support, to double 
or even triple its efforts in rendering scientific and productive support to the 
agricultural industry that had long been recognized as Kenya’s economic 
backbone. In that regard, the corporation was expected to acquire more land for 
its activities and had no authority to dispose of government land allocated to it. 
However, like other government entities placed with trust over land for public 
purposes, the corporation became subject of land grabbing.
376  See, Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002), Annexes, Volume 1, 
Annex 55, at pages 887 – 900.
377  See, Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002), at page 132.
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386. Land grabbing avenues were deliberately opened by the unexplained amendment, 
in 1991 of the ADC Act which changed its specific mandate to a general one 
by inserting a new section 12 which stated that the function of the corporation 
shall be to promote and execute schemes for agricultural development and 
reconstruction in Kenya by the initiation, assistance or expansion of agricultural 
undertakings or enterprises.
387. The amendment provided basis for subsequent executive orders for dealings 
with ADC lands in ways that were totally incompatible with its genuine mandate. 
In 1994, an executive order was issued, directing the allocation of eight ADC 
farms to individuals under the guise of settlement schemes to be financed by the 
SFT. Subsequently, the corporation’s farms in various parts of the country were 
sold as political reward or patronage. Others were sold to individuals favoured by 
the Moi and Kenyatta administrations including L.R. No. 9917/9 measuring 5 518 
acres in Machakos (formerly, ASTRA ADC farm) that was allocated to Professor 
Philip Mbithi; L.R. 8466 measuring 893 acres in Uasin Gishu (formerly ADC Edge 
Farm) which was sold to Karuna Units; L.R. 4486 measuring 795 acres in Trans 
Nzoia (formerly ADC Edge Farm) which was sold to V arap Too; L.R. 9069 and 
9062 measuring 149.33 acres in Nakuru (formerly, ADC Avondale farm) which 
was allocated to Njenga Karume; and L.R. 9867 measuring 1 040 acres in Nakuru 
(formerly, ADC Baraka farm).378 
388. These are just a few of the ADC farms that were illegally acquired by private 
individuals and entities, including high-profile government officials.379 Interestingly, 
illegal allocation of ADC farms to politically-connected individuals became the 
subject of investigation by the parliamentary committee on investment following 
the audit of its accounts for the year ending 30 June 1997. 
389. In its findings published in its Eleventh Report, the committee heavily criticized 
allocation of the farms to politically-connected and well-to-do individuals and 
private entities, but fell short of making specific recommendations for revocation 
of titles or nullification of allocations. It is recommended that all ADC farm lands 
that were allocated to government officials, including members of Parliament 
and their families, local authority officials and politically connected individuals 
be annulled, the lands repossessed and restored to the public domain.
378  See, Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002), at page 134 and 135.
379  For a complete list of all illegal allocations of ADC farms, see, Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry Into the Illegal/Irregular 
Allocation of Public Land (2002), Annexes, Volume 1, Annex 55, at pages 887 – 900.
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Illegal Sub-Division and Allocation of Trust Lands
	 Illoodo-ariak adjudication section
390. The case of Illoodo-ariak serves to illustrate the extent of breach of customary 
land rights by deliberate failure to comply with applicable laws. The adjudication 
section is situated in Kajiado District. The Illoodo-ariak land is situated south-west 
of Nairobi, in the district and used to be occupied and utilized in common by over 
six thousand members of the Maasai community. Under the Trust Lands Act and 
the former constitution, the land was designated as trust land and placed with 
Ol Kejuado County Council to hold for and on behalf of the Illkeekonyokie clan 
of the Maasai community who were entitled to occupy, utilize and transmit it to 
succeeding generations, but this was not to be.
391. In 1979, the Illoodo-ariak area was declared an adjudication area under section 
5 of the Land Adjudication Act, but with no indication of any consultation with 
the Maasai owners. Subsequently, land adjudication officials were appointed and 
posted to the area. The process of land adjudication was completed in 1989 and 
an adjudication register was opened for inspection and objections invited within 
a period of 60 days. However, the adjudication process was fraudulent in many 
respects. The names of many government officials, including non-Maasai ones, 
were entered on the adjudication register as owners of the land, making a total of 
362 persons who were not local residents of the area but were recorded as owners 
of the land and issued with title deeds. Many rightful Maasai inhabitants of the 
area were omitted from the register and disinherited from their ancestral land.380 
392. Obviously, the process violated the old constitution but attempts by affected 
inhabitants to seek legal redress were frustrated, especially by the barriers 
presented by section 143(1) of the Registered Land Act (now repealed), which made 
first registrations of land under the law indefeasible, regardless of irregularities. It 
is recommended that in light of enabling provisions of the current Constitution 
and the Land Act of 2012, titles issued to all non-Maasai individuals for land in the 
Illoodo-ariak Adjudication Section should be revoked.
	 Mosiro adjudication section
393. With respect to trust lands, the matters concerning the Mosiro Land Adjudication 
Section in Kajiado District provide a classic case of irregularities involved in the 
issuance of titles to land. These matters appear more elaborately in H.C. Misc. 
380  Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002) at page 141.
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Civil Application No.312 of 1991, James Ndungu Wambua vs. Director of Land 
Adjudication; in James Ndungu Wambua vs. The Republic & Others, Civil Appeal No. 
85 of 1992; and in the Kenya Times of 28 January 1991.381 
394. By Legal Notice Number 137 of 1970, the minister approved the application of 
the Land Adjudication Act to trust land, subsequently defined as the Mosiro 
Land Adjudication Section in Kajiado District as required under section 3 of the 
Land Adjudication Act. Subsequently, the process of adjudication commenced, 
in which rights of ordinary residents over parcels of land in the adjudication area 
were to be ascertained and recorded, and eventually parcels of land demarcated 
(after mapping and survey) and registered in their names. 
395. Contrary to the provisions of the LAA, setting out the procedure for adjudication 
(as already discussed), the adjudication officials, among other irregularities, failed 
to give any of the ordinary residents of the Mosiro Land Adjudication Section 
[hereinafter, MLAS] any opportunity to point out or to demarcate the boundaries 
of lands the people claimed, nor were they accorded opportunity to make claims 
to any land in the section. They allocated land to people on a map without 
such map or allocation being preceded by actual demarcation of the respective 
parcels of land on the ground. They further allocated some 52 452 hectares of 
land in the adjudication section to people mainly from the Central Province 
(Kiambu), about 27 of them (including the daughters of the [then] Director of 
Land Adjudication- Rose Muthoni Muthuri and Karen Kaguria Njuguna), and to 
at least 31 government officials. The officials failed to display the original of the 
land adjudication register at a convenient place or at any place at all so residents 
could peruse it to verify information respecting lands allocated to them;382 and 
proceeded to register parcels of land wrongfully allocated to the outsiders (non-
residents) under section 32 of the Registered Land Act, Cap 300, and to issue title 
deeds in respect thereof.
	 Kimuri ‘A’ adjudication section, Meru
396. The area in question, which constituted trust land for the Kagwanja clan of the 
Ameru community, was declared an adjudication section and the process of 
adjudication commenced and completed in clear breach of the provisions of law. 
397. As a result, land adjudication officials of the area allocated land to themselves, their 
relatives and friends, while denying members of the clan who were entitled to the 
381  Irregularities that occurred in the process of adjudication in the Mosiro Land Adjudication Section gave rise to the cases cited, and 
to the minister’s comments that were reported in the Kenya Times.
382  See section 25 of the Land Adjudication Act.
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land their rights.383 Resulting titles issued to non-members of the clan are illegal 
and this study recommends that they be revoked.
	 Fourteen Falls land in Thika
398. The land, which was held in trust by the Fourteen Falls Integrated Programme in 
Thika County, forms part of the Ol Donyo Sabuk Wetland ecosystem and is trust 
land. In spite of the facts, the land, measuring 11.6 hectares and registered as L.R. 
no. 22425, has been illegally sub-divided and allocated to private individuals, at 
the expense of ecosystem services and the rights of people in the surrounding 
areas to a clean and healthy environment. It is recommended that all of the titles 
issued be revoked and the land restored to the public.384
	 Manga Orotuba community forest land
399. The forested land in question is located in Mwamanwa Sublocation, Kiangoso 
Location, Kisii County and forms part of Manga Escarpment. It is a hilltop which the 
local Abagusii community claim to have been set aside for their use as trust land, 
under the trusteeship of Nyamira County Council. However, in 1991, the council, 
without consulting the community, sold a piece of the forested land to the Catholic 
diocese of Kisii. The council, again, in 2006, “granted” 20.23 hectares of the land to 
the same diocese for construction of a monastery, on land now registered as Central 
Kitutu/Mwamanwa/1594. Surprisingly, the title deed that the Catholic Church holds 
over the land does not bear any name of the previous owner. It is a clear case of 
illegal sale of community land by the trustee, Nyamira County Council.385 
400. In efforts to recover the land, community members, through an environmental 
organization, filed Civil Suit No. 38 of 2010 in the Environment and Land Court 
in Kisii. The case was still pending for hearing by the time of writing this report. 
The same community environmental group also challenged the issuance of an 
environmental impact assessment licence by National Environmental Management 
Agency (NEMA) to the Catholic Church. They were seeking to stop the church from 
constructing a house, as part of its monastery for Carmelite Brothers on the land 
(NET/99/2012).
401. It is recommended that the title deeds granted the Catholic Church over the 
two large parcels of land illegally annexed by the Catholic Church out of Manga 
Orotuba community land be revoked and the land be restored to the community. 
383  Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002) at page 142.
384  Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002) at page 142.
385  See, Report of the Public Complaints Committee on Environment dated 10th December 2012.
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	 Forced eviction in Thessalia and Buru farms in Kericho
402. To most Kenyans, inhumane treatment, torture and killing of innocent Kenyans 
within church grounds evoke quick memories of the recent happenings at Kiambaa 
church in Eldoret during the 2007/2008 post-election violence. What most people 
do not know is that other ethnic communities, especially members of the Luo 
community, long before Kiambaa, suffered a similar fate at the hands of tribalist 
community members and tribalist government officials, especially officials in the 
notorious provincial administration. The case of forceful evictions of members 
of the Luo community from, first, Buru Farm and subsequently, Thessalia Farm, 
demonstrate the widespread nature of forced evictions meted against innocent 
Kenyans by provincial administration officials.
403. In efforts to find a lasting solution to their problem of landlessness, some members 
of the Luo community who had been working in Kericho area as farm labourers 
and ‘squatting’ on the farms where they worked since the colonial days, formed 
the Buru Farmers Society, while members of the Kipsigis community in a similar 
situation formed the Kipsigis Farmers Society. The idea was first implemented 
in 1972, with encouragement of the then Kericho District Commissioner Milton 
ole Ncharo. Members of each of the societies paid all dues to the Kericho District 
Treasury as required for the purchase of two separate tracts of land for sub-division 
to each contributing member.386 
404. Tribalism as manifested by favouritism appeared for the first time when the povincial 
administration assisted the group owned by Kalenjin to quickly acquire title deeds 
to their lands, while offering no similar assistance to the Luo.387 Unbeknown to 
members of the Luo community, the failure of the provincial administration 
was intentional - its plan was, as it later turned out, to extort money from them 
and then forcibly evict them from the lawfully acquired Buru Farm. Without any 
plausible explanation, members of the Luo community who had fully paid Kericho 
District Treasury for the purchase of Buru Farm were later asked to pay a further 
KSh21,180.10 each, which they paid. 
404. However, the provincial administration declined to extend any assistance to 
them to acquire ownership documents as it did for members of the Kalenjin 
community.388Members of the Luo community first realized that the Kipsigis and 
their leaders, including those in provincial administration were opposed to their 
acquisition of Buru Farm in 1988 when a member of the Kipsigis community by the 
386  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 26.
387  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 26.
388  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 26.
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name Noah informed a baraza held by the provincial administration to tell the Luo 
that they would eventually be evicted from Buru Farm because the land belonged 
to the Kipsigis.389 In another baraza, the local councillor informed the meeting that 
the Luo who were then living in Kericho area were “milking” Kipsigis land and that 
land in Kericho should only be owned by the Kipsigis.390
406. As political debates for the multi-party system of democracy increased towards the 
year 1991, the Kalenjin, including officials in the provincial administration perceived 
members of the Luo community in their midst as being sympathetic to the multi-
party system and exploited their own perception, without any basis, to forcefully 
evict the Luo from Buru Farm on 16 November 1991. With the open incitement 
of the then local District commissioner Timothy Sirma, several members of the 
Kipsigis community invaded Buru Farm on the fateful day, burned down houses 
belonging to the Luo, took away their cattle, torched sugar cane plantations and 
forcibly evicted the Luo, while the local chief and administration police officers 
bulldozed their houses.391 In just one night, members of the Kalenjin community 
burned down more than 140 houses together with all belongings and grain stores, 
but when the matter was reported to the chief, he callously retorted that “the Luo 
had encroached on Kipsigis land and were expected to move out.”392 
407. The Luo were thereby rendered homeless and without security. Some of the 
arsonists and stock thieves from the Kalenjin community who had rendered the Luo 
homeless and destitute were known to them. Despite reports that were specifically 
made against the arsonist thieves at the Kericho police station, the police took 
no action whatsoever.393 Thus the Kalenjin were emboldened to undertake future 
acts of arson, killing and property destruction against members of other ethnic 
communities living in the Rift Valley, including the atrocities at Kiambaa, which 
drew the attention of a wider segment of Kenyans.
408. Members of the Luo community who were evicted from Buru Farm sought refuge 
at Thessalia Mission in Kericho, where they camped outside in makeshift structures. 
The notorious Timothy Sirma, again, ordered for their forceful eviction from the 
mission. On 13 December 1993, their eviction was carried out by the provincial 
administration “in a most cruel and inhumane manner.”394 The people were 
surprised at daybreak by armed policemen who woke them up and ordered them 
to leave immediately. They were not allowed time or opportunity to remove their 
389  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 26.
390  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 26.
391  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 27.
392  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 27.
393  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 27.
394  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 31.
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personal effects. Luo ‘squatters’ were in a most inhuman manner evicted from a 
mission centre where they had peacefully sought refuge, without causing anybody 
any harm, thanks to the local provincial administration and its known notorious 
perpetrators such as Sirma. 
409. It is people like Timothy Sirma, brutal acts of administration police on orders of 
district commissioners, provincial commissioners and district officers and both 
acquiescence and perpetration of similar acts by chiefs that make the provincial 
administration most abhorrent in the current governance setup. It is recommended 
that the case concerning Buru Farm be investigated thoroughly and that all 
government officers who participated in the forceful eviction be prosecuted. It is 
also recommended that the farm be restored to the Luo who purchased it and that 
they be issued with title documents to it. Alternatively, they should be paid for the 
land at current rates and those who are not able to acquire land for settlement 
should be assisted to re-settle elsewhere.
	 Forced eviction of the Endorois community
410. The Endorois indigenous community that speaks a language closely related to 
Kalenjin resides in the current Baringo County in the Rift Valley. The community, 
estimated to comprise 60 000 persons, used to live mainly around Lake Bogoria. A 
few of the members of the community lived in Nakuru and Laikipia districts. The 
Endorois were accepted by all neighbouring tribes and as the bonafide owners of 
the land around Lake Bogoria. They continued to occupy and enjoy undisturbed 
use of the land during the colonial British administration even though the British 
claimed overall title to the land as part of ‘Crown’ land under the Crown Lands 
Ordinance. At independence, the land occupied by the Endorois community was 
passed on to the respective county councils as trust land, to be held by the councils 
for the benefit of all of the members of the community.
411. In 1970, they were forcibly evicted by the government, without consultation or 
compensation, to pave way for the establishment of the Hannington Game Reserve, 
which was done the following year, in 1973. Their right to their homeland was further 
diminished by the re-gazettement of Lake Bogoria as a game reserve in 1978. At 
the time of eviction from their homeland which they had occupied for centuries as 
the authentic occupants, the Endorois were neither consulted nor compensated. 
The government also did not offer them any alternative settlement. The community 
suffered loss, not only of ancestral land where they had lived sustainable livelihoods, 
but also natural resources and cultural and religious sites.395
395  Endorois Welfare Council, Memorandum of Endorois Community to the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission, Kabarnet-
Baringo County, 24 – 26 October 2011 (BRG/002), at 1& 5.
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412. Shortly after the creation of the protected wildlife area around Lake Bogoria, 
the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) undertook to compensate Endorois families, 
then numbering 400, and in addition, allocate to them 25 percent of revenues 
generated from the game reserve and 85 percent of the jobs created thereby. 
However, KWS failed to honour its undertakings. Further directives by President 
Moi that KWS honours its undertakings also failed, prompting the community 
to sue Baringo County Council in William Yatich Sitet, alias William arap Ngasia, 
et. Al v. Baringo County Council in High Court Civil Suit No. 183 of 2000. Although 
in the judgment issued in 2002, the High Court dismissed the community’s suit, 
it did recognize that Endorois land around Lake Bogoria was trust land under 
management by the Baringo County Council but that they lost their right to the 
land when a game reserve was established thereon in 1973 and 1974.
413. The Endorois later learnt that parts of their land over which a protected wildlife 
area had been established was allocated to a private mining company and 
another portion, to a foreign investor who established thereon a private wildlife 
conservancy, both in the year 2002. Subsequent presentation of the matter to 
the National Assembly did not yield fruit as Parliament failed to address the issue, 
prompting the Endorois to sue the Kenya government in the court of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), under the African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights. The court ruled in favour of the community, against 
the government of Kenya, directing, among other things, that the government 
recognizes the right of the community to its ancestral land. 
414. The court also ruled that the government ensures that the community has 
unrestricted access to Lake Bogoria for religious, cultural and grazing purposes and 
that the government pays adequate compensation to the community for the loss 
incurred.  The government was also ordered to pay royalty to the Endorois from the 
economic activities to which their land was devoted and to table a report on the 
implementation of the ACHPR’s recommendations within three months from the 
date of recommendation.396 To date, the ACHPR’s ruling has not been effected by the 
government. It is recommended that the terms of the judgment be implemented in 
favour of the community without any further delay.
	 Hill Farm Kamwenja, Mathari, in Nyeri District
415. The land in question is registered as L.R. No. 9464 and measures 1 089 hectares. 
It formed part of trust land, being ancestral land of residents of Mathari sub-
location in Nyeri. However, during the colonial emergency period in the late 
396  Endorois Welfare Council, Memorandum of Endorois Community to the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission, Kabarnet-
Baringo County, 24 – 26 October 2011 (BRG/002), at 9.
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1950s, residents of the area were moved to emergency villages in 1955. Before 
then, the Catholic Church had, in 1929, purchased 1 054 hectares of land, 
forming part of the trust land from families living there at the time (before the 
emergency), a fact which residents acknowledge. However, when residents 
were moved to emergency villages in 1965, the church irregularly acquired an 
additional 2 577 hectares from the same trust land while residents were away in 
emergency villages, and registered the land in two parcels - LR. No. 1356 and L.R. 
No.4166.397 It is recommended that this matter be investigated further and, if all 
the facts are established, title for the additional land irregularly acquired while 
residents were away in emergency confinement be restored to them.
Involvement of land-buying companies in illegal acquisition of land
416. In addition to individuals who applied for land in the various settlement schemes 
that were implemented after Kenya attained independence, many land-
buying companies were formed comprising mainly the farming communities 
of Central Province to freely buy land from white settlers. By 1978 there were 
over 1 000  land-buying companies in the country, with more than two-thirds 
of them belonging to influential individuals and groups from Central Province 
and a few from Rift Valley, Western and Kisii regions. A few of these land-buying 
companies did commendable work to assist their members or shareholders 
to settle on parcels of land they purchased collectively. One such company is 
reported to have “settled their kin on 51 539 acres of land in Laikipia, 21 050 
acres in Njoro and Nakuru, 1 200 acres in Molo, more than 4 000 acres in Bahati 
area of Nakuru and 1 400 acres in Mau Narok, all parts of traditional Maasai 
territory.”
417. Settlement of individuals and families especially from the Kikuyu community in 
areas considered part of Maasai homeland was to later result in violent conflicts 
between members of the two communities, especially around the time of 
elections in 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007 in Molo and other parts of the Rift Valley.398 
GEMA Holdings Ltd formerly chaired by Njenga Karume, is one of the land buying 
institutions owned by members of the Kikuyu community that acquired land in 
areas occupied by other communities for settlement of their kin. 
418. It acquired 20 000 acres of land in Molo and 16 000 acres in Naivasha. It is not 
surprising that it is in Molo where ethnic-related violence broke out first in 1991. 
Ngwataniro Mutukanio Company and Miteitei Company Ltd also acquired land 
397  Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry Into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002) at page 142
398  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 2 – 4.
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in Nandi, where ethnic violence also broke out in 1991. In addition, Kiambaa 
Cooperative Society acquired the 500 acre of land in Kiambaa farm located in 
Eldoret in 1967 from a Mr Giussepe Morat and it should be recalled that Kiambaa 
is the area that witnessed one of the worst forms of ethnic-related violence 
during and after the elections of December 2007 and that many of the members 
of the Kikuyu community who had settled in the area were evicted and became 
internally displaced persons (IDPs), some, to this day. Other private institutions 
that also purchased land for their members or shareholders in the Rift Valley were 
Ngati Farmers Cooperative which purchased 16 000 acres in 1965 in Naivasha 
from Maiella Limited and Kipsiet Farmers Cooperative which purchased a 2,302-
acre farm in Kericho from Margaritis Ltd.  The other farms purchased under 
similar arrangement were Kamwaura Farm measuring 1,636 acre in Molo, which 
was purchased in 1976 from a Lionel Caldwel, Munyeki Farm measuring 4,000 
acres which was purchased in Trans Nzoia, in which case, Munyeki stood for 
Murang’a, Nyeri and Kiambu, being the origins of the business shareholders and 
beneficiaries. 
419. Besides community strife that settlements established on the basis of land-buying 
companies engendered, the companies themselves also engaged in numerous 
acts of fraud against their members or shareholders, thus promoting landlessness, 
scarcity and related poverty. The majority of the companies turned into dens of 
corruption and many swindled large sums of money or shares from their members, 
without any compensation. Notable among land buying companies in which 
corruption was pervasive was Ngwataniro Group, led by maverick politician by 
the name Dickson Kihika Kimani. Rampant fraud and corruption in the company 
leading to the loss of large sums of shareholders’ money resulted in tensions and 
violent conflicts between the company management and would-be beneficiary 
contributors that went on for years. 
420. Another land-buying company with a similar record is Mbo-i-Kamiti land-
buying company, which had branches in Kiambu and Thika areas. By late 1970, 
over 70 000 contributors had not received any parcel of land, despite clearing 
payments. As a result, numerous legal cases were filed against many of the land-
buying companies, which were mainly owned by influential individuals and 
companies. Moreover, the establishment and financial support of land-buying 
companies was discriminatory. Members of the Kikuyu ethnic seem to have 
received government financial support to establish land-buying companies 
in areas considered as homelands of other communities such as the Kalenjin 
and the Maasai. In contrast, other communities in Kenya whose members were 
facing landlessness, destitution and poverty were not similarly facilitated, 
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especially with provision of funds to purchase land from the departing white 
settlers. The fact is attributed to political patronage, entrenched negative 
ethnicity in Kenyatta’s administration and dominance of members of the Kikuyu 
ethnic community in key financial institutions in the country during Kenyatta’s 
administration, as rightly observed:
Kikuyu elite had overwhelming influence on officials in the Ministry of Lands and 
Settlement as well as the financial institutions that were providing loans for the land 
purchases. The Kalenjin, however, had no senior officials in these institutions or in 
the government. They had Daniel arap Moi as Vice-President to President Kenyatta, 
but he lacked the influence required to commit himself to competition with the 
powerful Kikuyu elite. Both groups were competing to purchase settler farms, but 
the Kalenjin were standing on relatively weaker ground. Each group nonetheless 
mobilized support from the political elite in its respective ethnic region to bring 
political influence to bear on the land control boards, which authorized transactions 
in the land market.399
421. To complicate the involvement of land-buying companies further, there were 
numerous cases of conflict within communities that benefited from land-
buying companies. Conflicts arose between peasant contributors of money 
for land and the wealthy individuals who owned and operated the companies, 
mostly Kikuyu elite. Conflicts also arose among the owners and operators of 
the companies over who had the rights to acquire or purchase certain parcels 
of land or specific farms. There were also cases of double and multiple claims 
and multiple registrations of the same plots of land and farms to more than one 
individual. As a result, by the early 1980s, there were thousands of contributors 
who had not received any parcel of land, despite making all required payments. 
This increasing alienation and fraudulent activities related to land purchases 
led to more tensions and violent conflicts in different sites involving influential 
individuals and land-buying companies as well as shareholders or contributors. 
In response, President Moi, upon taking office, demanded the disbandment of 
the over 1 000 land buying companies that were still operational by the early 
1980s. He also ordered for subdivision of the large farms that they had purchased 
on the basis that the companies had defrauded citizens.
399  Karuti, Kanyinga, ‘Land Redistribution in Kenya’ in HP B Mkhize Et al (eds.) Agricultural Land Redistribution: Towards Greater 
Consensus (2010) at 107.
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Illegal Land Alienations during President Moi’s 
Administration
422. In August 1978, Daniel arap Moi took over as the second President of the Republic 
of Kenya following the death of Jomo Kenyatta. He promised to follow the 
footsteps of his predecessor. Moi’s ‘Fuata Nyayo’ philosophy literally meant that 
he would follow in the footsteps of his predecessor in critical aspects of policy 
and governance, including approval of illegal land allocations, and he did, with the 
exception of minor policy departures, especially in relation to his pro-pastoralist 
policy and his new focus on the development of arid and semi-arid lands. 
During his tenure, every category of government-owned land including military 
establishments, road reserves, public parks, bus parks, public toilets, forests and 
cemeteries as well as trust lands were illegally acquired in what became publicly 
known as the widespread phenomenon of land grabbing, mainly by the president 
himself, his family, officials in his administration, politicians, civil servants, and 
military officers.400 In the process, more than 200 000 illegal title deeds were 
acquired which ought to be revoked.401 
723. This section of the chapter on land demonstrates that like his predecessor 
Kenyatta, President Moi adopted the policy and practices that facilitated the 
illegal allocations of land, especially government land, in ways similar to those of 
Kenyatta’s administration. In the end, there was no meaningful attempt during his 
administration to redress illegalities that had characterized dealings in land during 
Kenyatta’s administration. By the time Moi took over power in 1979, there were no 
more parcels of land in the former White Highlands that could be purchased from 
white settlers for resettlement of landless or land-scarce Africans who had lost their 
land during the colonial administration, even though there were still large numbers 
of communities at the Coast and in mainland Kenya in need of settlement. Also, 
there was hardly any more unalienated government land that could be utilized for 
settlement or farming by private entities, or for political patronage.  
424. In the prevailing circumstances, Moi and his close associates resorted to massive 
illegal allocations of unalienated government land and other real property in 
virtually every part of the country. To facilitate unquestioned dealings in land, 
Moi re-organized key ministries, including the Ministry of Lands and Settlement 
and the Ministry of Defence by placing his cronies, mostly members of his ethnic 
Kalenjin community in strategic positions.  Moi’s close associates in key government 
400 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u Commission, 
2004) at 154 – 160.
401  Ibid. pp.154-160,  Appendix one of Ndung’u Report  : Document prepared by the chief Conservator of Forests,
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positions included former powerful Permanent Secretary in charge of Internal 
Security Zakayo Cheruiyot,402 former Energy Minister Nicholas Biwott,403 former 
Central Bank Governor Micah Cheserem404 and former of Kenya Seed Company Ltd 
Managing Director Nathaniel Tum.405
425. Once in office, Moi’s cronies engaged, with his apparent approval, in massive 
illegal acquisition of lands owned by the Agricultural Development Corporation 
(ADC), forest lands including land in the Mau Forest complex, protected wildlife 
areas, wildlife migration corridors, public beaches, government houses and lands 
reserved for public utilities across the country.406  Land was mostly used during 
his administration as reward for political patronage. It was also used to selectively 
settle members of his community while in other cases, illegal alienation of 
land led to the forceful eviction of members of other communities. During his 
tenure, private entities also acquired public lands and other property across the 
country illegally, with wanton impunity. Local authorities similarly participated 
in massive illegal land allocations to themselves and close associates under the 
cover of corrupt officials in Moi’s administration. The following paragraphs detail 
pervasive cases of illegal land allocations during Moi’s tenure, which, in the new 
constitutional dispensation, require redress in order to avoid violent conflicts.
Continued irregularities in land allocation at the Coast
426. Official documents indicate that land problems at the Coast were of concern to 
Moi’s administration and, in the National Development Plan of 1979-1983, he 
promised a review of land rights in the area. He proceeded to freeze and review 
the existing allotments of beach plots, which had, previously, been massively 
and illegally allocated mainly to Kenyatta’s close associates, including his family 
members. 
427. As a show of the seriousness of his efforts to address land issues at the Coast and in 
other parts of the country, President Moi had curtailed the immense powers of the 
Ministry of Lands and Settlement, effectively reducing it to a department reporting 
directly to him. However, his well intentioned land reforms for the benefit of coastal 
communities were never realized.
402  Ndung’u Report , p.155 on Illegal/Irregular Allocation of land in South Western Mau Forest
403 Ibid., p.158. Nicholas Biwott was irregularly allocated land excised from Kaptagat forest under a private trust known as Maria Soti 
Memorial Trust ( Maria Soti was the late mother of Biwott)
404 Ibid., p.95. The three sold illegally/irregularly acquired land to the Kenya Ports Authority; Undeveloped plot L.R No.209/10212, 
Bellevue, Nairobi (1.6Ha)
405 Nathaniel Tum is on the list of powerful individuals in the Moi administration that benefited of Liyavo Farm that was meant to settle 
squatters in Trans Nzoia.
406  See full details in the Ndung’u Report, various secondary sources of information and various memos from the TJRC Hansard. 
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428. Failure to complete the process of land adjudication and registration, as well as 
failure to purposefully resettle the landless individuals and communities at the 
Coast were, perhaps the twin evils that facilitated official acquisition of land in the 
region in ways that were not at all lawful or acceptable. The situation was well 
presented by an affected community member who observed that at the Coast:
Moi’s government continued dishing out land as reward to councillors and MPs. You 
would find a councillor from Duruma selling land in Digo land and that brought a lot of 
enmity among the people. That is why the coastal community feels that all people from 
upcountry are bad because all their land has been given free of charge to people from 
upcountry. A councillor is given a beach plot and he then sells it and buys a nice car yet 
the people do not have anything.407
429. Communities at the Coast did not expect officials in Moi’s administration to 
continue illegally acquiring their land because when he came to power, he was 
not happy with the kind of illegal alienations of land that had occurred at the 
Coast and soon after taking office in 1978, he ordered that illegally acquired land 
revert to the real owners, that is, the locals. However, his wish was never actualized 
because, apparently, political leaders who perceived that they had a chance to 
enrich themselves through illegal land deals approached President Moi and told 
him that they were not willing to return land to the locals; neither were they willing 
to stop illegally acquiring land in the area. 
430. Instead of acting firmly to redress the land-related injustices that coastal 
communities had suffered for a long time, Moi directed that land be acquired at 
the Coast on a willing-buyer, willing-seller basis, yet affected communities at the 
Coast were too poor to afford land purchases. Moreover, what land dealers were 
offering local communities for their land was far too little compared to the actual 
value of land at the time and the huge profits that speculators were making from 
subsequent sale of land that they had acquired from locals for very little. In the 
words of an affected community member:
They came back and told us that the owners of the land would be given KSh20 000 per 
acre. There are those who took the money, but my father and others refused to take it. I 
worked for Diamond Trust for 20 years. I knew the worth of our land. I used to earn KSh15, 
000, but an Indian would bring a title deed and he would be given KSh430 million for ten 
acres of land. He had been given 14 acres by Moi. He was given plot number 14897 which 
is adjacent to Sheshe Beach Hotel. He demarcated two acres and Joseph Leting was given 
No.13438. Two other acres, No.13439, were given to Mark Too. Some other two acres were 
given to a European called Guy Barrington Bromnel that is No.13440. I could not take a 
loan then... Moi’s son took a plot whose number is 13441. It is undeveloped to date. Ten 
acres are with Travellers Beach Hotel ...It was my dad’s plot.408
407  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kwale/23 January 2012/p. 11, para 3.
408  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kwale/23 January 2012/ p. 38, para 1-4.
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431. From the testimony of affected family members who testified before the TJRC, it 
appears that officials in Moi’s administration and his political cronies demanded 
land from coastal communities for very little money and that where families 
objected to their acquisition of land, they took it by force and for subsequent 
sale, to make profit. Just as it was in Kenyatta’s administration, during Moi’s time, 
“people from far” places and privileged senior officers (government workers) and 
politicians were allocated huge chunks of land at the expense local squatters 
who have completely and have virtually ended up as paupers since the colonial 
times.409
Illegal acquisition of land in mainland Kenya
	 The cases of ‘squatter’ societies
432. Unlike in Kenyatta’s administration when a number of landless individuals and 
families pooled resources to acquire land in the Rift Valley and other parts of 
Kenya and succeeded in settlement, in many cases, during Moi’s era, efforts by the 
landless to attain settlement through loan schemes were deliberately thwarted by 
officials in the administration who flagrantly took away land from them. There were 
cases of people who purchased land through SFT, facilitated by the Agricultural 
Finance Corporation (AFC). 
433. However, upon making full repayment of the loans, group members or members 
of the cooperative societies did not get title to the land. Instead, their land 
was, without their consent or approval, allocated to prominent persons, some 
of whom resorted to harassing the members to ensure that they did not revolt 
against their illegal moves. In this regard, the Livayo, Maridadi and Sitatunga 
self-help schemes in Trans Nzoia and the Koriny Tich Farmers’ Group provide 
good examples of the deliberate historical land injustices. In the case of Liyavo 
Farm which was meant to resettle the land less in western Kenya, on their own 
initiative:
Land meant for ‘squatters’ in the farm was dished out as a gift to people who supported 
the then president Daniel arap Moi and the then ruling party KANU, with a classic 
example of Tolosho Ltd whose directors and owners  are Mart Properties, Dinal Chelal 
Chelimo, Tim Tim Holdings, Mart Holdings Ltd, Tiwai Holdings and Sammy Silas Komen 
Mwaita, a former Commissioner of Lands according to the Ndung'u Commission report 
revelation who blessed himself with 80.92 ha (about 200 acres) that could settle about 
80 squatters given two and a half acres on equitable basis.410
409  TJRC/Memo/M0791/ p. 4.
410  TJRC/Memo/M079/p.2, para 4.
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434. Similarly, members of Koriny Tich Farmers’ Group took a loan with the AFC to 
purchase their land in 1965 which loan they completed paying by 1973. Instead 
of the group getting title to the land, the land was, during Moi’s administration, 
illegally transferred/ allocated to Edward Kiptanui, a former Baringo South 
MP. Ironically, Kiptanui had neither been one of the members of the group nor 
contributed towards repayment of the loan.411  The group is said to have filed a 
case against the illegal allocation and obtained judgment in their favour, upon 
which the members were able to obtain a provisional title to the land, which they 
intended to sub-divide amongst themselves. However, at that point, they realized 
that there were unscrupulous sellers who were trying to sell their land to the 
government of Kenya for the resettlement of other internally displaced persons.412 
435. There is also a case of another self-help groups whose members came together 
and purchased land facilitated by a loan from the SFT. However, upon completion 
of repayment of the loan, the local District Commissioner took over the farm and 
sold it to non-members. The DC is also said to have allocated portions of the land 
to the DO and Chief who in turn sold it to third parties and to him. The DC further 
sold, for his own benefit, all other assets belonging to the group members that 
were in the farm, including livestock, without consulting the members.413
	 Illegal alienation of forest catchment areas
436. In addition to Karura Forest, there were other forests forming part of government 
land in the country that were similarly illegally excised and allocated to government 
officials and their close associates during Moi’s administration. One of such national 
forests is the Mau Forest complex, which serves critical ecological functions to the 
whole of the East Africa region in terms of being a catchment area and a source of 
trans-boundary rivers between Kenya and Tanzania. 
437. First, a decision was made to settle people in portions of the forest without following 
due procedures of law which require, among other things, de-gazettement. 
Kiptangach Extension Settlement Scheme is one of such settlement schemes that 
were illegally established in the Mau Forests.  Moreover, a Mau Task Force found 
out that instead of settling the landless, prominent people in the government and 
their cronies acquired land in the forest catchment area that had been set aside, 
ostensibly to settle squatters. A list of land allottees in the extension settlement 
scheme showed that prominent government officials and political leaders were 
each allocated land, some in excess of 5 000 acres. Retired president Daniel Moi, 
411  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nakuru/23 September 2011/p. 14.
412  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nakuru/23 September 2011/p. 14.
413  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kericho/20 September 2011/ p. 31, para 7.
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some cabinet ministers and MPs, former and current key civil servants benefited 
from the illegal/irregular land allocations in the Mau Complex.414 
	 Land and re-settlement conflicts
438. There was increasing feeling among the long –disadvantaged pastoral communities 
and the Kalenjin in particular (both herders and farmers) that they should fight at 
all cost to reclaim their ‘stolen land from the rich ‘foreign’ (black) settlers.  Although 
no attempt was made by the Moi government to revoke the land settlements of 
the Kenyatta regime, it became increasingly difficult for non-indigenous people to 
buy land north of Nakuru. The non–Kalenjin individuals and groups who had bought 
parcels of land in Kalenjin-dominated areas found it hard to get them demarcated 
or obtain title deeds. Indeed, just like in the previous regime, ethnicity played a 
significant role on the ground, especially in the former White Highlands, in terms of 
land allocation and employment. Although the policy of ‘willing-seller, willing-buyer 
remained unchanged, in practice it was slowly diminishing in parts of Rift Valley. 
439. During the Moi regime as was the case before, settlement schemes were often 
used to settle immigrant communities, while local officials, ministers, and 
influential civil servants allocated some plots to themselves, their families or 
cronies. The result of such irregular land initiatives was often violent ethnic 
conflicts and legal cases. In the meantime, the land adjudication and registration 
process slowed, as roughly two- thirds of agricultural land had been demarcated 
by 1980. The remainder was mostly pastoral land, grazed in common and very 
difficult to demarcate.  There were few individual or group title registrations after 
1983, leaving North Eastern Province, Marsabit, Isiolo, Turkana, Samburu and 
much of the Coast un-adjudicated.
440. In some recorded instances, development partners and donor agencies tried 
repeatedly to improve the lot of pastoralists through irrigation projects that 
encouraged the Turkana and Boran to become farmers. The Moi period witnessed 
a change of policy and government and development agencies attitudes towards 
the semi-arid and arid lands in Kenya. In fact, Moi created a special Ministry for 
Reclamation and Development of Arid and Semi- Arid Lands. The ministry was 
based in the Office of the President and it coordinated programmes across the 14 
mapped districts, funded by eight different donors. However, in reality, very little 
was accomplished to improve the livelihoods of communities in the areas. Moi’s 
good intentions seem to have been overridden by the land grabbing phenomenon 
that pervaded his regime. As a result, many communities that were awaiting his 
414  See Ndung’u Report ; is a catalogue who is who in the Moi era that benefited from Illegal/Irregular allocation of public land
305
Volume  I IB    Chapter T WO 
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
intervention in land-related injustices were frustrated and expressed it in ways that 
threatened the peace and security of other Kenyans.
441. Among pastoral communities that had been disadvantaged during Kenyatta’s era, 
especially the Kalenjin, there was growing feeling that they should fight at all cost 
to reclaim their “stolen land” from the people they considered as rich foreign black 
settlers. Therefore, although no attempt was made by the Moi government to revoke 
or nullify the land settlements established in the Rift Valley during the Kenyatta 
regime, it became increasing difficult for the non-Kalenjin to buy land in many parts 
of the Rift Valley. Those who had already acquired land in the region also found it 
very difficult to have them demarcated or obtain title deeds. Further, tension built 
up between the Kalenjin and other ethnic communities living in the Rift Valley and 
in many cases, violence erupted, especially around the time of national elections, as 
explained in the following section of this chapter on the land question in Kenya.
Land and Multi-Party Politics in Kenya
442. It is important to demonstrate the critical linkage between the unresolved 
land question, multi-party politics and ethnic violence in Kenya. The foregoing 
discussions explain that by the end of Moi’s era, none of the outstanding issues 
concerning land, especially the irregular acquisition of land from communities 
by the colonial administration and later during Jomo Kenyatta’s administration, 
had been resolved. The situation of affected communities that had been rendered 
landless or who had become ‘squatters’ and poor was made even worse after 
independence. Their resentment of other communities was kindled by the 
sustained preferential resettlement of other ethnic communities, especially the 
Kikuyu, on their lands and direct grabbing of their land by officials in the Kenyatta 
and Moi administrations.
443. The discussion demonstrates that because of official failure to address the perennial 
land problem at the Coast and in mainland Kenya, the problems remained, 
lingering in the minds and agenda of members of affected communities and their 
political leaders and over time, fomented anger and resort to self-help measures in 
the form of violent ethnic clashes and secessionist movements. 
444. It is demonstrated that affected community anger and resolve to rise against 
those perceived as ‘outsider invaders of other people’s homelands’ has often 
been expressed through politics, especially multi-party politics that seem to hold 
the promise of change in leadership which could, hopefully, result in genuine 
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resolution of the troublesome questions concerning land. Forceful evictions was 
also resorted to, especially by the Kalenjin during President Moi’s era in retaliation 
against communities living in areas considered by the Kalenjin as their tribal 
homelands for the perceived support of multi-partyism by the non-Kalenjin 
communities.415 Further, politicians from many affected communities in Kenya 
have never refrained from using political platforms to promise their constituents 
to resolve the problems once in office, and to mobilize their communities to rise 
against those considered as ‘outsider invaders of their homelands’. Such calls 
intensify around every election time, when politicians have ample opportunities 
to interact with their constituents. It has been observed that election campaigns 
have always been used as platforms where affected host communities and their 
political leaders remind  immigrants that they are living on ‘stolen’ lands that were 
unfairly alienated by the colonial administration but later  irregularly acquired or 
grabbed and awarded or sold by a syndicate in the Kenyatta administration. 
445. At such times, for some unexplained reasons, the national security apparatus is 
also usually lax, thus providing opportunities for community resolution of land 
problems through violence. 
446. One other matter that ought now to seriously concern the government is the 
tendency, over the years, to link the possibility of meaningfully addressing land 
questions through politics of majimbo, meaning regionalism. It was explained in 
the first section of this chapter that as the country prepared for self-rule, it was 
agreed among Kenyans preparing to take over power that governance would be 
based on regionalism to allow the different communities to live on and manage 
their homelands in their own ways. The position was affirmed by President 
Kenyatta who promised the people of Kenya at the time he took over power that 
there would be regional governments through which communities/‘tribes’ would 
regain and exercise control over their lands. However, this was not to be.
447. Kenyatta abolished regional governments soon after taking office, to the 
disappointment of many. That placed regionalist (majimbo) on the agenda of many 
affected communities. Whatever communities intended to do under a majimbo 
system was reflected in violent ethnic clashes in bids to rid specific regions in the 
country of people considered as outsiders. Apparently, politicians have also abused 
their constituents’ trust in resolving land problems through a regional system of 
government to unleash violence against members of other communities whom 
they believe to be unsupportive of their candidature.
415  See, Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 12, 26 – 31 
& 49.
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448. Now that we have attained regionalism without having also resolved the land 
problems, might calls for ethnicised regions/countries result in violent uprisings 
against perceived outsiders? Might such calls generate more calls for secession? In 
order to foreclose all of such chances, the following section should provide some 
lens through which political connections to the existing land problems should be 
clearly understood and measures urgently taken, on the basis of recommendations 
of this report, to avert looming dangers to cohesion and peaceful co-existence in 
Kenya.
 The danger of violence during multi-party elections
449. It appears that political leaders are determined to take cover under politics and 
related debates to address land problems through all means, including violence. 
This is a glaring sign of official failure to address the challenge, yet all post-
independent governments in Kenya have had adequate chances and means to 
address the problems with finality.
450. On the eve of the re-introduction of multi-party politics in Kenya in 1992, there was 
looming danger of renewed ethnic conflicts due to the increasing tension between 
those who were agitating for pluralism and those against it.  Moi repeatedly warned 
and predicted that multi-parties would cause ethnic conflicts and increase tribal 
hatred in the country. His predictions came true as the country faced a series of 
ethnic conflicts on the eve of the 1992 multi-party elections and subsequent ones. 
The land question has, since the colonial era to the present time, been interwoven 
with the majimbo debate, which has been resurfacing in almost all the national 
elections in the country.
451. In fact there was tension between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin as well as the 
Maasai over the long-simmering issue of land in the Rift Valley that had now 
acquired political undertones. The political alignments at that particular time 
were influenced mainly by conflict over land rights and negative ethnicity, 
resulting into “them versus us” type of confrontation in the former White 
Highlands, including Maasailand. For instance, in February 1991, in a phrase 
that came to epitomise his confrontational ethno- Maasai nationalism,   veteran 
Maasai  political leader William ole Ntimama demanded  that the Kikuyu 
residents of Maasai  land  should ‘lie low like an envelope’ or they would suffer 
the consequences. During the era of multi-party politics, the Kalenjin and Maasai 
revived their clarion call for majimbo or regional type of government, in which 
most of the public affairs, including land, would be run by regions, except foreign 
affairs and defence. 
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452. The pro-majimbo group of leaders convened a series of rallies in Nandi, Kericho, 
Eldoret and the Coast Province to disseminate and explain their positions to the local 
people in the respective regions. They agitated for a devolved and decentralized 
federal system to counter the centralised system that was being championed then 
by the Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD) under the leadership of Oginga 
Odinga and other opposition figures. The pro-majimbo group publicly called upon 
their supporters to expel those who had acquired land in their Rift Valley and Coast 
provinces. The notion of Rift Valley as the sole entitlement of the Kalenjin, Maasai, 
Turkana and Samburu (KAMATUSA) was affirmed openly. 
453. A few days after the series of pro-majimbo rallies in the country, violent conflict 
erupted along the border of Nandi and Kisumu districts, pitting the local Nandi 
against a mixed group of other ethnic communities who had migrated there after 
independence.  The conflicts spread rapidly to the other farms in the area and to 
the nearby Kisumu District. This period witnessed the emergence of organized 
groups like the ‘Kalenjin Warriors’, who were armed with poisoned bows, arrows 
and machetes which they used to kill many people from other ethnic communities. 
454. They attacked the Luo and other pro-multi-party supporters in Nandi and Kericho, 
looting and burning their homes and destroying crops and fences. Leaflets were 
circulated in these areas calling for all non-Kalenjin to leave the area and go back to 
their original home lands elsewhere. In November of the same year, ethnic conflicts 
spread to Trans Nzoia, when ‘Kalenjin Warriors’ attacked members of the Luhya and 
Kikuyu communities in the Rift Valley and also burnt their homes and drove them 
away from settlement schemes in the area. 
455. That December, violent conflicts spread to Mount Elgon and Bungoma Districts 
between the pro-Majimbo Sabaot and Teso and the pro-FORD Bukusu. It took the 
personal intervention of President Moi to calm the situation through a series of 
peace rallies in the region. However, violence did not end. Violent conflict spread 
to other areas of the Rift Valley, where members of other ethnic communities, 
especially the Kikuyu from Central Province had been settled, especially to 
hotspot areas of Molo and Olenguruone in the larger Nakuru District. In the areas, 
leaflets were first circulated, demanding that non-Kalenjin (madoadoa or spots 
in Kalenjin land) vacate the area or face dire consequences. Violent conflicts in 
the area led to a number of deaths, injuries and rape. The most visible and unique 
feature of these conflicts was between the Kikuyu Mungiki militia group who 
were using pangas and rungus versus the ‘Kalenjin Warriors’ who were using 
poisoned arrows and spears. The violent conflicts spread further to Narok and 
Bomet, along the Kipsigis-Kisii border. Here the main victims were the Abagusii 
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and Kikuyu immigrants.  There were other areas where ethnic violence similarly 
broke out in the country.
456. In Burnt Forest, Uasin Gishu District, violence broke out with just three months to the 
December 27, 1992 elections. In this conflict, ‘Kalenjin Warriors’ drove away about 
15 000 Kikuyu and Luhya immigrants. The intention of the warriors was to create 
a pastoralist-dominated Rift Valley as a buffer zone against perceived land-hungry 
members of other ethnic communities – the Kikuyu, Luhya, Ameru and Abagusii. There 
was also an underlying fear that if Moi lost political power through the elections, then 
the Kalenjin would lose their communal land rights. The fear drove many Kalenjin to 
arm themselves to defend their traditional homeland from encroachment by those 
considered as outsiders or immigrants. The negative perception and related violent 
conflicts continued throughout the Moi regime, especially in Rift Valley and were 
perpetrated mostly by the Kalenjin, Maasai and Samburu.  
457. Unfortunately, the government’s response to ethnic violence was half-hearted, often 
engaging in blame-games with political leaders in the opposition parties. The opposition 
also counter-accused Moi of facilitating ethnic conflicts to prove his earlier prediction 
that multi-parties would create violence in the country. Moi’s inability to address land-
related conflicts was demonstrated by his failure to act firmly against Maasai political 
leaders who facilitated violent evictions of members of other communities living in 
Narok and Enoosupukia in 1993 and the Kalenjin who participated in acts of violence 
against the Luo and other communities in the Rift Valley, not to mention several acts of 
violence targeting upcountry communities at the Coast which were never punished, 
even though in many cases, perpetrators were well-known.416 
458. However, it should be noted that the occupation of land by persons considered as 
outsiders is not the only cause of land problems in Kenya. In many cases, the politicians 
themselves, as well as affluent members of communities have grabbed land from 
their own, especially in areas where land was, originally owned communally. 
459. In the case of the Maasai community, intermingling of other factors apart from 
outsider occupation in land problems, especially scarcity and landlessness has 
been explained as follows:
 the problems the Maasai are encountering are not caused by non-Maasai. They are just 
a secondary factor. The biggest cause of land problems in Maasai land generally are the 
Maasai leaders. It is the leadership.... They now use the land to secure political favours 
from the powers that be. Look at any grabbing taking place in Maasailand and at the 
centre of it is one or two Maasai leaders. With the competitive politics that we now have 
416  See, for example, Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 
12, 26 – 31 & 49.
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because of multi-partyism since 1992, we have now seen Maasai leaders disposing of 
public land to get money for campaigns.417
460. Apparently, politicians have extended land grabbing practices to their own 
communities and constituents and are significantly contributing to landlessness 
of their community members as well as land scarcity on the part of government. 
Therefore, efforts to address land problems should exceed the establishment 
of settlement schemes and completion of land adjudication and registration to 
actual prosecution of perpetrators of land grabbing.
	 Land and political conflict over the 2005 Draft Constitution
461. The centrality of land to the structure of governance and related politics appeared 
during campaigns in preparation for a national referendum over the current 
Constitution. Political conflicts arose between those who supported the adoption 
of a new constitution (the ‘Yes’ group) and those who opposed it (the ‘No’ group) 
not just over the Draft Constitution in general, but also over the wording of the 
land chapter therein. To many people, the wording of the land chapter in the 
Draft Constitution, also known as the Wako Draft, conveyed the government’s 
intention to centralize decisions on land issues, including decisions on acquisition, 
management and use and were objectionable because it was feared that they 
might support the detestable return of outsiders to areas where local communities 
had resisted their presence, especially the return and occupation of members 
of the Kikuyu ethnic community in the Rift Valley. The situation led to violent 
referendum campaigns where a number of people were killed and scores injured 
as leaflets circulated in many parts of the country warning “outsiders” in Rift Valley 
and Nyanza to prepare to leave should the Wako Draft Constitution be approved 
during the 2005 National Referendum. The constitutional referendum held in 2005 
failed to gather enough public support for a new constitution and the people of 
Kenya were, once again, left with no constitutional basis for addressing land issues.
	 Land and politics in the 2007 elections
462. The 2007 General Election presented another opportunity for individuals and for 
members of Kenyan ethnic communities affected by illegal land alienation during 
the colonial and post-colonial period to base their hope for resolution of land-
related injustices in political change, especially given the likelihood of a win by 
the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) that was perceived to be favourable to 
change, including in the lands sector.
417  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kajiado/08 December 2011/p. 28.
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463. Because Kenyans have, over the years, linked resolution of land injustices to political 
change, especially the introduction of a federal (majimbo) government, it was 
anticipated that an ODM government would establish necessary structures for land 
to be managed at regional levels to eliminate, among other things, chances of illegal 
land alienation by central government functionaries.  However, instead of waiting 
for change to unfold through laws and policies in a new government, members of 
communities and their political leaders in many parts of the country, once again, 
took advantage of the lax security situation in the country during and after the 
campaigns to resort to self-help measures in attempts to rid their homelands from 
immigrant communities.In the Rift Valley, the Kalenjin community was concerned 
about eviction of members of the Kikuyu community whose presence in their 
homeland had been considered detestable and unacceptable for many years. 
464. A similar situation prevailed at the Coast. At the Coast, indigenous communities, 
especially the Mijikenda, had over the years, strongly opposed the settlement of 
members of the Kikuyu community on their lands and perceived the anticipated 
political change as embodying the only chance for their final resolution of land 
problems. 
465. In Nairobi, property owners, especially from the Kikuyu community, considered 
the likely political change as ominous because of fear that house rents might be 
controlled by central government, thereby diminishing their profits. In Western 
Province, land problems of the Sabaot persisted and the possibility of change in 
governance held the promise of a final resolution resulting in the settlement of many 
landless members of the community who had been rendered destitute for decades.
466. In other parts of the Rift Valley, members of the Maasai community were expecting 
political change to usher in resolutions of land conflicts with the Kikuyu who were 
unacceptably settled on their homelands. It is, perhaps for these reasons that 
Mwai Kibaki lost the support of Kalenjin, Maasai and the Mijikenda, among other 
communities affected by illegal land alienations. However, all the expectations were 
dashed by irregularities and illegalities that characterized especially the presidential 
election of the time.
467. As a result of many communities’ failed expectations of political change that could 
have facilitated the final resolution of persisting land issues, members of almost 
all affected communities resorted to violent means to address the persistent land 
problems from the colonial times to post-independence Kenya. These communities 
also sought to vent pent-up anger at the resented dominance of members of 
the Kikuyu, Meru and Embu communities in Kenya’s Treasury, Kenya Revenue 
Authority, Central Bank, Internal Security and Provincial Administration, among 
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other key sectors, which formed part of the broader inequalities and historical 
injustices persisting in the country. 
468. In various parts of the country, several more organized militia or ethnic “self-defence” 
groups emerged, with support of local politicians, to either defend their land against 
invasion by members of other communities or avenge previous alienations of their 
land and displacement from their homelands. In the Rift Valley, there emerged 
and re-emerged ‘Maasai Warriors’ and ‘Kalenjin Warriors’, among others; in western 
Kenya, there emerged the Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF), in Kisii, the Chinkororo 
re-emerged; and at the Coast, there emerged various militia groups, eventually 
culminating in the establishment of the broader Mombasa Republican Army (MRC), 
whose agenda include secession of the Coastal Strip from Kenya.418 
469. The unprecedented violent activities of the various militia groups nearly drove 
Kenya into civil war between December 31, 2007 soon after flawed presidential 
results were announced and February 2008 when a National Peace Accord was 
eventually agreed. A report of the Commission that investigated post-election 
violence in Kenya traces roots of the 2007-2008 violence to inequalities in land 
acquisition and settlement419 and states that as a result of the widespread violence, 
more than 350 000 people were displaced from their homes and farms and at least 
1 200 killed.420 The suffering and destitution that resulted has been described in 
many ways that convey a sense of urgency in resettlement as been explained here:
During the displacement many people died, more than what is documented by the 
Government. We lost our children, fathers and other relatives. Even it goes beyond what 
the government said; 1,333 people died. We know of people who died and were buried 
even before it was reported. Our property and everything that we had was destroyed. 
Others were looted. Some of us sustained injuries. We are suffering because we do not 
have money to buy drugs or seek medical care. It is very expensive for us because we 
do not have money. Therefore, many people have died after displacement because of 
psychological trauma. Some relatives got lost and have not been found to date. There 
are parents who do not know where their children are to date. There are children who 
cannot trace their parents. People lost their jobs. All our rights were violated. Our human 
basic rights were abused. Some women and girls were raped… There are violations in 
the camps. Among many violations, there is lack of shelter. IDPs are just living in those 
tents that were given out in 2008. These are old and worn out tents.421
470. The severity of the 207-2008 post-election violence brought to the fore the critical 
nexus between land-related injustices and politics and the potential of a mix of 
both to destroy the country. It also presented, in no uncertain terms, the need for 
418  See, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) (2008) at 27.
419  Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) (2008) at 21-30.
420  Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) (2008) at 271-346.
421  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nakuru/23 September 2011/ p.35, para 2.
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urgent redress of existing land-related injustices. However, while lessons for the 
nation concerning failure to resolve land-related disputes were clear, the manner 
in which the problem of internally displaced persons was handled reflected what 
Kenyans, by then, knew too well - the preferential treatment of members of certain 
communities in Kenya at the expense of others.
471. The convergence of political factors with land problems brought about 
displacement of people of virtually all ethnic communities in Kenya but mostly 
the Kikuyu, Luo, Kalenjin, Luhya and Kamba. However, by then, there were large 
numbers of other people and communities already internally displaced in historical 
and political circumstances already explained, who had been awaiting settlement 
for many years while living on abject poverty. Therefore, efforts to settle the most 
recent IDPs, mostly members of the Kikuyu tribe, while others have been awaiting 
similar government intervention for years, especially at the Coast, in the Rift Valley 
and in western Kenya demonstrated, again, bias by Kibaki’s administration in 
favour of members of the Kikuyu ethnic community against all others who were 
similarly affected and whose discontent has been expressed as follows:
While the Kenyans who were displaced by the post-election violence of 2007 are 
considered Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), little consideration has been given to the 
Lamu community members who were forced out of their farmland in 12 villages, including 
in Shakani, Shendeni, Vundeni by the security forces during the  Shifta War in the 1960s. 
These locals, who were, in essence, the first IDPs in Independent Kenya, were forced to 
move into slums in Lamu or to migrate to other areas of Kenya and Tanzania and, to date, 
no form of redress has been given.422
472. It is the view of many affected Kenyans that the earliest IDPs in the land have 
suffered for too long and, therefore, the government should give them the highest 
priority in settlement.423 It has also been emphasized by affected communities 
that to avoid problems that might arise from continued selective settlement, all 
persons and families currently living as squatters in the country should be settled. 
In the words of an affected individual:
When it comes to resettlement, all tribes should be resettled because there are squatters 
even among the Kalenjin. Those differences in resettlement are causing problems and 
it should be uniform...424
473. Discrimination in settlement of IDPs worsens existing land injustices which, in totality, 
contributed significantly to the post-election violence of 2007-2008.  Contributions 
of existing land-related injustices to the violence were clearly demonstrated by host 
community resistance to the return of IDPs to their homelands. The matter was aptly 
described as follows:
422  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/ Lamu/9 January 2012/ p. 4, para 3.
423  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nakuru/23 September 2011/ p. 5.
424  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nakuru/23 September 2011/ p.46, para 2 & 6.
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Some decided to go back to where they had been displaced. However, they were not 
received well. Nobody welcomed them there. They were not even given a chance to enter 
into their farms. Some of them stay here with us. They went back into their farms, but they 
are still living in these transit camps. These are just camps that are in shopping centres. 
Others are near the District Commissioner’s office, where they feel there is safety. It is at 
this point where they can do their farming during the day and return to the tents in the 
evening.425
474. Obviously, resettlement of IDPs alone is not adequate. A lot of peace building 
initiatives ought to accompany resettlement of all affected persons to promote 
acceptance of co-existence and integration in order to avoid resurgence of 
violence after settlement. Also, the fact that a very high level of ethnic violence was 
witnessed in Kenya for the first time in 2007-2008 and that it was largely prompted 
by land-related injustices should bring the need for resolution of all pending land 
issues to the fore of the government’s agenda. 
475. Since Kenya bases its development largely on agriculture, meaningful development 
will not take place unless all pending land-related issues that hamper agriculture 
are resolved with finality. Moreover, resettlement efforts targeting the latest stream 
of IDPs have been riddled with the same corruption that characterized dealings in 
land in both the Kenyatta and Moi administrations. The following is an account of 
circumstances surrounding IDP settlement efforts in the absence of transparency 
and accountability:
After people are resettled, they are given tents. They are given one tent for a whole 
household with adult children. They live in the same tent with their grown up children. 
We know that there are iron sheets that were donated by the government of China. 
Where are these iron sheets? The government says people should stay there for a whole 
one year without proper shelter. Why can they not give us those iron sheets? Many of us 
are exposed to cold. In such conditions, we are bound to fall sick. Malaria and pneumonia 
are common diseases in those areas and even in these transit camps. After people were 
settled, many of them died. With regard to water and sanitation, we feel the government 
is not doing enough. After the government had taken us there, it did not care to see 
where these people would get their water. I thank the Nakuru District Commissioner 
then. He gave people piped water. But unfortunately, we learnt recently that there is a 
bill of Ksh3.4 million, which they never knew that they were supposed to pay, and the 
water was disconnected. So many toilets in the camps are full. During the rainy season, 
waste overflows into the tents. This is very dangerous and poses health risks.426
476. It appears that efforts to address past and current land injustices would have to be 
accompanied with efforts to eradicate corruption in order for success to be realized.
425  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/ Nakuru/23 September 2011/ p.35, para 2.
426  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nakuru/23 September 2011/  p.36, para 2, 3 & 4.
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Key Actors and Factors in Land-Related Problems
477. In this chapter, origins of the current land problems persisting in the country have 
been traced from the colonial period to the present time. Land-related injustices 
including instances of illegalities and irregularities attendant acquisition and 
ownership of land have been presented. In the foregoing elaboration, certain factors 
and actors emerge that are considered to be key in the emergence and facilitation 
of acts and omissions in relation to land that today, threaten to destroy the fabric of 
Kenya, as a nation. It is deemed necessary that the key facts and actors be presented 
here to highlight their contributions to existing land problems so that expected 
redress efforts are undertaken with them in mind to avoid impeding the efforts.
The provincial administration and illegal acquisition of land
478. Whether or not officers falling under the gamut of the provincial administration 
will continue to form part of the governance structure of Kenya is debatable but 
as things stand today, they are likely to be erroneously subsumed in the county 
structures countrywide. Therefore, with their past participation in land deals 
in mind, their presence and likely contributions, negatively or positively to the 
expected land reforms in the country ought to inform decisions to either include 
or exclude them altogether. The provincial administration is one of the systems of 
governance that Kenya inherited from the colonial government, with authority, 
power and influence. It is (until subsumed in the county governance structure, if 
at all) a department in the Office of the President.427 It has, over the years, been 
heavily relied upon by post-independence governments for general control and 
implementation of government policies. 
479. In addition, during the reign of KANU as a political party, the provincial administration 
took over certain important responsibilities of the party, such as recruitment and 
registration of its members, organization of KANU elections, collection and custody 
of KANU funds and the issuance of permits for public meetings.428 Between 1963 
and 1992 when the defunct Electoral Commission of Kenya was established, the 
provincial administration also conducted national elections.429 As the central 
government’s principal public relations officer, an important feature of the day-to-
day functions of provincial administration officers is the holding of barazas, an age-
old forum of communication with the public.430 Barazas are intended for government 
to make known its intentions and to also seek support from the public. 
427  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 27.
428  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 27.
429  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 27.
430  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 27.
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480. Barazas should also allow the public to register their views and reactions, 
including those concerning simmering problems and conflicts between and 
within communities.431 Moreover, the provincial administration has also played 
significant roles with regard to internal security. Provincial commissioners have 
been the chairmen of provincial security committees and provincial intelligence 
committees. At the district level, district commissioners are the chairmen of district 
security committees and district intelligence committees. 
481. Other members of the committees at provincial and district levels are, respectively, 
the provincial heads of the various departments of the police force and district heads 
of similar institutions. Sub-district security committees are chaired by district officers 
and also a similarly composed organ exists at the divisional level. Representatives of 
the army may be co-opted as members of the security committees.432 Even though 
the role of provincial administration and that of the police force, may, as far as 
security matters are concerned, be said to be complementary, in reality, the provincial 
administration dominates over the police force. Clearly, the provincial administration 
has been occupying a position of considerable power as the political agent of the 
Executive.433 The provincial administration consists of a network of officers at various 
levels countrywide. There have been a total of eight provincial commissioners, 604 
district officers (DOs), 2 190 and 6 029 assistant chiefs countrywide.434
482. Regardless of their prominent positions in government and the potential 
to contribute significantly to the economic and social development of the 
country throughout post-independence Kenya, officers serving in the provincial 
administration have blatantly subverted the law, participated in various acts 
of lawlessness, committed atrocities on the people of Kenya and remained 
complacent when their action was required to redress wrongs. For example, a report 
of the Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes435 established that officers in the 
provincial administration of various ranks turned a blind eye to reprehensible acts 
of KANU leaders in the misconception that it was their duty to sustain a continued 
ascendancy of a political party under which they had thrived in power.436 
483. They also directly participated in the forceful evictions of innocent Kenyans who did 
not belong to their ethnic communities,437 directed armed administration police 
officers to bulldoze houses of innocent Kenyans and thereby subjected them to 
poverty and destitution.438 The officers were found to have withheld vital security 
431 Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 27. 
432  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 28.
433  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 28.
434  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 27.
435  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998.
436  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 29.
437  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 30.
438  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 30.
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information that would have averted tribal clashes at the Coast, among other 
parts of Kenya, including the attack on the Likoni police station.439 They condoned 
actions of Digo youth who had attacked Likoni police station, killing at least 10 
police officers440 and remained partisan when tribal clashes broke out in Gucha 
District.441 They generally maintained a lukewarm attitude towards addressing 
real threats of tribal clashes between 1991 and 2007,442 deliberately declined to 
undertake their security-related duties and duties related to maintenance and 
restoration of law and order.443 Further some of them perpetrated acts of violence 
including the burning of peoples’ houses in collaboration with the administration 
police in Nakuru and Kericho, among other places.444 These are just a few of the 
illegal activities of officers serving in the provincial administration, which leads to 
the conclusion that the persistent land-related problems are due, largely to their 
acts of commission and omission. 
484. For the same reasons, the provincial administration is unsuitable to serve in the 
new county structures and should be scrapped. Details of their illegalities are 
presented in the following paragraphs. The provincial administration is one 
institution that has been used by past governments to implement settlement and 
re-settlement programmes and decisions, but their participation has had disastrous 
consequences. In many cases, they facilitated illegal and irregular allocation of 
land for their own benefit, their cronies, collaborators and family members and, 
in many cases, carried out unjustifiable and illegal evictions of landless Kenyans in 
different parts of the country. Chiefs, DOs, DCs, PCs and officers in the district and 
divisional plot allocation committees in various parts of the country participated 
in illegal acquisition of land meant for settlement of the landless and in the sale of 
some of the land meant for settlement for their own benefit. 
485. Some also engaged in extorting money and other commodities, including 
livestock, from the landless and landed community members. For example, in an 
exercise that was intended to settle members of the Ogiek community, both the 
local chief and the assistant chiefs who were trusted with the process of issuing title 
deeds sold them to non-deserving individuals, even in the presence of landless 
community members who were waiting to be issues with the same.445 An affected 
community member present at the time of the illegal sale of the land described the 
illegal transaction as follows:
439  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 31.
440  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 31.
441  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 32.
442  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 32.
443  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 33.
444  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 35 – 36.
445  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kericho/19 September 2011/ p. 36 para 3.
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Some of them were actually being sold at that time. One of them was actually negotiating 
with someone. He received money, but no action was taken despite our complaints at 
the chief’s office. This is the letter from Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC). This 
letter shows that the chief was actually selling the land. He was selling it to people and 
issuing them with title deeds immediately. The chief would meet somebody and give 
him the card. This card entitles you to five acres of land. The chief was selling each at 
KSh500,000. I have the evidence here.446
486. The testimony describes the blatant manner in which members of the provincial 
administration illegally acquired community land with wanton impunity in not just 
one, but several parts of the country. It is interesting that in the case described 
above, members of the affected community fought for their land to the point 
of reporting the case to the Kenya Anti-corruption Commission (KACC), but 
apparently no action was taken against the thieving officers. 
487. During the exercise intended to re-settle members of the Ogiek community, a DC also, 
with the aid of administration police, forcibly evicted some genuine landless who should 
have been allocated land and in the process, forcefully took away their livestock, leaving 
them destitute.447 The act was additional to committing several other human rights 
atrocities against members of the community, causing many of them to flee.448
488. In Sotik, community members struggled to establish a trust fund to jointly purchase 
a farm for their settlement in 1968. However, after making all the payments, 
including repayment of the loan that they had obtained for that purpose, Mr 
Harry Wamubey, a former Kericho District Commissioner, illegally sold the land 
to a different community and pocketed the money. As if his act of corruption 
was not damaging enough to the community members, he returned, took their 
prime livestock and sold them for his own profit.449 The DC’s gross violation of the 
community’s land and other rights was described as follows:
we bought our farm in 1968. I am before you this morning because of the problems 
caused by the DC. He has taken away the land we had bought. We bought the land on 
20th August 1968 through trust fund. We sold milk to Sotik KCC and also sold 200 cows 
every year to raise this money. In 1973, we sold 200 cows; in 1974 we sold others and 
paid a total of KSh70,000. Later we paid KSh12,616. In 1975, we sold another 200 cows 
to the Kenya Meat Commission (KMC). In 1976, there was drought and we sold more 
cows to add to the loan we had. Each member contributed three bulls and we paid 
KSh120,000. In 1980, we sold 500 cows to KMC and sold pyrethrum to the Pyrethrum 
Board of Kenya (PBK). We also sold maize. In 1981, we completed repaying the loan 
446  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kericho/19 September 2011/ p. 36, para 3.
447  TJRC/Memo/M0013/ p. 23-25.
448  TJRC/Memo/M0013/ p. 23-25.
449  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kericho/20 September 2011/ p. 31-32.
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amounting to KSh200,023. After completing paying the loan on 26th, 27th and 28th 
January in 1982, the former Kericho DC, Mr Harry Wamubey, came. We stayed for a while 
and heard that he had sold the farm to a different community of 363 people. He sold our 
farm and the people paid him some money. He took KSh3,162,000 from those people. 
He banked the money in Acc.No.001784 in Kisumu so that we could not know what was 
going on. On 14th December 1982, the DC came back and sold some of the 11 heifers 
that were on that farm at a cost of KSh55, 553…In 1999, the DC sub-divided the farm 
again. He got a piece for himself.450
489. The account described by the affected community member smacks of looting from 
poor Kenyans by an officer entrusted with the responsibility of their protection 
and improvement of their livelihoods. For such kind of heinous acts, it is not right 
for the provincial administration to be incorporated in county establishments all. 
In Bomet, a District Officer who was placed in charge of sub-division of a farm for 
distribution to community members illegally took a plot for himself, which was 
registered as plot No.547, which he subsequently sold to one Micah Ng’erechi.451 
490. In the same fraudulent exercise, Assistant Chief Moses Rop took plot No.462 which 
he subsequently sold to Edward Rotich.452 Senior Settlement Officer Isaya Nyamache 
also, illegally acquired plot No.426 which he sold to one Chemutai Lang’at.453 Other 
officers in the provincial administration also illegally acquired land as follows:
The fourth person was the chief called David Kiplang’at Ng’eno who also irregularly 
acquired plot No.425 and gave it to his driver called Reuben Tanui. The other one of the 
plots he acquired was No.348 which was sold to Mr Joseph Kirui. The person who was 
employed as the manager of Mr Joseph Ng’eno also irregularly acquired land parcel 
No.443. He gave it to his wife claiming that she was among the members. Out of all 
those people, we are 234 who are original members. We have a register.454
491. Where evidence is available as in the case described above, action should be taken, 
without any further delay, to prosecute the errant provincial administration officials.
Community members in many parts of the country complained that the heinous 
practices of provincial administration officials was not only an unfair and irregular, 
but they also created inequalities in land ownership. They also denied the country 
the full benefits of environment and cultural heritage because in many cases, 
officials in the provincial administration also encroached onto protected lands 
such as road reserves, forests, riparian reserves, wetlands, foreshores, monuments 
and historical sites as well as spiritual (shrines) sites of some communities. In 
many cases, officers in the provincial administration did not act alone; they acted 
450  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kericho/20 September 2011/ p. 31-32.
451  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kericho/20 September 2011/ p. 31-32.
452  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kericho/20 September 2011/ p. 31-32.
453  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kericho/20 September 2011/ p. 31-32.
454  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kericho/20 September 2011/ p. 31-32.
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in collaboration with elected members of Parliament, among others, to illegally 
acquire land, including land forming part of group ranches. With reference to some 
of the group ranches, the problem was explained as follows:
The issue with all these group ranches [Kuku Group Ranch, Kimana, Ikiondo Group 
Ranch, Mbirikani] is that it has been a play ground where Group Ranches Management 
Committee, the local member of Parliament and the DC have made them their cash 
cows. All revenues earned from the eco-tourism activities are just taken by the DC and 
the management committee. The group ranch members have been silenced by the 
provincial administration through the use of excessive force, arrests and manipulation 
of the land controls. The Land Adjudication Officer and the Registrar of Group Ranches 
have become tools of approving these malpractices.455 
492. In many cases, as in the one above, community members protested against illegal 
acquisition of their land and related resources by members of the provincial 
administration. However, their protests were often violently thwarted in ways that 
were likely to generate more violence and conflicts, as described below:
When he realized that we were very keen on following up this matter although we were 
not being listened to, they came back and started arresting people.”456
493. Apparently, provincial administration officials enlisted the aid of police officers to 
arrest and torture community members who complained against their illegalities. 
As the following sentiment discloses, provincial administration officers abused their 
offices whenever the citizens protested illegalities relating to land by using the police 
to effect arrests as a way of intimidating protesters. In other cases, officers serving in 
the provincial administration, in total disregard of the law, entrenched robbery of 
poor community members in their daily operations for very long period of time. In 
this connection, former Baringo District Commissioner Philemon Mwaisaka and his 
cohort, Ezekiel Barng'etuny, were notable.457 In addition to committing other human 
rights violations against the very communities that they were assigned to serve, they 
also, for as long as 10 years, robbed the community of livestock, their only means of 
subsistence. Their deplorable conduct was described as follows:
We are seeking also direct compensation in respect of the robbery with violence 
charge and our goats which we lost during the famous ‘Kimalel Goat Auction’. We were 
literally robbed of our goats by Mr Philemon Mwaisaka, who was the former Baringo 
District Commissioner. The goats were being auctioned by Mr Ezekiel Barng’etuny…I 
want to state clearly that we never volunteered to sell goats in Kimalel. You would 
wake up in the morning and find a lorry outside with administration police inside. They 
455  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kajiado/08 December 2011/ p. 30, para 2.
456  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kericho/19 September 2011/ p. 36, para 4.
457  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nakuru/23 September 2011/ p.6, para 1 &2.
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would descend on your boma and take your goats in the name of orders from the DC. 
They took them to auction in Kimalel. There was no meaningful development given 
to us. So, we lost goats for nearly 10 years. I wish the Commission could investigate 
and see what we were given or if anything was built on our behalf. There is nothing 
in place. If that was not an economic crime, then it should have been something else 
like being robbed.458
494. It is recommended that all of the officers who participated in such acts of human 
rights violations including illegal land acquisition while serving in the provincial 
administration, who are still alive, be prosecuted.
Multiple claims over land 
495. The Commission established that multiple claims over land are a cause of tension 
and violent conflicts in the country. Multiple claims over land have arisen as a 
result of the willing-buyer, willing-seller land transactions without a ceiling on 
the maximum amount of land that one could privately own, the sale of allotment 
letters to third parties, claims over land based on ancestral homelands and related 
abuse of office, political patronage, official corruption, and ignorance among the 
majority of citizens. 
496. As elaborated below, a mix of these factors has resulted in physical violence, bodily 
injuries, deaths, community displacements and violation of the human rights and 
freedoms of many individuals and communities. 
497. Proponents of historical claims over certain territories include the Maasai, 
Kalenjin, some communities at the Coast and in the North Eastern regions who 
originally lost their land either through annexation, forced evictions or irregular 
land agreements by the colonialists. The claims find support in those who 
believe that communal land tenure based on the traditional African customary 
land tenure was the most suitable system of land tenure for indigenous Africans. 
Those who maintain the position often cite the unfair, brutal and unjust means 
by which they lost their land as well as the assurances by Jomo Kenyatta and 
KANU during the struggle for independence which were never honoured. 
498. For example, with reference to land over which some of the communities that now 
live in the Rift Valley lay claim, it was stated that:
I have also included an abstract from the Provincial Commissioner in 1961, which 
indicated where people were supposed to be settled, but instead people from other 
458  TJRC/Hansard/Nakuru/ New County Hall Nakuru/Harun Chemjor Chepkeitany Chepkeitan/23 September 2011, p. 21 & 22.
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provinces were transported and allocated land. This land includes Wanyororo, Engashura, 
Limuru Pyrethrum, Lari-Nyakinyua, Endarasha and Ikure. However, the natives were not 
settled.459
499. It appears that communities that do not currently live in the foregoing areas, 
having been occupied by other tribes, maintain an entitlement to the areas as 
their ancestral homelands on the basis that they were the original inhabitants 
of the areas. A similar situation prevails in the Rift Valley, where various 
communities including the Maasai, the Pokot, the Ogiek and the Kipsigis, to 
mention just a few, all claim to have been  displaced because of the historical 
injustice orchestrated by both the colonial government and the successive 
post-colonial regimes. As elaboration in the foregoing sections of this report 
reveal, such claims have been the cause of violent evictions of members of 
certain ethnic communities in Eldoret, Burnt Forest, Molo, and several parts of 
the Coast, among others.
500. The likelihood of violence over multiple land claims based on historical homelands 
is increased by the failure of Kenyatta’s administration to apply settlement funds 
provided by the British government and other donors as part of the independence 
package to benefit all deserving communities. It is on record that the British 
government, through the Colonial Development Fund, gave the Kenya Government 
0.75 million for purchase of farms for settlement of all tribes that were in need of 
settlement or re-settlement. 
501. To the contrary, members of mainly one tribe benefited, at the expense of 
others who have, over the years, maintained the view that they were cheated.460 
The view that members of particular ethnic communities are entitled to their 
historical/original homelands has not remained unscathed. There are opponents 
of the historical claims model of land rights and redress on that basis, comprising 
mainly those who believe in the modern individual land rights based on the 
English property rights system that has firmly taken hold in the country. Such 
proponents support the willing-buyer, willing-seller model of land tenure, based 
on sanctity of land titles. The two positions conflict, not only where historical 
claims over land exist, but also where land was illegally acquired but title to it 
made indefeasible, especially by the Registered Land Act (now repealed), making 
it difficult, if not impossible for those with genuine claims to recover their “stolen” 
land. It is necessary to exercise a careful balance of all the interests raised in order 
to find acceptable solutions to the problems, especially of persisting landlessness 
and incomplete adjudication and registration processes.
459  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nakuru/23 September 2011/ p.6, para 4.
460  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kericho/19 September 2011, p. 29, para 7.
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Allotment letters as catalyst for land grabbing
502. During the colonial era and part of the post-independence period, letters of 
allotment given to qualified applicants were never transferable to a third party, 
since such letters did not create an interest to be traded until registration was 
completed. However, in 1994, Legal Notice No. 305 was passed, which allowed 
for the sale of allotment letters to third parties on payment of consent fees 
equivalent to 2 percent of the selling price or capital value of the land, whichever 
was higher. This provided a leeway for and fuelled land grabbing in the country, 
where individuals would be allocated land and immediately make arrangements 
to sell it for millions of shillings without first paying the standard premium. The 
ensuing land grabbing and forceful evictions, especially by politicians and their 
cronies affected the enjoyment of other rights such as access to water, freedom of 
movement, and access to education as illustrated in the following sentiment: 
My sentiments here are movement and accessing water. This land where we are 
disputing is possessed by the family of Moi. They have fenced along the river and for us 
to get water…Molo River is the only source of water. Since Molo River passes through 
that farm, they have erected gates and you do not go through them without paying. 
So, you pay for natural water. We cannot also cross to the other side called Emining or 
Noyuet. We are forced to go 15 or 20 kilometres until Mogotio and then back again, 
yet a public road used to exist. If you have to pass through the road, payment must 
be made… For our children to go to school, they have to pass through that path, but 
payment must be made. We consider that as an atrocity. 461
503. Hindrance of access to water and other amenities as a result of illegal sale of 
allotment letters has had worse effects on communities living in marginal 
unproductive areas where they were selectively settled during the colonial period. 
For example, communities in Cherangany have complained that:
Where we were placed by the colonial government is a place where water is not available; 
it is rocky. Our lives centre on animals. Without grass and water, no animal will survive. 
So, this river must be made accessible to us. We cannot plant maize or other crops and 
so we have to be in Lomolo in order to survive.462
504. Forceful evictions of communities in the area can be traced to the colonial period 
and later acquisition of their land by politicians after colonialists left, as already 
elaborated.  In the current Cherangany constituency in Trans Nzoia East, there have 
not only been forced evictions, but the area has also experienced official brutality, 
forcing many residents to flee  to market centres such as Nzoia, Kaplamai, Moi's 
461  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nakuru/23 September 2011/ p. 15, para 8.
462  TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nakuru/23 September 2011/ p. 16, para 8.
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Bridge slums, Sibanga and Maili Saba (Sirende) for shelter.463 In many of the places, 
community members who ones lived in the security of their homesteads have 
been exposed to hunger, destitution, insecurity, prostitution and related vices.464
Ethnicity as a cause of land-related tension and conflicts
505. Ethnicity and ethnic stereotypes and perceptions created by the colonialists and 
later entrenched by post-independence political leaders are critical variables in the 
analysis of the complexities of land problems and related injustices in Kenya. It is 
not unusual for members of a particular community in Kenya to stereotype another 
by use of derogatory and, in some cases, dehumanizing names, terminologies, 
references, characteristics and/or features that exhibit, on the part of perpetrators 
and attract, from subjects, hatred, animosity, resentment, discrimination, conflict 
and, in some cases, violence.
506. Soon after independence and for many years since then, ethnic consciousness 
and drive to control political power in Kenya has largely been influenced by 
the struggle to maintain land and related assets illegally and unjustly acquired, 
especially from the now landless and land-scarce, in the midst of affected 
communities seeking to restore lost land rights, including those arising from 
colonialism and those generated by post-independence land grabbing.465 The 
point is made plain by the not uncommon promises by politicians to assist 
their communities to recover “stolen” land when they come to political power. 
Obviously, those who have benefited from illegal land deals also seem to be 
determined to hang on to power, at all costs, in order to protect their illegally 
acquired lands, among other assets.
507. For these reasons, ethnically-instigated conflict, especially those that revolve around 
politics and political power, have endured over the years, despite many efforts to 
build national identity. The vice has shaped Kenya’s political system, as influenced 
perpetually by Kenyan politicians and the public institutions they occupy including 
the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary.466 It could also have influenced the 
resolve of national leaders, expressly and impliedly, not to address land-related 
injustices. The situation has to quickly change for Kenya to remain one nation. 
463  TJRC/Memo/M0791/ p. 1.
464  TJRC/Memo/M0791/ p. 1.
465 There is indeed a warped picture of the historical land injustices, consisting of historical claims, multiple claims, skewed distribution 
of land during resettlement, illegal and irregular land deals that has not only caused confusion but also made the process of 
addressing the land problem more complex and political.
466  This can be ascertained by examining the nature, magnitude, pattern and impact of the various ethnic and political conflicts that 
have occurred in Kenya since independence, where the magnitude and impact seems to be multiplying before, during and after 
every electioneering period. The information about the perennial conflicts is contained in official government reports, including the 
Kiliku Parliamentary Select Committee Report on Ethnic Conflicts, The Akiwumi Commission of Inquiry Report and more recently 
the Waki Commission of Inquiry Report.
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508. In most parts of Rift Valley, among other parts of Kenya, land-related tension and 
structural conflicts that had simmered over the years, largely unchecked due to 
negative ethnicity, have engendered lack of concern for the affected communities 
have degenerated into physical violence. 
509. For example, the marginalised Sabaot took up arms in 2004 in Mount Elgon area to 
protest decades of conflicts over land allocated to them as ‘squatters’ when, in fact, 
they were the true owners of the land. 
510. The unchecked violence in Mount Elgon area escalated in 2006 and 2007 when 
the Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF) killed hundreds of people perceived 
to be outsiders, and their collaborators in protest over grabbing of their land 
and settlement rights in Chebyuk area in Kopsiro Division. During the Kibaki 
administration, historical inequalities and injustices underlying many of the 
instances of ethnic violence were exposed but so far, there has been no official 
action targeting the causes. Moreover, the Ndung’u Report, so far the most detailed 
on land illegalities, failed to trace the existing land problems in many parts of the 
country to their historical roots.
511. Mount Elgon area is not the only part of the country that experienced land-
related violence triggered by negative ethnicity. There was also conflict between 
the Maasai and the Kipsigis in Trans Mara in 2004. Water and land rights were 
Mrs. Salome Matakwei, widow of the late Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF) leader Mr. Wycliffe Matakwei, 
testifying before the TJRC
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also the main causes of the violent conflict that broke out in January 2005 in 
Naivasha between the Maasai and the Kikuyu, where 15 people were killed and 
several houses burned down. Surprisingly, instead of addressing the causes of 
the violence, warring communities received reinforcements from members of 
their communities. While the Maasai in Naivasha received reinforcement from 
their kin (morans) in Narok, the Kikuyu received reinforcement from their kin 
(Mungiki) from Kiambu. In other parts of the Rift Valley, messages prompted 
by ethnic hatred, as far back as 1993, raised claims that Rift Valley was for the 
Kalenjin, Maasai, and other pastoralists, and that immigrants must leave, keep 
silent or support Moi, from the region, to avoid death or eviction from their 
land. 
512. For instance in October 1993, then cabinet minister Francis Lotodo demanded 
that all the Kikuyu leave West Pokot within 48 hours, or they would be dealt 
with “mercilessly.”467  There were similar anti-immigrant threats in Turkana and 
other parts of Rift Valley, particularly Kericho, Bomet, Trans-Nzoia and Uasin 
Gishu. On several occasions, the Kikuyu were warned that they must “toe 
the line” in Maasailand or they would be punished. The numerous cases of 
ethnically-instigated violent evictions in many parts of the country appeared 
to be eroding the ‘willing-buyer, willing-seller’ system that was beginning to 
be closely associated with development in the country and Kenya appeared 
to be heading towards a balkanised system of ethnic fragmentation and the 
institutionalization of negative ethnicity, nepotism ethnic discrimination and 
stigma/stereotyping. By 1997, ethnic-related trouble revolving around land and 
politics spread to the erstwhile peaceful areas along the Gucha-Trans Mara–
Migori border between the Maasai, the Abagusii and the Luo, largely prompted 
by differing party allegiances.
513. The Akiwumi Commission of Inquiry established in 1998 to investigate into the 
ethnic clashes related to the 1997 General Election vividly demonstrated how 
the skewed land allocation and ownership has over the years fuelled ethnic 
tensions and subsequently led to violent ethnic conflicts in different parts of 
the country, particularly in the Rift Valley and Coast regions of Kenya.468 The 
Commission heard  that there was a long standing Kalenjin and Maasai aversion 
or grudge to ‘outsiders or strangers’ living in their midst and on their ancestral 
land, which were alienated by the colonial administration for white settlers, but 
at independence were not returned to the ‘first owners or traditional owners’ 
as a key factor that caused recurrent ethnic conflicts. The long-simmering 
467  Economic Review, 1 November,1993,p.8
468  See, Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 27 – 31, 49 
and 53 – 55.
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ethnic tensions over land have often been exploited by the politicians to cause 
conflicts around the time of elections as witnessed in the trends of 1992, 1997 
and 2007/8.469
514. There has also been a gap between the government’s policy directives and their 
implementation, as illustrated by a typical case in parts of the Rift Valley involving 
the Maasai and immigrant communities in the Enoosupukia area of Narok District 
(now Narok County). Retired president Moi is on record to have ordered the 
resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in this area, but Maasai leader 
William ole Ntimama and the local administration were unwilling to comply with 
his directive. In fact, most of the IDPs congregated in makeshift camps in Nakuru 
for a very long time. On 23 December 1994 the police forcibly rounded up 2 000 
displaced persons from the Nakuru camp and dumped them at what was said to 
be their “ancestral homes in Central Province.” 
515. The camp was destroyed and the message it sent was loud and clear for immigrants, 
“leave Enoosupukia and Maasailand.”470 It is not surprising that violence involving 
the same ethnic communities recurred in Enoosupukia.471Ethnicity appears to 
be reflected even in the settlement of internally displaced persons, or lack of it. 
During the Moi administration, the large numbers of IDS from Enoosupukia area 
who were, from 1993, being driven away by communities believing the area to be 
their homeland remained largely unsettled.472 Efforts of the regime to settle the 
IDPs remained slow, selective and in some cases, inappropriate. For example, the 
government often used to declare curfews from 6pm to 6am, whenever ethnic 
conflicts occurred, instead of decisively addressing its causes and effects. For 
instance, in September the 1993, Moi’s government declared Molo, Burnt Forest 
and part of Kericho security zones and continued to exercise emergency powers 
until 1995. 
516. The entry of journalists and observers was restricted, while attacks on IDPs 
occurred. 473 The result was that that over 30 people were killed, hundreds injured 
and between 25 000 and 30 000 displaced from their land and residential homes.474 
The treatment seems to have been reciprocated when negative ethnicity spurred 
violence in late 2007 and early 2008. 
469  See, Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 27 – 31, 49 
and 53 – 55.
470  Republic of Kenya, Report of the Judicial Commission appointed to inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Report, Nairobi, 
1999, pp.165-170.
471  Republic of Kenya, Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Report, Nairobi, 1999 at 
51.
472  Republic of Kenya, Report of the Judicial Commission appointed to inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Report, Nairobi, 
1999, pp.165-170.
473  Sunday Nation, 18 June 1995,p.3
474  Sunday Nation, 18 June 1995,p.3
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517. There were no government efforts to settle IDPs who were not from the Kikuyu 
ethnic community when Mwai Kibaki was in power. It appears that non-members of 
the Kikuyu community, including large numbers of the Kalenjin, the Luo, the Luhya 
and even Tanzanians who were evicted, especially from Nakuru and Naivasha, were 
not even officially recognized as IDPs, thanks to negative ethnicity and tribal hatred 
and animosity that appear to pervade even high-ranking government decisions. 
Commissions of Inquiry and Land 
518. Before its formation by law in the year 2008, previous independence governments 
had made a number of efforts to investigate land related injustices, sometimes 
directly and other times in the course of investigating other national maladies, 
such as prevalent tribal clashes. The discussion below focuses on just a few of 
those commissions of inquiry. 
Select committee on issue of land ownership along the 10-mile Coastal 
Strip
519. The first national commission to investigate land-related problems in the country 
after independence was established during the Kenyatta administration in 1976, 
in the nature of a Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the 
10-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya.475 As the title suggests, the committee’s mandate 
with regard to land-related injustices was limited to the coastal area, specifically, 
the 10-mile Coastal Strip. Establishment of the committee and its mandate was 
premised on the recognition of the fact that:
land tenure system along the ten-mile Coastal Strip along the Coast Province has created 
a lot of problems for the indigenous people in that they are regarded as ‘squatters’ who 
have no right to own that land…476
520. The committee was tasked with the responsibility of probing the origin of the 
problem and making recommendations to Parliament on how to resolve the 
problems “permanently.”477
521. Previous sections of this chapter have cited some of the committee’s findings, 
hereby summarised for purposes of analysing recommendations made and 
475  Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya 
(government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at i.
476  Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya 
(government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at i.
477  Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya 
(government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at i.
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determining if, at all, any of the recommendations has ever been implemented. 
The committee found, that the Coastal Strip has the largest single concentration 
of landless people in Kenya and that478 most of the landless live as ‘squatters’, 
licencees and unprotected tenants on private or government land in both rural 
and urban areas at the Coast. 
522. The communities affected by landlessness are mostly the Mijikenda, the 
Pokomo and the Taita.479 The origin of the problem of landlessness at the Coast 
was traceable to the slave trade and control of the region by Arabs, which, in 
subsequent years, was made worse by British colonial policies, laws and practices 
and discrimination in re-settlement programmes soon after independence.480 
523. The committee also established that the problem of landlessness at the Coast is 
an emotive issue,481 deserves urgent attention, is of national significance and needs 
urgent attention.482 
524. The independence constitution of 1963 contained section 75 which ruled out any 
possibility that historical claims would ever be the basis of land distribution after 
independence.483 A presidential committee was established in 1972 to look into 
land problems in the 10-mile Coastal Strip but the select committee was not able to 
determine what became of its recommendations.484 
525. The pattern of land ownership structure at the Coast has fundamentally 
changed, mainly as a consequence of tourism.485 Changes in the structure of land 
ownership in the area will have a direct bearing on the success or failure of any 
attempt to solve the initial problem of landlessness however well-intentioned 
the effort might be.486 
478  Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya 
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 1.
479  Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya 
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 1.
480  Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya 
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 1 & 4.
481  Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya 
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 1.
482  Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya 
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at i.
483  Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya 
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 4.
484  Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya 
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 4.
485  Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya 
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 5.
486  Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya 
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 6.
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526. Mass evictions in many coastal areas in post-independence Kenya have raised 
anew the old question of the nature of the ‘squatters’ interests in permanent 
improvements made by them on land,487 and the ‘squatter’ problem is a major 
hindrance to land developments in the area.488
527. On the basis of its findings, the select committee made a number of recommendations, 
including the development on national guidelines on landlessness clarifying how 
existing and future claims of landlessness could be resolved.489 
528. It also recommended the development of a national land policy on landlessness 
and  the immediate registration of people claiming to be absolutely landless 
at the Coast for evaluation of their claims, based on national guidelines.490 
Further the committee called for urgent and accurate determination of the 
amount of land available for distribution from the public and private domain 
and the491 immediate commencement of compilation of a national data of the 
absolute landless for purposes of redistribution of land.492 The committee also 
recommended the establishment of a government programme for acquisition 
of land for settlement of the absolute landless only,493  and the establishment of 
an agricultural land tribunal with power to, among other things, fix rent approve 
quit notices, and assess necessary compensation for fixed improvements on 
land.494 
529. The Committee emphasised that in order to give effect to its recommendations, 
personal economic advantages should not be allowed to frustrate national goals.495 
Although the select committee’s report was submitted to Parliament, it is not easy 
to determine with accuracy, the nature of implementation measures or mechanisms 
that the government may have established on the basis of the committee’s findings 
because of absence of relevant literature. However, persistence of landlessness 
487  Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya 
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 6.
488  Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya 
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 7.
489  Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya 
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 8.
490  Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya 
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 8.
491  Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya 
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 8.
492  Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya 
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 8.
493  Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya 
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 9.
494  Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya 
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 11.
495  Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya 
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 13.
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and related land injustices at the Coast which only got worse in subsequent years, 
suggests that not much was done to address the issues.
530. It is noted that some of the recommendations that the committee made, for 
example, mandating land control boards at the Coast to ensure that land is sold 
to the landless first and then to others with economic interest496 may have been 
overtaken by subsequent developments, especially the substantial change in the 
pattern of land ownership in the area. 
531. However, other recommendations that the committee made may still be valid 
and should be explored in the context of recently-created enabling law and 
implementation institutions, especially the National Land commission. The 
recommendations include the urgent and accurate determination of amount of 
land available for distribution from public and private domain and the immediate 
registration of people claiming to be absolutely landless at the Coast for evaluation 
of their claims, based on national guidelines.
532. They also include the immediate development of national guidelines on landlessness, 
clarifying how existing and future claims of landlessness could be resolved, the 
immediate commencement of compilation of a national data base of the absolute 
landless for purposes of redistribution of land and establishment of a government 
programme for acquisition of land for settlement of the absolute landless only. 
The Environment and Land Court already established should exercise power to 
determine claims of a historical nature involving agricultural land.
The Akiwumi Judicial Commission of Inquiry
533. The Judicial commission of Inquiry Into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (the Akiwumi 
Commission) was established in 1989 by President Moi (by Legal notice No. 3312 of 1 
July 1998) to investigate the ethnic clashes that had occurred since 1991 with a view 
to establishing and determining the origin, probable, immediate and underlying 
causes of the clashes and actions taken by the police and other law enforcement 
agencies with regard to any incident of crime arising out of or committed in the 
course of the tribal clashes. 
534. It was also mandated to establish the level of preparedness and effectiveness of 
law enforcement agencies in controlling tribal clashes and in preventing their 
future occurrence; and to inquire into and investigate any other matter that was 
incidental to or connected with the foregoing. In addition, the commission was 
496  Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya 
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 12.
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required to make recommendations as necessary, including prosecution of persons 
who participated in the offences as well as ways and means that must be taken 
to prevent, control or eradicate clashes.497 With the exception of one hearing held 
in camera, the Commission conducted its business through public hearings held in 
Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru, Kisumu and Eldoret.498
535. In summary, the commission found out, among other things, that since the 
amendment of section 2A of the former constitution to allow multi-parties in Kenya, 
there had emerged political parties dangerously based on tribal allegiances,499 
that ordinary Kenyans regard themselves, firstly as members of their tribe and only 
secondly as nationals of a country.500 Tribal clashes had occurred in virtually every 
province in Kenya since acceptance of multi-partyism, especially around election time 
in 1992 and 1997.501 It also established that by the time Kenya attained independence, 
tribalism was deeply rooted in Kenya largely due to lack of contact between the 
ethnic communities during colonialism, which subsequently led to brutal expulsion 
of, in the form of ethnic cleansing, of members of certain communities considered as 
outsiders by others and that independent governments have done little to eliminate 
or contain tribalism.502
536. In its report, the commission elaborated the participation of the provincial 
administration in the perpetration of ethnic clashes, stating, among other things 
that officers in the administration turned a blind eye to reprehensible acts of 
KANU leaders in the misconception that it was their duty to sustain a continued 
ascendancy of a political party under which they had thrived in power.503 
537. It stated that they also directly participated in forceful evictions of innocent Kenyans 
who did not belong to their ethnic communities,504 directed armed administration 
police officers to bulldoze houses of innocent Kenyans and thereby subjected them 
to poverty and destitution.505 They also withheld vital security information that 
would have averted tribal clashes at the Coast and other parts of Kenya, including 
the attack on Likoni police station,506 condoned actions of Digo youth who had 
attacked Likoni police Station, killing at least 10 police officers.507 
497  Republic of Kenya, Judicial commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) was established in 1989 by 
President Moi (Legal notice No. 3312 of 1st July 1998) at iii.
498  Republic of Kenya, Judicial commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) was established in 1989 by 
President Moi (Legal notice No. 3312 of 1st July 1998) at 3.
499  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 22.
500  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 23.
501  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 25 & 26.
502  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 26.
503  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 29.
504  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 30.
505  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 30.
506  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 31.
507  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 31.
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538. Some members of the provincial administration were also accused of remaining 
partisan when tribal clashes broke out in Gucha District,508 and maintaining 
a lukewarm attitude towards addressing real threats of tribal clashes between 
1991 and 2007.509 They deliberately declined to undertake their security-related 
duties and duties related to maintenance and restoration of law and order,510 and 
perpetrated acts of violence including burning peoples’ houses in collaboration with 
administration police in Nakuru and Kericho, among other places.511 
539. These are just a few of the illegal activities of officers serving in the provincial 
administration which would lead to the conclusion that persistent ethnic clashes, 
including those related to land are due, largely, to the acts of commission and 
omission of the provincial administration. 
540. Although the commission’s mandate did not specifically relate to land, it did 
investigate clashes arising as a result of conflicts over land and those affecting land 
ownership, occupation and used part of its mandate to determine, “the origin, the 
probable, the immediate and the underlying causes of such clashes.”512 Also, during 
its investigations, the commission received information on matters related to land 
and ethnic clashes, which it ably presented in detail in its report. 
541. Of significance to the TJRC are findings, among others, that the provincial 
administration participated in forceful evictions of Kenyans in many places 
including the Rift Valley.513 Certain ethnic communities, especially in the Rift Valley, 
expected and intended the introduction of majimboism to lead to the expulsion of 
members of communities considered as “outsiders” from the Rift Valley.514 The issue 
of land in Kenya is often treated with fervent sentimentality and sensitivity and is 
in many ways, considered explosive.515 Although the Constitution guarantees the 
right of ownership of property anywhere in the country, the peaceful co-existence 
of the 42 ethnic communities that live within the national borders appears to have 
been profoundly undermined by diverse man-made problems directly or indirectly 
connected to land.516 
542. The Akiwumi commission noted that developments in the political arena tended 
to exacerbate rather than ameliorate the situation and by the same token, ushered 
in such problems with far-reaching implications for communities living within 
508  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 32.
509  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 32.
510  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 33.
511  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 35 – 36.
512  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at iii.
513  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 30.
514  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 49.
515  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 53.
516  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 53.
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multi-ethnic farm settlements.517 It stated that some tribal conflicts stemmed from 
the pre-independence era, while a host of others emanated from government 
policies and programmes.518 A lot of land was taken away from the Kalenjin in 
the Rift Valley to settle members of other ethnic communities and as the Kalenjin 
population increased, many were rendered landless, living in conspicuous poverty, 
while members of other ethnic communities exclusively occupied the most fertile 
arable rain-fed lands.519
543. The commission’s report detailed a number of cases of forceful evictions of 
members of particular communities, including the Luo from Buru and Thessalia 
farms in Kericho520 and the Kikuyu from Enoosupukia.521 It also elaborated, in a whole 
chapter on land and politics as key determinants of tribal conflicts, land issues which 
underlie tribal wars between the Sabaot and the Luhya in western Kenya, explaining 
the injustices committed against the Sabaot in terms of illegal alienation of their 
land [p 10-13 titled Land and politics at Centre of Chaos in Western Kenya). 
544. The commission established that the Sabaot land problem was addressed during 
the colonial period in 1932 when the Carter Commission recommended that 
the community be granted 80 000 acres of land on the slopes of Mount Elgon 
behind and above the forest reserve. Another 40 000 acres in the moorland area 
which they already occupied was to be added to them, but the recommendation 
was never considered when the independent government finally acquired and 
turned certain former white settler farms in Trans Nzoia into settlement schemes 
open to all Kenyans to purchase.522 This, the commission states, was the genesis 
of the never-ending Sabaot wars.523 The commission found out that the Sabaot, 
to date, consider the farms in Trans Nzoia as part of the 80 000 plus acres of 
land which the Carter Commission had proposed should be set aside for their 
exclusive use and occupation in compensation for the land they lost to the white 
settlers in Trans Nzoia.524
545. The commission further established that because the issue of the Sabaot’s land 
was not addressed by the post-independence governments and which issues had 
been pending for a long time, were exploited by the Sabaot at the introduction of 
multi-party politics to evict the non-Sabaot from the area for political gain.525
517  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 54.
518  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 54.
519  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 55.
520  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 26 – 33.
521  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 51.
522 Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 13. 
523  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 13.
524  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 13.
525  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 12 & 13.
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546. The commission made a number of recommendations specifically related to the 
elimination of tribal clashes, including the investigation and prosecution of named 
security agencies due to their involvements in the commissions and omissions that 
fueled tribal clashes. In addition, the Akiwumi Commission made recommendations 
that would reduce or eliminate land-related injustices that also fuel tribal clashes. 
In this regard, it stated that:
(i) since land ownership and use in the various clash areas was given as one of 
the causes of conflict and tribal clashes, the government should embark on 
an ambitious programme to issue title documents to all persons who were 
either allocated land there by the government or who bought the same 
from previous owners but have not got title, to minimize land disputes and 
conflicts in the areas;526
(ii) the government should protect and respect rights over land;
(iii) in order to inspire confidence in the government, all of the people who 
were displaced during tribal clashes should be re-settled;
(iv) tribal-based settlements should be discontinued; and that
(v) the public should be educated on land rights.527
547. It is proposed that recommendations of the Akiwumi Commission should be 
carefully evaluated in light of the provisions of the ‘new’ Constitution and the 
recently-enacted land laws. One of the most important points that emerges, as a 
finding of the Akiwumi Commission is that some ethnic communities in Kenya are 
“…ready for the introduction of majimboism whereby every person will be required 
to go back to his motherland.”528 The perception and expectation of Kenyans, 
both at independence and several years after independence was that with the 
introduction of a regional government, regions would have absolute control over 
land within their jurisdictions for purposes which appear to be, among others, 
to recover or restore the lands that they lost. The position appears to have been 
guaranteed by Jomo Kenyatta in his remarks just before independence as stated 
previously in this chapter. 
548. So firmly rooted in the belief that regionalism would provide structures to remove 
persons and communities considered as outsiders from other communities’ 
homelands that one member of the Kalenjin community once remarked that: 
526 Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998, Chapter Four, at 2.
527 Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998, Chapter Five 
(Recommendations) at 2.
528  Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 49.
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Once we introduce majimbo in Rift Valley, all outsiders who acquired our land will have 
to move and then leave the same land to our children.529
549. Now that regional governments are being firmly established on the basis of permissive 
provisions of the 2010 Constitution, what mechanisms does the government have 
to ensure that exclusionist tendencies and practices that were expected to be 
facilitated by majimboism are not manifested in the new majimbo (regions/counties) 
governments? Could implementation of any of the foregoing recommendations 
help to avert majimboism, with its original intent, in relation to land or should new 
and innovative mechanisms be devised to hold the country together?
The Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into illegal/irregular allocation of 
public land
550. The Ndung’u Commission was established by President Mwai Kibaki by the Kenya 
Gazette Notice No. 4559 of 30 June 2003 to inquire into illegal or irregular allocation 
of public land and lands reserved for public purposes to private individuals 
and corporations. The commission was mandated to prepare a list of lands so 
irregularly acquired, collect and collate data on the nature and extent of unlawful 
or irregular allocations of public land and ascertain the identities of perpetrators, 
including public officials. The commission was to make recommendations on legal 
and administrative measures for restoration of the lands to their proper title or 
purpose.530 
551. Obviously, the focus of the commission was illegally or irregularly alienated public 
land. The mandate of the commission did not extend to illegal alienation or 
acquisition of private land by private individuals and entities. Also, an analysis of 
the commission’s report indicates that although in the introduction, it presented 
information in relation to land of a historical nature, stating briefly, for example, 
public land under African tenure [p2] some of the laws introduced in the colonial 
period to provide basis for alienation of land by the colonialists [p3], policy and 
administrative changes in relation to land after 1948 [p3], the practice of land 
allocation after 1951 and the legal position regarding allocation of public land 
before and after independence, it did not present a detailed analysis of existing 
land alienation problems in a historical context. 
552. It is noted and appreciated that the Ndung’u Commission report presents 
numerous cases of illegal alienations of public land, but its analysis was, in the 
529 Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 49. 
530  Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung'u Commission, 
2004) at xvii-xviii.
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absence of any indication of scope of work in terms of time or period of coverage, 
focused on the Moi administration, without similarly presenting cases of illegal 
alienations of public land that occurred during Kenyatta’s administration.  This 
observation, in the absence of any explanation why the commission never 
considered cases of illegal land alienation that occurred during Kenyatta’s era, 
helps to understand that there are more cases of illegal alienations of public 
land that should be included in a broader scheme of government to address the 
problem as a whole.  In any case, the commission completed its investigations 
of land-related irregularities and illegalities in 2004, leaving cases of illegal 
acquisition and use of land that occur in Kenya on a daily basis, from 2004 to 
date, outside of its purview.
553. It has also been stated the commission focused its work on public land without 
investigating, in a historical perspective, cases of illegal alienation of privately-
owned or occupied land which has been one of the causes of devastating ethnic 
clashes, not to mention landlessness, under-development and destitution that has 
resulted therefrom. 
554. The gap in information had to be filled by the TJRC, not only as a matter of 
execution of its mandate, but also to investigate, gather and present detailed 
information as much as possible to provide the basis for incisive understanding 
of the origins, nature and magnitude of the problem, which have to be very well 
understood in order for responsible government agencies to know what kinds 
of measures or schemes could be devised to best address them. It would not be 
honest to recognise the limitations of the Ndung’u Commission’s work without 
similarly acknowledging the tremendous work that the commission undertook to 
investigate and subsequently, produce a reliable source of information on illegally 
acquired public lands that could provide basis for both private and public entities 
to make informed decisions on transactions relating to land. 
555. Without legal challenge to specific aspects of the Ndung’u Commission’s report, 
it remains one of the few valuable official documents that one would rely one, 
for example, to determine which land would be risky to purchase, having been 
irregularly or illegally acquired from the public domain. The report has also 
formed the basis of government actions to recover private lands that were illegally 
acquired from the public domain. It has also prompted, in a few cases, the voluntary 
return or restoration of public lands that were illegally acquired by private entities. 
Moreover, the commission’s report was also found useful by the TJRC in validating 
some of its own findings that have been presented in various sections of this 
chapter on land.
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556. For all the foregoing reasons, the Ndung’u Commission’s report should be carefully 
evaluated, together with this report, by the National Land Commission and other 
government agencies that will have the responsibility to address all cases of 
land-related injustices to provide permanent solutions. Herein below are some of 
the findings and recommendations of the Ndung’u Commission that should be 
carefully evaluated in light of detailed information availed by the TJRC:
	 For all the foregoing reasons, the Ndung’u Commission’s report should be 
carefully evaluated, together with this TJRC Final Report, by the National Land 
Commission and other government agencies that will have the responsibility 
to address all cases of land-related injustices to provide permanent solutions. 
Herein below are some of the findings and recommendations of the Ndung’u 
Commission that should be carefully evaluated in light of detailed information 
availed by the TJRC: Clear provisions of law, including sections 3, 7 and 15 
of the Government Land Act were flouted as personalities, including senior 
government officials, participated in land grabbing.531 Officials of local 
authorities in various parts of the country, in collaboration with those within and 
outside of government, participated in numerous cases of illegal acquisition of 
government land, especially through the means of letters of allotment.532 
	 Unauthorized persons, including district commissioners and provincial 
commissioners took part in illegally allocating public land to themselves and 
their cohorts.533 
	 Some of the illegally acquired public lands have been allocated to diplomatic 
missions, contrary to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular 
Relations.534 The government established settlement schemes for the landless 
but land therein were distributed to undeserving people.535 Many parcels of 
land reserved for public utilities have been alienated and allocated to private 
individuals and entities.536 The phenomenon of land grabbing in Kenya rendered 
the perceived sanctity of land title a myth.537 Past efforts to reclaim public land 
531 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u Commission, 
2004) at 7.
532 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u Commission, 
2004) at 11 – 15.
533 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u Commission, 
2004) at 14.
534 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u Commission, 
2004) at 187.
535 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u Commission, 
2004) at 126 – 127.
536 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u Commission, 
2004) at 128 – 132.
537 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u Commission, 
2004) at 15 – 16.
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did not bear fruit due to what may be described as official lethargy or lack 
of political will to do so.538 Although the phenomenon of land grabbing was 
known to the public in general, its exact nature and extent was not known to 
the public.539 
557. The gap in public information was filled, in relation to public land, by the 
Commission’s publication of two volumes of approximately 800 pages detailing 
cases of illegal acquisition of public land in virtually every part of the country, 
including protected wildlife areas, land for public schools and ADC farms, among 
many others. For the first time in Kenya, the commission also provided the 
public with names of individuals and entities that illegally benefited from public 
land.540The Ndung’u Commission made valuable recommendations that offer some 
of the practical approaches that should be taken to address land-related injustices, 
including those relating to public land. It recommends that all land allocated in 
settlement schemes which were made to people who were, at the time, public officers, 
members of Parliament, councillors, political operatives and other undeserving 
people at the expense of the landless and contrary to established policies and 
procedures, should be revoked. The lands in question should be repossessed and 
allocated to the landless.541 
558. The possibility of the expeditious implementation of this recommendation should 
be explored, in the light of more information availed by the TJRC. A problem that 
is likely to arise, which should be anticipated and measures designed to address 
is that of bonafide purchaser for consideration, without notice of the illegality. 
Mechanisms should be designed to address cases where lands illegally acquired 
have subsequently been sold, especially to individuals who purchased it without 
notice of illegalities attendant to the first title, in order to avoid exposing more 
people to what may be perceived as another form of land-related injustice.
559. The commission also recommended that all public officials, especially those in the 
department of settlement, who facilitated illegal allocations of land in settlement 
schemes should be investigated and prosecuted where offences were committed 
by them in the process of such allocations.542 These recommendations should be 
538 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u Commission, 
2004) at 17 & 18.
539 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u Commission, 
2004) at 19.
540 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u Commission, 
2004), Annexes, Volume I and II. See, also, pages 93 – 108 of the Report.
541 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u Commission, 
2004) at 36.
542 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u Commission, 
2004) at 137.
340
Volume IIB    Chapter T WO  
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
implemented in the light of Chapter Six of the Constitution which renders such 
officers unfit for public service. The Ndung’u Commission also recommended the 
establishment of a land titles tribunal,543 the second time a land titles tribunal was 
proposed, the first was made by the select committee in 1978. The proposal should 
be evaluated in the light of establishment of the Environment and Land Court, 
especially to determine whether cases proposed for a land titles tribunal would 
adequately fall under its jurisdiction. These recommendations should be evaluated 
and where suitable,544 integrated in a broader scheme of redress actions proposed by 
the TJRC.
Other land reform initiatives in Kibaki’s administration
560. Mwai Kibaki ascended to power as the third President of Kenya in 2002 through a 
popular vote on a National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) party ticket that saw 
the end of close to four decades of KANU rule. In terms of the land question, Kibaki 
was faced with similar land issues and challenges that were encountered during 
the previous regimes. 
561. One of the first challenges that the Kibaki administration faced when it came to 
power in 2003 was how to deal with the historical claims over land that were not 
resolved at Lancaster and remained unresolved throughout the Kenyatta and Moi 
administrations. In addition to the establishment and operationalisation of the 
Ndung’u Commission already elaborated, the following initiatives were undertaken 
during his administration. 
562. The initiatives included formulation of the National Land Policy, completion of the 
constitutional review process culminating in the adoption of a new Constitution 
with key provisions of land elaborated in subsequent sections of this TJRC Report, 
appointment of new Ministers of Lands and Settlement including Amos Kimunya 
and James Orengo who showed willingness to revoke illegally acquired title 
deeds and the prosecution of key personalities including William Ruto, Wilson 
Gachanja, Joshua Kulei  and Sammy Mwaita over land-related offences.545 
563. Further, in 2005, a Forest Act was eventually enacted, to help secure the county’s 
remaining forests and encourage commercial forestry. Illegal logging was 
reduced and some parts of Karura and Ngong’ forests repossessed, although 
the Kibaki administration sooner or later proved more reluctant to act when 
543 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u Commission, 
2004) at 188 – 199.
544 See, Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u 
Commission, 2004) at 188 – 200 which details recommendations of the Commission.
545 See for example Daily Nation, 16 April 2004, online edition.
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politicians and senior officials had been allocated the land. A number of land laws 
were also passed, including the Land Act of 2012 whose details and significance 
are presented in the next section of this Report.
564. During Kibaki’s regime, the then Prime Minister Raila Odinga also took a courageous 
step in confronting land-related issues in the Mau Forests complex in Narok North. 
He based actions to restore the health of the forests on the plausible argument 
that Kenya’s declining rainfall was mainly caused by the destruction of forest water 
catchment areas around Mau and other water towers. His argument attracted 
the support of some external development partners and development agencies, 
including the Bill Clinton Foundation. Through this institute, the government 
formed a task force to review the irregular/illegal allocation of land in the Mau 
Forest and to restore the health of the forest through a re-afforestation programme. 
565. The initiative should have been complemented by action on the part of the 
Ministry of Lands and Settlement to finally re-settle members of the Ogiek 
community who were claiming residence in the protected area.  Opposition of the 
restoration of Mau Forests by the very ministers of government then, including 
William Ruto, who is now the Deputy President of President Uhuru Kenyatta, 
signal the need for unanimity in the design and implementation of government 
programmes.546 The challenge for the new government is to sustain efforts that 
have, so far, been implemented to genuinely address land-related issues, while 
also implementing recommendations of this TJRC Report, alongside others, 
including those made in the Ndung’u Commission’s Report, as appropriate. 
Conclusion 
566. The bulk of the statements and memorandum, more than 40 percent, that the 
Commission received related to land grievances and disputes. There are close linkages 
between land injustices and ethnic violence in Kenya. More specifically, land related 
injustices are prominent factors that precipitate violence between and within ethnic 
communities in Kenya. Since independence, there has been no genuine political will 
on the part of the state to address grievances and disputes relating to land. Policy 
initiatives have more often than not failed to address the root causes of land related 
grievances and disputes. As such, one thing is clear, the stability of Kenya depends 
to a great extent  to the willingness of political actors to address these grievances 
and disputes. The creation of the National Land Commission is a step in the right 
direction. But this step must be backed by genuine commitment to support its work.
546 See Daily Nation, 1st November 2009, on-line edition.
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CHAPTER
THREE 
Economic Crimes and Grand 
Corruption
Introduction
1. This Chapter focuses on the phenomenon of corruption, the causes and effects 
of corruption especially on the citizenry’s enjoyment of socio- economic 
rights, efforts made in Kenya to combat corruption, the challenges faced, and 
institutional, administrative and legislative measures that may be put in place to 
address its violation of the economic rights of Kenyans.
2. The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (the Commission) was empowered, 
amongst other functions, to establish an accurate historical record of violations and 
abuses of human rights and economic rights inflicted upon persons by the state, 
public institutions and holders of public office between 12 December 1963 and 28 
February 2008. The Commission was required to achieve this through investigations 
and holding of public hearings in order to establish the causes, nature and extent of 
these violations.
3. The specific mandate to look into economic crimes is found in Section 5 of the 
Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission Act (TJR Act), which outlines the 
objectives of the Commission. Section 5(d) provides for investigation of economic 
crimes, including grand corruption, and the exploitation of natural or public 
resources. Upon completion of investigations and hearings, the Commission 
is required to make recommendations with regard to policy, prosecution of 
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violators of human and economic rights, and any institutional, administrative 
and legislative measures that may be put in place to address these violations.
4. The following issues are considered in the Chapter: definition of economic crime 
and grand corruption; causes and effects of corruption; the linkage between 
grand corruption and gross violation of human rights; initiatives to combat 
corruption in Kenya since 1956; the anti-corruption legal framework in Kenya; 
recent legislative developments on leadership and integrity; the magnitude and 
scale of grand corruption in Kenya; challenges of fighting corruption in Kenya 
(legal, institutional, political, etc.  Recommendations are provided at the end.  
Definition of Economic Crimes and Grand 
Corruption
5. The TJR Act did not define economic crimes or grand corruption. The Commission 
therefore resorted to definitions provided for in relevant international and 
regional instruments to which Kenya is a signatory, and the relevant domestic 
laws. Additionally, it became imperative to consider definitions used by other 
institutions that are actively involved in combating corruption, for example the 
World Bank and Transparency International.
6. In order to comprehend the meaning of economic crime and grand corruption, it is 
essential first to try and understand the phenomenon of corruption generally, and 
the specific types of corruption referred to as grand corruption, petty corruption 
and systemic corruption. An attempt will also be made to understand economic 
crimes as they are defined under the Kenyan law, and how they differ from 
corruption offences
The meaning of corruption
7. There is no single, comprehensive, universally accepted definition of corruption, 
and there are many definitions given by different scholars, institutions, 
practitioners and writers. Attempts to develop such definition invariably 
encounter legal, criminological and in many countries, political problems. This is 
largely due to the broad nature of the phenomenon and the fact that it manifests 
itself in various ways, depending on the culture of the society where it is taking 
place. Since the nature and effects of corruption are unique to each country and 
society, it is therefore not possible to confine it to one particular set of facts or 
circumstances.
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8. The difficulty in defining corruption was evident during the negotiations of the 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2002.1 According to 
information contained in the UN Anti-Corruption Toolkit, when the negotiations 
began in early 2002, one option under consideration was not to define corruption 
at all but list specific types or acts of corruption. Proposals to require countries 
to criminalise corruption mainly covered specific offences or groups of offences 
that depended on what type of conduct was involved, whether those implicated 
were public officers, whether cross border conduct or foreign officials were 
involved, and if these cases related to unlawful or improper enrichment. 2
9. Nevertheless, many specific forms of corruption are clearly defined and understood, 
and are the subject of numerous legal or academic definitions. Many are also 
criminal offences, although in some cases governments consider that specific 
forms of corruption are better dealt with by regulatory or civil law proceedings. 
Although the varied definitions emphasize varying elements of corruption, they 
generally acknowledge corruption as dishonest behaviour where individuals or 
groups of individuals abuse public office for private profit.
10. At the international level, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
(UNCAC), to which Kenya is a signatory, does not define corruption. In Chapter 
3 Articles 15 to 24, it lists circumstances or situations that could constitute 
corruption. The Convention requires each State Party to adopt legal measures 
to establish certain criminal offences, including bribery, embezzlement, 
misappropriation or other diversion of property by public officials, trading in 
influence, abuse of functions, illicit enrichment, bribery in the private sector, 
embezzlement in the private sector, money laundering, concealment of property 
obtained as a result of any of those offences, and obstructing justice. These 
provisions reflect the tendency of international bodies to regard offences of 
corruption as including offences beyond the confines of bribery as popularly 
understood.
11. Within the African continent, the African Union Convention On Preventing and 
Combating Corruption (AUCPCC), to which Kenya is also a signatory, describes 
corruption as solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly as by a public official 
or any other person of any goods of monetary value or other benefit such as a 
gift, favour or advantage for himself or herself or for another person or entity in 
exchange for any act or omission in the performance of his or her functions.
1 The Global Programme Against Corruption: UN Anti-Corruption Toolkit, 3rd Edition, Vienna , September 2004
2 For a detailed discussion of the attempts made to define corruption, see the UN Manual on Anti-Corruption Policy, Part II
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12. Transparency International, one of the global organisations actively involved in 
the fight against corruption, has defined corruption as the “misuse of entrusted 
power for private gain.” The definition reflects the current approach to the topic, 
but its usefulness is debatable. It has the advantages of simplicity as it embraces 
offences of corruption strictly so-called, and related offences such as misconduct in 
public office, extortion, embezzlement, fraud and theft which are distinct offences. 
Although these are distinct offences, they are usually committed in the course of 
corruption. The World Bank, on the other hand, defines corruption as the abuse of 
power for personal gain or for the benefit of a group to which one owes allegiance. 
13. In Kenya, the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act of 2003(ACECA) does 
not define corruption but outlines conduct that would constitute an offence of 
corruption. The Act stipulates that corruption means an offence under sections 
39-44, 46 and 47 of the Act, and certain other wrongs. The wrongs as listed under 
section 2 of the Act are breach of trust, an offence involving dishonesty in relation 
to taxes or elections to public office. The offences enumerated under sections 
39-44, 46 and 47 are bribing agents, secret inducements for advice, deceiving 
principal, conflict of interest, improper benefits to trustees for appointment, bid 
rigging, abuse of office and dealing with suspect property.
14. In what is seen as a major improvement and deviation from the other legal 
instruments at both international and regional levels, the ACECA creates and 
defines a special category of offences referred to as economic crimes. Greater 
details of the meaning of economic crimes will be explained in a later portion 
of this chapter when defining the term as it relates to the major concept of 
corruption.
Grand corruption
15. The term grand corruption is used to describe cases where massive personal wealth 
is acquired from States by senior public officials using corrupt means.3 It arises 
mostly where high officials have power over the granting of large public contracts 
and a local agent receives a commission if the transaction is won. It has three main 
criteria: size, immediacy of its rewards and mystification. The more technical and 
complicated a transaction is, the less likely it is that questions will be asked. Some 
of its key mechanisms have been fully described in George Moody Stuart’s book, 
Grand Corruption in Third World Development4.
3 Report of the Anti-Corruption Working Group of the Society for Advanced Legal Studies “Banking on Corruption, The 
Legal Responsibilities of Those Who Handle the Proceeds of Corruption”, February 2002
4 Berlin: Transparency International, 1994
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16. The Society of Advanced Legal Studies Anti-Corruption Working Group concluded 
that grand corruption involves two main activities: bribe payments and the 
embezzlement and misappropriation of state assets. The bribe can either be a 
direct payment in return for showing favour or payment of part of the proceeds 
of a contract granted as a result of the bribe, called a kick back. For example, 
Benazir Buto’s husband, Asif Zardari, was convicted in Pakistan of taking secret 
kickbacks from airline, power station, and pipeline projects, rice deals, customs 
inspections, defence contracts, land sell offs, and even government welfare.5 
17. Another good example of grand corruption is the embezzlement and 
misappropriation of state assets by the late Nigerian President Sani Abacha. 
In addition to taking hefty cuts before approving contracts, he siphoned off 
fortunes from sales of Nigerian crude oil as well as diverting huge sums from 
four state- owned oil refineries leaving them in near –total collapse.6
Petty corruption
18. Although the focus of this chapter of the Commission’s Report is grand corruption, 
it is important to also understand the other type of corruption commonly referred 
to as petty corruption. Petty corruption, as the term implies, may involve small 
amounts and junior officials but it also has a huge impact on people’s enjoyment 
of their basic rights like the rights to water, health, food, clothing and shelter. It 
cannot therefore be ignored or wished away in discussing the phenomenon of 
corruption. Admittedly, a discussion of grand corruption will not be complete 
without mentioning the corresponding petty corruption.
19. The term “petty corruption” is sometimes used to distinguish between grand 
corruption practised by senior officials, and the petty corruption to which, for 
example magistrates and judges, are subject due to inadequate remuneration 
and facilities. The term is more used however to describe “facilitation” or “grease 
payments” sought by officials for services the public are entitled to free of charge. 
Examples are payments to customs officers to pass goods through a road border, 
to immigration officers to have travel documents accepted, to medical staff to 
receive prescription drugs or other benefits, payments for fictitious services, or to 
avoid prosecution for traffic offences, real or imagined. 
20. The distinction from grand corruption is that an official is paid for what he is 
lawfully required to do. The sums involved are usually small and paid to cut through 
5 The Court in Pakistan convicted Mr and Mrs Zardari of corruption, sentenced them to 5 years imprisonment, ordered fines of US 
8.6m, and disqualified both from holding public office, Eastern Economic Review, 29 April 1999
6 Davi Orr, The Scotsman, 4 December 1998
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bureaucratic red tape. In most cases it is assumed that the service required would 
not be obtained without the additional payment, so there is an element of extortion.
Grand corruption Vs Petty Corruption
21. Grand corruption is corruption that pervades the highest levels of national 
government, leading to broad erosion of confidence in good governance, the rule 
of law and economic stability.7 Petty corruption on the other hand, can involve 
the exchange of very small amounts of money, the granting of minor favours by 
those seeking preferential treatment, or the employment of friends and relatives in 
minor positions. The most critical difference between grand and petty corruption is 
that grand corruption involves the distortion or corruption of the central functions 
of government, while petty corruption develops and exists within the context of 
established governance and social frameworks.
22. Experience and testimony received by the Commission shows that both grand and 
petty corruption occurs in Kenya, with consequential violation of economic rights. 
The mandate of the Commission was however specific to grand corruption. 
Systemic corruption
23. Another type of corruption that may be visible in Kenya though not expressly 
mentioned in our mandate is systemic corruption. Systemic corruption or 
institutional or entrenched corruption, as it is sometimes called, is corruption 
brought about, encouraged or promoted by the system itself. It occurs where 
bribery is routine on a large scale. The causes are usually brought about by 
inefficiency, inadequacy, or undue laxity in the system.
24. Systematic corruption arises where corruption permeates a country’s political and 
economic institutions and is no longer restricted to a few dishonest individuals. It 
thrives where institutions are weak or non-existent and is closely related to poor 
governance, where there are inadequate legislative controls, no independent 
judiciary, or oversight, and where independent media and civil society agencies 
are absent.
25. In Kenya, the judiciary and media are now relatively independent and civil society 
is largely free to operate without restrictions. There is a plethora of anti-corruption 
laws and an independent constitutional anti-corruption commission dedicated 
7 Rose-Ackerman S “Democracy and Grand Corruption”, UNESCO 1996( ISSI49/1996), reprinted in Williams R Edition” Explaining 
Corruption”, Elgon Reference Collection, UK 2000, PP 321-336
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fully to the fight against corruption. Experience shows that corruption has however 
permeated almost all sectors of the Kenyan society and there is need for more 
much more to be done to combat corruption and its insidious effects on Kenyans.
Economic crimes
26. The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (ACECA) of 2003 goes further than 
the UNCAC and AUCPCC in defining corruption by isolating special corruption 
related offences referred to as economic crimes. According to ACECA, an economic 
crime is any act or omission by any person that results in loss or destruction of 
public property, revenue or other resources. This is clearly distinguished from 
corruption that is broadly seen as the improper use of power, privilege or office for 
benefit to oneself or another person(s).
27. The ACECA defines economic crimes as an offence listed under section 45, that is:
	 Illegal acquisition, mortgage and disposal of public property service or benefit
	 Unlawful damage to public property
	 Failure to pay taxes, fees, levies or charges that are payable to a public body
	 Causing or obtaining the non-payment of taxes, fees, levies, or charges that 
are due to a public body
28. Furthermore, an officer or person who is in charge of public revenue or property 
commits an economic crime if he illegally makes payment or excessive payment 
from public revenue for sub-standard or defective goods, for goods not supplied 
or not supplied in full, for services not rendered or not adequately rendered. This 
provision has the effect of creating offences in the sphere of public procurement 
that consume a huge chunk of public funds. 
29. Economic crimes are also committed when a public officer wilfully fails to follow the 
law or applicable procedures on procurement, allocation, sale or disposal of property, 
tendering of contracts, management of funds or incurring of expenditure. Good 
examples of such laws are the Public Finance Management Act, the Public Procurement 
and Disposal of Goods Act, together with the regulations made there under. 
30. Finally, the ACECA makes it an economic crime for a public officer to engage in a project 
without planning. This crime was intended to save deliberate wastage of public funds 
by senior officials who initiate projects without any prior planning, with the sole aim 
of making personal gain from such projects, in collusion with persons or companies 
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awarded the contracts. Most of these projects were never included in the planned 
projects for the financial year in focus. Many projects in Kenya remain incomplete 
many years after their construction commenced. This has resulted in loss of shillings 
that could have been used to provide basic services to millions of Kenyans
31. Having looked at the meaning of economic crimes as defined in ACECA, it is evident 
that there is a close link between economic crimes and grand corruption in Kenya. 
Economic crimes result in loss or destruction of public property or revenue, especially 
in the area of public procurement, public contracts, public land and general 
management of public funds. These crimes inevitably involve very senior powerful 
public servants awarding large public contracts running into billions of shillings, 
with the assurance of getting a certain amount as a commission. This ultimately 
constitutes what is referred to as grand corruption. Grand corruption is therefore a 
direct product of economic crimes. In other words, economic crimes result in grand 
corruption. The two are inextricably linked to each other, and for our purposes, we 
use the terms interchangeably.
Causes and Effects of Corruption
32. Since 1994, unprecedented global efforts have been made to raise awareness 
about corruption, its insidious nature and damaging effects it has on the welfare of 
entire nations and their peoples.  Corruption not only distorts economic decision-
making, it also deters investment, undermines competitiveness and ultimately, 
weakens economic growth. There is evidence that the social, legal, political and 
economic aspects of development are all linked, and that corruption in any one 
sector impedes development in them all.8
33. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) describes corruption as 
a complex social, political and economic phenomenon that affects all societies all 
over the world.  Corruption undermines democratic institutions, slows economic 
development and contributes to government instability. Corruption attacks the 
foundation of democratic institutions by distorting electoral processes, perverting 
the rule of law and creating bureaucratic quagmires whose only reason for existing 
is the soliciting of bribes. Economic development is stunted because foreign direct 
investment is discouraged and small businesses within the country often find it 
impossible to overcome the start up cost required because of corruption 9
8 The Global Programme Against Corruption: UN Anti-Corruption Toolkit , 3rd Edition, Vienna, September 2004
9 http//www.unodc.org/en/corruption/index.html- accessed on 26/2/2013
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34. The UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, said at the occasion of the  International 
Anti-Corruption Day on 9/12/2009, that it is the world’s vulnerable who suffer 
“first and worst” such as the theft of public money or foreign aid for private gain. 
The result, he said, is fewer resources to fund the building of infrastructure such 
as schools, hospitals and roads. Mr Ban however noted that corruption “is not 
some vast impersonal force but the result of personal decision, most often motivated 
by greed”10
35. In a nutshell, corruption is caused by pure greed on the part of the perpetrators, 
and those who are affected most are the poor in society. Corruption deprives them 
of their basic rights to shelter, food, education, decent housing, good roads and 
education for their children. Although most Kenyans are now aware of the causes 
and effects of corruption on their lives, it nevertheless is paramount to briefly 
discuss these two issues as a basis for further in depth analysis of the phenomenon 
of corruption in Kenya. 
Causes of corruption
36. As part its mandate to create awareness about the dangers of corruption and 
to enlist public support in the fight against corruption, the now defunct KACC 
published a lot of Information, Communication and Education (IEC) materials, 
including manuals for public officers and members of the public. In trying to 
explain the causes and effects of corruption, this chapter will borrow heavily 
from the manual titled ‘The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003 
Explained.11
37. KACC identified some causes of corruption, which sometimes operate in combination 
and should not be seen singularly or as isolated derivatives. These are:
	 Political patronage: When holders of public office give their loyalties to those 
individuals who appoint them to their positions instead of being loyal to their 
duties, the law, integrity and set standards, they stop being accountable to the 
public, clients and colleagues.
	 Bad governance: Poor leadership and management practices and styles 
that provide opportunities and loopholes for corrupt conduct is a major 
cause of corruption. Leaders who are inept and who do not inspire a culture 
of achievement provide a poor model to those below them resulting in poor 
performance and mediocrity.
10 http//www.unodc.org/en/corruption/index.html- accessed on 26/2/2013
11 The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act,2003 Explained: A Manual for Public Officers and Members of the Public”, a 
publication of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission Directorate of Preventive Services
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	 Lack of political will: For the fight against corruption to succeed, there has to 
be willingness on the part of political leaders to show by word and deed that 
they are committed and supportive of the fight.  For example, they must not 
only facilitate an enabling climate of corruption intolerance by enacting laws, 
policies and systems but they must also provide operational support and tools.
	 Breakdown or erosion of societal values and norms: When a society 
disregards or ignores positive moral values and laid down procedures and 
regulations, it opens itself up to anarchy, ineptitude and failure. A positive 
value system in society helps to benchmark individual conduct and guides 
collective behaviour.
	 Weak or absent management systems, procedures and practices: In 
organizations where systems, procedures, standards, policies and practices 
are weak or absent, individuals take advantage to exploit such loopholes 
leading to loss of public resources.
	 Misuse of discretionary power vested in individuals or offices: Use of 
discretionary powers without checks and balances encourages corruption 
because of families, friends and other connections.
	 Weak civil society and general apathy: When civil society and the general 
public fail to exercise vigilance over management of public affairs, we abandon 
our oversight and responsibility and fail collectively in our civic duty.
	 Lack of professional integrity: When those trained and paid to offer professional 
services lack personal ethics and integrity, they rob their institutions and the 
country a chance to develop thus leading to wastage of valuable resources.
	 Lack of transparency and accountability: Public affairs should always 
be conducted in an open, fair and responsible manner.  Opaqueness fuels 
corruption because it brings an atmosphere of secrecy.
	 Tribalism, favouritism, nepotism and cronyism: All four have one thing in 
common – a favoured entity gets to enjoy public resources at the expense 
of others. Merit is disregarded and benefits such as contracts, employment, 
tenders are enjoyed on the basis of favor.  People are discriminated against 
and generally denied equal opportunity.
	 Inefficient public sector: An inefficient and bureaucratic public service where 
delays and under-performance are a hallmark of its culture encourages people 
to seek shortcuts while seeking for services.  This situation creates room for 
endemic corruption.
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	 Greed: The tendency to live beyond one’s means or to acquire excessive 
wealth without working for it contributes significantly to corruption and 
economic crime.  It is therefore not surprising that some of the wealthiest 
people in society are also the most corrupt.
	 Non-enforcement of the law: Laws and regulations are made and yet they 
are not implemented or there is reluctance to enforce them.  In this way, 
wrongdoers are encouraged to behave with impunity.
Effects of Corruption 
38. The introductory pages to the KACC Manual correctly point out that corruption is 
harmful to the economy and has caused much destruction to Kenya as a country. 
Corruption, according to the KACC Manual, greatly impedes the realization of 
durable development at many levels thereby increasing poverty and fuelling 
inequities and vulnerabilities in society.  It affects everyone but harms more 
those in society who are already vulnerable. This is the same observation that has 
been made by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and supported by 
the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon during the International Anti-Corruption 
Day on 9/12 2009; that corruption affects the poor “first and worst”.
39. Some of the effects of corruption include but are not limited to:
	 Poor health services – Looting of funds intended for buying drugs and the 
theft of the drugs already bought leads to lack of adequate medical supplies. 
When public medical practitioners run down public health facilities in order 
to refer patients to their private clinics, for example, the majority will not 
have access to affordable medical services leading to increased sickness and 
deaths.
	 Poor transport and communication networks – Diversion and theft of funds 
meant to construct or repair infrastructure like roads, telephone network, water 
supply and so on leads to poor infrastructure making less money available for 
such purposes and at the same time leading to dilapidation and wastage.
	 Reduced investment and relocation of investors to other countries – 
Corruption increases the cost of doing business, which scares off current and 
potential investors.  They move instead to countries which are considered to 
be more conducive to the realization of their investment.  Lack of investment 
affects all wealth creation plans.
	 Increased cost of goods and services – When a country’s economy is run-
down through corruption, the cost of living rises and the poor are affected 
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immensely.  Corruption translates into high costs of goods and services 
causing inflation and economic vulnerability.
	 Delay, denial and sale of justice in courts – Justice delayed is justice 
denied.  When the courts become corrupt, cases are delayed and judgments 
favour the unmerited sides.  With access to justice dependent on corruption, 
administration of justice will be compromised or frustrated thereby affecting 
individuals, businesses, commerce and the economy.  These lead to breakdown 
in law and order.
	 Increased poverty – Corruption leads to misallocation of resources.  It causes 
scarce resources to be confined to a few undeserving hands leading to the 
majority being denied access to basic necessities such as food, water, shelter, 
health and education. 
	 Shoddy work and stalled projects – Once money intended for certain 
projects has been stolen or embezzled, the little that is left is hardly adequate 
for the planned jobs leading to substandard/incomplete work.
	 Unemployment – With the relocation and reduction of investment, business 
activities decline, industries are shut down and jobs are lost.
	 Loss of confidence in government – Corruption leads to widespread 
dissatisfaction with the general management of public affairs causing loss of 
public goodwill and confidence in government leading to social unrest.
	 Rise in crime rate and insecurity - Corruption increases poverty, contributes 
to high rates of unemployment and aggravates the levels of frustration in 
society, leading to a corresponding rise in the crime rate and insecurity.
	 Negative international image – Image is an important ingredient in the 
development of a country.  The perception that a country is corrupt paints 
a bad image of the country to the rest of the world, negatively affecting 
tourism, investment, donor relations, trade, travel and national prestige.
	 Irregular/illegal acquisition of public land, property and utilities – 
Individuals who are corrupt are capable of using their ill-gotten wealth and 
authority to steal even more public property such as playgrounds, schools, 
hospitals, government houses, court premises and land, thereby denying the 
public access to and use of public utilities.
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The Linkage Between Economic Crimes and Gross 
Violation of Human Rights
40. The fight against corruption is central to the struggle for human rights. 
Corruption has always greased the wheels of exploitation and injustice which 
characterize our world. From violent ethnic cleansing to institutionalized racism, 
political actors have abused their entrusted powers to focus on gains for the 
few at great cost for the many. The Lord Chancellor, Lord Falconer, wrote in his 
Foreword to the UK draft Corruption Bill in 2003: “Corruption worldwide weakens 
democracies, harms economies, impedes sustainable development and can 
undermine respect for human rights by supporting corrupt governments with 
widespread consequences”.
41. It is essentially important to give attention to the impact of corruption on 
economic, social and cultural rights. Corruption is likely to undermine enjoyment 
of these rights in relation to the state’s duty to provide or regulate public services 
in relation to health, housing, water and education. These services generate large 
public contracts which not only create opportunities for corruption but have a 
disproportionate impact on vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, in particular 
women. Widespread corruption in health or educational services deters the poor 
from seeking health care and education, and depresses living standards and 
opportunities for poorer people in particular. 
42. International human rights standards require states to realize socio-economic 
rights progressively, prioritize human rights when allocating resources, and 
thereafter respect, protect and fulfill these human rights. This is based on the 
principle of availability and accessibility of public services to all citizens, especially 
the cost and proximity. Corruption not only reduces the resources available to 
implement programmes to achieve human rights but also reduces the delivery of 
services. This leads to under provision, poor quality, exaggerated prices, wastage, 
fraud and unavailability. Money lost to corruption could have been used to buy 
medicine, equip schools or supply water. When corruption is rampant, it implies 
that the state is not taking steps in the right direction. 
43. Corruption may also violate the principles of equality and non-discrimination which 
are fundamental principle of human rights. This is because corruption produces 
unequal and discriminatory outcomes with regard to human rights for example, 
those who cannot bribe police officers are the ones who are arrested and charged. 
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Similarly, those who cannot bribe judges are the ones who are jailed. Bribery, 
extortion and inducement may also scare away witnesses and entrench corruption
44 Corruption also violates the right to political participation. In Kenya, these are 
referred to as political rights enumerated under Article 38 of the COK 2010. These 
include the right to vote for a candidate of one’s choice, and the right to stand for 
elections.  These rights may be violated by corrupt practices such as bribing voters, 
election officials, intimidation, inter alia. Corruption is incompatible with a free and 
fair electoral process or a merit –based approach to appointment in public service. 
45. Corruption also violates the right to a fair trial (Article 50) and effective remedy. 
This occurs due to bribery, extortion and intimidation by police, prosecutors and 
judges. This violates a suspect’s right to presumption of innocence  
46. It is the vulnerable and marginalized – women, children and the minority groups- 
who often suffer corruption’s harshest consequences.  While dealing with police, 
judges, hospitals, schools, and other basic public services, poor citizens tend to 
suffer more violations than the rich and see a larger share of their resources eaten 
away. It is therefore correct to state that systemic corruption facilitates, perpetuates 
and institutionalizes human rights violations, and therefore prevents individuals 
from realizing and enforcing their basic human rights.
47. Corruption destroys the fundamental values of human dignity and political 
equality, making it impossible to guarantee the rights to life, personal dignity and 
equality. These daily realities are a direct contravention of many human rights 
conventions and basic principles enshrined in those conventions. 
Human Rights Conventions
48. Chapter Four of the Constitution of Kenya of 2010 (COK 2010), applies at the 
national level, Kenya’s international human rights obligation undertaken through 
ratification of the major instruments. Chapter Four of the COK 2010 sets out the 
rights and fundamental freedoms to be enjoyed by all Kenyans.
49. Article 19 states that the Bill of Rights is an integral part of Kenya’s democratic 
state and is the framework for social, economic and cultural policies. It further 
stipulates that the purpose of recognizing and protecting human rights and 
fundamental freedoms is to preserve the dignity of individuals and communities, 
and to promote social justice and the realization of the potential of all human 
beings. Of utmost importance is the provision in Article 19(3) which provides 
that the rights and fundamental freedoms in the Bill of Rights belong to each 
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individual, are not granted by the state, and are subject only to the limitations 
contemplated in the Constitution. 
50. Kenya, therefore, has an obligation to respect, protect and promote the human rights 
of its citizens, and to ensure that corrupt acts do not violate these human rights. 
51. These human rights conventions set out the legal obligations of a government to 
ensure that people living in a country enjoy equality, a fair justice system, access to 
public goods and services.  States have an obligation to respect, to protect and to 
fulfill human rights. A country’s ability to respect, protect and fulfill these rights will 
ultimately be defined by the levels and systematic nature of corruption. A violation 
of human rights therefore occurs when a state fails to respect, protect and fulfill 
recognized human rights of its citizens. It follows that where rights are guaranteed 
and implemented, corruption will drastically reduce.
Corruption as a violation of human rights
52. Before attempting to connect corruption to human rights, it is important to point 
out that not all acts of corruption imply a violation of rights. All forms of corruption, 
may however, in the long run, have an impact on human rights.
53. The United Nation Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) provides a solid basis 
for holding states accountable and offers a path towards stopping human rights 
abuses. The convention does this by criminalizing acts of corruption, for example 
bribery, embezzlement, abuse of office, illicit enrichment, inter alia. One glaring 
anomaly however is that international anti-corruption conventions rarely refer to 
human rights, and major human rights conventions rarely mention corruption. 
International anti-corruption treaties give little guidance on how officials are to 
reconcile their commitment to fight corruption with their obligation to protect 
human rights.
54. Some linkages between corruption and human rights are however visible in some 
anti-corruption and human rights instruments. For example, the Preamble of 
the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption emphasizes that 
“corruption threatens the rule of law, democracy and human rights, undermines 
good governance, fairness and social justice, distorts competition, hinders 
economic development and endangers the stability of democratic institutions and 
the moral foundation of society”
55. Another linkage between corruption and human rights is seen in the Preamble 
to the Declaration of Human and Citizen’s Rights of 1789. It considered that 
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ignorance, forgetfulness or contempt for human rights are the only causes of 
public misfortune and the corruption of governments
56. Nevertheless, it is indisputable that where corruption is widespread, states cannot 
comply with their human rights obligations.  This has been concluded by UN treaty 
bodies and UN special rapporteurs. For example, the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights states that “states face serious problems of corruption, 
which have negative effects on the full exercise of rights covered by the Covenant”.12 
57. The Committee on the Rights of the Child stated thus “it remains concerned at the 
negative impact corruption may have on the allocation of already limited resources 
to effectively improve the promotion and protection of children’s rights, including 
their right to education and health.”13 
Victims of corruption and human rights violation
58. While corruption violates the rights of all those affected by it, it has a 
disproportionate impact on people that belong to groups that are exposed to 
particular risks.  Examples of these are minorities, indigenous people, the disabled, 
those with HIV/AIDS, refugees, prisoners, the poor, women and children. They are 
more exploited and less able to defend themselves. Their vulnerability makes them 
easy victims of corruption
59. Women are over-represented in the poorest social segments of society and under- 
represented in decision-making bodies. They are less able to afford bribes, depend 
much more on public servants and sometimes that men do not, especially during 
pregnancy.
60. Corruption affects children’s right to life, right to health, right to education. They 
also suffer from child trafficking, sexual exploitation and child labour. A good 
illustration of corruption thrives in inter country adoption where judges and 
orphanages are bribed to speed up the process or they accept fake adoption 
papers. 
61. Poor people are affected by corruption because it diverts public resources from 
investment in infrastructure that is crucial to lift them out of poverty. Grand 
corruption damages the quality of public services on which the poor depend 
particularly to meet basic needs.
12  E/C. 12/1/ADD.91 CESCR, 2003, paragraph 12
13  CRC/C/COG/COG/CO/1, paragraph 14
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62. The indigenous and minorities, especially those linked to land that they own 
collectively, suffer effects of corruption when they are displaced by infrastructure 
projects, illegal/irregular sale of public land and fraud in registration of land.
Types of human rights violations in relation to corruption
63. Three types of violations linked to corruption are: direct, indirect and remote 
violations. Direct violations that occur where corruption is the direct cause of the 
violation for example a parent whose child is denied entry into a public school 
because the parent is unable to bribe the head teacher of the school. This directly 
violates the child’s right to education. Indirect violation where corruption is a 
necessary condition, for example when a traffic police man allows an overloaded 
public service vehicle to pass a police road block in return for a bribe, and that 
vehicle is later involved in a road accident killing the passengers.  The right to life 
would be indirectly affected as a result of the bribery. The bribe is an essential 
factor without which the violation would not have occurred.  Remote violations 
where corruption is one factor among many, for example electoral corruption may 
lead to protests but may not be the cause of riots or repression.
64. A practical illustration of the link between corruption and violation of human 
rights is show in Appendix 1 in a table depicting selected corrupt practices 
and their impact on human rights. Although Kenya has made some strides 
in fighting corruption and protecting human rights, there still exists grand 
corruption that grossly violates human rights. This aspect will be analyzed later 
in this chapter, when looking at the challenges of fighting corruption in Kenya, 
and recommendations on the way forward in terms of legal, institutional and 
administrative frameworks. 
65. One fact that is certain however is that anti-corruption agencies need to collaborate 
with human rights activists in order to adequately address violation of human rights 
caused by corrupt acts. Such collaboration may take place in participatory budgeting, 
tracking of public expenditure, naming and shaming of corrupt public servants, 
lobbying and advocacy, raising awareness and empowering people about the effects 
of corruption on violation of human rights.  Corruption is a complex phenomenon with 
a “no one fits all solution” but a multi-disciplinary approach is critical.  
66. Before assessing Kenya’s compliance with legal obligations to combat corruption 
and protect human rights, it is important to first of all briefly look at the initiatives 
made to combat corruption in Kenya, since colonial times to date. This will form the 
basis of determining whether or not Kenya has protected its citizens from violation 
of human rights caused by corrupt acts.
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Magnitude and Scale of Grand Corruption in Kenya 
67. In order to appreciate the magnitude and scale of grand corruption in Kenya, the 
Commission resorted to documented cases of grand corruption from as early as 
the KenRen scandal in the 1970s up to the IEBC’s procurement of biometric voter 
registration kits in 2013. Kenya’s post- independence history has been marred by 
successive cases of huge scandals, commonly referred to as grand corruption. In 
the last two decades, the media and civil society exposed numerous multimillion 
dollar financial scams. A few select cases of grand corruption will be briefly 
mentioned, to demonstrate how much the country has lost. 
The Ken Ren Scandal
68. Sometime in the early 1970s, the Kenyan government entered into a joint venture 
with an American company called Ken Ren Chemical and Fertilizer Company, to 
establish a fertilizer processing plant in Mombasa. The deal collapsed, the plant 
was never built, the government owned company ended up in liquidation and was 
embroiled in enduring cycles of litigation in Europe.14 At the time, the treasury was 
headed by Mwai Kibaki as Minister for Finance. He would later become President 
and serve between 2003 and 2013. In 2007, parliament was informed that Kenya 
still owed Ken Ren Kshs 4.3 billion, which was being repaid using taxpayers’ money. 
For example, in the 2007/2008 Budget Estimates, the Treasury made a provision for 
Kshs 192.982 million as principal repayment of the Ken Ren loans to Autria-Bawag.15
The Goldenberg Scandal
69. The Commission analysed the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the 
Goldenberg Affair (Bosire Commission) that was established by President Kibaki in 
February 2004, barely a month after he was sworn into office.16  It was chaired by 
Justice Samuel Bosire and was mandated to inquire into allegations of irregular 
payment of export compensation to Goldenberg International and into payments 
made by the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) to the Exchange Bank Limited in respect 
of fictitious foreign exchange claims. 
70. In the late 1980s, President Daniel Arap Moi introduced the infamous export 
compensation scheme to encourage legitimate export of gold and to eliminate 
smuggling of gold, thereby increasing revenue from such export business. The 
14 SA Coopee Lavalin vs Ken Ren Chemicals and Fertilisers Limited (1994) 2 All ER 449, Republic of Kenya –vs- Bawag of Austria 
(2000).  In both cases, awards were made against Kenya
15 Government of Kenya 2007/2008 Estimates of Recurrent Expenditure for the Year ending 20th June 2008(June 2007). See also 
Mars Group Kenya “The Mystery of Ken Ren Fertilizer Company” at http//www.marsgroup.org/pages/stories/ken-ren 
16 The Goldernberg Report, which runs into some 848 paragraphs and appendices marked” A” to “Q”, is a collation of oral evidence 
of over 102 witnesses, whose Hansard ran into a staggering 18,824 pages.
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relevant legislation, the Local Manufacturers (Export Compensation) Act, Chapter 
482 of the Laws of Kenya, provided that the scheme was intended to encourage 
trade and foreign exchange earnings.  Unfortunately, this was never to be. 
71. The Goldernberg scandal, which began in 1991, was a massive economic scam that 
cost the Kenya government over Kshs 60 billion (approximately USD 750 million). 
This loss was occasioned by illegal/irregular and fraudulent foreign exchange claims 
and dubious export compensation awards to Goldernberg International Limited 
(GIL), based on fictitious gold and diamond jewellery exports.  The architects of the 
scheme also used instruments and mechanisms like pre-shipment finance facility 
and Export retention schemes to defraud Kenyans of the billions of shillings, under 
the watch of the CBK. In a nutshell, the scam was a high level conspiracy between 
senior government officials and unscrupulous well connected businessmen, to 
plunder the country’s resources at will. 
72. The scam came into the public limelight in April 1992 through the courageous 
actions of a whistleblower, the late David Munyakei, a clerk at CBK. He passed on 
some damning information to opposition MPs, who tabled the same in Parliament. 
The Daily Nation, a major media house in Kenya, also published the first story. 17 
Following the exposure, the payment scheme was stopped.
73. After nearly three years of intensive inquiry, the Bosire Commission produced 
the famous Goldernberg Report, listing several names for the Attorney General 
to either prosecute or take civil action. The following individuals were adversely 
mentioned in the report of the Commission;
a) Mr. Kamlesh Mansukhlal Damji Pattni (the Director, promoter and 
shareholder of GIL);
b) Mr. James Kanyotu (Pattni’s business partner and former head of the 
dreaded Special Branch, deceased);
c) Prof. George Saitoti (former Vice President and Finance Minister during 
former president Moi’s reigns, deceased);
d) Mr. Charles Mbindyo (former Treasury PS);
e) Dr. Wilfred Karuga Koinange (former Treasury PS);
f ) Mr. Collins Owayo (former Commissioner of Mines and Geology);
g) Mr. Arthur Ndegwa (then Senior Mining Engineer in the Office of the 
Commissioner of Miners and Geology);
17 See P. Warutere “Goldernberg’s Sh 186 million Pre-Shipment Scheme, Daily Nation( 21 April 19192)
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h) Mr. Eric Kotut (former CBK Governor);
i) Mr. Francis Chelego Cheruiyot (former Commissioner of Customs and 
Excise);
f ) Mr. Eliphas Riungu (former CBK Deputy Governor);
k) Mr. Elijah Arap Bii (former Kenya Commercial Bank General Manager);
l) Mr. Tom Kilalya Werunga (former CBK employee);
m) Mr. Michael Wanjihia (former CBK employee); and 
n) Mr. Job K. Kilach (former CBK employee).
74. In respect of “those whose specific roles could not be established, [the 
Commission] recommend[ed] that at the discretion of the Attorney General 
further investigations be undertaken against them to determine their respective 
roles, if any, in the whole scam, and whether they were in any way, involved in any 
wrong doing. Falling in this category are, among others, former president Daniel 
Arap Moi, Mr. Joseph Magari (former Treasury PS), Mr. Joshua Kulei (Moi’s former 
personal aide), and Multiphasic Co. Ltd. A number of individuals like Professor 
George Saitoti successfully moved to court to have their names expunged from 
the report.
75. Apart from identifying individuals involved, the Report also made a startling 
finding that the alleged gold and diamond jewellery exports were non-existent 
and that no exports or earnings were made to warrant export compensation. 
Further, the irregular payments to GIL flagrantly flouted the provisions of the Export 
Compensation Act as the compensation rate of 35% was above the ceiling of 20%. 
The Bosire Commission could not execute its mandate relating to the tracing of 
assets acquired with monies illegally obtained from the Goldernberg scam, as it 
correctly pointed out that this was a Herculean task involving a thorough forensic 
audit both locally and internationally. 
76. Although the Goldernberg scam was undoubtedly a massive rip off perpetrated 
by greedy individuals, the full extent of the damage is unknown. The Commission 
is of the view that the report is yet to be meaningfully implemented, particularly 
in the realm of conducting further investigations and prosecution of those behind 
the scam. A few senior public officers in the Ministry of Finance, like Dr Wilfred 
Koinange, Eliphas Riungu, Elijah Bii were dismissed and charged with abuse of 
office. Others like Michael Wanjihia and Joshua Magari were dismissed but not 
charged with any offence, although   Joshua Magari was later charged with abuse 
of office in another grand corruption case commonly known as Anglo- Leasing.
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77. In relation to asset recovery, the CBK repossessed the multi-billion Grand Regency 
Hotel from Kamlesh Pattni, the chief architect of the Goldenberg scam. The hotel 
was later sold by the Bank to the Libyan Arab African Investment Company Kenya 
Limited (LAICO) under mysterious circumstances, and is now known as Laico 
Regency. Following public outcry over the sale, a Commission of Inquiry set up 
by President Kibaki made adverse findings against the then Minister for Finance 
Amos Kimunya and Professor Njuguna Ndungu the CBK Governor, but no action 
was taken against them. To date, the contents of the said report have never been 
released to the public.  
The Charter House Bank Scandal
78. The Charterhouse Bank Scandal is perhaps one of the most profound scandals 
in Kenya’s banking sector to date. Though it only received much attention in the 
media in the recent years, the scam dates back to March/April 2004, when some 
former employees of the blank blew the whistle on a raft of irregularities involving 
the bank and a host of its customers, including tax evasion, money laundering 
and off-shore money transfers. This was being allegedly done in collusion with 
Nakumatt Holdings. 
79. The bank was in June 2006 placed under statutory receivership by the CBK. The 
investigative audit uncovered considerable evidence pointing at strong indications 
that the Bank’s customers were involved in tax evasion and money laundering. The 
Bank was also found to have grossly violated the Banking Act and CBK’s prudential 
regulations. Similar concerns had earlier been raised by the government’s Joint 
Investigation Task Force.
80. In January 2010, attempts were made to have the bank re-opened.  The attempts to 
have the bank reopened resurfaced on 7 July 2010 when Yatta MP Charles Kilonzo 
presented a petition to Parliament on behalf of 35 depositors seeking to have the 
bank re-opened. In September 2010, the Bank was the focus of a fresh probe by the 
Parliamentary Committee on Finance, Planning and Trade. 
81. The Committee, chaired by Nambale MP Chris Okemo summoned and heard from, 
among others, the then Finance Minister Uhuru Kenyatta, former Finance Minister 
Amos Kimunya, KRA Commisioner-General Michael Waweru, CBK Governor Prof. 
Njuguna Ndung’u, KACC Acting Director John Mutonyi, Deputy Solicitor-General 
Muthoni Kimani, and the Director of Public Prosecutions Keriako Tobiko. In a 
strange twist, the senior government officials backtracked on the government’s 
earlier position, recommending the re-opening of the bank. Through its 
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Commissioner-General, Michael Waweru, KRA, for instance, absolved the Bank 
of any wrong-doing, asserting that its investigations on tax evasion focused on 
the bank’s customers, and not the bank itself. Clearly, this contradicts KRA earlier 
position (in July 2006) that the Bank had abetted massive tax evasion by its 
customers.
82. On its part, through its Governor, Prof. Ndung’u, CBK told the Committee that it 
did not object to the re-opening of the Bank. Through its then Acting Director, 
John Mutonyi, KACC informed the Committee that it would have no objection to 
the bank’s re-opening, and that the evidence of money laundering uncovered by 
the task force could not be acted upon as money laundering was not an offence in 
Kenya at the time.
83. So far, nothing substantial has been revealed to the public concerning the 
operations of the Bank, as well as the circumstances surrounding its closure. 
Apparently, the concerned government institutions and agencies have much to 
hide. Since Kenyans have a right to the truth of the matter, it is only prudent for 
the government to conduct in-depth investigations and reveal the truth.
The Anglo-Leasing Scandal
84. The Goldenberg Affair was only a precursor to other cases of grand corruption 
in the government. Early in 2004, Kenyans awoke to the news of an even more 
monstrous scandal, the “Anglo Leasing Scam”. Sadly, the precise story of the scam 
cannot, as yet, be conclusively narrated as too much still remains unravelled; the 
scam is heavily shrouded in secrecy. 
85. The Commission looked at the scam through the eyes of an “insider”, the former 
Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President (in-charge of Ethics and 
Governance), Mr. John Githongo, who blew the whistle on the scandal.  Mr. 
Githongo, a former head of TI-Kenya, was once forced into exile (in the UK) amidst 
threats to his life and personal security. He has since returned to Kenya after 
President Kibaki’s government pledged to ensure his security. The Commission 
regrets that Mr. Githongo could not appear before it to shed light on the saga. 
The Commission therefore relied on reports by various government agencies, 
including the National Assembly’s Public Accounts Committee (PAC), the Kenya 
Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC), the defunct Office of the Controller & 
Auditor-General (C&AG). The Commission also considered reports by various 
non-state actors (NSAs), including the media and civil society organizations 
(CSOs).
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86. The multimillion dollar scandal, which Transparency International (TI) has 
described as an “albatross around the Kibaki government’s neck”,18 involved an 
array of contracts with non-existent entities for various fictitious security projects.19 
The scam, which was predicated on the condition that payments of the contract 
sum of KES 56.3 billion would be in the form of irrevocable promissory notes to the 
order of Anglo Leasing & Finance Company (ALFC) and other similarly fictitious 
entities,20 was reportedly intended to raise funds for President Kibaki’s re-election 
in December 2007. 
87. The scandal started when, sometime in 2001, the government wanted to replace its 
old passport printing system with a state-of-the-art tamper-proof system. Between 
late 2001 and December 2002, the Moi government had signed an overwhelming 
USD 443.36 million worth of contracts with a fictitious company, Anglo Leasing 
and Finance Limited. In January 2003, the Kibaki government ratified the scam; 
between January 2003 and January 2004, it had signed an additional USD 277.7 
million worth of contracts, once again with the fictitious company. This eventually 
saw Kenya grappling with massive scams to defraud public coffer.
88. At the height of the scandal, the PS in the Office of the President (in Charge of 
Governance and Ethics), Mr. John Githongo, conducted an investigation into the 
scam. He shared his findings with President Kibaki on 22 November 2005, while in 
exile in the UK. This is because he ‘thought it wise to wait until the conclusion of 
the politically intense referendum-related campaigning period”. And wise it was, as 
he notes, once again, a release of the dossier during the campaign period “[would 
have been] construed to be part of a politically-motivated action in favour or in 
opposition of any political formation [of the time]”.  In the report, he indicates that 
the President was well aware of all that was going. 
89. The Githongo Dossier reveals that the scam involved senior-most officials in the 
then infant Kibaki regime, the majority of whom were the President’s closest 
associates. Adversely mentioned in this respect are: 
(a) Dr. Moody A. Awori (former Vice President);
(b) Mr. Kiraitu Murungi (former Minister for Justice and Constitutional 
Affairs);
18 “Its Time To Tell Kenyan People The Truth About Anglo-Leasing Corruption Scandal” TI Press Release, Jan 22, 2006, http://www.
transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_
19 J. Githongo, “Findings Of Graft In The Government Of Kenya”( November 2005), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/
pdf/09_02_06kenya_report.pdf 
20 Kenya National Audit Office Special Report by the Controller and Auditor General on the Procurement of Passport Issuing 
Equipment( May 2004)
366
Volume IIB    Chapter T H R E E  
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
(c) Amb. Francis Muthaura (former Head of Civil Service);
(d) Mr. David Mwiraria (former Minister for Finance);
(e) Mr. Chris Murungaru (former Minister for Internal Security);
(f ) Mr. Dave Mwangi (former Permanent Secretary for Internal Security); 
and 
(g) Mr. Joseph Magari (former Permanent Secretary for Treasury).
90. In April 2004, the Parliamentary Accounts Committee (PAC) requested the 
Controller and Auditor General(C&AG) to conduct an audit report on the Anglo 
Leasing transactions relating to procurement of passport issuing equipment. From 
28 April 2004 to 7 May 2004, the C&AG conducted the audit and presented his 
report, which was eventually tabled before the National Assembly on 18 May 2004. 
The report disclosed that:
(a) the Department of Immigration (DOI), the actual client of the project, was 
not involved in the procurement process;
(b) no due diligence tests were carried out to verify ALFC’s financial and 
technical capacity;
(c) Anglo Leasing had fore-knowledge of DOI’s plans to modernize its passport 
issuing system.
91. After scrutinizing the report, PAC tabled the report for debate and adoption by the 
House. This was not to be as the report was subjected to heavy mutilations. For 
instance, the recommendation that the then Minister for Finance, Hon. Mwiraria, 
be held responsible for involving the government in the fraudulent project was 
expunged from the report, following a successful amendment motion by the then 
Minister for Water, Hon. Martha Karua. Further, the recommendation that Ministers 
be held responsible for any fraudulent activities or embezzlement of funds in their 
ministries was also expunged. Consequently, the motion for the adoption of the 
Committee’s report was defeated on a vote by the House.
92. This conduct by MPs clearly demonstrates the greatest challenge to fighting 
corruption in Kenya; lack of political will and impunity. Disappointed, the 
Committee deliberated at length over the rejection of its report by the House. It 
resolved that the only way to push the report through the House was to collect 
further evidence to establish the real movers of the scam, after which it would table 
a comprehensive report in the House. Thus, from 7 February 2006 to sometime in 
March 2006, under the leadership of its Chair (Hon. Uhuru Kenyatta), it embarked 
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on a process of summoning and hearing various witnesses “star witnesses”. In 
total, about 22 sittings were held, with the view of collecting further evidence 
to establish the real identities of individuals and entities behind the scam. The 
Committee received both oral and written submissions. 
93. In the company of a representative from the Office of the Controller & Auditor-
General and four members of staff of the National Assembly, the Committee 
members also travelled to London, where they heard the evidence of Mr. Githongo 
(on 11th and 12th February 2006), which was entirely based on his earlier dossier. 
The decision to take Mr. Githongo’s evidence in London was based on the fact that 
though he was willing to give evidence on the subject, he had alleged that he was 
receiving threats from powerful personalities.
94. In its consensual report, the Committee observed that, generally, the witnesses 
who appeared before it cooperated and gave vital information. However, it 
regrettably noted that some witnesses sought refuge under the sub judice rule in 
their bid to escape giving evidence. More importantly, though he appeared before 
the Committee, Mr. Murungi refused to testify, contesting the legality of the probe. 
On the identity of ALFC and its “shareholding”, the Committee heard evidence 
pointing to the fact that the fictitious firm:
(a) “is part of an organized, systematic and fraudulent scheme to fleece the 
government through the so-called special purpose financing vehicles for 
purported security contracts”; and
(b) is associated with Mr. Deepak Kamani, Mr. Anura Perera, Mr. Amin Juma, Dr. 
Merlvyn Kettering and Mrs. Ludmilla Kuschenko.
95. On the features of the security contracts, the Committee observed:
The Security contracts all have the same design and features. The contracts are all for 
large sums of money, and have been entered into by single sourcing. In each case, there 
are two role players, a financier and a supplier. ... [Sometimes] the financing company 
and the supplier are ... related companies. At other times, the supplier is a reputable 
international company ... [while] the financing company is a shadowy entity whose 
exact identity could not be legally verified. It seems that the role of the financing 
company is to necessitate the creation of debt by the government, as opposed to 
outright payments for the goods or services procured. Once debt is created, it is the 
responsibility of the Treasury to service it through the Consolidated Fund Service, as 
opposed to the line ministry paying for it through its voted funds. ... In effect, therefore, 
the government paid money to the financing company which then paid to the supplier, 
using that money, who then supplied the goods or services. The government then paid 
interest to the financing company on its own money.
368
Volume IIB    Chapter T H R E E  
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
96. On the procurement process, the Committee heard that “security was used 
as an excuse to procure [the] contracts using single sourcing, even where the 
projects merely involved the postal services and meteorological department”. The 
Committee noted with grave concern that:
(a) key ministers (in the Kibaki government) attempted to cover-up the scam, 
and also hindered investigations into the same (Hon. Mwiraria and Hon. 
Murungi were adversely mentioned in this respect);
(b) the Treasury abdicated its role, and particularly failed to advise the 
government on the grossly unfavourable terms of the contracts;
(c) the AG was not involved in the negotiations for the contracts;
(d) there is no evidence that the Cabinet approved the contracts;
(e) “KACC was initially eager to investigate the case ... [as] demonstrated by 
the preliminary report that named the vice president, Minister for Finance 
and their respective permanent secretaries, and civil servants as among the 
individuals that could provide useful information” but “when the final list 
of names was presented to the Attorney General for prosecution, only the 
names of permanent secretaries and other civil servants were included ... 
[but those of ] political figures were notably missing”; and 
(f ) it was not convinced about the ability of KACC to prosecute the cases fairly, 
given its selective exclusion of political figures.
97. Mr. Murgor was sacked and replaced with Mr. Keriako Tobiko, a former Chief 
Defence Counsel in cases involving Mr. Cheruiyot and others in respect of the 
Forensic Science Laboratory project — a clear case of conflict of interest, as Mr. 
Tobiko was expected to continue with prosecution of the cases. The Committee 
accepted Mr. Githongo’s evidence that:
(a) the discussion between Mr. Githongo and Hon. Mwiraria is “authentic”; 
(b) the Vice President (Hon. Awori) was aware of the Anglo Leasing affair:
(c) President Kibaki was also up to date, having been “regularly briefed on the 
Anglo Leasing contracted and the related contracts from the time Anglo 
Leasing became the subject of a parliamentary inquiry [sometime in 2004]”. 
In this respect, it observed:
98. The Committee was of the view that the Anglo Leasing arrangement “[was] not 
possible without the most elaborate collusion on the part of all concerned” — the 
business people involved in the supply of goods and services; civil servants (as 
negotiators of the terms of contracts); and the political leaders in the concerned 
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Ministries or departments. In this respect, the Committee went ahead to identify 
“culpable” individuals at all the three levels. The Committee particularly found Hon. 
Awori culpable, making its finding in the following unequivocal terms:
There is abundant evidence on record that [Hon. Awori] was, contrary to his evidence 
before the committee, sufficiently involved in the implementation of the Anglo Leasing 
contracts as to take responsibility for its shortcomings. First, on the evidence of his 
Permanent Secretary, the [he] was involved in the procurement of the contract and was 
kept informed at every stage. ... Secondly ... [he] read a ministerial statement in Parliament 
in which he exonerated himself from any wrong doing in respect of the contract and 
further informed Parliament that the passports contract with [ALFC] was valid. ... [He] 
could only have read the ministerial statement with either the intention of facilitating a 
cover up, or he was unconcerned as to whether or not the statement was true. ... Thirdly, 
[he] misleadingly defended the reputation of Anglo Leasing in his ministerial statement. 
... Fourthly, [nowitstanding Mr. Githongo’s warning], [he] abdicated responsibility which 
allowed Anglo Leasing to sign a contract that was outrightly disadvantageous to the 
public interest. ... His inaction, when his ministry was involved in a procurement process 
that was questionable is completely inexcusable.
99. Even more culpability was attributed to Hon. Mwiraria, in whose respect the 
Committee made the following categorical observation:
The Minister for Finance, Hon. David Mwiraria, MP displayed a most cavalier attitude 
towards the Anglo Leasing and related contracts, failing to give the much needed 
leadership in the search for the resolution of these contracts. To begin with, according to 
his own testimony before the Committee, [he] was only interested in the recovery of the 
money paid to [ALFC] and once this had been recovered, he considered himself discharged 
from any further responsibility. In the view of the Committee, [he] displayed greater fear in 
finding out who was behind the Anglo Leasing contracts, as if he already knew.
100. From the evidence presented to it, the Committee particularly inferred that Hon. 
Mwiraria knew the identity of the highly fictitious Anglo Leasing. Thus it noted:
The evidence of Mr. Githongo, which the Committee accepts, was that Hon. Mwiraria, 
MP had instructed Mr. Oyula to call the principals of Anglo Leasing and ask them to 
refund the money. ... There is evidence of expensive trips to Europe that were made by 
law enforcement officers with a view to establishing the owners of Anglo Leasing when, 
all along, Hon. Mwiraria and his Financial Secretary [Mr. Oyula] appear to have known 
them. Mr. Oyula’s testimony also confirmed that he was instructed by Hon. Mwiraria, MP 
to seek a refund from [ALFC]
101. The Committee was satisfied that Hon. Murungi “acted to protect Hon. 
Murungaru, MP and Mr. [Alfred] Gitonga and hence obstruct justice given that he 
was in charge of [the] ministry [responsible for providing leadership in the fight 
against corruption]”. The Committee observed that Mr. Mwaliko misled it by, for 
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instance, claiming that due diligence was done (when, in fact, it was not done), 
and claiming that all comments forwarded to his office from the AG’s office had 
been incorporated into the final project documents, when that was not the case. 
Mr. Cheruiyot (former PS for Internal Security) was found to be “most evasive 
and unreliable” as “[h]e appeared not to remember only those matters that were 
prejudicial to him and remembered the details of everything else”. In light of the 
role he played in the Forensic Laboratory Project, the Committee recommended 
“[f ]urther inquiry involving persons who worked with [him], for example his 
minister and the Head of Public Service at the time”. 
102. On Amb. Muthaura, the Committee was of the view that “[t]he head of civil service 
had in the advertisement misled the public that there had no wrong doing by 
anybody”. Further, it opined that — “[t]he Principal Immigration Officer (PIO) was 
transferred within the knowledge of the head of the public service fully aware that 
he was one of the few officers who were opposed to the manner in which the 
passport project was handled. In fact he could not offer an explanation as to why 
Mr. Ole Ndiema was transferred. The Committee found it difficult not [to] believe 
that he was not transferred because of being a ‘stumbling block’ in the passport 
procurement contract.
103. Based on the above (and other findings), the Committee recommended further 
investigation into the conduct of, among others, Hon. Awori, Hon. Mwiraria, Hon. 
Murungi, Mr. Mwaliko, Mr. Cheruiyot, Amb. Muthaura and Mr. Dave Mwangi. 
Unfortunately, the Committee shied from making any recommendation in respect 
of the President, yet it was of the unanimous view that the President was aware of 
all that was going on but failed to act.
104. Further, the Committee recommended, among other things, that:
(a) the KACC Director should liaise with the AG, the Police Commissioner and 
other relevant bodies, with a view to ensuring prosecution of those involved 
in the negotiations and approval of the passport procurement project;
(b) the AG should ensure legal termination of projects that had not taken off;
(c) government programmes, whether security related or otherwise, should 
be included in the National Budget and tabled before the House;
(d) the office of the C&AG should urgently table its report (on the 18 “Anglo 
Leasing and Anglo Leasing type” contracts);
(e) a Departmental Committee called “Parliamentary Security Committee” be 
established to deal with national security related issues;
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(f ) KACC should hasten its investigations and make its report public as soon as 
possible; and
(g) all government projects, whether security related or otherwise, should 
receive cabinet approval before the signing of any contract or payment of 
any funds.
105. The Committee’s report was presented to the National Assembly (for tabling) on 
28 March 2006. Initially, the government characteristically attempted to block the 
tabling of the report, questioning the legality of the same. However, on 30 March 
2006, the then Speaker of the House (Hon. Francis Ole Kaparo) made a landmark 
ruling that, in light of the coming to fore of new evidence, PAC’s re-opening of 
the investigations was justified.21 This effectively paved way for the tabling and 
eventual adoption of the report (on 18 April 2006). In sanctioning the tabling of 
the report, the Hon. Speaker ruled:
I am persuaded to take the view that auditing is a continuous process that moves 
forward and backwards. Its aim is to establish whether public funds have been utilized 
in the intended way, economically, efficiently and within the legal framework. It is also 
meant to establish whether there has been impropriety in the utilisation of funds, and 
if there has been, to seek redress, close the gaps and stop further impropriety. In short, 
to stop waste misappropriation of public funds. It is a continuing process. In the same 
breath, the PAC, being the first Committee ever to be created in the history of the House 
of Commons of the United Kingdom, from where we derive our own procedures, is a 
Select Committee as opposed to ad hoc, Sessional and Departmental Committees. It 
is alive all the time. It watches over the application of taxes collected from the people 
by the Executive. It is for this reason that it is referred to as the “Watchdog Committee”. 
The “dog” must watch. The “dog” in the Committee is not allowed to sleep in its watch, 
and so must the Committee. It must be vigilant and watchful on behalf of the House 
at all times. It is dynamic and not static in its very nature. ... It is for this greater public 
interest, in spite of my misgivings on the procedure used in compiling this Report, that 
I am inclined to admit this report for consideration by this House.
106. During 2004/2005 and part of 2005/2006, the C&AG carried out audits of the 18 
security related projects funded through foreign supplier/credit arrangements. The 
culminating report, which was presented to the National Assembly in April 2006, 
summarized the outcome of the audit, particularly highlighting issues relating to 
financing, procurement and implementation of the projects.22 The report came hot 
on the heels of the PAC Report.
21 National Assembly Official( Record) Hansard, 30/3/2006, 236-239
22 Kenya National Audit Office Special Report of the Controller and Auditor General on Financing, Procurement and Implementation 
Strategy Related Projects( April 2006)
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107. The audit made a number of serious revelations about the scam, which, in many 
respects, corroborated the findings made in the Githongo Dossier and the PAC 
Report. For instance, the audit report revealed that:
(a) Out of the 18 projects, 12 were contracted and respective agreements 
signed between 1997 and December, while the remaining six were 
contracted and signed between January 2003 and January 2004. Out of the 
latter six, three were initiated and negotiated between the years 2000 and 
2002; no information was available regarding the initiation and negotiation 
of the other three.
(b) The policy regarding consideration and use of lease financing and supplier 
credit arrangements in respect of key priority security projects had been 
approved by the cabinet in 2001, as an alternative to the unreliable and 
fast-dwindling donor support.
(c) Through the 18 contracts, the government had been committed to spending 
a total of KES 56.33 billion. The commitments, whose net value is equivalent 
to 16.21% of Kenya’s Gross Annual Expenditure for the year 2003/2004, 
assumed the character of “irrevocable Promissory Notes which were given 
to the credit provides on the dates the respective credit agreements were 
signed”.
(d) Competitive bidding as provided for in the Public Procurement Regulations 
(2001) was not applied in the identification and ward of the contracts to the 
various suppliers. In the absence of this, it was not possible for the audit 
team to ascertain how the contract sums were determined and accepted 
by the government as fair and competitive.
(e) Similarly, no competitive bidding was used to identify the financiers/
credit providers. In the absence of this, the audit team could not ascertain 
how the terms of the credit, including the interest rates chargeable, were 
determined and agreed upon. As a result, it was equally not possible to 
ascertain whether the respective interest rates and other terms were fair 
and competitive.
(f ) For most of the contracts, the suppliers were not subjected to due diligence 
tests. Consequently, it was not possible for the audit team to establish how 
the competence, capacity and capability of the contracted suppliers were 
ascertained.
(g) Seven of the supplier/credit providers do not exist in the countries in which 
they are purported to be registered/domiciled, and may therefore not be 
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bona fide registered business firms. The seven are: Forensic Laboratories 
(purportedly based in Edinburg, Scotland); Anglo Leasing & Finance Ltd. 
(purportedly based in Liverpool, UK); Sound Day Corporation (purportedly 
based in Daventry, Scotland); Infotalent Ltd. (purportedly based in Geneva, 
Switzerland); Midland Finance & Securities Ltd. (purportedly based in Geneva, 
Switzerland), Apex Finance Corporation (purportedly based in Geneva, 
Switzerland); and First Merchantile Securities Corporation (purportedly 
based in Geneva, Switzerland). The audit team further expressed fears 
that additional firms may also prove fictitious if probes are made into their 
identities.
(h) The audit team could not establish the amounts of credit disbursed or the 
amounts which remained undisbursed as there were no invoices, delivery 
notes or certificates of completion of works, which would ordinarily 
indicate the value of the contract deliverables accomplished as at the date 
of payment. n fact, the team was surprised to find out that none of the 
contracts had provision requiring the suppliers to submit these documents 
to the government.
(i) From the evidence and information gathered, it was evident that “the 
contract sums and particularly the prices of goods/equipment were grossly 
inflated compared to the market prices at the time”.
(j) In the absence of complete information on the work/goods/services 
delivered in respect of each of the 18 contracts, the audit team could not 
establish the extent of actual losses suffered by the government.
108. On the basis of this revelations, the C&AG recommended, among other things, 
that:
(a) immediate steps be taken to establish the legal status of the respective 
suppliers/financiers, including the seven earlier mentioned;
(b) the responsible Accounting Officers should be required to provide all 
information and documentation necessary for the determination of the 
actual losses suffered by the government in respect of each of the 18 
contracts;
(c) where overpayment to the suppliers/financiers is proved, or where 
payments have been made but no work/goods/services have been 
received, efforts (including legal action) should be made to recover such 
overpayments;
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(d) all security projects’ budgets be presented to Parliament for approval under 
the respective Ministry/Department’s estimates/votes;
(e) a Special Procurement Committee to oversee the procurement of security 
related equipment/services be established; and
(f ) consideration be given for the establishment of a Special Parliamentary 
Committee to deal with Defence/National Security issues, including the 
related accounts and audit reports.
Implementation of the various reports: Review of KACC’s responses
109. An analysis of KACC’s response to the various PAC and C&AG reports  reveals a 
mixed record. It was surprised that the first time KACC conducted an investigation 
was in the quarterly period January-March 2005, yet the matter had come to public 
limelight as early as April 2004. In the first place, why it took KACC this long to 
respond was beyond the TJRC’s comprehension.
110. In the January-March 2005 quarterly period, KACC inquired into contracts relating 
to the CID Forensic Laboratories Project.23 Its investigations revealed, among 
other things, that “the government procurement procedures were not followed 
in awarding the contract” and “the contract was signed before establishing the 
legal status of the two companies”. Though it could not establish the identity of 
the Directors of the two companies, the investigation revealed that, by 14 June 
2004, “all the money paid to [ALFC] ... [had been] paid back to the Government”. 
On this basis, KACC recoed the prosecution of Mr. Cheruiyot (former PS), Mr. John 
F.A. Agili (former Finance Office in the Office of the President) and Mr. Francis Sang 
(former Director of CID). The file was forward to the AG on 11 February 2005. On 2 
March 2005, the AG accepted the recommendation to prosecute Mr. Cheruiyot and 
Mr. Agili, but recommended that Mr. Sang be treated as a witness “as his evidence 
would be vital”
111. During the January-March 2005 quarterly period, KACC also investigated the 
contract relating to the supply and installation of new passport issuing system 
for the Department of Immigration. Investigations revealed that “[ALFC] is not 
registered either in UK or in Kenya” and “[the] contract was entered into without 
verifying the legal status of the company and in total breach of procurement 
procedures” The investigation further established that “the money paid to [ALFC] 
... was paid back to the Government by 13th May 2004”.
23 Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) Quarterly Report for the Period January-March 2005( April 2005), 2-3
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112 .Based on its findings, KACC recommended the prosecution of Mr. Mwaliko 
(former PS in the Office of the Vice President), Mr. Magari (former Treasury 
PS), Dr. Wilson Kipsang Sitonik (former Director of the Treasury’s Government 
Information Technology Systems) and Mr. David L. Onyonka (former Head of the 
Treasury’s Debt Management Division). The file was forwarded to the AG on 11th 
February 2005 and the recommendation to prosecute was accepted on 16th 
February 2005.
113. In the July-September 2006 quarterly period, KACC inquired into allegations 
of irregular contract involving Globetel Inc. (UK) relating to the supply and 
installation of a multi-channel security system for the Administration Police, and 
found out that the procurement process was marred with various irregularities. 
For instance,  “[t]he project was [neither] planned for nor was it budgeted for 
as required by law”; “[n]o due diligence was done to assess the competence 
and capability of the contractors”; and “[f ]urther, commitment fee and the first 
instalment were paid before anything was done to implement the project”. 
The file was reportedly forwarded to the AG on 27 September 2006, with clear 
recommendations that the former PS, OP (in charge of Provincial Administration 
& International Security) , the former Deputy Chief Finance Office t, he former 
Finance Minister and the former Treasury PS be charged with criminal offences.
114. The quarterly period also saw investigations into other “Anglo Leasing and Anglo 
Leasing type” projects.
115. The e-Cops Project: Investigations into this ambitious project — which was 
intended to see countrywide computerization of the security, law and order 
systems — established various irregularities in the procurement process. For 
instance, it revealed that “[t]he project was not planned for nor was it budgeted 
for as required by law” and that “[n]o due diligence was done to assess the 
competence and capability of the contractors”. The file was forwarded to the AG 
on 27 September 2006, with recommendation that the former PS in the Office of 
the President in-charge of Internal Security), Mr. Mwiraria (former Finance Minister) 
and former Treasury PS be charged in court.
116. The NEWSS Project: KACC inquiries into this project — which was intended to 
modernize the country’s early warning food security system at the Meteorological 
Department — established that “[t]he project was approved despite the 
fact that no budgetary allocation had been made”. It also revealed that “[t]he 
procurement procedures were ... not followed”. The file was forwarded to the AG 
on 29 September 2006, with recommendation that the former Director of the 
376
Volume IIB    Chapter T H R E E  
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
Meteorological Department, former Transport Minister, former Finance Minister 
and former Financial Secretary be charged in court.
117. The Spacenet Project: KACC’s investigations into this project — which was 
intended to install VSAT-based internet services in all post offices in Kenya (even 
in rural post offices where there is no electricity!) — revealed that the project had 
been secretly negotiated between the former Postmaster General of the Postal 
Corporation of Kenya and one Mr. Michael Alan of Spacenet Corporation of USA, 
with the cumulative approval of the former PS, Ministry of Transport, the former 
Minister for Transport and the former Minister for Finance. The investigation 
further revealed that the project was camouflaged as a security project. The file 
was forwarded to the AG, with the recommendation that the former Postmaster 
General, the former Minister for Transport, the former PS in the Ministry of 
Transport, the former Minister for Finance and the former Financial Secretary be 
charged in court.
118. The Police Department Modernization Project: KACC also inquired into this 
projected, which was intended to secure financing for the modernization of Police 
equipment and accessories (including an assortment of arms and ammunitions). 
The investigations revealed that “there was no budgetary allocation for the 
project”, and that a commitment fee of EUR 1.2 million was paid upfront, but no 
supplies were made. The file was forwarded to the AG on 29 September, with 
recommendation that the former PS in the Office of the President in-charge of 
Internal Security, the former Minister for Internal Security, the former Treasury 
PS, former Finance Minister) and former Head of Treasury’s Debt Management 
Department be charged.
Anglo Leasing and Related Prosecutions: Progress Review
119. So far, the government has done little to implement the PAC Repor. Mr. Mwaliko 
was charged in court alongside Mr. Onyonka (Debt Management Department) 
and Dr. Wilson Sitonik. In March 2012, the latter two were acquitted for lack of 
sufficient evidence while Mr. Mwaliko was put on his defence. It suffices to note that 
prosecution of the trio started way before the PAC recommendations. Recently, 
some leaked US diplomatic cables (from the US Embassy in Nairobi) detailed how 
the former AG (Wako) and the former Director of the defunct KACC (Ringera) 
frustrated efforts to prosecute the big names behind Anglo Leasing scam.
120. The Grand Regency saga was an outcrop of the Goldenberg Affair. It revolved 
around the famous Grand Regency Hotel, one of the properties believed to have 
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been acquired (by Kamlesh Pattni) with proceeds from the Goldenberg scam. The 
CBK came into the tussle via a credit of KES 9.9 billion to Mr. Pattni’s Exchange 
Bank, which debt was passed on to Mr. Pattni sometime in June 1993. 
121. When Mr. Pattni failed to fully repay the loan, the CBK secured a charge over the 
Hotel, then registered in the name of Uhuru Highway Development Ltd., one of 
the many companies owned by Mr. Pattni. On 15 April 1994, CBK appointed a 
receiver-manager. Later, itattempted to exercise its statutory power of sale under 
the charge. This prompted Mr. Pattni and UHDL to file a suit, which resulted in 
injunctive orders restraining the Bank from exercising its statutory power of sale.24 
122. In 2003, KACC filed a suit against Mr. Pattni and 16 others, with the intention of 
repossessing the hotel, arguing that it had been obtained using illegally acquired 
public funds.25 In April 2008, after endless battles in court, Mr. Pattni and UHDL 
gave in; a settlement was registered in court, by which the pending suits were 
discontinued and terminated, and the hotel handed over to CBK.  Thereafter, the 
hotel was controversially sold to the Libyan Arab African Investment Company 
Kenya Ltd (LAICO).
123. The controversy surrounding the sale of the Hotel surfaced in the National Assembly 
when, on 23 April 2008, the MP for Imenti Central, Hon. Gitobu Imanyara, sought 
a Ministerial Statement from the Minister for Finance. Hon. Imanyara specifically 
wanted to know: (1) whether UHDL and CBK had sold, or were in the process 
of selling, the Hotel to a company known as Meridian Arab African Investment 
Company (MAAIC); and (2) whether the Government of Kenya had agreed to 
withdraw all civil and criminal cases revolving around Pattni and his companies.26
124. On 29 April 2008, the Finance Minister Hon. Amos Kimunya issued the Ministerial 
Statement, wherein he indicated, among other things, that: 
(a) he had directed CBK to move and dispose of the Hotel at the earliest 
opportunity; 
(b) CBK would be selling the Hotel under its statutory power of sale;
(c) the public is assured that the sale value will not be less than the highest 
open market value obtained during the valuation of the hotel; and
(d) the Government had a keen interest in the sale, and that the Minister would 
consult and guide CBK in the sale process.
24 Uhuru Highway Development Ltd, Kamlesh Pattni & Others –Vs- Central Bank of Kenya & Others, HCC NO. 589 OF 1999
25 Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission –Vs- Kamlesh Pattni & Others, HCC NO. 1111 of 2003
26 Kenya National Assembly Hansard (23 April 2008) xxxx.
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125. Responding specifically to the issues raised by Hon. Imanyara, the Minister stated 
that “[i]t is not true that the hotel has been sold to Meridian Arab African Investment 
Company” and “[i]t is not true that the Government has given amnesty to Kamlesh 
Pattni and his associated companies”. Certainly, this was not true as, by the time 
the Minister issued the Ministerial Statement, so much water had gone under the 
bridge in relation to the sale of the hotel (to LAICO). In fact, Kamlesh Pattni had 
already instructed his counsels to negotiate with CBK with a view to selling the 
hotel to LAICO, and the CBK had been negotiating the sale of the hotel (to LAICO) 
and its Board had already sanctioned the sale.
The Cockar Probe
126. The Finance Minister’s Ministerial Statement did not settle the dust; in fact, it 
generated more heated debates, both within the House and in the public domain. 
On 11 July 2008, the intense public pressure prompted President Kiabki to appoint 
a three-member Commission, with Justice (Rtd.) Abdul Majid Cockar, a former Chief 
Justice of the Republic, as its Chairperson. Its terms of reference included a broad 
mandate to investigate the circumstances surrounding the sale of the hotel, the 
role played by named Treasury and CBK officials. In the end, it was expected to give 
recommendations on legal and administrative measures to redress the anomaly. 
On 24 November 2008, it submitted its final report to the President.
127. The report contains a precise empirical analysis of the events leading up to the 
sale of the hotel. The analysis is based on the oral and written presentations made 
by various individuals who appeared before the Cockar Commission, including 
CBK Governor Professor Njuguna Ndung’u, Lands Minister Hon. James Orengo, 
CBK Board Secretary Mr. Kennedy Kaunda Abuga, the Commissioner of Lands Mr. 
Zablon Mabea, Mr. Kamles Mansukhlal Pattni, the then KACC Assistant Director 
Ms. Fatuma Sichale, the then Interim Director-General of the Public Procurement 
Oversight Authroity (PPOA) Mr. Robert Hunja, Mr. David Masika (a director of 
Lloyd Masika Ltd.), and three former receiver-managers of the hotel. The Cockar 
Commission reported that former Finance Minister Hon. Amos Kimunya chose not 
to appear before it to give evidence.
128. On the legal front, the Cockar Commission made two recommendations of a legal 
reform character. First, it called for the amendment of the Public Procurement and 
Disposal Act, 2005 to explicitly extend the scope of its application to the disposal of real 
property. The Cockar Commission observed that, as it is, the Act gives public officers 
room to circumvent its provision when disposing real property as the Act apparently 
governs disposal of “unserviceable, obsolete or surplus stores and equipment”. 
379
Volume  I IB    Chapter T H R E E 
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
129. The Cockar Commission also recommended review of the CBK Act to strengthen 
the CBK Board’s statutory responsibility of reviewing and checking any excesses of 
the Governor, who happens to be its Chairperson. The Cockar Commission pointed 
out that a similar recommendation had been made by the Bosire Commission, but 
regrettably noted that the same had not been acted upon.
130. The Cockar Commission found that the sale of the hotel was questionable and 
flawed, as it lacked transparency and “did not realise the best value for the Hotel”. 
On the culpability of individuals involved in the irregular sale of the hotel, the 
Cockar Commission was of the view that, though he was not directly involved 
in the sale of the hotel, Hon. Kimunya was adequately briefed but failed to give 
Parliament and the people of Kenya the true picture on the sale of the hotel. Thus 
it concluded: “As the Minister responsible for the affairs of the CBK, he must take 
responsibility for the questionable disposal of the Hotel”.
131. As for the CBK Governor, the Cockar Commission was of the view that “[he] was 
not truthful to other public institutions ... about the sale of the Hotel”. Particularly 
finding this conduct to be contrary to the provisions of section 18 of the Public 
Officer Ethics Act, 2003, it concluded that “[t]he Governor must take responsibility 
for the disposal of the hotel in a secretive and questionable manner”. A similar 
finding was made in respect of the Mr. Abuga. However, at the time of publishing 
this report, no action had been taken against Amos Kimunya, Njuguna Ndungu 
or Kennedy Abuga for their role in the clandestine sale of the Grand Regency 
Hotel.
Initiatives to Combat Corruption in Kenya
132. The defunct Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) had carried out considerable 
research into prior efforts made to fight corruption in Kenya before 2003 when the law 
establishing KACC was enacted. This research, embodied in the manual developed 
to educate pubic officers and members of the public, forms the content on anti-
corruption efforts in Kenya since colonial times.27
133. There has been growing public awareness of the consequences of corruption, its 
negative and destructive effects on the economy and development, and the need 
to eliminate it.  In seeking to forcefully address corruption, Parliament passed the 
Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act 2003 and the Public Officer Ethics Acts 
27 The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003 Explained: A Manual for Public Officers and Members of the Public, a 
publication of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission
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2003 (POEA).  These Acts came into effect on 2nd May 2003, before Kenya signed 
and ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). 
134. Historically, the KACC Manual acknowledges the fact that corruption, as a 
problem in Kenya, dated back to the colonial times. In 1956, the Prevention 
of Corruption Act, Chapter 65 of the Laws of Kenya, was passed by the British 
colonial authorities in an effort to provide a legal framework for combating 
public corruption.  It provided for the punishment of bribery involving holders of 
public office.  The act was amended in 1991 to provide stiffer penalties for those 
convicted of corruption. In 1993 there was an established Anti-Corruption Squad 
in the Police force.  The Squad was established administratively to spearhead the 
fight against corruption.
135. In 1997, the Prevention of Corruption Act was amended to establish the Kenya Anti-
Corruption Authority (KACA).  KACA existed until year 2000 when it was declared 
unconstitutional by a constitutional court.  This declaration was on the basis, 
among others, that the powers of KACA to prosecute went against Section 26 of the 
Constitution which empowers the Attorney General to prosecute cases. 28 In 2001, 
the Anti-Corruption Police Unit was formed administratively to continue with the 
work of KACA.  This Unit existed until 2nd May 2003 when the Anti-Corruption and 
Economic Crimes Act 2003 which established the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission 
(KACC) as the main legal body with the mandate to fight corruption in Kenya came 
into effect.  The Commission replaced the Anti-Corruption Police Unit. 
136. The new Constitution of Kenya 2010 not only entrenched the anti-corruption 
commission in Chapter 6 but also, renamed it as the Ethics and Anti-Corruption 
Commission (EACC). Details of the new anti-corruption laws emanating from the 
new Constitution are contained in the following portion of this chapter that delves 
into the legal instruments governing anti-corruption efforts in Kenya.
The Anti-Corruption Legal Framework
137. This portion of the Chapter identifies and analyses all laws that have a bearing 
on anti-corruption efforts, acknowledge the gains made, and also point out legal 
and institutional weaknesses that need to be addressed. The observations made 
at this juncture will form part of the final recommendations by TJRC on what 
Kenya should do to address past violation of economic rights. At a quick glance, 
the following legal instruments govern the fight against corruption at the global, 
regional and domestic levels: 
28 Stephen Mwai Gachengo and Albert Muthee Kahuria –v- Republic, NRB HC MISC APP.NO. 302 of 2002
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	 The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)
	 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption
	 The Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2009
	 Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act of 2003
	 Public Officer Ethics Act of 2003
	 Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act of 2011
	 Leadership and Integrity Act of 2012
138. Other relevant laws that directly or indirectly strengthen the governance and anti-
corruption efforts in Kenya are:
	 Criminal Procedure Code
	 Mutual Legal Assistance Act of 2011
	 Public Finance Management Act, 2012
	 Public Procurement and Disposal Act, 2005
	 Banking Act, Chapter 488 of the Laws of Kenya
	 Foreign Judgements( Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, Chapter 45 of the Laws of 
Kenya
	 Civil Procedure Act, and Civil Procedure Rules of 2010
139. The fight against corruption in the entire world is now hinged on the United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). Kenya was the first country in 
the world to sign and simultaneously ratify the Convention on 9/12/2003 in Merida 
Mexico. At the regional level, Kenya has also ratified the African Union Convention 
on Preventing and Combating Corruption, and is working with other partner states 
of the East African Community (EAC) towards the development of the East African 
Community Protocol on Preventing and Combating Corruption. All these efforts 
are aimed at promoting good governance, ethics and integrity in the management 
of public services and property.
140. It is worth noting that Kenya’s main anti-corruption statutes, namely the Anti-
Corruption and Economic Crimes, 2003(ACECA) and the Public Officer Ethics 
Act, 2003(POEA) were enacted in May 2003 before the adoption of the UNCAC in 
December 2003. The ACECA established the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission 
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(KACC).  Kenya had therefore established her anti-corruption legal and institutional 
framework before the ratification of the UNCAC. This indeed is commendable on the 
part of the Government of Kenya.  The lack of a national anti-corruption policy has 
however been blamed for the lack of focus and disconcerted efforts in this arena. 
The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)
141. The four main pillars of UNCAC, that State Parties such as Kenya are measured 
against, are:
	 Prevention of corruption in both the public and private sector by establishing 
anti-corruption bodies, strengthening transparency and accountability in 
financial matters, public procurement, funding of political parties, election 
campaigns, appointments and promotions on merit, development of codes 
of conduct, and the participation of the civil society and private sector in 
preventing corruption
	 Criminalization and law enforcement
	 International cooperation i.e. mutual legal assistance, extradition and the use 
of special investigative techniques, enact  proceeds of crime and anti- money 
laundering law
	 Asset recovery i.e. the return of corruptly acquired assets to the country of 
origin through freezing, seizure, confiscation, repatriation, and compensation 
of victims and legitimate owners
142 The UNCAC Gap Analysis Report of 2009 showed that Kenya had substantially 
complied with the provisions of the UNCAC through enactment of the Anti-
Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (ACECA), the Public Officer Ethics Act (POEA) 
and other laws on public finance, procurement and political party financing. 
There was however more to be done to strengthen public institutions in Kenya 
and enhance transparency and accountability. This opportunity presented itself 
in the promulgation of the new Constitution of Kenya on 27/8/2010, ushering in a 
new political, social and economic dispensation. Of relevance in the fight against 
corruption is Chapter Six on Leadership and Integrity that gave birth to the new 
Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) and the Ethics and Anti-Corruption 
Commission Act (EACC Act) No 22 of 2011.
143. Article 79 gave power to parliament to enact legislation to establish an Ethics 
and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) to ensure compliance with the 
provisions of Chapter Six. After consultations and various drafts passing from 
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one government office to another, parliament finally enacted the EACC Act that 
received Presidential assent on 27 August 2011. 
144. It is important to note that the EACC Act did not repeal the ACECA, but only 
repealed Part III of ACECA that establishes the KACC, the Advisory Board, their 
composition and respective functions. In a nutshell therefore, all the provisions of 
the ACECA save for Part III still form part of the anti-corruption legal framework in 
Kenya. 
Constitution of Kenya 2010
	 Constitutional entrenchment
145. Article 79, which is housed in Chapter 6 of the Constitution, obligates parliament 
to enact legislation to establish an independent ethics and anti-corruption 
commission, which shall be and have the status and powers of a commission 
under Chapter 15, for purposes of ensuring compliance with and enforcement of 
the provisions of Chapter 6 on Leadership and Integrity. The new anti-corruption 
body is therefore entrenched in the Constitution, unlike KACC which was a 
creature of the statute. It is therefore a permanent creature of our governance 
system and cannot be disbanded at the whims or wishes or personal expediency 
of a few selfish individuals, as has been in the past.
146. However, Article 79, unlike other Articles establishing constitutional commissions, 
does not prescribe the specific functions required of an anti-corruption agency as 
provided for in the four (4) pillars of UNCAC. These are prevention, investigation, 
asset recovery and international cooperation. 
147. Out of the eleven (11) Commissions established by the Constitution, it is only the 
EACC that is not listed as one of the Constitutional Commissions under Article 
248 of Chapter 15, and whose functions are not outlined in the enabling Article. 
Other than the general objects, authority, funding, composition, removal from 
office, functions and powers of bestowed upon all Commissions and Independent 
Offices under Chapter 15, the specific functions and powers of the EACC are left 
to parliament to determine through legislation.
148. A keen perusal of the articles establishing the ten (10) other Commissions will 
illustrate this glaring legislative discrimination or bias in the establishment 
of EACC. Their composition and functions are clearly enumerated in the 
Constitution, thereby leaving no room for speculation, ambiguity or interference 
while enacting their respective enabling statutes. These are:
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	 Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission (Article 59)
	 National Land Commission (Article 67)
	 Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (Article 88)
	 Parliamentary Service Commission (Article 127)
	 Judicial Service Commission (Article 171)
	 Commission on Revenue Allocation (Article 216)
	 Salaries and Remuneration Commission (Article 230)
	 Teachers Service Commission (Article 237)
	 National Police Service Commission (Article 246)
	 Commission on Implementation of the Constitution (Sixth Schedule-Section 5)
149. The anti-corruption commission is the key institution in the realm of good 
governance, and should therefore have been accorded superior or similar status 
to all the other Constitutional commissions. The importance of the EACC is further 
reinforcement by the power and authority conferred upon it, as a watchdog 
agency, to oversee issues of integrity and ethics in all the other public institutions, 
including the Commissions which have been accorded special treatment. The 
EACC is indeed the enforcer of the national values enshrined in Article 10 and 
Chapter 6 of the in the New Constitution. A weak constitutional basis is a recipe 
for a weak policy and legal framework, hence diluting all the gains made since 
Kenya signed and ratified UNCAC on 9/12/2003. This is the negative implication 
and ambiguity that Kenyans will have to grapple with until the EACC is given a 
sound constitutional grounding through amendment of the Constitution.  
150. This apparent ambiguity in the Constitution may perhaps explain the varied opinions 
that emerged at the different stages of drafting the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Act of 
2011, as it weaved its way through the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission, Ministry 
of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Kenya Law Reform Commission, Commission 
on Implementation of the Constitution, Attorney General’s Office, Cabinet and 
Parliament. The Cabinet draft that was published on 19/8/2011 for introduction 
into the National Assembly, for example, gave prosecutorial powers to the EACC 
in case the Director of Public Prosecutions failed to act on recommendations from 
the EACC. Parliament deleted this provision, arguing that such a function is already 
constitutionally vested in the now independent office of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions. 
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151. Notwithstanding this weak constitutional mandate of EACC, it is a giant leap from 
the previous scenario where the body existed only in statutes. It gives hope to 
the future establishment and solid existence of a strong anti-corruption agency as 
envisaged in UNCAC.
New governance structure 
152. Article 250 of the Constitution provides that “Each commission shall consist of at 
least three, but not more than nine commissioners”. In line with the provisions of 
Article 250, the new law is a radical departure from the previous provisions relating 
to the composition, appointment and terms of office of the commissioners. Part 
III of ACECA, which created the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission and Advisory 
Board, was repealed. 
153. The effect of this new law is that the KACC Advisory Board under ACECA, which 
consisted of 12 persons nominated by private professional bodies and religious 
organisations, has been replaced by a Chairperson and two (2) Commissioners 
who will be openly and competitively recruited by a Selection Panel comprising 
representatives from the public, private and religious sector. The intention, it 
appears, was to have a lean team of experts steering the policy and strategic 
direction of the new EACC. Indeed, the number of Commissioners to serve on 
the EACC was a point of diversion between the stakeholders at different stages of 
the deliberations. Whereas the Cabinet had provided for nine (9) commissioners, 
parliament reduced it to only three (3) commissioners. This small number of 
Commissioners, although desirable, may present operational challenges. 
154. Firstly, there is no provision in EACC Act on the mode of appointment or election 
of the Vice-Chairperson yet Article 250(10) of the Constitution provides that the 
members of a commission shall elect a vice-chairperson from among themselves. 
This ought to have been part of Section 6 of EACC Act or in the section appearing 
immediately thereafter. 
155. Secondly, Section 14 of EACC Act empowers the EACC to establish committees for 
the effective discharge of its functions. With a small number of only 3 commissioners, 
it will be near impossible to establish any such committees. The effect of this is that 
all the 3 commissioners will belong to all the committees, hence defeating the 
purpose of setting up different committees to deal with different aspects of the 
Commissions functions or powers.
156. Thirdly, and in what appears confusing, Section 6 of the Second Schedule to the EACC 
Act, that prescribes how the business and affairs of the EACC shall be conducted, 
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makes reference to a vice-chairperson who shall preside at meetings in the absence 
of the Chairperson. Where both are absent, the members shall elect one of them to 
preside. This is where the operational challenges and weaknesses of the new law 
become evident. The EACC commissioners are only three (3) in number including 
the chairperson. Assuming that they have elected one of the other two to be the vice 
chairperson, and that both the chair and vice chairperson are absent, this leaves only 
one commissioner to continue with the meeting. This is impossible because section 
5 of the Second Schedule sets the quorum for the conduct of business at a meeting 
of the Commission at two thirds of all the members of the EACC.
157. Although Section 14 of EACC Act allows the EACC to co-opt persons into 
membership of the Committees; these persons may only attend meetings and 
deliberate but shall have no power to vote. No decision can therefore be made 
where there is lack of quorum, and this could delay and or paralyse the work of the 
Commission. For operational expediency and quorum requirements, it would have 
been prudent to have at least five or seven commissioners.
159. There are several positive aspects of the new governance structure that are worth 
noting.
	 The Commissioners will appoint the Secretary who will also be the Chief 
Executive Officer and accounting officer. This is a departure from the previous 
CEO who was appointed by the President, hence vulnerable to executive 
pressure and political interference.
	 The duties of the Secretary are also more explicit, clear and the chain of 
command between the Secretary, the Commissioners and the staff is clear.
	 The Commissioners and the Secretary will serve for a single term of 6 years 
in contradiction to the previous Board members who could be nominated to 
serve for another term by their professional bodies. This guards against the 
risk of top anti-corruption officials staying in office for too long and possibly 
getting too familiar with suspects.
	 The Commissioners will serve on a full time basis hence able to give policy and 
strategic direction by devoting all their time and energy to the affairs of the 
Commission. The previous Board members were 12 in number (too many!) and 
had several other public and private matters to attend to, hence diluting their 
commitment and quality of service to the Commission
	 The Commissioners will also deal with complaints against the employees of the 
Commission, such as abuse of power, impropriety, misconduct, maladministration, 
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delay in investigations, unreasonable invasion of privacy, etc. Such complaints 
were previously handled by the Director in a secretive and unclear manner that 
left a lot of suspicion and or allegations of bias and favoritism, or outright inaction 
altogether. It is hoped that all complaints will now be fairly and openly addressed 
to their terminal stages. The abuse of power and delay in investigations is a 
particularly critical issue as concerns had been raised by members of the public 
that it took too long to investigate complaints of corruption, and or that the 
KACC appeared to conduct biased or shoddy investigations.
Code of Conduct 
159. Section 21 of the EACC Act provides for a Code of Conduct contained in the 
Third Schedule of the Act that binds all the Commissioners and the staff of 
the EACC.  This differs from ACECA which left the drafting of the Code to the 
CEO. Furthermore, the Code of Conduct for the Advisory Board was drafted by 
themselves independently of the Commission employees. The new law therefore 
ensures uniformity and equal standards of ethical behaviour for all persons 
working for the Commission. This Code is heavily borrowed from Chapter Six of 
the Constitution, which EACC is supposed to enforce. The enforcer must therefore 
be composed of persons of integrity before they can check on the integrity of 
others. The salient features of the Code are herein below summarized:
	 Commissioners and employees are barred from doing business with the 
Commission, and are required to avoid, and to disclose any interest in a 
contact, or conflict between their personal and official duties.
	 Most importantly, they are not supposed to receive any gifts or favours that 
would influence their decisions, and not to actively participate in fundraisings
	 The Act also clarifies that the provisions of this Code are in addition to the 
provisions of the Public Officer Ethics Act, and that where there is a conflict, 
the provisions of the POEA will prevail. Officers of the new EACC will therefore 
be expected to be people of unquestionable character and high levels of 
integrity.
Mandate of the Commission
160. It is important to note that the new law does not repeal the entire ACECA of 2003 
but has only two amendments captured in Sections 36 and 37 of the EACC Act. In 
the first amendment (under Section 36), Section 2 of ACECA is amended to delete 
the name “Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission” and substitute it with the new 
name “Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission” established under Section 3 of the 
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EACC Act, pursuant to Article 79 of the Constitution. In the second amendment 
captured under Section 37 of EACC Act, Part III of the ACECA that establishes the 
Advisory Board was repealed. 
161. The effect of this is that all the offences created under Part V of ACECA and the 
provisions relating to investigations (Part IV), compensation and recovery of 
improper benefits (Part VI), evidence (Part VII), execution (Part VIIA), miscellaneous 
provisions on suspension and disqualification of public officers charged with 
corruption, protection of informers, e.t.c. (Part VIII), repeal, transition and 
amendments (Part IX) have been retained. This is contrary to public opinion that 
suggests that the new commission has been rendered weak or toothless, and 
that all the work that had been carried out for the last six years would go down 
the drain. On the contrary, the new Act, in the saving and transitional provisions, 
clearly stipulates that all the orders and processes of the old body shall be 
deemed to be carried out under the new body and new law. 
162. The mandate of the Commission has, in effect been expanded, to give it more 
teeth as regards the mainstreaming of ethics and integrity in the public sector. 
Section 11 of EACC Act states provides or the following functions of the Anti-
Corruption Commission. 
(i) General functions and powers under article 252 of the Constitution
163. These include, conducting investigations on its own initiative or on a complaint 
made by a member of the public; powers necessary for conciliation, mediation 
and negotiation; recruiting its own staff and; other functions and powers 
prescribed by legislation.
(ii)  Functions of the EACC under Chapter Six 
164. The EACC established by Article 79 of the Constitution is to ensure compliance 
with and enforce the provisions of Chapter Six on Leadership and Integrity as 
relates to State Officers.  These are; the guiding principles of leadership and 
integrity( Article 73), oath of office( Article 74), conduct of state officers( Article 
75), financial probity(Article 76), restriction on activities of state officers( Article 
77), citizenship and leadership( Article 78). 
165. In summary, the EACC will ensure that State Officers are:
	 selected to public office based on personal integrity, competence and suitability
	 elected in free and fair elections
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	 not influenced by nepotism, favoritism, other improper motives or corruption 
in making decisions
	 declare any personal interest that may conflict with public duties
	 subscribe to oath or affirmation of office
	 deliver gifts or donations given to them to  the State
	 do not maintain bank accounts outside Kenya
	 do not participate in any other gainful employment
	 do not hold office in  a political party
	 citizens of Kenya and do not hold dual citizenship
	 retired State Officers do not hold more than two concurrent remunerative 
positions in a state organ
166. Previously, the issue of ethics, development and enforcement of ethical 
standards was provided for in the Public Officer Ethics Act, which gave the 
powers to the Responsible Commissions to receive complaints and take 
disciplinary or other administrative action against the officers involved. 
Examples of the Responsible Commissions under POEA are the Public Service 
Commission, Teachers Service Commission, Judicial Service Commission, inter 
alia.  The Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) had no powers in this 
regard and appeared helpless when such conduct was reported or disclosed 
during investigations. The KACC could only refer such issues to the responsible 
commission to deal administratively or otherwise under Sections 35-39 of 
Public Officer Ethics Act (POEA). 
167. Apart from investigating corruption, raising awareness about the dangers of 
corruption and examining the work processes in public institutions as provided for 
under the now repealed Section 7 of ACECA, the new EACCC’s functions have been 
expanded, under Sections 11 and 13 of EACC Act, to include:
	 development of codes of conduct for public officers
	 oversee enforcement of codes of conduct for public officers
	 receive complaints on breach of codes of ethics
	 Investigate and recommend to the DPP prosecution for any acts of corruption 
or violation of codes of ethics or other matter prescribed under this Act or any 
other law enacted pursuant to Chapter 6 of the Constitution.
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	 recommend appropriate action to be taken against public officers for unethical 
conduct
	 Monitor the practices of public bodies to detect corruption and secure the 
revision of methods of work that are conducive to corrupt practices. This 
function is however subject to Article 31 (Right to Privacy). This function 
implies that the EACC can deploy undercover techniques to detect corruption. 
Note that the Right to Privacy is not absolute and can be limited in public 
interest, so long as the requirements of Article 24 of the Constitution are 
satisfied.
Asset Recovery 
168. Asset recovery, under Article 51 of UNCAC, is the fundamental anti-corruption 
objective. This function, that was previously conferred upon KACC under Section 
7 of ACECA, has been retained in Section 11(1)(k) of the new Act. The EACC shall 
institute and conduct proceedings in court for purposes of recovery or protection 
of public property, or to freeze, confiscate proceeds of corruption, payment of 
compensation or other punitive or disciplinary measures.
Inter agency collaboration
169. This is a crucial provision that has been carried over from Section 12 of ACECA. The 
only difference is that ACECA was more specific in naming such bodies such as the 
Controller and Auditor General, and the Director of CID, among others. May be 
Parliament found it prudent not to limit the state organs or agencies that the new 
body may collaborate or work with.
International cooperation
170. Section 11(5) provides that the EACC may request and obtain professional 
assistance from such persons or organizations as it considers appropriate. This 
may loosely be interpreted to include requests for mutual legal assistance from 
other countries, but it is vague and subject to narrow, domestic application. 
The repealed Section 12(3) of ACECA was more explicit. It provided thus, “The 
Commission may in the performance of its functions work in cooperation with 
any foreign government or international or regional organization”.
171. Indeed, this is the Section that KACC relied upon to successfully appeal against a 
court order that had barred it from seeking and obtaining evidence from a certain 
foreign government institution. The legal framework for recovery of corruptly 
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acquired assets is now found in the Mutual Legal Assistance Act of 2011(MLAA). 
This Act provides for mutual legal assistance to be given and received by Kenya 
in investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings. 
172. Prior to the enactment of this law, Kenya offered or received legal assistance 
through the Harare Scheme Relating to Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 
within the Commonwealth (commonly referred to as the Harare Scheme). It 
was signed between Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa. Its purpose was 
to increase the level and scope of assistance rendered between Commonwealth 
governments in criminal matters. The measures enumerated in paragraph 1(3)
(i) of the said scheme include, inter alia, the tracing, seizing and confiscation of 
proceeds and instrumentalities of crime.
173. The Mutual Legal Assistance Act (MLAA) of Kenya regulates the rendering of legal 
assistance to any requesting state unless otherwise regulated by agreement. It 
applies to requests for legal assistance from any requesting state or international 
entity to which Kenya is obligated on the basis of a legal assistance agreement or 
even where there is no such agreement. 
174. The enactment of the MLAA by Kenya is a giant step forward in tracing and 
recovery of corruptly acquired assets that may be hidden outside Kenya. It is 
hope that other countries, especially those that have ratified UNCAC will give 
Kenya the desired cooperation and technical assistance in this regard. 
Powers to conduct mediation, conciliation and negotiation
175. The new Constitution lays emphasis on Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
as a means of resolving disputes expeditiously in a less costly manner. It is a 
power that is vested in all Constitutional Commissions by Article 252 of the 
Constitution. 
176. In the anti-corruption war, this new power that had already manifested itself in 
the 2007 amendments to ACECA and the recently enacted Amnesty Regulations 
of 2011 pursuant to Section 25A of ACECA.  The purpose is to encourage out 
of court settlements on condition that the suspect fully discloses what they 
corruptly acquired and the matter is published in the daily papers in order to 
enlist comments from members of the public before the matter is settled.  This 
is an expeditious and less costly form of determining disputes, although some 
Kenyans have opposed on the basis that it will encourage impunity.
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Access to information
177. Any member of the public may request for information from the new body, 
upon payment of a fee, and subject to confidentiality requirements. This will 
make the EACC more transparent and accountable to the tax payers who fund its 
operations.
Financial provisions
178. Funds of the EACC will be derived from money allocated by Parliament and 
from grants, gifts or donations that must be disclosed to parliament and made 
public before use. This will ensure transparency and accountability in the use 
of public finance. This is in contradiction to the previous commission whose 
expenses were charged on and issued out of the Consolidated Fund without 
further appropriation other than the ACECA (See Section 13(5) of ACECA. This 
may be attributed to Article 249 of the Constitution that obligates parliament 
to allocate adequate funds to enable each commission to perform its functions, 
and that the budget of each commission shall be a separate vote. It is only the 
remuneration and benefits payable to a commissioner that shall be a charge on 
the Consolidated Fund (Article 250(7). 
Annual reports
179. Apart from financial and statistical issues, the EACC will report to the President 
and the National Assembly about recommendations made to state departments 
and any action taken upon those recommendations. Previously, the Anti-
corruption Commission examined work processes and made recommendations 
that were never acted upon by state departments. It was often helpless in 
the face of such inaction. The presentation of these recommendations to the 
President and Parliament will ensure that government departments are held 
accountable for failure to act upon these reports. This will enhance transparency 
and accountability. 
Independence of the Commission
180. This has been enhanced. Previously, KACC was accountable to Parliament (Section 
10 of ACECA). The new law is however states that the EACC shall not be subject 
to the control or direction of any person or authority. This independence from 
legislative oversight, unless provided for in the Constitution or this Act, is good for 
the new entity
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Saving and transitional provisions
181. These provisions are good in so far as they preserve the processes and assets of 
the Commission. All orders, notices, transactions, investigations, prosecution, civil 
proceedings, any other process carried out under ACECA are deemed to be done 
under the new Act. Similarly, all the property, assets, rights, liabilities, obligations, 
agreements, shall vest in the new body. Any undertakings or responsibility of the 
Advisory Board will be assumed by the new Commission.
192. Staff of the Commission, except the Director and Deputy Directors, will transit to 
the new body and serve for their unexpired terms of their contracts. However this 
is not automatic. They will be required to apply and be vetted for their suitability 
to serve in the new body. This seems to a trend in almost all the bodies that are 
being set up and the staffs of KACC are no exception. This could also be explained 
by the fact that the new EACC will be ensuring that other public servants maintain 
integrity in their service to the citizens. They must therefore, of necessity, be 
persons of unquestionable character and integrity as required by Chapter Six of 
the Constitution.
Weaknesses in the new law
183. The following are some of the weaknesses in the new law and which may hamper 
the fight against corruption in Kenya: 
	 Lack of prosecutorial powers by EACC is perceived by a significant proportion 
of Kenyans as an aspect that may hamper expeditious and independent 
determination of corruption cases. However, under Article 157(12) of the 
Constitution, Parliament may enact legislation conferring powers of prosecution 
on authorities other than the Director of Public Prosecutions. There is therefore 
a window of opportunity for EACC to be granted prosecutorial powers, subject 
of course to proven efficiency, objectivity and fairness in investigations.  
	Failure to criminalise some offences in UNCAC:
	Bribery of foreign public officials and officials of international organizations 
(Article 16)
	Trading in influence (Article 18)
	Bribery in the private sector (Article 21)
	Embezzlement of property in the private sector (Article 22)
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	Liability of legal persons (Article 26) 
	Illicit enrichment (Article 20)
	Concealment or continued retention of property knowing it to have been 
corruptly acquired (Article 24)
	Opening and maintaining bank accounts abroad
	Failure to provide for anti-corruption measures targeting the private sector 
(Article 12) as well as failure to provide for lifestyle audit of public servants as 
a means of tracing and recovering corruptly acquired property. Equally, there 
is no specific provision empowering the EACC to deploy special investigative 
techniques such as electronic or other forms of surveillance and undercover 
operations in order to combat corruption effectively as required by Article 
50 of UNCAC. Moreover, there is no provision for admissibility in evidence of 
evidence derived from special investigative techniques. 
	The anti-corruption legal framework is now contained in four (4) different 
statutes, namely the ACECA, POEA, EACC Act and the Leadership and 
Integrity Act (LIA).  There is a lot of duplication especially in POEA and EACC 
Act in relation to matters of ethics and integrity. For example, under POEA 
and LIA the Responsible Commissions are required to develop and ensure 
compliance with their respective Codes of Conduct. Under EACC Act, the 
EACC is also legally empowered to develop and enforce codes of conduct for 
all public officers. This will represent operational and jurisdictional conflict 
when dealing with breaches of ethics. There is need to vest this powers in 
only one commission or clearly distinguish their roles to avoid confusion and 
duplicity.
Recent Legislative Developments on Leadership 
and Integrity In Kenya
184. It has been acknowledged globally, that lack of integrity and ethics is what 
invariably results in corruption. This chapter will therefore not be complete without 
looking at the twin issues of leadership and integrity, and how they have been 
addressed in order to combat corruption in Kenya. There is no other chapter in 
the Constitution of Kenya 2010 (COK 2010) that is known and widely discussed in 
Kenya more than Chapter 6.  It has been used to qualify or disqualify persons from 
seeking either appointive or elective positions in public office. 
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185. Interestingly, neither the Constitution nor any other statute in Kenya defines the 
term “integrity”. This could perhaps explain the various divergent opinions on what 
comprises lack of integrity, and the different integrity thresholds that have been 
set by both the Parliament and the Judiciary in Kenya. At the onset, it is proposed 
that the term “integrity” should be defined in order to clear the ambiguity and 
confusion that seems to have dogged the implementation of Chapter 6 of the 
Constitution. Such a definition may however beg the question whether issues of 
morality, as implied by the common meaning of integrity, should be the subject of 
legislation. It remains a burning issue that may interest scholars, religious leaders 
and writers on corruption and governance issues. 
186. The promulgation of the new Constitution of Kenya on 27/8/2010 ushered in a 
new political, social and economic dispensation. Of relevance in the fight against 
corruption is Chapter Six (6) on Leadership and Integrity that gave birth to the new 
EACC and the EACC Act. Article 79 gave power to Parliament to enact legislation to 
establish an ethics and anti-corruption commission to ensure compliance with the 
provisions of Chapter Six (6). After consultations and various drafts passing from one 
government office to another, Parliament finally enacted the EACC Act that received 
Presidential assent on 27 August 2011. Closely related to Chapter 6 of the COK is the 
Leadership and Integrity Act (LIA) that was enacted by Parliament in August 2012. 
187. Following the promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya 2010, a lot of attention 
has been paid to Chapter 6 of the said COK that deals with Leadership and 
Integrity. This chapter provides for the manner in which state officers shall conduct 
themselves both in their public and private lives. 
188. The EACC is tasked with the responsibility of ensuring compliance with, and 
enforcement of the provisions of Chapter 6.  The Leadership and Integrity Act of 
2012 establishes procedures and mechanisms for the effective administration of 
the legislation on leadership as required by Article 80. More specifically, it sets out 
standards of behaviour that a person seeking or already serving in public office 
may be judged against. The intention of Chapter 6 was to ensure that only persons 
of high integrity standards are allowed to serve in public offices. It was hoped that 
this would prevent corrupt persons from getting into or remaining in public office, 
and ultimately attain good governance. This noble intention has however been 
met with a lot of legal challenges that are highlighted in this section.
189. Of special concern in this chapter is Article 73(2) (a) that provides for selection of 
state officers on the basis of personal integrity, competence and suitability, or election 
in free and fair elections, as one of the guiding principles of leadership and integrity. 
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Herein lays the distinction between appointive and elective positions in the public 
office. This distinction, as will be discussed later, has posed challenges to the 
implementation of Chapter 6 because it seems to place higher integrity standards 
on appointed officers more than elected officers. A further distinction that has 
created controversy is that between a state officer and a public officer, especially 
when it relates to the mode of appointment, election, remuneration and dismissal 
from office. It therefore becomes imperative to, as a preliminary issue, understand 
the different categories of public officers in Kenya. 
190. The COK 2010 has also created a new category of public officers known as state 
officers. Previously, all officers serving in public service were all referred to as public 
officers, as defined in the Public Officer Ethics Act of 2003. Chapter 6 of the COK 
2010 applies specifically to state officers, although the Leadership and Integrity 
Act (LIA) has extended the application of this chapter to all public officers, save for 
section 18 of the LIA that applies only to state officers. This distinction becomes 
important when looking at the qualification and disqualification criteria.
191. Before the promulgation of the new Constitution of Kenya 2011, there was no 
category of public servants referred to as State officers. All of them were referred 
to as public officers as defined in the Public Officer Ethics Act. However, the 
Constitution now creates a special category of senior public officers called state 
officers, and clearly separates them from the rest of the other majority public 
officers. Article 260 of Chapter 17 of the Constitution on General Provisions that 
deals with interpretation of the Constitution defines;
192. A public officer as a state officer or a any person, other than a state officer, who 
holds a public office. A public office means an office in the national government, a 
county government, or the public service, if the remuneration and benefits of the 
office are payable directly from the Consolidated Fund or directly out of money 
provided by Parliament
193. A state officer is a person holding a state office. A state office means the;
	 President, 
	 Deputy President, 
	 Cabinet Secretary, 
	 Member of Parliament, 
	 Judges and Magistrates,
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	 member of a Commission to which Chapter 15 applies, 
	 holder of an independent office ,
	 member of a county assembly, governor or deputy governor, member of the 
executive committee of a county government,
 	 Attorney General, 
	 Director of Public Prosecutions, 
	 Secretary to the Cabinet,
	 Principal Secretary, 
	 Chief of the Kenya Defence Forces,
	 Commander of a service of the Kenya Defence Forces, 
	 Director General of NSIS, 
	 Inspector General and Deputy Inspector General of the National Police Service; 
and
	 an office designated as a state office by national legislation
194. This distinction probably explains why there was need to have another law to deal 
with the newly created category of State officers, hence the drafting of the Leadership 
and Integrity Act 2012. State officers obviously perform more serious public functions 
than ordinary public servants do. Their process of selection and appointment is also 
quite rigorous, lengthy and subject to transparency requirements.
195. Going by the definitions of economic crime and grand corruption, State officers 
are also the ones most likely to engage in large procurement contracts involving 
large sums of money. These officers therefore require special mention in this 
chapter.
Relevant legal framework
196. In order to objectively and exhaustively deal with the twin issues of appointment 
and election to public office, one must of necessity identify and analyse all the 
relevant Constitutional and statutory provisions. It may also be prudent to look at 
them differently since there appear to exist legal provisions that apply differently 
to each of the two categories. 
	 The Constitution of Kenya, 2010
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	 Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2011
	 Leadership and integrity Act, 2012
	 Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003
	 Public Officer Ethics Act, 2003
Constitution of Kenya
197. Article 73(1) (a) Chapter 6 of the COK 2010 sets out the guiding principles of 
leadership and integrity by providing for selection of state officers on the basis 
of personal integrity, competence and suitability, or election in free and fair 
elections, as one of the guiding principles of leadership and integrity. 
198. The EACC established by Article 79 of the Constitution is to ensure compliance 
with and enforce the provisions of Chapter Six on Leadership and Integrity as 
relates to State Officers.  These are; the guiding principles of leadership and 
integrity (Article 73), oath of office (Article 74), conduct of state officers (Article 
75), financial probity (Article 76), restriction on activities of state officers (Article 
77), citizenship and leadership (Article 78). 
199. In summary, the EACC will ensure that State Officers are:
	selected to public office based on personal integrity, competence and 
suitability
	elected in free and fair elections
	not influenced by nepotism, favoritism, other improper motives or 
corruption in making decisions
	declare any personal interest that may conflict with public duties
	subscribe to oath or affirmation of office
	deliver gifts or donations given to them to  the State
	do not maintain bank accounts outside Kenya
	do not participate in any other gainful employment
	do not hold office in  a political party
	citizens of Kenya and do not hold dual citizenship
	retired State Officers do not hold more than two concurrent remunerative 
positions in a state organ.
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The Leadership and Integrity Act Of 2012
200. The Leadership and Integrity Act of 2012 is an Act of Parliament to enacted to give 
effect to, and establish procedures and mechanisms for effective administration of 
Chapter Six of the Constitution, and for connected purposes. According to section 
3, the primary purpose of this Act is to ensure that State officers respect the values, 
principles and requirements of the COK.
201. The focus on state officers is based upon the provisions of Chapter Six, and the 
reality that state officers ordinarily hold the highest level of responsibility in 
terms of directing the management of affairs in the public service. The EACC is 
responsible for overseeing and enforcing the implementation of this Act. It is also 
expressly stated that the provisions of Chapter 6 of the COK and the Public Officer 
Ethics Act (POEA) shall form part of the General Leadership and Integrity Code.
202. The Act establishes a General Leadership and Integrity Code for all state officers 
that is distinct from the general Code of Conduct and Ethics prescribed for other 
public officers under the Public Officer Ethics Act of 2003. Closely related to this is 
the requirement for each public entity to have Specific Leadership and Integrity 
Codes, which borrow from the general Leadership and Integrity Code. 
203. The new law also facilitates the extension of the application of the provisions 
of Chapter Six of the COK and the General Leadership and Integrity Code, except 
section 18 (on public collections) to all public officers as if they were State officers. 
This is found in section 52 of the LIA that makes reference to Article 80(c) of the COK.
204. It also worth noting that breach of the codes under the LIA results in disciplinary 
action (section 42) by the public entity responsible for the State officer, unless 
the behavior warrants the institution of civil or criminal proceedings against the 
State officer. The public entity shall refer civil matters to the Attorney General (AG), 
whereas criminal matters shall be referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions 
(DPP), or to any other appropriate entity. This will be done after investigations by 
the public entity and after it is of the opinion that civil or criminal proceedings 
ought to be preferred. 
205. The only breaches that attract criminal sanctions under the LIA relate to opening 
or operating bank accounts outside Kenya without approval from the Commission 
(section 19), and acting for foreigners (section 20 as read together with section 
48), obstructing or hindering persons under the Act (section 46).
206. An objective reading of Chapter 6 and the LIA does not clearly reveal the role of 
EACC before an individual is elected or appointed to a public office.  The Leadership 
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and Integrity Bill had given the EACC a clear role of vetting such individuals and 
thereafter issuing a Clearance Certificate. These vetting provisions were however 
deleted by Parliament. The only duty left for EACC is to receive a Self Declaration 
Form from those wishing to be elected to a state office, thus leaving it to interested 
individuals to “vet” themselves.
207. An honest reading of Chapter 6 and the Leadership and Integrity Act shows 
that Parliament deliberately avoided the use of the word “vetting”. If Parliament 
intended to vest such a function or responsibility on the EACC, it would have 
expressly used this word or referred to it. A good example of such an express 
provision is found in Section 23(1) of the Sixth Schedule of the COK 2010 
that requires Parliament to enact legislation establishing mechanisms and 
procedures for vetting the suitability of judges and magistrates to continue to 
serve.
208. Another example is found in section 34(3) of the EACC Act that empowers the 
EACC to vet any member of staff of KACC who wishes to work for EACC, to ensure 
that he or she is fit and proper to serve in the position applied for as a member of 
staff of EACC.
209. The LIA does not state what the EACC is supposed to do with this Declaration. 
However, it may be safe to infer that anyone who gives false information to the 
Commission commits an offence punishable by a fine not exceeding kshs 5 
million, imprisonment for a period not exceeding 5 years or both, as per section 
46(1) (d) of the Leadership Act. Since the EACC has no prosecutorial powers, the 
matter will be referred to the DPP for appropriate action. Should the officer in 
question be convicted, they may thereafter be disqualified from holding a state 
office if the law establishing that office provides for such action.
210. It is clear that the EACC only comes in after the state officer has assumed office to 
ensure that the Leadership Code is adhered to by state officers. This role is further 
expounded in the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act, which establishes 
the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission.
The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act of 2011 (EACC Act)
211. Apart from investigating corruption, raising awareness about the dangers of 
corruption and examining the work processes in public institutions as had been 
provided for under the now repealed Section 7 of ACECA, the new EACCC’s 
functions have been expanded, under Sections 11 and 13 of the Ethics and Anti-
Corruption Commission Act to;
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	 development of codes of conduct for public officers
	 oversee enforcement of codes of conduct for public officers
	 receive complaints on breach of codes of ethics
	 investigate and recommend to the DPP prosecution for any acts of corruption 
or  violation of codes of ethics or other matter prescribed under this Act or 
any other law enacted pursuant to Chapter 6 of the Constitution.
	 recommend appropriate action to be taken against public officers for unethical 
conduct
	 Monitor the practices of public bodies to detect corruption and secure the 
revision of methods of work that are conducive to corrupt practices. This 
function is however subject to Article 31 ( Right to Privacy). This function implies 
that the EACC can deploy undercover techniques to detect corruption.  Note 
that the Right to Privacy is not absolute and can be limited in public interest, so 
long as the requirements of Article 24 of the Constitution are satisfied.
Mandate of the Commission under the EACC Act 
212. It is important to note that the new law does not repeal the entire ACECA of 2003 
but has only two amendments captured in Sections 36 and 37 of the EACC Act.
213. In the first amendment (under Section 36), Section 2 of ACECA is amended to 
delete the name “Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission” and substitute it with the 
new name “Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission” established under Section 3 of 
the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2011, pursuant to Article 79 of the 
Constitution. In the second amendment captured under Section 37 of EACC Act, 
Part III of the ACECA that establishes the Advisory Board was repealed. 
214. The effect of this is that all the offences created under Part V of ACECA and the 
provisions relating to investigations (Part IV), compensation and recovery of 
improper benefits (Part VI), evidence (Part VII), execution (Part VIIA), miscellaneous 
provisions on suspension and disqualification of public officers charged with 
corruption, protection of informers, e.t.c., (Part VIII), repeal, transition and 
amendments (Part IX) have been retained. This is contrary to public opinion that 
suggests that the EACC has been rendered weak or toothless, and that all the 
work that had been carried out for the last six years would go down the drain. 
On the contrary, the new Act, in the saving and transitional provisions, clearly 
stipulates that all the orders and processes of the old body shall be deemed to 
be carried out under the new body and new law. 
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215. The mandate of the EACC has, in effect been expanded, to give it more teeth as 
regards the mainstreaming of ethics and integrity in the public sector. However, it 
is notable that there is no provision in the Constitution or EACC Act empowering 
the EACC to vet, qualify or disqualify any individual from election or appointment 
to public office. The EACC steps into the arena after the public officer has assumed 
office, to oversee enforcement of codes of conduct.
Qualification and disqualification for appointive positions in public service
216. Since there are no specific provisions in Chapter 6 or the Leadership Act for 
qualification or disqualification, the EACCC may be guided by Chapter 13 of the 
COK 2010 on Public Service. Article 232 lays down the values and principles of 
public service, whereas Article 233 enumerates instances that make one ineligible 
to serve as a member of the Public Service Commission. These criteria can be 
applied, and indeed has been applied, to everyone seeking to serve as a state 
officer in the public service. 
217. An individual is not eligible for appointment if the person:
	has at any time within the preceding 5 years held office or stood for election 
as a member of Parliament or of a county assembly
	a member of the governing body of a political party
	holds any state office
	is or has been a candidate for election as a member of Parliament or county 
assembly
	is or has been the holder of an office in any political organization that 
sponsors or supports a candidate for election as a member of Parliament 
or county assembly
218. Apart from the Constitution, the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act has 
provisions on suspension on half pay after being charged in court (section 62), 
suspension without pay after conviction pending any appeal (section 63), dismissal 
and disqualification from being elected or appointed to public office after conviction 
for ten years if appeal is lost (section 64).  However, a convicted public servant is 
disqualified only after exhausting their right of appeal in a superior court. 
219. These provisions however do not apply to constitutional office holders, where the 
constitution provides for their qualifications, or disqualification or removal from 
office. They nevertheless guide the EACC and other state organs on criteria for 
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qualification and disqualification from elective or appointive offices, especially 
the category now referred to as public officers. State officers are covered by the 
Constitution and relevant enabling legislation. It is evident that the issue whether 
a person is qualified or not qualified to be elected or appointed to public office is 
best addressed by looking at the Constitution and the statute establishing that 
office or institution.
220. Article 38 of the COK on political rights, in summary, provides that every person is 
free to make political choices, the right to free, fair and regular elections based on 
universal suffrage, the free expression of the will of elections for any elective public 
body or office established under this Constitution. Article 38(3), in particular, 
stipulates that every adult citizen has the right, without unreasonable restrictions, 
a) to be registered as a voter
b) to vote by secret ballot in any election or referendum
c) to be a candidate for public office, or office within a political party of 
which the citizen is a member, and if elected, to hold office
221. Although political rights are not among those that may not be limited under 
Article 25, the State or any person seeking to justify a particular limitation shall 
demonstrate to the court, tribunal or other authority that the requirements of 
Article 24 have been satisfied. This provision is found in Article 24(3).  A right or 
fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall not be limited except by law, and 
then only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into 
account all relevant factors. These are enumerated in Article 24(2) and (3).
222. Simply stated, the right to vote or seek an elective office is a fundamental right 
that shall not be limited or taken away except as allowed by law. Therefore, 
before preventing voters from electing a person of their choice or disqualifying a 
person from seeking elective office, the State or person wishing to do so must first 
acknowledge that this action may limit political rights, and therefore such action 
needs to be justifiable within the constitutional limits.  
223. In order to appreciate how important the political rights are, it is necessary to look 
at the Constitutional provisions on qualification or disqualification for election as 
Member of Parliament, President, Governor and member of the County Assembly.
224. Before looking at provisions of Article 99, it is important to note that the 
Parliament of Kenya consists of the National Assembly and the Senate. Reference 
to Member of Parliament therefore refers to National Assembly members and 
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Senators (Article 93). Article 99(1) provides that unless disqualified as stipulated 
in this Article, a person is eligible for election as a member of Parliament (MP) if 
the person;
a) is registered as a voter
b) satisfies any educational, moral and ethical requirements prescribed by this 
Constitution or an Act of Parliament
c) is nominated by  a political party or is an independent candidate
225. Article 99(2) stipulates that a person is disqualified from being elected as an MP if 
the person;
a) is a State officer or other public officer, other than an MP
b) has within the last 5 years been a member of the Independent Electoral and 
Boundaries Commission( IEBC)
c) has not been a citizen of Kenya for the last 10 years before the election
d) is a member of a county assembly
e) is of unsound mind
f ) is an undischarged bankrupt
g) is subject to a sentence of imprisonment of at least 6 months, as at the date 
of registration as a candidate, or at the date of election
h) is found in accordance with any law to have misused or abused a State 
office or public office or in any way to have contravened Chapter Six.
226. The EACC must therefore bear this Article in mind, while developing guidelines to 
clear those seeking elective posts. The ethical requirements referred to in Article 99(1)
(b) are to be found in Chapter 6 of COK 2010, as read together with the Leadership 
and Integrity Act and the Public Officer Ethics Act. These provisions and the role of 
EACC have been exhaustively discussed in the earlier portions of this Chapter. 
227. The Elections Act of 2011 borrows heavily from the Constitution. Section 24 guides 
the IEBC on the criteria to be used when deciding whether one is qualified or 
disqualified for election as a Member of Parliament.
228. For its part, Article 99(3) provides that “a person is not disqualified under clause 
2 unless all possibility of appeal or review of the relevant sentence or decision 
has been exhausted’. Article 99 therefore recognizes the right of appeal that is 
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found under the Bill of Rights, specifically Article 47 and 50. Article 47 on fair 
administrative action provides that if the right or fundamental freedom of a 
person is adversely affected by administrative action, the person has the right to 
be given written reasons for the action, and that this action can be reviewed by 
a court or independent tribunal. Closely related to Article 99 and 47 is Article 50 
on fair hearing. Article 50(2)(q) provides that if convicted, a person has the right 
to appeal to, or apply for review by, a higher court as prescribed by law.
229. These constitutional provisions clearly mean that a person is not disqualified from 
elective positions merely because they have been charged or adversely affected 
by an administrative decision or convicted by a court of law. It is only after they 
have exhausted their right of appeal that they may be disqualified from seeking 
elective office. This constitutional threshold is aptly captured in Section 64 of 
the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003 (ACECA) that provides that 
a person convicted of corruption is disqualified from seeking elective position 
or appointment to public office for 10 years, only after his or her appeal against 
conviction is lost. 
230. Although ACECA applies to public officers whereas the Constitution applies to 
State officers, both legal instruments find congruence in the requirement that 
disqualification shall only take effect after the suspect or convict has exhausted 
their right of appeal. It is important for any State organ such as EACC, or any person 
seeking disqualification of persons seeking election as MPs, to bear in mind the 
provisions of Article 99 of COK.
231. According to Article 137(1), a person is qualified for nomination as a presidential 
candidate if the person:
a) is a citizen of Kenya
b) is qualified to stand for election as a member of Parliament
c) is nominated by a political party or is an independent candidate
d) is nominated by not fewer than two thousand voters from each of a majority 
of the counties
232. Article 137(2) lists the grounds for disqualification, that is, if the person:
a) owes allegiance to a foreign state, or 
b) is a public officer, or is acting in any State office or other public office, except 
the President, Deputy President and MP
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233. It is apparent that once someone is qualified to be an MP under Article 99, the 
person is, subject to a few other requirements, qualified to President. The same 
qualification and disqualification criteria apply to the President and MPs. Any 
person or body seeking to disqualify such candidates must therefore bear these 
two Articles in mind. These Constitutional requirements for disqualification or 
qualification for election as President are echoed in Section 23 of the Elections 
Act of 2011.
234. Just as the President and MPs, Article 180 provides that to be eligible for election as 
county governor, a person must be eligible for election as a member of the county 
assembly. Article 193 sets out the criteria for qualification and disqualification for 
election as member of county assembly, and also governor. The criteria is the 
same as that for the MPS and President. Unless disqualified under this Article, a 
person is eligible for election as a member of a county assembly if the person:
a) is registered as a voter
b) satisfies any educational, moral and ethical requirements prescribed by this 
Constitution or an Act of Parliament
c) is nominated by  a political party or is an independent candidate
235. Article 193(2) stipulates that a person is disqualified from being elected as a 
member of a county assembly if the person:
a) is a State officer or other public officer, other than a member of the county 
assembly
b) has within the last 5 years been a member of the Independent Electoral and 
Boundaries Commission( IEBC)
c) has not been a citizen of Kenya for the last 10 years before the election
d) is of unsound mind
e) is an undischarged bankrupt
f ) is subject to a sentence of imprisonment of at least 6 months, as at the date 
of registration as a candidate, or at the date of election
g) is found in accordance with any law to have misused or abused a State 
office or public office or in any way to have contravened Chapter 6
236. In similar fashion to disqualification for election as MP or President, Article 193 
provides that “a person is not disqualified under clause 2 unless all possibility of 
appeal or review of the relevant sentence or decision has been exhausted”. The 
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earlier analysis on the right of appeal also applies to disqualification for election 
as governor or member of county assembly. Any State organ or person seeking to 
disqualify a person from election as Governor or member of county assembly must 
bear this provision in mind. Just like in the case of the President and Members of 
Parliament, Section 25 of the Elections Act adopts the criteria laid down in the 
Constitution, for qualification or disqualification for nomination as a member of a 
county assembly.
237. Although included among the members of the National Assembly and Senate, it is 
important to mention that the following persons are State officers, subject also to 
the application of Article 99 and 193: Women representatives to the Senate; Youth; 
Persons with disabilities; Speakers of the National Assembly, Senate and County 
Assemblies.
Suggested framework for EACC in enforcing leadership provisions
238. In order to wade through this apparently complicated maze of legal framework, 
the EACC is advised to:
a) Categorize the persons seeking elective or appointive offices into either 
State officers or Public officers
b) Whether they seek elective positions or appointive positions
c) Consider the applicable constitutional provisions, e.g. Chapter 6, Bill of 
Rights, qualification/ eligibility, and disqualification
d) Consider the applicable statutory provisions, e.g. Leadership and Integrity 
Act, Public Officer Ethics Act, Anti- Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 
Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act, etc
e) Consider the law establishing those offices, e.g. the Public Service Commission 
Act, Police Service Commission Act, County Governments Act, etc. 
239. While the EACC has the express mandate to ensure compliance with Chapter 6 
on Leadership and Integrity, and while the clamour for high ethical standards has 
reached fever pitch in Kenya, the EACC must not loose sight of the Bill of Rights and 
other constitutional provisions that provide for qualification or disqualification for 
appointment or election to public office. Chapter 6 must be read alongside other 
relevant constitutional and statutory provisions, such as political rights and right 
of appeal. Exercise of caution and restraint is called for, particularly at this critical 
point in time when Kenya is still implementing the new constitutional dispensation, 
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in the midst of different interpretations of the term “integrity” by Parliament and 
the Judiciary.
Emerging jurisprudence on leadership and integrity in Kenya
240. Soon after the promulgation of the new Constitution of Kenya in August 2010, 
most Kenyans were hopeful that a new crop of both appointed and elected 
leaders would be ushered into office, and hopefully bring honour and respect to 
state offices.  It appears though that Kenyans may have to wait longer to enjoy 
the fruits of leadership that is governed by integrity. This is attributed to the 
different integrity thresholds that have been displayed by interviewing panels, 
parliament and the judiciary. Different standards seem to apply to those seeking 
appointment as opposed to those seeking to be elected to public office.
241. In order to illustrate the uncertainty and apparent bias, this Chapter will briefly 
consider the facts and judgements in five (5) major cases touching on eligibility of 
persons to serve as State officers based on Chapter 6 on Leadership and Integrity. 
These are:
a. Keriako Tobiko - Director of Public Prosecutions
b. Mumo Matemu- Chairperson of Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission
c. Kiema Kionzo- Member of Parliament for Mutito Constituency
d. Mary Wambui- Member of Parliament for Othaya Constituency
e. Uhuru Kenyatta & William Ruto- President and Deputy President
Appointment of Keriako Tobiko as Director of Public Prosecutions
242. The first case that tested the integrity standard was filed against Mr. Keriako 
Tobiko the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), soon after his televised public 
interview, approval by Parliament and appointment by the President. 29 The 
petitioners, a civil society group, sought to restrain the newly appointed DPP 
from assuming office after his appointment on 16/6/2011. They submitted that, 
in the light of allegations of corruption, incompetence, conflict of interest and 
lack of reform credentials labelled against him by various persons, Mr Tobiko 
lacked integrity as required by Chapter 6 of the COK and the Public Officer 
Ethics Act.
29 Kenya Youth Alliance- Vs Keriako Tobiko and others (2012) Nairobi HC Petition No. 101 of 2011 (unreported
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 243. In a unanimous decision delivered on 25 May 2012, the three judge bench 
dismissed the petition by holding that the allegations of integrity had been 
investigated by the selection panel and parliament, and that the court could not 
reopen the process and reconsider issues which were conclusively determined. 
They made the following observation;
The Constitution vests different functions to different organs, and to ask this court 
to fault processes by these organs without presenting material to prove any wrong 
doing, is to usurp the functions of those organs. That we shall not do. Those organs 
undertook their mandate and exercised their discretion after seeing those that 
presented complaints in whatever form. We cannot reopen the process and consider 
issues which were conclusively determined.
244. The court in Tobiko’s case declined to interfere with the work of other organs 
which had already deliberated upon the integrity issues and found them 
baseless. 
Appointment of Mumo Matemu as Chairperson of EACC
245. Parliament approved the nomination of Mr. Mumo Matemu to serve as the 
Chairperson of EACC and the President and Prime Minister subsequently 
appointed him, but a bench of three (3) High Court judges found him 
unsuitable to serve after a civil society organisation challenged his suitability 
on integrity grounds.30 The three judges held that although the Executive and 
Parliament had inquired into integrity allegations levelled against Mr Matemu 
while he served as the Legal Officer of Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC), 
they interrogated the process of nomination and selection, found it wanting 
due to unresolved integrity issues, and set aside the appointment. The court 
found that Mr. Matemu did not meet the integrity threshold set out in Chapter 
6 of the COK 2010, despite the fact that the formalities of appointment were 
followed by the Executive and Parliament. According to the three judges:
A person is said to lack integrity when there are serious unresolved questions about 
his honesty, financial probity, scrupulousness, fairness, reputation, and soundness 
of his moral judgement or his commitment to national values enumerated in the 
Constitution. For the purpose of integrity test in Kenya’s Constitution, there is no 
requirement that the behaviour, attribute, or conduct in question has to rise to the 
level of criminality.
30 Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance –VS- the AG and others, Nairobi High Court Petition No. 229 of 2012( unreported)
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246. This was the first major judicial pronouncement and interpretation of Chapter 
6 in Kenya’s Constitution, and was lauded by many Kenyans as setting out the 
integrity standards for those seeking public office. The judges seemed to have 
been persuaded by the very nature and functions of the office to which he 
was being appointed to; and wondered how he could preside over corruption 
investigations when he had unresolved integrity issues haunting him.  Mr. Matemu 
however lodged an appeal, whose outcome will help Kenyans understand this 
phenomenon.
247. It is worth noting that according to the submissions filed by the Director of 
Public Prosecutions (DPP), Mr Matemu was neither a suspect nor a witness in 
the criminal inquiry that was referred to by the petitioners to cast doubts on his 
integrity. File records show that the criminal inquiry was commenced after two 
directors, in a private company, differed in management of the funds allegedly 
borrowed from AFC. One director reported the matter to police in Nakuru, 
alleging fraud on the part of his co-director.  The DPP further informed the 
court that the criminal investigation file had been closed due to failure by the 
complainant to submit an audit report as proof of the alleged theft or fraud. At 
the time of writing this report, the EACC has no chairperson and the matter is 
still pending in the Court of Appeal after Mr Matemu appealed against the High 
Court decision.31
Suitability of Kiema Kilonzo to continue serving as MP for Mutito 
Constituency 
248. In another case involving a sitting Member of Parliament (MP), Mr Kiema Kilonzo 
and the Constituency Development Fund Committee,32 the petitioners alleged 
misappropriation of CDF monies allocated to Mutito Constituency by Mr Kiema 
Kilonzo and the CDF committee. They, inter alia, sought court orders that Mr 
Kiema had contravened Chapter 6 of COK, was unfit to hold any state office 
and should be disqualified from holding any state office.   While dismissing 
the petition, Justice David Majanja held firstly, that the petitioners had not 
exhausted the dispute resolution mechanism provide for under section 52 of 
the CDF Act.
249. Secondly, he distinguished Kiema’s case from Matemu’s case by holding that the 
court, in Matemu’s case did not purport to take upon itself the process of assessing, 
31 Mumo Matemu –VS- Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance and others, Nairobi Court of Appeal, Civil Appeal No. 290 of 2012( 
unreported)
32 Benard Kasinga –VS- Kiema Kilonzo and Others, Nairobi High Court Petition No. 402 of 2012( unreported)
411
Volume  I IB    Chapter T H R E E 
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
nominating or appointing a specific candidate to office. Justice Majanja observed 
that the court in Matemu’s case interrogated the process, found it wanting in 
certain respects and intervened by setting it aside.  Similarly, the judge declined 
“to act as auditor general, make specific findings against the respondents, surcharge 
them, remove them from office and thereafter declare them unfit for office” as prayed 
by the petitioners. 
250. The snapshot of Justice Majanja’s decision is that courts, while determining 
integrity issues, must respect the role of other entities. This seems to materially 
depart from Matemu’s case wherein the judges not only interrogated the process of 
vetting, but also found it wanting.  The principle of separation of powers between 
the executive, judiciary and legislature comes into play, although this is not the 
subject of discussion in this chapter of the Report.
251. Just before the 4 March 2013 elections in Kenya, several petitions were filed 
seeking to bar several persons from being elected to public office for contravening 
Chapter 6 off COK.  Examples are the two petitions against Mary Wambui Munene 
who was seeking to replace President Kibaki as MP for Othaya Constituency, and 
the now famous petition seeking to bar Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto from 
seeking Presidency and Deputy Presidency respectively.
Eligibility of Mary Wambui for election as MP for Othaya Constituency
252. In the case involving Mary Wabui Munene33, the petitioners challenged her 
educational qualification and integrity as required by Chapter Six of the COK 
2010. Specific to her integrity, the petitioners averred that she had been 
adversely mentioned in various official reports prepared by constitutional 
bodies mandated to inquire into matters of public interest, for example, a report 
by the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) tiled “On the Brink 
of a Precipice: A Human Rights Account of Kenya Post 2007 Election Violence”, the 
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 2007 Post Election Violence (Waki 
Report), the “Report of Investigations into the Conduct of the Artur Brothers and 
their Associates” prepared by the National Assembly Departmental Committee 
on Administration, National Security and Local Authorities , and Administration 
of Justice and Legal Affairs , an investigative journalistic piece aired in the local 
media( Kenya Television Network) titled “Jicho Pevu”, and several other press 
reports. 
253. The petitioners contended that as a result, she did not meet the test of leadership 
and integrity spelt out in Chapter Six of the COK 2010, and the Leadership and 
33 Michael Wachira Munene-Vs- Mary Wambui Munene, Nairobi High Court Petition No. 549 of 2012(unreported)
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Integrity Act, No.19 of 2012 (LIA).  The petitioners further averred that these issues 
had not been conclusively investigated or resolved. 
254. While dismissing the petition, Justice David Majanja held that although the 
LIA provides for procedures and enforcement of Chapter Six of the COK 2010, 
the issues as to whether Mary Wambui was qualified to vie for a parliamentary 
seat was not a matter for determination by the court but for the Independent 
Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), in accordance with electoral laws, 
in this case being the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission Act 
(IEBC) of 2011, Political Parties Act, and LIA. The judge further found the petition 
immature as the respondent had not presented herself to IEBC for clearance.
255. The decision in this case seems to echo those made in the Tobiko, and Kiema 
Kilonzo cases; that courts should not usurp the functions of other constitutional 
organs. The only case in which the court seems to have questioned the inquiry of 
other state organs is that of Mumo Matemu.
Eligibility of Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto for election as President 
and Deputy President
256. Soon after they expressed their intention of seeking election to the two top 
state offices in Kenya, four (4) petitions were filed in the High Court challenging 
the eligibility of Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto based on Chapter 6 of the 
Constitution. The petitions were later consolidated into one major petition for 
hearing and determination since they raised similar issues of law.34 The Chief 
Justice appointed a bench of five (5) judges to hear the petition that generated 
a lot of interest both locally and internationally. This was largely due to the fact 
that the International Criminal Court (ICC) had confirmed charges against the 
two suspects for crimes against humanity, following the 2007 post election 
violence in which they are alleged to have been behind the murder of over 1000 
Kenyans, displacement, rape and destruction of property. 
257. It was the petitioners’ submission that the confirmation of charges took 
away their honour, dignity and integrity to vie for the Presidency and Deputy 
Presidency respectively. The petitioners relied on the High Court decision in the 
Mumo Matemu case and argued that the integrity test was not one of criminality. 
They insisted that the candidacy of Uhuru and Ruto was contrary to the tenure, 
ideals and spirit of the COK, especially Chapter 6 on integrity and sovereignty. It 
34 International Centre For Policy and Conflict-Vs- Uhuru Kenyatta, William Ruto and Others, Nairobi HC Petition No. 552of 2012 
(unreported).
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was their averment that the confirmation of charges met the integrity threshold 
required to bar them from assuming public office. They pointed out that there 
would be no confidence in those two offices if the two individuals were allowed 
to ascend thereto. 
258. In a unanimous judgement delivered on 15/2/2013, the five judges dismissed the 
petition.  They held that although the court had jurisdiction to consider issues 
of integrity, any question relating to the qualification or disqualification of a 
person who had been nominated to contest the position of Presidency can only 
be determined by the Supreme Court. This, according to the judges, includes the 
determination of the question whether such a person meets the test of integrity 
under Chapter 6 in relation to Presidential elections; and that these two questions 
could not be determined by the court outside the context of elections to be held 
on 4/3/2013.  
259. The judges seemed to have many reasons for dismissing the petition. They are 
summarised below;
a. Even if Uhuru and Ruto had no integrity, the Independent Electoral and 
Boundaries Commission (IEBC) not the court, would determine their 
eligibility to seek elective office
b. The IEBC, Supreme Court, National Assembly and Senate are the only 
institutions which may interfere with or invalidate the election of a 
President or Deputy President. The judges cited the case of Blackburn –VS- 
the AG (1971) I WLR 1037 in which it was held that “ Litigation should not 
influence political decisions. Courts should only look at the effect of decisions 
and enforce the law, but not say what it should be”
c. As regards the interplay between Chapter 6 and Chapter 4(Bill of Rights), 
they stated that the Bill of Rights must prevail because the two suspects 
had not been convicted, they were presumed innocent until proven 
guilty, and they were entitled to a fair trail. These rights, although not 
absolute, could not be derogated from except as provided for by the law.
260. The judges also paid special attention to the now contentious issue of the role of the 
court in interpreting Chapter 6 of the COK 2010. They made reference to the High 
Court decision in the Mumo Matemu case which had held that the court has power 
to review both the process of appointment and the legality. They concurred with 
the integrity standard laid down by their counterparts in Matemu case; that there 
is no requirement that the behaviour, attribute or conduct in question has to rise to 
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the threshold of criminality. According to the judges, the fact that a person has not 
been convicted of a criminal offence is not dispositive of the inquiry whether they 
lack integrity or not. In the judges own words, it is enough if there are sufficient, 
serious, plausible allegations which raise substantial unresolved questions about 
one’s integrity. 
261. The five (5) judges however disagreed with their counterparts in Matemu’s case 
by stating that the court should not descend into the arena of inquiry as was 
the case in Matemu’s case, wherein the three judges held that although some 
inquiry had been done into integrity allegations against Matemu by Parliament, 
they found it wanting. Still on the inquiry issue, the five judges found that 
there was no evidence adduced to show if any inquiry ha been made into the 
allegations of lack of integrity against Uhuru and Ruto, unlike in Matemu’s 
case where Parliament had debated the allegations of lack of integrity against 
him. It is important to note that both the EACC and IEBC had cleared the two 
gentlemen to vie for elective positions, without raising any integrity issues 
against them. 
262. A reading of the judgement in Uhuru & Ruto case depicts a determined effort 
by the five judges to shift the responsibility of determining eligibility of Uhuru 
and Ruto, to vie for elective positions, to other state organs. Their decision also 
manifests the challenges that several institutions in Kenya are facing in trying to 
enforce the constitutional provisions on integrity, more so the different integrity 
standards that seem to apply to appointive and elective positions.  
263. On one hand, the judges in the Uhuru case clearly assert that behaviour that 
is deemed lacking in integrity does not have to rise to the level of criminality; 
and that it is sufficient if there are allegations raising unresolved questions 
about one’s integrity. Since at the time of delivering their judgement, there 
were unresolved issues about Uhuru and Ruto participation in the 2007 post 
election violence, one would naturally expect the judges to declare Uhuru 
and Ruto ineligible to vie for elective office. On this aspect, they shifted the 
responsibility to the IEBC, EACC, Supreme Court, National Assembly and Senate.
264. On the other hand, the judges also state that the two individuals are presumed 
innocent until proven guilty of any criminal charges. By stating so, they seem to 
imply that mere allegations alone do not suffice to disqualify them for lack of 
integrity, as happened in the Matemu case. Bearing in mind that Matemu was 
seeking an appointive position whereas Uhuru and Ruto were seeking elective 
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posts, Kenyan courts need to set establish clear consistent jurisprudence in the 
realm of the integrity threshold. 
Observations and way forward on integrity threshold
265. As it stands now, it seems as though the integrity standards differ; and that the 
one for appointive positions is much higher than that for elective positions. 
During the March 2013 general elections in Kenya, many individuals were 
cleared by both IEBC, EACC and the courts to seek elective posts, despite the 
fact that there had pending court cases raising  unresolved integrity issues. 
Many other Kenyans seeking appointive positions have been barred due to 
unresolved integrity cases yet they neither face arrest nor prosecution before 
any court of law. 
266. This is an unacceptable, discriminatory application of the law that is in gross 
violation of Chapter 6. Principles of leadership and integrity apply to all state 
officers, irrespective of their mode of ascension to office. This was the intention 
of Chapter 6 of COK 2010, and all those charged with making and interpreting 
the law, that is Parliament and Judiciary, should strive to uphold the national 
values and principles enshrined in Article 10 of COK 2010.
267. It is an onerous task to ensure that State offices are selected to office on the basis 
of personal integrity, competence and suitability. It is an even more onerous 
task to ensure State officers are elected to office in free and fair elections. The 
EACC may need to collaborate with the Independent Electoral and Boundaries 
Commission (IEBC) in designing the framework for eligibility for election as 
President, MP, Governor and member of county assembly. Collaboration with 
other public recruitment agencies like the Public Service Commission may yield 
a more coherent and harmonised approach pertaining to appointive posts
268. Only a fair, objective and impartial reading and interpretation of the applicable 
legal framework will lend credence and credibility to EACC, IEBC and to 
some extent, the Judiciary, as they embark on this sensitive yet critical task 
of ensuring compliance with Chapter 6 of the COK 2010. There may also be 
need to come up with a clear statutory definition of integrity and the attendant 
integrity threshold that should be used to either disqualify or remove a person 
from public office. Chapter 6 of COK 2010, if properly interpreted and applied, 
will definitely be a major boost in the war against corruption in Kenya. 
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Corruption Reports received by the Commission
269. Apart from reliance on reports of other Commissions and agencies, the 
Commission also received complaints about corruption from various Kenyan 
citizens during the course of its hearings throughout the country. A total of 
5,646 persons who spoke to the Commission complained about corruption as 
a major contributor to violation of their rights. A few examples are listed below.
	 Residents of Eastleigh District Business Association (EBDA) reported that 
most of them are denied citizenship in a discriminatory manner due to their 
tribe, religion and ethnicity, resulting in inhuman and degrading treatment. 
They reported that they are referred to as ‘Kenyan Somalis’, and are forced 
to bribe in order to acquire Kenyan identity cards and passports from the 
immigration officials. Those who do not have identification papers are 
constantly harassed by the police and forced to bribe the police or judicial 
officers to avoid arrest, prosecution or conviction on charges of being 
illegally present in Kenya. 
	 Residents from Kajiado district reported incidents of land grabbing, during 
land adjudication, which was facilitated by corruption among senior 
public officials. Before adjudication, land was communal and belonged 
to the whole community. They reported that during adjudication, land was 
illegally allocated to senior government officials, their friends and relatives 
who were not originally residents, in return for financial considerations. 
Most beneficiaries of the Mosiro and Illodo-Ariak land in Kajiado were 
Ministers and MPs. The land was later sold to third parties despite 
restrictions placed on the titles. This again, was facilitated by corruption, 
at the expense of poor, illiterate residents of the Maasai community. Other 
reports from Kajiado indicated that forest land was being hived off and 
sold by corrupt government officials. Similar reports were received about 
land in Machakos, Meru, Makueni, Nyeri, Muranga, Pokot, Ilchamus, 
amongst others. Details of historical injustices pertaining to land issues 
are comprehensively captured in the chapter on land.
	 The 7.2 billion purchase of mosquito control products in 1996: An 
informer gave the Commission detailed information regarding the grand 
corruption surrounding the 7.2 billion purchases of mosquito control 
products in 1996. This was curiously done by the Ministry of Public Works 
and Housing instead of the Ministry of Health as was expected in such 
procurement. It occurred during retired President Moi’s rule.
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 According to the informer, the price was not only inflated but the Government 
was supplied with the wrong chemical, that is, ‘a little petroleum product 
with a little bit of insecticide’. Further more, the Government bought massive 
quantities to last for five (5) years yet they only required two (2) years supply. 
The chemical was supplied by Equip Agencies Limited at the unit price of Kshs 
2,925/= instead of the market price of Kshs 2/= per litre. 
 The informer also told the Commission that a report by Price WaterHouseCoopers 
indicated that the order for the malaria drugs was made well above the budget 
allocations for that period. A number of people were associated with Equip 
Agencies Limited and some senior government officials were named in the scam. 
The Commission’s further inquiry into this matter disclosed the existence of a 
decision, Nairobi HCCC No. 159 of 2006 filed by Equip Agencies v Attorney general 
(2011). The plaintiff was claiming a total of Kshs 1,873,335,880, being money 
owed to Equip Agencies for the anti- malaria equipment supplied, delivered 
and distributed to various units in the country in 1995. In a judgement delivered 
by Justice Muga Apondi on 2/12/2011, the court ordered the government to 
pay Equip Agencies the sum of Kshs 1,873,335,880 for the malaria drugs and 
equipment, and faulted the government for purporting to cancel the contract 
after goods had already been supplied, received and distributed for use by the 
government. 
 Although this was a civil case that does not bar criminal proceedings for any 
acts of corruption, it may have an impact on any criminal proceedings that 
may be contemplated or commenced against any suspected loss or fraud in 
the said procurement. This is due to the judge’s finding that at that point in 
time, there was no complaint that the quantity, quality and price of the goods 
did not meet the required standards. The judge also found that the goods 
were utilized for the purpose for which they were intended. The government 
did not file a defence nor lodge an appeal against the final judgement. It is not 
known whether the decretal sum was paid as ordered by the court. 
 Interestingly, the informers told Commission that the goods were ordered 
by the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, whereas the evidence adduced 
before the High Court in the HCCC No. 159 0f 2006 show that the contracts 
were awarded by the Ministry of Health. The truth may only be unearthed 
after proper investigations are conducted by the EACC. It was further alleged 
that despite a report being made to the Director of the defunct Kenya Anti-
Corruption Commission, no action has been taken by the said Commission to 
date. 
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	 Procurement of electronic voter registration and identification devices 
by the IEBC: The Commission obtained from informers volumes of documents 
and correspondence with various government agencies, pointing out the 
flawed procurement process that culminated in the failure of the electronic 
devices during the March 4 2013 General Elections in Kenya. Although this 
matter fell outside the Commission’s mandate period, the Commission received 
the complaint under its mandate to ‘investigate or make recommendations 
concerning any other matter with a view to promoting or achieving justice, 
national unity and reconciliation’. He singled out the following tender awards 
that need to be investigated:
a. Biometric Voter Identification Kits (BVR) by Face Technologies of South 
Africa that cost the tax payer close to Kshs 9 billion 
b. Ballot papers by Smith and Ouzman
c. Indelible marker pens from Mini Mix Agencies
d. Polling station banners from Hopeland Advertising
e. Solar lanterns from Solarmark Technologies
f. General electoral materials by Africa Infrastructure Development 
Company
 
 The informers pointed out that Face Technologies (FT) did not meet the technical 
specifications at the time they submitted their bid to IEBC. Furthermore, the 
devices supplied were different from the samples submitted at the bid opening 
as witnessed by all bidders who attended the bid opening. When the first 
sample failed, FT was allowed to produce another sample for testing, contrary to 
procurement law. Reports were made to the Public Procurement Authority, and it 
would be interesting to establish their findings. 
 In respect of the ballot papers, the informer alleged that the ballot printer was 
privately commissioned by IEBC outside a publication log ahead of the tender 
award. The entire procurement of all electoral materials was estimated to have 
cost the Kenyan taxpayer close to Ksh 15 billion. Sadly, the gadgets failed during 
voting on 4 April 2013 leading many Kenyans to question the procurement 
process and quality of the gadgets. The Commission recommends that the matter 
be investigated by the EACC to establish if any economic crimes were committed 
by the IEBC staff in collusion with the suppliers of the electoral materials. 
Appropriate recommendations must be forwarded to the DPP for appropriate 
action. 
419
Volume  I IB    Chapter T H R E E 
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
Challenges of Fighting Corruption in Kenya
270 The foregoing detailed discussions on the magnitude and scale of grand corruption 
in Kenya expose major challenges in the fight against corruption in Kenya. In brief, 
the following were noted and need to be addressed:
	 The lack of a national anti-corruption policy: The lack of a policy has resulted 
in lack of focus and disconcerted efforts in the fight against corruption in 
Kenya.
	 Failure to fully domesticate the UNCAC: Although Kenya has made great 
strides in domesticating UNCAC, some major gaps still exist especially in 
criminalisation of some acts that impede the fight against grand corruption.  A 
glaring omission is failure to criminalise acts like illicit enrichment that would 
deter illegal acquisition of wealth, which has made it near impossible to trace 
and recover corruptly acquired wealth. Apart from illicit enrichment, the Anti-
Corruption and Economic Crimes Act does not criminalise the following acts:
	Bribery of foreign public officials and officials of international organizations( 
Article 16)
	Trading in influence(Article 18)
	Bribery in the private sector( Article 21)
	Embezzlement  of property in the private sector(Article 22)
	Liability of legal persons(Article 26) 
	Illicit enrichment(Article 20)
	Concealment or continued retention of property knowing it to have been 
corruptly acquired( Article 24)
	Opening and maintaining bank accounts abroad
	 Failure to fully entrench EACC in the Constitution of Kenya 2010: 
Article 79 of the COK 2010, unlike other Articles establishing constitutional 
commissions, does not prescribe the specific functions required of an anti-
corruption agency as provided for in the four (4) pillars of UNCAC. These are 
prevention, investigation, asset recovery and international cooperation. Other 
than the general objects, authority, funding, composition, removal from office, 
functions and powers of bestowed upon all Commissions and Independent 
Offices under Chapter 15, the specific functions and powers of the EACC are 
left to parliament to determine through legislation. 
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 This is a glaring omission that left room for speculation, ambiguity or 
interference while enacting the respective enabling statutes ambiguity, which 
are the EACC Act and the Leadership and Integrity Act. More ambiguity and 
confusion manifested itself in the definition of integrity threshold and the 
interpretation of the role of EACC, especially in ensuring compliance with 
Chapter Six together with the Leadership and Integrity Act.  This may perhaps 
explain the varied definitions of the integrity threshold to be applied to those 
seeking public office, by Parliament, the Judiciary and civil society. 
 Moreover, Out of the eleven (11) Commissions established by the Constitution, 
it is only the EACC that is not listed as one of the Constitutional Commissions 
under Article 248 of Chapter 15, and whose functions are not outlined in the 
enabling Article. Article 79 attempts to cure this glaring omission by stipulating 
that the anti-corruption agency established by Parliament through statute, “....
shall have all the status and powers of a commission under Chapter Fifteen “. 
This deliberate omission appears to diminish the important role of EACC and 
further dilute its powers and function.  
	 Insufficient number of Commissioners at EACC: The Ethics and Anti-
Corruption Commission Act provides for a new governance structure of 3 
Commissioners and a Secretary/CEO. This small number of Commissioners, 
although desirable, may present operational challenges.
 Firstly, there is no provision in EACC Act on the mode of appointment or 
election of the Vice-Chairperson yet Article 250(10) of the Constitution 
provides that the members of a commission shall elect a vice-chairperson 
from among themselves. This ought to have been part of Section 6 of EACC 
Act or in the section appearing immediately thereafter. 
 Secondly, Section 14 of EACC Act empowers the EACC to establish committees 
for the effective discharge of its functions. With a small number of only 3 
commissioners, it will be near impossible to establish any such committees. The 
effect of this is that all the 3 commissioners will belong to all the committees, 
hence defeating the purpose of setting up different committees to deal with 
different aspects of the Commissions functions or powers.
 Thirdly, and in what appears confusing, Section 6 of the Second Schedule to 
the EACC Act, that prescribes how the business and affairs of the Commission 
shall be conducted, makes reference to a vice-chairperson who shall preside at 
meetings in the absence of the Chairperson. Where both are absent, the members 
shall elect one of them to preside. This is where the operational challenges and 
weaknesses of the new law become evident. The EACC commissioners are only 
421
Volume  I IB    Chapter T H R E E 
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
three (3) in number including the chairperson. Assuming that they have elected 
one of the other two to be the vice chairperson, and that both the chair and 
vice chairperson are absent, this leaves only one commissioner to continue with 
the meeting! This is impossible because Section 5 of the Second Schedule sets 
the quorum for the conduct of business at a meeting of the Commission at two 
thirds of all the members of the Commission.
 Although Section 14 of EACC Act allows the Commission to co-opt persons 
into membership of the Committees; these persons may only attend meetings 
and deliberate but shall have no power to vote. No decision can therefore be 
made where there is lack of quorum, and this could delay and or paralyse the 
work of the Commission. 
 For operational expediency and quorum requirements, it would have been 
prudent to have at least five or seven commissioners. However, with the 
establishment of 47 county governments after the March 4th 2013 general 
election, it may be necessary for the number of commissioners to be increased 
to the maximum constitutional limit of nine (9). An increased number of staff 
is also required to deal with the increased workload created by the two levels 
of government with the attendant huge sums of public funds being allocated 
to the 47 counties. There is a real danger of corruption being devolved to the 
counties unless the EACC is quickly restructured empowered and visible at 
both levels of government. 
	 Lack of prosecutorial powers by EACC: This is perceived by some Kenyans 
as an aspect that may hamper expeditious and independent determination 
of corruption cases. However, under Article 157(12) of the Constitution, 
Parliament may enact legislation conferring powers of prosecution on 
authorities other than the Director of Public Prosecutions. There is therefore a 
window of opportunity for EACC to be granted prosecutorial powers, subject 
of course to proven efficiency, objectivity and fairness in investigations. 
Priority must however be given to strengthening EACC’s investigative capacity 
at both national and county levels of government. 
	 Failure to provide for anti-corruption measures targeting the private 
sector: Article 12 of UNCAC requires State Parties to enact legislation aimed 
at criminalising corruption in the private sector. This is borne out of the reality 
that the private sector companies and individuals are the ones who oil the 
wheels of corruption by colluding with public sector entities and officials.
	 Failure to provide for lifestyle audit of public servants: The current anti-
corruption laws have failed to provide a legal framework to audit the wealth 
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of public servants as a means of tracing and recovering corruptly acquired 
property.  The wealth declaration process, which is now conducted once 
every two (2) years, is merely ritualistic. The information is never disclosed to 
the public to enable them monitor the wealth acquired by a public servant. 
	 Lack of specific provisions empowering the EACC to deploy special 
investigative techniques: Article 50 of UNCAC requires State Parties to enact 
domestic legislation that empowers anti-corruption investigative agencies 
to use special investigative techniques such as electronic or other forms 
of surveillance and undercover operations in order to combat corruption 
effectively. In the same vein, the current Kenyan laws have also failed to provide 
for admissibility in evidence of evidence derived from special investigative 
techniques.
	 Proliferation and duplicity of anti-corruption laws: The anti-corruption 
legal framework is now contained in four (4) different statutes, namely the 
ACECA, POEA, EACC Act and the Leadership and Integrity Act (LIA). There is 
a lot of duplication especially in POEA and EACC Act in relation to matters 
of ethics and integrity. For example, under POEA and LIA the Responsible 
Commissions are required to develop and ensure compliance with their 
respective Codes of Conduct. The EACC is also legally empowered to develop 
and enforce codes of conduct for all public officers. This will represent 
operational and jurisdictional conflict when dealing with breaches of 
ethics. There is need to vest this powers in only one commission or clearly 
distinguish their roles to avoid confusion and duplicity.
	 Erosion of independence of EACC by involving Parliament in appointment 
of CEO: Article 250(12) of the Constitution provides that each Commission shall 
have a Secretary who shall be appointed by the Commission. While enacting 
the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Act, however, Parliament required the EACC 
Secretary to be subjected to parliamentary approval before assuming office. 
This provision violates article 250(12) of COK, and is therefore null and void to 
the extent of its inconsistency. The EACC, like other constitutional commissions, 
is an independent body whose commissioners should be given a free hand 
in recruiting and supervising all their staff. The EACC Act therefore needs to 
be amended to delete the phrase that requires approval of the Secretary by 
parliament.
	 Conflicting definitions of integrity threshold pursuant to Chapter Six 
of COK 2010: Interestingly, neither the Constitution nor any other statute 
in Kenya defines the term “integrity”. This could perhaps explain the various 
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divergent opinions on what comprises lack of integrity, and the different 
integrity thresholds that have been set by both the Parliament and the 
Judiciary in Kenya. 
 Soon after the promulgation of the new Constitution of Kenya in August 2010, 
most Kenyans were hopeful that a new crop of both appointed and elected 
leaders would be ushered into office, and hopefully bring honour and respect to 
state offices.  It appears though that Kenyans may have to wait longer to enjoy 
the fruits of leadership that is governed by integrity. This is attributed to the 
different integrity thresholds that have been displayed by interviewing panels, 
parliament and the judiciary. Different standards seem to apply to those seeking 
appointment as opposed to those seeking to be elected to public office. 
 In order to illustrate the uncertainty and apparent bias, this Chapter, in its 
preceding discussion, briefly analysed the facts and judgements in five (5) 
major cases touching on eligibility of persons to serve as State officers based 
on Chapter 6 on Leadership and Integrity: Keriako Tobiko - Director of Public 
Prosecutions; Mumo Matemu- Chairperson of Ethics and Anti-Corruption 
Commission; Kiema Kionzo- Member of Parliament for Mutito Constituency; 
Mary Wambui- Member of Parliament for Othaya Constituency and; Uhuru 
Kenyatta & William Ruto- President and Deputy President respectively.
 From the emerging jurisprudence on leadership and integrity in Kenya, 
It was not clear from these five (5) cases, at what stage an individual was 
considered ineligible to assume or remain in service as a state officer.  Mr 
Matemu was found unfit to assume office due to unresolved allegations 
about his integrity, whereas the judges in the Uhuru and Ruto case stated 
that the duo were innocent until proven guilty, and that even if the were 
convicted, they could not be barred until they had exhausted their right of 
appeal. More confusion sets in when one considers the fact that Mr Matemu 
was not under any criminal investigation whereas Uhuru and Ruto had been 
indicted by the International Criminal Court and are facing trial. 
 As it stands now, it seems as though different integrity standards apply 
and that the one for appointive positions is much higher than that for 
elective positions. During the March 2013 general elections in Kenya, many 
individuals were cleared by both IEBC, EACC and the courts to seek elective 
posts, despite the fact that there had pending court cases raising  unresolved 
integrity issues. Many other Kenyans seeking appointive positions have 
been barred due to unresolved integrity cases yet they neither face arrest 
nor prosecution before any court of law. 
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 In the Commission’s view, this is an unacceptable, discriminatory application 
of the law that is in gross violation of Chapter 6. Principles of leadership and 
integrity apply to all state officers, irrespective of their mode of ascension to 
office. This was the intention of Chapter 6 of COK 2010, and all those charged 
with making and interpreting the law, that is Parliament and Judiciary, should 
strive to uphold the national values and principles enshrined in Article 10 of 
COK 2010. 
 At the onset, it is proposed that the term “integrity” should be defined in 
order to clear the ambiguity and confusion that seems to have dogged the 
implementation of Chapter 6 of the Constitution. Such a definition may however 
beg the question whether issues of morality, as implied by the common 
meaning of integrity, should be the subject of legislation. It remains a burning 
issue that may interest scholars, religious leaders and writers on corruption and 
governance issues. 
	 Ambiguity in the role of EACC under Chapter 6 and the Leadership and 
Integrity Act (LIA): An objective reading of Chapter 6 and the LIA does not 
clearly reveal the role of EACC before an individual is elected or appointed to 
a public office.  The Leadership and Integrity Bill had given the EACC a clear 
role of vetting such individuals and thereafter issuing a Clearance Certificate. 
These vetting provisions were however deleted by Parliament. The only duty 
left for EACC is to receive a Self Declaration Form from those wishing to be 
elected to a state office, thus leaving it to interested individuals to “vet” 
themselves.
 A reading of Chapter 6 and the Leadership and Integrity Act shows that 
Parliament appears to have deliberately avoided the use of the word “vetting”. 
If Parliament intended to vest such a function or responsibility on the EACC, it 
would have expressly used this word or referred to it. A good example of such 
an express provision is found in Section 23(1) of the Sixth Schedule of the COK 
2010 that requires Parliament to enact legislation establishing mechanisms 
and procedures for vetting the suitability of judges and magistrates to 
continue to serve. Another example is found in section 34(3) of the EACC Act 
that empowers the EACC to vet any member of staff of KACC who wishes to 
work for EACC, to ensure that he or she is fit and proper to serve in the position 
applied for as a member of staff of EACC.
 The LIA does not state what the EACC is supposed to do with this Declaration. 
However, it may be safe to infer that anyone who gives false information 
to the EACC commits an offence punishable by a fine not exceeding kshs 
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5 million, imprisonment for a period not exceeding 5 years or both, as per 
section 46(1) (d) of the Leadership Act. Since the EACC has no prosecutorial 
powers, the matter will be referred to the DPP for appropriate action. Should 
the officer in question be convicted, they may thereafter be disqualified 
from holding a state office if the law establishing that office provides for 
such action.
 Once again, there is no provision in the Constitution or EACC Act empowering 
the EACC to vet, qualify or disqualify any individual from election or 
appointment to public office. The EACC steps into the arena after the public 
officer has assumed office, to oversee enforcement of codes of conduct. 
Confidentiality of wealth declaration details submitted by public servants 
every two years in accordance with the Public Officer Ethics Act( POEA). This 
information should be made available to the public to enable Kenyans monitor 
wealth acquisition, especially by public servants.
	 Lack of political will to fight corruption: According to observations made 
by some anti-corruption experts,”..... we have entrenched elite in power that 
is built and sustained by corruption, and then a wider national elite that 
is not necessarily in power but which has benefited in one way or another 
from graft or graft related activities.35 Unless we deal with these challenges, 
anti-corruption institutions and other tools meant to fight corruption will be 
surrounded by a collective enemy so powerful that they will never succeed. 
These observations were made way back in January 2001 at a public forum 
organised by Transparency International, soon after a KACA was disbanded 
following a court order that declared the authority unconstitutional. 
Parliament and the Executive should demonstrate by words and deeds that 
they support the war against corruption.
	 Harassment and intimidation of whistle blowers: Those who blow the 
whistle on corruption expose themselves to great risks of physical harm, 
death or dismissal from employment. The case of the late David Munyakei is 
a good illustration of such dangers. However, Kenya has since enacted the 
Witness Protection Act 2006 and set up a Witness Protection Agency to provide 
several protective measures to those willing to give information or testify 
about corruption. The only weakness in this law is the failure to criminalise the 
harassment of witnesses or provide any form of compensation for injury or loss 
suffered by whistle blowers.
35 Report of a Public Forum held on the 17th January 2001, “KACA RULING: WHAT NEXT?” at page 50-51, A paper presented by 
Erastus Wamugo and John Githongo of Transparency International 
426
Volume IIB    Chapter T H R E E  
REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
	 Lengthy adjudication of corruption cases in court: Although the ACECA 
establishes special magistrates courts to daily hear and expeditiously 
determine corruption cases, this has been made impossible due numerous 
to constitutional petitions filed  by accused persons in the High Court, where 
they obtain orders restraining or staying proceedings in the magistrates 
courts. Ironically, they cite breach of their human rights, yet the majority 
of the victims of corruption are the ones who suffer gross violation of their 
basic human rights due to corruption. The courts ought to weigh public 
interest against individual rights, when determining such applications by 
suspects. 
Conclusion 
271.  Grand corruption and economic crimes have had a profound and far reaching 
effects on the enjoyment of socio-economic rights by especially the poor in 
Kenya. These two interconnected crimes are insidious; they lessen the availability 
and access to the fundamental needs of human life: food, education, health care, 
shelter, etc.  This Chapter of the Commission’s Report has sought to make more 
apparent the huge cost that Kenya is paying through corruption. 
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SELECTED CORRUPT PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS
Corrupt
Practice
Act of Corruption
(UNCAC)
Potential Harm Possible Human
Rights Violation
Officials bribed to 
allow toxic waste to 
be dumped illegally 
in an area planned for 
residential use.
Bribery (UNCAC Article 
15)
Exposure to radio-activity 
which has serious health 
and life consequences.
Right to life (ICCPR, Article 
6).
Right to adequate housing 
(CESCR, Article 11).
Right to health (ICESCR, 
Article 12).
Immigration or police 
officers bribed to allow 
trafficking, sale or 
abduction of children 
as sex workers or other 
forms of exploitation.
Bribery (UNCAC Article 
15)
Sexual exploitation and 
abuse; forced labor; denial 
of liberty and dignity.
Right to be protected 
from trafficking and sexual 
exploitation (CRC, Articles 
34 and 35).
Right to be protected from 
child labor (CRC, Article 
32).
Right to freedom from 
slavery or servitude (ICCPR, 
Article 8).
Plaintiff offers a bride 
to a judge to obtain a 
favorable ruling in a 
lawsuit.
Bribery (UNCAC Article 
15)
Unfair and partial trial; 
denial for the victim of a 
right to effective remedy 
and justice.
Right to a fair trial (ICCPR, 
Article 14).
Right to non-
discrimination (ICCPR, 
Article 2(2)).
Right to equal protection 
of the law (ICCPR, Article 
26).
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Corrupt
Practice
Act of Corruption
(UNCAC)
Potential Harm Possible Human
Rights Violation
Oil company offers bribes 
to public officials to build 
an oil pipeline on a site 
sacred to indigenous 
peoples; a business bribes 
official to seize lands of 
a minority group, or the 
shelter of urban slum 
dwellers.
Bribery (UNCAC Article 
15)
Arbitrary eviction and 
dispossession; denial of 
right to adequate shelter; 
denial of enjoyment of 
family heritage; denial 
of means of subsistence; 
restriction of access to 
natural resources.
Right of self-
determination (ICCPR, 
Article 1 and 47; ICESCR, 
Articles 1 and 25).
Right to privacy, and 
family life (ICCPR, Article 
17).
Right to minority groups 
(ICCPR, Article 27).
Right to adequate 
housing (ICESCR, Article 
11).
Official demands a bribe 
to award state registration 
to religious group.
Bribery (UNCAC Article 15) Potential threat to 
freedom of religion if 
followers are unable to 
gather without state 
permission.
Right to be protected 
from trafficking and 
sexual exploitation (CRC, 
Articles 34 and 35).
Right to be protected 
from child labour (CRC, 
Article 32).
Right to freedom from 
slavery or servitude 
(ICCPR, Article 8).
Bribery of voters and 
rigging of election by 
incumbent officer holders.
Abuse of functions 
(UNCAC Article 18).
Trading in influence 
(UNCAC, Article 19).
Bribery (UNCAC, Article 
15).
Denial of free and true 
participation in political 
and governance process.
Right of political 
participation (ICCPR, 
Article 25).
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Corrupt
Practice
Act of Corruption
(UNCAC)
Potential Harm Possible Human
Rights Violation
Bribery of labor inspector 
by an employer to prevent 
enforcement of labor law.
Bribery (UNCAC Article 
15)
Poor working conditions; 
unreasonable working 
hours; low remuneration; 
unhealthy or unsafe 
conditions of work.
Right to just and favorable 
conditions of work 
(ICESCR, Article 7).
Companies offer illegal 
payment to water 
regulator, to exceed water 
extraction permit.
Bribery (UNCAC Article 
15)
Shortage of water to 
neighboring communities; 
water pollution.
Right to water (ICESCR, 
Articles 11 and 12).
Illegal diversion or sale 
of medicines from public 
clinics to private practice 
by doctors and health 
officers.
Misappropriation 
(UNCAC, Article 17).
Reduction in drug 
availability; poor and 
discriminatory service by 
health officials.
Right to health (ICESCR, 
Article 12).
Right to non-
discrimination (ICCPR, 
Article 2(2)).
Illegal payment to a judge 
or orphanage owner to 
speed up the adoption of 
a child in breach of rules.
Bribery (UNCAC Article 
15)
Loss of identity, family 
lineage, ethnic roots and 
medical history.
Right to best interest 
protection (CRC, Article 3).
Right of the child to 
preserve identity (CRC, 
Article 8).
Right to best interest 
protection in adoptions 
(CRC, Article 21).
Corrupt
Practice
Act of Corruption
(UNCAC)
Potential Harm Possible Human
Rights Violation
Student at primary level 
has to bribe teachers to 
obtain a place at school.
Bribery (UNCAC Article 
15)
Restriction of access to 
education; unfair privilege 
given to certain students.
Right to education 
(ICESCR, Article 13 and 14).
Right to equality and 
non-discrimination 
(ICCPR, Article 2(1) and 26; 
ICESCR, Article 2(2)).
Persons who request 
an official document, 
such as passport, visa or 
identification card, are 
asked for bribes to obtain 
them.
Bribery (UNCAC Article 
15)
Unfair privilege given to 
certain people; restriction 
of access to personal 
official documents; 
restriction in liberty to 
move within and leave a 
country.
Right to equality and 
non-discrimination 
(ICCPR, Article 2(1) and 26; 
ICESCR, Article 2(2)).
Right to liberty of 
movement (ICCPR, Article 
12).
Corrupt police officers 
arrest individuals for 
no reason and without 
warrant and request 
bribes for their release.
Bribery (UNCAC Article 
15)
Arbitrary restriction of 
liberty.
Right to liberty of 
movement (ICCPR, Article 
12).
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Corrupt
Practice
Act of Corruption
(UNCAC)
Potential Harm Possible Human
Rights Violation
A public official obtains 
favourable press from 
a media group in 
exchange for extending 
the cable-television 
license of the group; 
or bribes are given to 
journalists to cover 
up or misrepresent 
information.
Trading in influence 
(UNCAC, Article 19)
Bribery (UNCAC Article 
15)
No fair and free 
information for 
population; no efficient 
and fair competition for 
cable- television license; 
deception of public and 
misinformation.
Right to freedom of 
opinion, expression 
and information (ICCPR, 
Article 19).
Right to equality and 
non-discrimination 
(ICCPR, Article 2(1) and 
26; ICESCR, Article 2(2)).
Hospital patients are 
asked for bribes to be 
treated.
Bribery (UNCAC Article 
15)
Restriction in access to 
health; unfair privilege 
given to certain patients.
Right to health (ICESCR, 
Articles 12).
Right to equality and 
non-discrimination 
(ICCPR, Article 2(1) and 
26; ICESCR, Article 2(2)).
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LIST OF PERSONS ADVERSELY MENTIONED IN GRAND 
CORRUPTION SCANDALS
Name Corruption scandal Year Approximate 
loss in Kshs
Ministry of Finance officials at material time Ken Ren Chemical & Fertilizer 
Co Ltd
1970 4.3 billion
Kamlesh Pattni
Eliphaz Riungu
Lazarus Wanjohi
Wilfred Karuga Koinange
Michael Wanjihia Onesmus
Job Kilachi
Professor George Saitoti
Eric Kotut
Joshua Magari
James Kanyotu
Elijah Arap Bii
Goldenberg International 
Limited
1991 60 billion
Moody Awori
Kiraitu Murungi
Francis Muthaura
David Mwiraria
Chris Murungaru
Dave Mwangi
Joseph Magari
Deepak Kamani
Anura Perera
Dr Amin Juma
Dr Merlvyn Kettering
Mrs Ludmilla Kuschenko
Francis Oyula
Wilson Sitonik
Anglo Leasing Finance Co Ltd 
& others
2004 56.3 billion
Amos Kimunya
Professor Njuguna Ndungu
Kennedy Abuga
Sale of Grand Regency Hotel 9.9 billion
Equip Agencies Limited Supply of malaria control 
drugs to Ministry of Public 
Works and Housing
1996 7.2 billion
Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
Face Technologies of South Africa  
Smith and Ouzman
Mini Mix Agencies
Hopeland Advert
Solarmark Technologies
Africa Infrastructure Development Company
Procurement of electoral 
materials for March 4 2013 
General Election
2007-
2012
15 billion

K E N Y A
